


A Translation and Investigation of
Vidyānandin's Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā



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Summary

This thesis is a translation of the 10th century Jain philosophical Sanskrit text *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*, composed by Vidyānandin. The text, not all of which has survived, presents and refutes 12 Indian philosophical systems, the most important of which are Sautrāntika and Yogācāra Buddhism, Advaita Vedānta, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Cārvāka. Criticizing these from the standpoint of the Jain *anekāntavāda* (theory of manysidedness), Vidyānandin aims to establish the superior status of Jain philosophy.

In addition to providing an English translation of this text from the Sanskrit, with explanatory notes, it also places it in the context of Jain philosophy and investigates the arguments Vidyānandin employs in his refutations of his rivals. The doctrines Vidyānandin ascribes to his rivals are also examined and compared to presentations of their doctrines in secondary literature on Indian philosophy and in some cases to how these doctrines are presented in the original literature of the schools in question. Some issues are highlighted as requiring further research.

The thesis also shows considerable influence from Vidyānandin's predecessors Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka on Vidyānandin's argumentation. The clearest example of this influence is shown on comparing the sections of the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* in which Vidyānandin quotes the Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra (ca 600 CE) with Akalaṅka's (ca 770 CE) commentary to these verses in his *Aṣṭaśatī*.

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1. Introduction

Jainism is but one of many religions and philosophies that evolved in India. Existing in a pluralistic environment necessarily entails finding ways in which to relate to one's rival schools of religion and philosophy. This can of course be done in many different ways. While discussing Jain responses to being in the minority, Phyllis Granoff writes:

“...one consistent Jain response seems to have been that Jains exhibited an eagerness to study and understand the various religious groups around them that was virtually unparalleled in classical and medieval India. Jain monks read and studied every major work of literature, philosophy, poetics, astrology – indeed every major contribution to knowledge written both by their co-religionists and by those outside their faith. It is an irony of history that one of our best sources on early medieval Buddhist philosophy is the Jain refutations that are contained in the works of philosophers like Mallavādin and Haribhadra. Many medieval Jain philosophical texts are veritable encyclopedias of philosophy, and modern scholars have yet to mine them for the rich information that they can give us about medieval Indian philosophy and religion. In many cases they contain information about religious schools and philosophical doctrines that is not preserved elsewhere” (Granoff 1994: 242).

Introducing his translation of parts of Vidyānandin's critique of Buddhist philosophy in the *Aṣṭasahasrī*, Jayandra Soni states about Vidyānandin: “Although this ninth-century Digambara scholiast is recognized as an excellent and independent thinker in the Jaina tradition, not much work has been done on him and his writings” (Soni 2009: 449).

The purpose of this thesis is to make a small contribution to the understanding of Vidyānandin and his works, the use of the *anekāntavāda* in Jain philosophy and polemics and to the understanding of the philosophy of the Jains' rival schools, by translating Vidyānandin's *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* (ŚŚP), assumed by Soni (1999: 162) to be Vidyānandin's fifth independent work, into English. The English translation, accompanied by explanatory notes, is then used as a basis for investigating Vidyānandin's arguments, his presentations of his rival schools and highlighting some areas which require further study.

The present chapter presents the *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* and briefly places it in the context of the Jain philosophical tradition. Selected aspects of Jain philosophy, which help place the ŚŚP within the larger Jain tradition, will be discussed in Chapter 2. The present chapter further presents the work done by others on the text, explaining the role of this thesis in relation to these previous contributions and the way in which these have been utilized to aid the translation and investigation of this difficult and technical text. Lastly, it also discusses some methodological issues regarding translation of Sanskrit texts in general, Sanskrit texts dealing with philosophy and logic in particular and how these have been dealt with in the present translation of the *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā*.

In Chapter 2, the concepts of *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge) and the *anekāntavāda*, both essential for the understanding of the *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā*, are explained. Chapter 3 deals with the main topics discussed in the various chapters of the

SŚP. It also examines the doctrines Vidyānandin ascribes to his rivals and how these relate to other available evidence concerning the doctrines of the schools in question, while Chapter 4 further investigates and discusses the influence on Vidyānandin by his predecessors Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka through comparing a selection of the paragraphs in which Vidyānandin quotes verses from the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra with Akalaṅka's commentaries to these verses in his *Aṣṭaśatī* (a commentary on the *Āptamīmāṃsā*).

The *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*

Not much is known about Vidyānandin, the author of the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*. The only thing that is known for sure is that he was a Digambara monk. Paṇḍit Koṭhiyā, in his preface to the critical edition of Vidyānandin's *Āptaparīkṣā*, postulates that Vidyānandin was born in a Brahmin family in or near Mysore and that his dates are AD 775-840. These postulations are, according to Jayandra Soni, based on an analysis of "the internal and external evidences in Vidyānandin's work" (Soni 1999: 145). According to Dhaky (1996: 25), one of the main arguments employed by Koṭhiyā for setting this date is that Vidyānandin does not refute the famous mid-ninth century philosopher Vācaspati Miśra. His argument is thus that Vidyānandin must predate Vācaspati Miśra. But, as Dhaky points out, Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmati* is indeed quoted in the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* (2, 13-16), in addition to Miśra being referred to by Vidyānandin elsewhere as well. It is thus clear that Koṭhiyā's pre-Miśra date for Vidyānandin cannot be correct. On account of inscriptional evidence, Dhaky sets Vidyānandin's date to between 900 and 950 AD (Dhaky 1996: 25-27)¹. Dhaky's dating seems clearly preferable, and is also adopted by Malvania and Soni (2007: 542).

The *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* is a short Sanskrit philosophical and polemical text, making up 47 pages in Devanāgarī print and comprising eight chapters in which Vidyānandin presents and refutes 12 Indian philosophical schools. The following schools are dealt with: Puruṣādvaita (Advaitavedānta), Śabdādvaita, Vijñānādvaita (Yogācāra Buddhism), Citrādvaita, Cārvāka (materialistic² philosophy), Bauddha (Sautrāntika Buddhism), theistic and atheistic Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. In addition to these schools Vidyānandin also, in his introduction, states that he will discuss the Tattvopaplavavāda and the Anekāntavāda (here used in the sense of the Jain teaching as a whole). These chapters are however lost as the text breaks off in the

¹ Due to limitations of space, all of Dhaky's arguments cannot be recreated here. For details see Dhaky (1996). For a thorough discussion on all the available data on Vidyānandin see Trikha (2009:100-108).

² Cārvāka here refers only to the materialistic branch of the Cārvāka, much like Bauddha (Buddhist) only refers to the Sautrāntika school of Buddhist philosophy. The skeptical Cārvāka was to be investigated in a separate chapter under the name Tattvopaplavavāda. Sadly this chapter has been lost. Cf. footnote 140.

middle of the Mīmāṃsā chapter. Thus the intended number of schools to be discussed was 14. The reason for the discrepancy of the number of schools and number of chapters is that the Śabdādvaita and Citrādvaita are considered to be refuted by the same arguments as those refuting the Puruṣādvaita and Vijñānādvaita respectively, and thus have not been treated in separate chapters.³ Also, the two variants of Sāṃkhya (theistic and atheistic) and Mīmāṃsā (Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara) are both treated in one chapter each.

In his introduction, Vidyānandin states that only that which is not contradicted by the *pramāṇas* (valid means of knowledge), such as perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), is known as the truthfulness (*satyatva*) of the teaching.⁴ Vidyānandin then systematically investigates the other doctrines, showing that they are one-sided (*ekānta*) and contradicted by perception and inference and therefore not truthful.

The intended structure of the text was thus that the rival schools are investigated first and shown to be contradicted by perception and inference. This is on account of their one-sided (*ekānta*) views (cf. Chapter 2). Having shown this Vidyānandin would then investigate the Jain doctrine (here referred to as the Anekāntavāda), showing that it is not contradicted by perception and inference as it is not one-sided (*ekānta*). On the contrary, the Jain doctrine is held to be a *sui generis*⁵ synthesis of the one-sided viewpoints held by the other schools (cf. once again Chapter 2). Thus the Jain doctrine avoids the faults that haunt all the other doctrines and it alone meets the criteria of truth which Vidyānandin set forth in his introduction.

As the text is incomplete this structure is somewhat disrupted due to the conclusion, i.e. the chapter showing that the Jain Anekāntavāda is not contradicted by perception and inference and thus is the “true teaching” (*stayaśāsana*), being lost. The text as it exists today is thus only a refutation of 12 rival philosophical schools on the basis of their one-sided doctrines being contradicted by perception and inference. Two monistic schools, Puruṣādvaita and Vijñānādvaita, are refuted first, then the “pluralistic” or “realistic” schools, starting with the Cārvāka, are refuted.

Each chapter of the text is further divided into a *pūrvapakṣa* and an *uttarapakṣa*. The *pūrvapakṣa* presents the opponents doctrines and arguments. In the SŚP it focuses on ontological issues and the means to salvation. It is unclear why the last point gets the

³ The superficial treatments of the Śabdādvaita and Citrādvaita form part of the Puruṣādvaita and Vijñānādvaita chapters respectively. This is clear by the verses concluding the Puruṣādvaita and Vijñānādvaita appearing after the Śabdādvaita and Citrādvaita refutations respectively.

⁴ *idam eva hi satyaśāsanasya satyatvaṃ nāma yad dṛṣṭeṣṭāvīruddham* | (SŚP 1, 14-15)

⁵ *Sui generis* is here used as a translation of the Sanskrit term *jātyantara* (“another class/species”; for its use cf. SŚP 27, 3). The Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary (1979), defines *sui generis* as “of his, her or its own kind; singular; unique; *in a class by itself*” (italics added). The idea it expresses here is that the Jain *anekānta* (non-one-sided) view is not a mere “mechanical” combination of two *ekānta* (one-sided) views, which would make it susceptible to the faults of both these positions, but that it is a synthesis of the two, making up something altogether different. Thus, it is argued, it transcends the faults raised against the *ekānta* views.

amount of attention that it gets, as these issues are not discussed by Vidyānandin in the *uttarapakṣas*.⁶ Vidyānandin may have attempted to show that only the Jain path to liberation is possible in the chapter on the Anekāntavāda, but as this chapter is lost this is not known. The *uttarapakṣa* is Vidyānandin's refutation, focusing mainly on ontological issues.

The *uttarapakṣa* is made up of three parts. In the first part Vidyānandin shows that the doctrines of the school in question are contradicted by perception (*pratyakṣaviruddha* or *dṛṣṭaviruddha*), while the second part shows that they are contradicted by inference (*anumānaviruddha* or *iṣṭaviruddha*) as well. The third, concluding part, states that the scriptural tradition (*āgama*) of the school in question is thus not trustworthy and concludes the chapter with verses which declare the insufficiency of the school in question, affirming that they do not refute the Syādvāda (here used in the sense of the Jain doctrine as a whole).⁷

The the SŚP's treatment of the various schools can be classified into three categories according to length. The first group has a length of approximately ten pages in Devanāgarī print in Gokulchandra Jain's edition⁸, the second has a length of approximately four pages in Devanāgarī print, while the third group are merely mentioned at the end of a chapter dealing with another school and considered to be refuted by the same arguments as those used against the school the chapter they appear in is devoted to refuting. The members of the first of these groups are the Puruṣādvaita, the Bauddha and the Vaiśeṣika. The second group is made up of the Cārvāka, Sāṃkhya and Vijñānādvaita, while the third group is made up of the Citrādvaita, Śabdādvaita and, though with some reservations, the Nyāya. As the Mīmāṃsā chapter is incomplete, it is not known how long the chapter devoted to their refutation originally was, or was intended to be. What today remains of the chapter makes up almost four pages in Devanāgarī print, and stops before the *pratyakṣaviruddha* part of the chapter is complete.

If it can be assumed that the Mīmāṃsā, Tattvopaplava and Anekānta chapters would conform to this threefold classification, it is not certain whether the Mīmāṃsā chapter was intended to be approximately four or ten pages long, though it seems most probable that it was intended to be ten pages long as the *pratyakṣaviruddha* section is not

⁶ The closest thing to an exception to this is found in the Vaiśeṣika chapter, where, in the discussion centering around the existence of a creator God, Vidyānandin claims that God cannot have knowledge, desire and active effort as the liberated soul, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, does not have these qualities (SŚP 40, 6-20). Even this does not directly concern the means to salvation, which according to the Vaiśeṣikas is thorough knowledge of the categories, but is rather concerned with the ontology of the liberated soul as described in the *pūrvapakṣa*.

⁷ While all the chapters, except for the incomplete Mīmāṃsā chapter, are concluded by such verses, not all contain the paragraph declaring the scriptures of the school not to be a valid means of knowledge. The Bauddha (§47), Sāṃkhya (§19) and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (§8 Nyāya chapter) chapters have such a paragraph, while the Puruṣādvaita, Vijñānādvaita and Cārvāka chapters do not.

⁸ When composed the SŚP was of course not written in a format comparable to the pages in Jain's printed edition of the SŚP, and the use of this measure is used simply for the sake of convenience.

yet finished by the end of page four. On the other hand, the *anumānaviruddha* section of the Sāṃkhya chapter only counts two paragraphs (SŚP 33, 3-12 §§17-18), and it is thus also possible that the Mīmāṃsā *anumānaviruddha* section too was brief, making the chapter only four pages long.

The length devoted to these systems speaks of their relative importance as perceived by Vidyānandin, though with some caution. It is tempting to conclude that the systems to which ten pages are devoted are considered the most important or dangerous adversaries, while those which are merely mentioned as an appendix to a chapter dealing with another system are the least important. This may very well be the case, with two notable reservations.

The brief treatment of the Nyāya does not signalize its lack of importance, but rather that the SŚP was written at a time when the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools had almost completed their merger.⁹ It should also be mentioned that unlike the Citrādvaita and Śabdādvaita, the section dealing with the Nyāya has a *pūrvapakṣa*. The treatment of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya should thus rather be seen as constituting a single whole, making the treatment of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the longest chapter with its 11, 5 pages in Devanāgarī print.

The second reservation concerns the treatment of the Vijñānādvaita. Though the Vijñānādvaita are only awarded four pages, their treatment should rather be seen as part of the treatment of Buddhist philosophy as a whole, which also includes the ten pages devoted to the treatment of Sautrāntika (Bauddha) philosophy. Seen thus, the largest amount of space is dedicated to Buddhist philosophy. Possible reasons for this are discussed below.

The brief treatment of the Citrādvaita and Śabdādvaita seems to indicate their subordinate importance, in the eyes of Vidyānandin, as compared to the other schools. The treatment of the Cārvāka and Sāṃkhya, both making up four pages, also seems to signify their lower importance. The refutation of Cārvāka materialist views seems mostly included in works such as the SŚP by convention, as there is nothing to indicate that the Cārvāka was a functioning and active school at the time of Vidyānandin (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 52-3). Larson suggests that the Sāṃkhya lost much of its importance some time after Śaṅkara (788-820), who vigorously debated against them, and that by the time of Alberuni (eleventh century), one only finds occasional summaries of the Sāṃkhya views in the texts of other philosophical traditions (1969: 192-4). Though the Sāṃkhya later experienced a revival, mostly in the hands of Vedānta philosophers, its relatively brief treatment in the SŚP suggests that much of its force had already been lost by the time of Vidyānandin.

⁹ Cf. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika section of Chapter 3.

Previous treatment of the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*

Not much work has previously been done on the *Satyaśānanaparīkṣā*. It first became known and available around 1920 (Soni 1999: 162). A critical edition with a Hindi preface, and an English introduction by Nathmal Tatia, was published by Gokulcandra Jain in 1964. It is on this edition that the present thesis is based. As I do not read Hindi, I have not been able to utilize Jain's preface to his edition of the *SŚP*. Trikha (cf. below) and Jain's footnotes throughout the text, however, make clear that Jain's edition is based on three manuscripts, a Devanāgarī manuscript from Bihar (labeled "Ka") and two Kannada manuscripts from Karnatiaka (labeled "Ga" and "Gha"). Manuscript "Ga" breaks off in the Vaiśeṣika chapter, while manuscripts "Ka" and "Kha" break off in the Mīmāṃsā chapter. There is also supposedly a fourth manuscript from Mumbai, but also this is said to be incomplete (Trikha 2009: 97)

A transliterated version of the Sanskrit text of the Vijñānādvaita chapter of the *SŚP* was published by Jayandra Soni in 2003.¹⁰ Parts of Vidyānandin's introduction to the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* and the parts of the *Vaiśeṣikaśāsanaparīkṣā* ("Investigation into the Vaiśeṣika teaching) dealing with inherence (*samavāya*) have been translated into German¹¹ by Himal Trikha in his PhD dissertation "Schluss mit ungültigen Perspektiven! Polemik gegen das Vaiśeṣika in der *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* des Digambara Vidyānandin vor der Hintergrund des kritischen Perspektivismus der Jainas". His translation and analysis has been consulted as far as my very limited knowledge of German has allowed.

With the exception of the thorough study of Himal Trikha of the arguments against the Vaiśeṣika concept of *samavāya*, the previous treatment of the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* has been rather superficial. Tatia's treatment of the various chapters of the *SŚP*, in his introduction to Jain's 1964 edition of the text, is for the most part, with the exception of the sections dealing with Puruṣādvaita or Advaita Vedānta chapter and the Vijñānādvaita, very brief and superficial, though it does identify many of the main arguments raised by Vidyānandin throughout the *SŚP*. In the sections dealing with the Puruṣādvaita and Vijñānādvaita, however, several parts, especially in the section dealing with the Vijñānādvaita chapter, are directly copied from Tatia's own "Studies in Jaina Philosophy" (SJP)¹², which was published 13 years before the publication of

¹⁰ In Olle Qvarnström (ed.) 2003, "Jainism and early Buddhism, essays in honor of Padmanabh S. Jaini", Asian Humanities Press, Fremont California.

¹¹ The relevant portions translated by Trikha are *SŚP* 1, 4-19 and *SŚP* 34, 3-39, 17.

¹² 1951, Jain Cultural Research Society, Benares.

Gokulchandra Jain's edition of the SŚP. Due to limitations of space, the sections in question cannot be quoted here.¹³

Though Tatia's references are quite scarce, the few references given in the SJP to the copied portions make it clear that they are based on a study of Vidyānandin's *Aṣṭasahasrī*, a commentary to Akalaṅka's *Aṣṭasatī* (which is in turn a commentary on Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*). Even though the portions copied from the SJP for the most part accurately describe the main issues dealt with in the parts of the SŚP they are to explain, many details and arguments discussed by Tatia are not found in the SŚP. Tatia even quotes the *Aṣṭasahasrī* instead of the SŚP as a reference to one of the points he makes in his introduction (Tatia 1964: 32, footnote 5). Due to limitations of time and space, an investigation of the *Aṣṭasahasrī* has not been possible.

Nevertheless, though this is not pointed out by Tatia in his introduction, it is clear that there must be considerable similarities between the *Aṣṭasahasrī* and the SŚP. This is not only illustrated by Tatia's introduction and its copying from his SJP, but also by Jayandra Soni's (2009:452-6) transliteration and translation of Vidyānandin's critique of Buddhist philosophy in *Aṣṭasahasrī* 182/ 10 and 183/6-8, the first of which makes a similar argument as that made in SŚP 26, 12-13, while the wording of the latter is almost identical to that of SŚP 26, 24-30. Jain also points to similarities between the SŚP and the *Aṣṭasahasrī*.¹⁴ Similarities between the SŚP and Vidyānandin's *Āptaparīkṣā* are also pointed out by Jain.¹⁵ It is thus clear that a thorough investigation and comparison of the SŚP, the *Aṣṭasahasrī* and the other works of Vidyānandin is needed.

This is unfortunately, due to restrictions of space and time, not possible in the present thesis, which has slightly more limited ambitions. Its principal aim is to translate the SŚP, on the basis of Jain's 1964 edition, into English, and to highlight some of the issues which require further study. As noted above, Vidyānandin, though being regarded as an important Jain philosopher, has received relatively little scholarly attention. Moreover, very little of his work has been translated into western languages. The translation of the SŚP into English aims at rectifying this situation, hopefully inspiring more research on Vidyānandin and his fellow Jain philosophers.

¹³ The copied sections in are, the following explanation, designated by page number and line number (the designation "p 13, 31-33" thus referring to page 13 lines 31-33), both in Tatia's introduction and in his SJP. In his section on the Puruṣādvaita, under the heading "Vedāntic Monism", in his 1964 introduction, p 13, 31-33 corresponds to p 171, 14-17 of the SJP and p 15, 18-31 (introduction) corresponds to pp 184, 29-185, 1 of the SJP. Almost the entire section dealing with the Viṣṇūnādvaita chapter is taken directly from the SJP. Pp 32, 12-35, 12 (introduction) correspond to pp 208, 36-211, 39 of the SJP, with the exception of the sentence in p 32, 18-19 (introduction), which does not appear in the SJP. Tatia gives no references to the SJP in his introduction. It is possible that an even closer reading and comparison of the SJP and Tatia's 1964 introduction could reveal even more such examples, but these will here suffice to illustrate the point.

¹⁴ Cf. footnotes 359, 448 and 470.

¹⁵ Cf. footnotes 325 and 330.

The *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* as part of the Jain philosophical and polemical tradition

When talking about the "intra-jain" context into which the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* fits, two separate aspects must be recognized. On the one hand, it is a philosophical text, and as such must be seen as part of a continuum or evolution of Jain philosophy stretching from the oldest strata of āgamic Jain literature, through the *Tattvārthasūtra* etc. and lastly to the texts of the logical period of Jain philosophy of which the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* is a part.

On the other hand, it is part of what might be called the tradition of Jain dealings with other views. The Jains have always had an interest in the views of others, both external (i.e. non-jain) and internal. Regarding disputes internal to Jainism, both Śvetāmbara-Digāmbara debates and polemical texts and intra-Śvetāmbara and intra-Digāmbara debates and texts, both between different groups or orders within these larger designations and within such groups or orders, are found (Balbir 1999: 2)¹⁶. Regarding engagement with non-Jain views, this interest has taken several different forms. Purely descriptive works, doxographical compendia or *Sarvadarśanasamgrahas*,¹⁷ and works of a rather vague polemical character, such as works related to the 363 account¹⁸, are found. There are also texts or portions of the canonical texts which are polemical in a less vague way, but whose criticism is mostly of an ethical character.¹⁹ Lastly, more purely polemical philosophical or logical texts, with clearly identifiable opponents, like the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* and its predecessors, such as the *Āptamīmāṃsā* etc., are also found (Balbir 1999: 1).

The texts dealing with other views, and especially the polemical texts, must also be considered with regard to Jain participation in public debates. The Jain emphasis on learning and understanding the doctrines of their rivals made them vigorous adversaries in such debates, and many biographies and stories tell of debates and the victory of Jain monks over their opponents (Granoff 1994: 242).²⁰ The *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*, as many other Jain philosophical texts, is structured as a debate, with objections raised on behalf of the opponents. In addition to the descriptions of debates in biographies and stories, polemical texts such as the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* illustrate the importance of such debates and show that the Jain attitude to rival religions and philosophies was not one of seclusion but rather of active engagement with respect to issues with which they were

¹⁶ For more on this see Balbir (1999).

¹⁷ For examples of such works see Folkert (1993), where four such works, the *Sarvasiddhāntapraveśaka*; Rājaśekhara's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*; Merutuṅga's *Ṣaḍdarśananirṇaya*; and parts of Jinadatta's *Vivekavilāsa* are translated.

¹⁸ For an excellent and thorough treatment of the 363-account see Folkert (1993).

¹⁹ See for example the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. This treatment of others is prevalent throughout most of the early āgamic literature (5th century BC to 1st century AD), where the opponents are seldom identifiable and criticism tends to center around ethical issues (Dixit 1971: 40, 88).

²⁰ See also Granoff (1985).

concerned. This attitude is discernable even in the canonical texts, which tell of debates in which Mahāvīra defeats non-Jain opponents (ibid: 242, 257).

Texts such as the SŚP clearly show that the Jains not only have a clear identity as something separate and clearly discernable from the other religions and philosophical schools on the Indian sub-continent, but also that these rival philosophies and doctrines, and perhaps especially the philosophy of the Buddhists, were feared and thus had to be countered. The arguments advanced against the other philosophies in texts such as the SŚP were not only meant as tools in debates against adherents of these rival views, but would naturally also function as assurances to Jains that their religion and philosophy is indeed the true one. They thus have both an external and an internal function, and are directed towards Jains and non-Jains alike, albeit for different purposes.

That the Buddhists are felt as a particularly pressing threat is suggested by the relative amount of space dedicated to refuting Buddhist philosophy in the SŚP and other Jain philosophical texts.²¹ It is also discernable from Jain narrative literature (Granoff 1994: 258-9), and has several reasons. Firstly, Jains and Buddhists have been closely linked by their common Hindu opponents throughout the classical and medieval period. This is perhaps not so surprising as, from the perspective of the brahmanic systems, the Jains and Buddhists had a lot in common, rejecting the primacy of Sanskrit and the authority of the Veda, to name only a few of these similarities. This Hindu conflation of Jain and Buddhist doctrine was so strong that in late medieval times, when Buddhism had virtually disappeared from India, Jains are referred to as Bauddhas (Buddhists) in Hindu texts such as the *Vallabhadigvijaya* (Granoff 1994: 258).²²

Another reason seems to be the feared attractiveness of Buddhist doctrine and philosophy. Many Jain stories tell of Jain devotees, both monks and lay people, who are led astray by Buddhists. While many of these claim that Jain monks convert to Buddhism because of the delicious food in their monasteries, thus also criticizing the lack of asceticism in Buddhist practice which might be attractive to many people, there are also Jain stories which make clear the perceived attractiveness of the Buddhists doctrines, especially to educated philosophers. Such stories, and the depth of study devoted by Jain philosophers to Buddhist logic evident in texts such as the SŚP, show the fear and respect held by the Jains towards the doctrines of their Buddhist rivals (Granoff 1994: 259-60).

A full understanding of the place of the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* within the larger Jain tradition, and within the larger Jain literature, must thus take both these aspects into

²¹ The renowned Jain philosopher Akalaṅka, Vidyānandin's predecessor, dedicated much of his work to refuting Buddhist doctrines. For an excellent investigation of Akalaṅka's arguments against Dharmakīrti see Shah (1968).

²² Such a conflation, or at least subordination of the Jains to the Buddhists, was also prevalent in 19th century western Indology until Hermann Jacobi established the separate identity and history of Jainism (Folkert 1993: 27).

consideration. These are of course not really separate, as Jain philosophy did not evolve in a vacuum. It has always had to take other views and philosophies into consideration. Evolving within the larger Indian philosophical milieu, Jain theoreticians have always compared and contrasted their doctrines with those of rival systems. As the Jain āgamic texts were highly technical and made use of a technical vocabulary that was not easily translatable into that which was used by other Indian systems. This task was not easy. The composition of the *Tattvārthasūtra*, written in Sanskrit instead of the Prakrits used in the earlier āgamic literature, was an important step towards amending this situation. The real breakthrough, however, came with Samantabhadra (ca 600)²³, making use of the *anekāntavāda* in evaluating the doctrines of rival systems. His approach was later further developed by Akalaṅka (ca 770)²⁴, who was again followed by Vidyānandin (Dixit 1971: 148-9), with whom, according to Dixit, this approach culminated (ibid: 10-11, 154-5). In the words of Dixit:

“With Vidyānanda comes to an end the second stage of Logic... Vidyānanda was not only the last representative of the stage in question he was also its most learned representative. Certainly, it is in his writings that this memorable period in the history of Indian philosophy stands reflected in an adequate manner. Those who came before him made way for him and in this sense they did what nobody else did, but it was he who really proved equal to the task of the hour” (Dixit 1971: 154-5).

In the following chapter, selected aspects of Jain philosophy and their evolution, more precisely the doctrines of *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *syādvāda*, are presented, thus showing the backdrop against which the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* was composed. It was on the work of his predecessors that Vidyānandin built his texts, adding considerably to their efforts with his ingenuity. Before doing this, however, some theoretical and methodological issues regarding the work on the translation of the SŚP are discussed.

Methodological issues

“Textual criticism is not something to be learned by reading as much as possible about it. Once the basic principles have been apprehended, what is needed is observation and practice, not research into the further ramifications of theory” (West 1973: 5).

Just as one cannot become a proficient soccer player by reading a book on how to play the game, so making a translated edition of a sizable and difficult Sanskrit text is to a large degree learned by practice. When setting out to translate a Sanskrit text, and especially a text on philosophy and logic such as the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* which abounds in technical vocabulary and intricate arguments, there are many issues to consider. The matter is far more complicated than simply translating the words and sentences making

²³ This date is adopted from Malvania and Soni (2007).

²⁴ This date is adopted from Malvania and Soni (2007).

up the text at hand. There are many ways to approach a text, and many decisions to be made concerning how to deal with the source material and regarding the form and character of the intended product. It is not possible to discuss all these issues here, but the most important issues for the present work shall be discussed below. As this has been a learning process, the ways in which these issues have been dealt with have undergone change throughout the work on this thesis. Though I have tried as best I can to root out all inconsistencies, some are bound to have escaped me.

Choosing to translate the whole of the SŚP instead of selected portions of it, as Himāl Trikha has done in his PhD dissertation mentioned above, has considerably influenced the nature of this thesis. Seeing as the amount of source material has been large and the MA thesis is to be written in one year, it has not been possible to conduct a study as thorough as the one made by Trikha. The focus of the present work has therefore been on translating and understanding the text, and not on tracing its sources or comparing its content with other works, though this too has, to some extent, been done.

Translation

It is often said that a translation is never merely a translation, but always involves interpretation as well. This may be a cliché, but it is still worth pointing out, for in addition to emphasizing the fact that there is no such thing as a completely “objective translation”, it also draws attention to the often taken for granted point that one must understand the text one translates, and that one’s understanding of it is reflected in the translation. This takes us to the heart of the matter, for understanding a complicated and specialized work such as the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* is no easy task. Though I have done my very best to understand the often intricate arguments of the SŚP, with the generous and invaluable help of Professor Nagin Shah and Dr. Srinivasan and by reading secondary literature on Indian philosophy and to some extent the primary literature of the philosophical systems the SŚP deals with, there are still passages and points which I do not fully understand. Where this is the case, my uncertainty has been indicated in the footnotes. Where I have felt that I do understand the arguments employed, or at least their main aspects, footnotes containing explanations of these arguments and their relation to the doctrines of the philosophical system in question or arguments elsewhere have been added.

It is a basic problem concerning translations that one on the one hand has to take Sanskrit syntax and modes of expression into consideration, while at the same time attempting to make the meaning of the text, or rather what one understands the meaning of the text to be, as clear as possible. Any translation must find a balance between the two. This issue is an especially pressing one in the case of translating highly technical

literature such as texts dealing with philosophy and logic where arguments are often concisely expressed, presupposing a familiarity with the issues being discussed.

Put simply, the question is one of how literal the translation should be. I will illustrate this with one sentence from the SŚP: *nanu naiṣa doṣaḥ, paramāṇupratyakṣasya tallakṣaṇasambhavād iti cet* (SŚP 21, 25). A literal translation of this sentence would be: “If it is objected: ‘Certainly this is not a fault, because the definition of that is applicable to the sensory perception of atoms’”. This results in a quite minimalistic English sentence which leaves much of the meaning unexpressed. One could then either supply the additional information in a footnote, or simply assume that the reader understands the intended meaning. The sentence could be more freely translated as: “If it is objected: Certainly there is no fault of inapplicability with respect to our definition of sensory perception, because our definition of perception is applicable to the sensory perception of atoms”. Here the meaning of the sentence, as understood by the translator, is made explicit, not distinguishing between what the Sanskrit text explicitly says and what it leaves unexpressed. In the present translation, a middle position between these two has been adopted, translating the sentence as: “If it is objected: Certainly there is no fault [of inapplicability] [with respect to our definition of sensory perception], because [our] definition of that [perception] is applicable to the sensory perception of atoms”. The parts of the translation which are not explicitly expressed by the Sanskrit text have here been bracketed using square brackets, thus clearly distinguishing between that which is explicitly stated and the added interpretations of the translator. Where the Sanskrit text omits a word or phrase that has been used previously in the same sentence, this is supplied using rounded brackets.

Another issue is to what extent one should try to represent Sanskrit syntax in the English translation. The problem can be fittingly illustrated by the example of an especially prominent grammatical feature of Sanskrit philosophical literature as a genre, the subjective genitive, found both with and without abstract nouns and often paired with the ablative.²⁵ A translation of the sentence: *vedyavedakalakṣaṇasya paraparikalpitasya vyabhicāritvāt* | (SŚP 11, 5-6) following the Sanskrit syntax would be “Because there is erroneousness of the characteristics of cognized and cognizer posulated by the opponents”. This is not very good English and makes the reading tedious. Therefore, the translation “Because the defining characteristics of the cognized and cognizer postulated by the opponents are erroneous” has been chosen, making the logical subject in the Sanskrit sentence the grammatical subject in the English sentence. While this is the approach chosen for short and relatively straight forward sentences such as this, a more

²⁵ Cf. Tubb and Boose (2007: 179) on the subjective genitive with abstract nouns. Cf. Speijer (2006: 85) for subjective genitive of the agent in passive constructions.

Sanskrit-like syntax has, however, been retained in more complicated sentences. For an illustrative example of this cf. §9 of the Vaiśeṣika chapter. The main priority when working on the present translation has been to render the Sanskrit text and its meaning as faithfully as possible.

Another, closely related issue is how to translate technical terminology. There are, broadly speaking, two ways in which this has been done in works dealing with Indian philosophy and logic. One is to use terms from the Western tradition of philosophy and logic, the other is to use what Alex Wayman (1999: xvi) calls “ordinary words”. Wayman argues²⁶: “A reader should not ask a translator for the meanings of the Western terms, since the latter probably uses them because someone else used them. Ordinarily one must be a specialist in Western philosophy to know those selected terms in their classical senses” (Wayman 1999: xiv). He goes on to illustrate the potentially misleading effects of such translations through the example of the word *sāmānya*. This word, Wayman argues, is usually translated by the term “universal”, regardless of the context, and this can be misleading. For while the term *sāmānya*, in Buddhist logic, most often refers to *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, it may some times also refer to *sāmānyagocara* (ibid: xv). Matilal likewise argues for a literal translation of the terms *vikalpa* and *kalpanā* as “imagination”, thus rendering *nirvikalpapratyakṣa* as “perception without imagination” and *savikalpapratyakṣa* as “perception with imagination”, stating that this would be less misleading than the various other translations found in modern writings on Indian philosophy (1986: 312-13). In the end, “for the sake of perspicuity in English” (ibid: 313), he ends up translating them as “conception-free” and “conception-loaded” respectively, avoiding the terms “indeterminate” and “determinate”, which are Western philosophical terms often used to translate these Sanskrit words.

In the present translation neither one of these approaches have been exclusively adopted. In some cases, words from the Western philosophical tradition are used, in others “ordinary words” are employed. Thus, for example, the terms *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa* are translated as “determinate” and “indeterminate” and *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are translated as “universal” and “particular”, in both cases using words from Western philosophy. The terms *hetu* and *sādhya* are, on the other hand, translated as “premise” and “that which is to be proved” respectively, avoiding the terms “probans” or “middle term”, which are often used to translate *hetu*, and “probandum” or “major term”, often used to translate *sādhya*.

The main criterion when choosing a translation for terms such as these has been that the translation be as easily understandable as possible. Thus, when translating terms such as *hetu* and *sādhya* it has been deemed best to render them as “premise” and “that which

²⁶ For Wayman’s full discussion of this see Wayman 1999: xiii-xxi.

is to be proved”, as these terms will be readily understandable for most readers, unlike the terms “probans” and “probandum”. However, when translating the terms *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, I have rather chosen to follow convention and render them as “universal” and “particular”. The reason for this is that while translating *hetu* as “premise” it becomes generally understandable, translating *sāmānya* as, say, “generality” as Wayman (1999: xvi) suggests, still requires some explanation or more specific background knowledge on behalf of the reader in order to fully understand what is meant. In such cases I have opted for using terms that are often used to translate such terms and which the reader is therefore more likely to be familiar with.

In some cases, such as with the words *dharma*, *karma*, *pradhāna* and, in some cases, *tattva*, I have chosen to retain the Sanskrit words instead of finding English translations for them. In the case of *dharma* and *karma*, this is mainly because they are so well known and much used. They are both words that have multiple connotations and thus it has been deemed better to leave them untranslated than to adopt translations that inevitably exclude some of these connotations.

In the case of *tattva* and *pradhāna*, this solution has been adopted both because they are well established technical terms in secondary literature on Indian philosophy, and because no translation seems quite satisfactory. In the case of *tattva*, for example, various dictionaries propose various translations such as “category”, “truth”, “the essence of things”, “reality”, “principle”, “that-ness”, “element”, “type of reality”, “level of existence” and “true principle”.²⁷ None of these seem quite satisfactory, and the word *tattva* has therefore been retained as a technical term when used as a noun. On the other hand, *tattva* is also used as an adjective, such as in the compounded phrase *tattvajñāna* which has been translated as “thorough knowledge” (SŚP 34, 6) or “true knowledge” (SŚP 12, 27), depending on the context.

Jain’s edition of the SŚP

In addition to general issues of translation, how to deal with the available edition or source material is also an issue. The transliterated Sanskrit text supplied with the English translation in the appendix in general follows Jain’s version of the SŚP. Jain’s organization of the text into paragraphs has been retained, and so has his marking of quotes from other works with bold print and his insertions of commas and semicolons. In general, the transliteration is a faithful representation of the Sanskrit text as printed in Jain’s edition, except that the transliteration does not indicate the editors inconsistent use of *avagraha* (otherwise indicated by ‘) in the case of vowel-coalescence resulting in an *ā*. Where the commas and semicolons have been moved or removed, this has been noted in

²⁷ Grimes (1996) and Monier-Williams (2005).

a footnote. The few cases in which several paragraphs have been joined together or the paragraphs have been reorganized, this is recorded in the reference to Jain's edition or in footnotes.

Jain has added two sets of footnotes to the Sanskrit text. One, using Arabic numbers, records the variant reading of the manuscripts, the other, using Devanāgarī numbers, are Jain's comments on words or phrases in the Sanskrit text and occasionally also quotes from other texts. All of Jain's notes belonging to the second category have been included in the transliterated version. The content of the first set of notes, however, has not been included, except where these readings are of interest.

Amendations

In some places it has, however, been deemed necessary to amend the Sanskrit text. Where the reading of the printed edition does not make sense, whether on account of grammar or syntax being wrong, the spelling being incorrect or simply because the argument expressed does not fit the point the text is making, the alternate readings recorded by the editor have been consulted. When there are no alternate readings or the recorded readings are not helpful, amendations have been made based simply on making the sentence or argument make sense. The amendations are always noted in a footnote, where the reading of the printed edition is given. In the cases where the editor has recorded relevant alternate readings, these are also included. Thus the reader can easily identify the words and phrases that have been changed or omitted and himself, or herself, judge whether the amendation is justified.

An example of such an amendation is: *saṃvidāṃ kṣāṇikatvenānanyavedyatvena nānāsaṃtānatvena nityatvena ca sarvavedyatvenaikatvena paramabrahmaṇā jñānavādinā iva svasaṃvedanābhāvāt* (SŚP 12, 6-7), which has been amended to *saṃvidāṃ kṣāṇikatvenānanyavedyatvena nānāsaṃtānatvena ca nityatvena sarvavedyatvenaikatvena paramabrahmaṇa iva svasaṃvedanābhāvāt*. Here the editor has recorded two variant readings. Instead of reading *sarvavedyenaikavena* manuscript "Ka" reads *sarvavedyatvenaikaitvena*, a simple spelling error, classified by West as "dittography" (1973: 24), where the scribe has written *ai* twice instead of once; and instead of reading *jñānavādinā iva*, manuscript "Ka" reads *jñānavādiṇā iva*, i.e. it erroneously makes the *na* retroflex. None of these variant readings are helpful. The amendations are therefore here made following the criterion that the sentence and argument should make sense.

Firstly, the placing of *ca* in the printed edition groups *nityatvena* together with *kṣāṇikatvenānanyavedyatvena nānāsaṃtānatvena* in qualifying *saṃvidāṃ*, which makes no sense. Clearly, *nityatvena* belongs with *sarvavedyatvenaikatvena* in qualifying *paramabrahma*, and so *ca* has been moved. Secondly, the comparison, marked by *iva*,

contains only instrumentals. This makes no sense as *parabrahma* must be the subject of the comparison, corresponding to *saṃvidāṃ* in the main clause, in order for the argument to make sense. It thus seems that the scribes have erroneously written *parabrahma* as an instrumental on account of it being preceded by several instrumentals. Thirdly, the word *jñānavādin* does not fit into the argument, and has therefore been removed.

The relation between the surviving or available manuscripts of the SŚP has here not been investigated, and requires further study. It is noted, however, that there are many cases like those presented above where all three manuscripts present the same errors, which may indicate that all three manuscripts are based on closely related manuscripts. It, for example, seems unlikely that three scribes should independently corrupt the genitive *parabrahmaṇa* into the instrumental *parabrahmaṇā*.

The SŚP quotes several other works. These quotes do not always present the same reading as the available editions of the quoted text. A good example of this is verse 13 of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* quoted in SŚP 31, 6-7. The SŚP reads:

sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam avaṣṭambhakaṃ calaṃ ca rajah |
guruvaraṇakam eva tamaḥ sāmyāvastihā bhavet prakṛtiḥ || [Sāṃkhyakā- 13]

The consulted versions of the SK²⁸, on the other hand, read:

sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam upaṣṭambhakaṃ calaṃ ca rajah |
guruvaraṇakam eva tamaḥ pradīpavac cārthato vṛttiḥ || 13 ||

Not only is the entire fourth quarter of the verse different, but the verse in the SŚP reads *avaṣṭambhakaṃ* instead of *upaṣṭambhakaṃ*. We note again that no variant readings are recorded by the editor.

There are several ways in which this can be interpreted and two ways in which it can be dealt with. Firstly, the verse quoted here can be based on a different reading than the manuscripts used for the consulted editions of the SK. Alternatively, it may be due to scribal errors or even Vidyānandin's faulty memory when quoting the verse.²⁹ The second of these alternatives seems unlikely, as the following paragraph (§2 Sāṃkhya chapter) comments on the verse as it is quoted in §1, though it is of course possible that a later scribe may have amended the following paragraph so that it would match the reading of the verse which had previously been corrupted by an earlier scribe. Further study is needed before reaching any conclusion on this matter.

²⁸ Sastri, S.S. Suryanarayana (ed. and transl.) 1948, *The Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa*, University of Madras, Madras; and the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* printed in Larson, Gerald James 1969, *Classical Sāṃkhya – An interpretation of its History and Meaning*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.

²⁹ Cf. West (1973: 10-12, 17-18) for a discussion of various ways in which quotations may acquire errors.

Whatever the reason for the discrepancy in reading may be, this can either be dealt with by amending the reading of the SŚP to match that of the other editions of the quoted text, or not. Here, the latter of these two alternatives has been adopted. Following the same criterion as with regard to other amendments of the text, the text has only been amended if the reading does not make sense, either because the grammar or syntax are wrong or because the argument or statement does not fit. In the cases where I have had recourse to editions of the quoted works, their readings are merely recorded in footnotes.

2. Pramāṇa and Anekānta

In his introduction to the SŚP, Vidyānandin, having listed up the many mutually contradicting views of the Indian philosophical schools, states that:

“And thus, in such a situation, ‘verily, what teaching may be the true one?’ is investigated. For that which is not contradicted by perception and inference, only that is that which is called the truthfulness of the true teaching. If something which is contradicted by the valid means of knowledge, such as sensory perception, inference etc.. were true, nothing in the world can be untrue. And if something which is not contradicted by those [valid means of knowledge] were untrue, then nothing can be true. This definition of truth is regarded as not being incorrect, because of the impossibility of being too wide, being too narrow and inapplicable. And that state of not being contradicted by perception and inference is [found] only in the non-one-sided teaching. Only it is qualified to ascend the tree of the true teaching. And the one-sided teaching is wholly untrue, because it is contradicted by perception and inference.” (SŚP 1, 14-19)

This statement makes it clear that there are certain valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), more specifically here referring to the two valid epistemological tools of *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception) and *anumāna* (inference), by which claims about reality are to be judged. Moreover, only the non-one-sided teaching (*anekāntavāda*, i.e. the Jain doctrine) is said to live up to the scrutiny of the valid means of knowledge, while the one-sided (*ekānta*) teachings, being contradicted by perception and inference, do not. An understanding of the concepts of *pramāṇa* and *anekānta*, which form the foundation on which the SŚP is built, is necessary in order to understand this highly complex text. Or rather, the theory of *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge) and the *anekāntavāda* (theory of manifoldness) are the two tools by means of which Vidyānandin engages in philosophical dispute with the other schools. In order to understand the arguments he raises and the premises for the discussion, these two tools must be properly understood.

The Jain *anekāntavāda*, or theory of manifoldness, is an ontological and epistemological theory, i.e. it is both a theory of the nature of reality and a theory of how this reality can be known, consisting of the *saptabhaṅgī* or *syādvāda* (method of sevenfold modal description) and the *nayavāda* (doctrine of standpoints).³⁰ While the Jains, like all other schools of Indian philosophy, have a set of *pramāṇas* (valid means of knowledge) by means of which truth may be reached, the Jains maintain that *pramāṇas* alone are not enough in order to make valid or true assertions about reality. Thus while the other schools of Indian philosophy maintain that philosophical understanding of reality is reached through the *pramāṇas*, Umāsvāti, in the *Tattvārthasūtra* (TS) 1.6, states that philosophical understanding is generated by both the *pramāṇas* (valid means of knowledge) and the *nayas* (points of view)³¹. More specifically “*pramāṇas* serve as criteria of validity and reliability of our cognition and are expected to ensure the

³⁰ The *nikṣepavāda* or *nyāsavāda* (doctrine of the four standpoints) could here be mentioned as well, but is not important for our purposes here. For a concise explanation of the *nikṣepavāda* see Shah 1998: 417-18.

³¹ TS 1.6: *pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ* ||

acquisition of truth, whereas the viewpoints (*naya*) are an attempt to contextualize any given utterance and determine in which sense it asserts truth” (Balcerowicz 2002: 46). Thus the *pramāṇas* are, according to the Jains, not in themselves enough with regard to generating philosophical understanding, and must be supplemented by the *nayas*.

This chapter will first explain the term *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge), and give a brief overview of its evolution in the Jain tradition, with a special focus on sensory perception and inference, and then present the *anekāntavāda* through explaining the *nayavāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* or *syādvāda*. The implementation of the *anekāntavāda* in the criticism of other philosophical schools by Jain masters such as Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka will then be shown. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, these concepts and doctrines must be properly understood in order to fully understand the argumentation in the SŚP, and thus this chapter provides the reader with a basic understanding of them and their evolution within the Jain philosophical tradition. Secondly, by explaining these concepts and their evolution, the tradition on which the SŚP builds and which forms its foundation is presented, thus also making clear the role of the SŚP and its author Vidyānandin in relation to the wider Jain philosophical tradition.

***Pramāṇa* – the valid means of knowledge**

According to the *Nyāyavārttika*, all knowledge implies four conditions: Firstly, a cognizer (*pramātr*), who is the substantive ground for the cognition; secondly, an object of knowledge (*prameya*) to which the cognition is directed; thirdly, a resulting state of cognition (*pramiti*) arises; and finally the means or instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). While the first three are found in all cognitive acts, even the invalid, the nature of the knowledge as valid or invalid depends upon the *pramāṇa* (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 43-44). Vātsyāyana, author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, defines *pramāṇa* as “that by which the knowing subject knows the object” (ibid: 44), i.e. an instrument of knowledge. Thus knowledge obtained by means of a *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge) is valid, while knowledge not obtained by *pramāṇa* is invalid. According to Akalaṅka, cognition is understood as valid in so far as it corresponds to its object. Cf. Akalaṅka’s *Siddhiviniścaya* (quoted in SŚP 9, 9-13 and 23, 3-5): “So far as [the cognition] corresponds to [its object], [it has] validity.”³²; and, “Like the seeing of poison by one who is ignorant [of poisons], all perception which does not have conceptual construction as its nature [i.e. indeterminate cognition] cannot be a valid means of knowledge, *on account of not corresponding [with the object]*”³³.

³² *yathā yatrāviśaṃvādas tathā tatra pramāṇatā* | [siddhivi- 1 | 19]

³³ *viśadarśanavat sarvam ajñasyākālpanātmakam | darśanam na pramāṇam syād avisaṃvādahānitaḥ* || [siddhivini- 1|24]

The number of *pramāṇas* accepted, varying from one (Cārvāka) to six (Advaita Vedānta), differs among the various schools. While the Nyāya accepts *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *āptavacana* or *śabda* (verbal testimony) and *upamāna* (comparison), the Jains accept only *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*. Since *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception) and *anumāna* (inference) are used throughout the SŚP to refute the views of the rival schools, they will be discussed in greater detail below.

The older Jain āgamic texts, ranging from the 5th century B.C. to the 1st century A.D, however, almost never use the word *pramāṇa* to refer to valid means of knowledge, the few instances in which this happens probably being later interpolations (Dixit 1971: 22). The main distinction regarding cognition seems to be between sensory and extra-sensory cognition, further classified by whether it is correct or not and whether one is omniscient or not. Instead of *pramāṇas* the *Bhagavatīsūtra* enumerates five *jñānas* (i.e. five kinds of knowledge): *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala*, and three kinds of *ajñānas*: *mati*, *śruta* and *avadhi* (ibid: 22). *Mati*- and *śrutajñāna* are empirical types of knowledge, while the last three are supra-empirical. *Matijñāna* includes sense perception, memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*saṃjñā*), hypothetical reasoning (*cintā*) and inference (*abhinibodha*); *śrutajñāna* is verbal knowledge (knowledge generated by means of words); *avadhijñāna* cognizes physical objects that are spatially and temporally remote; *manaḥparyāyajñāna* directly perceives the modes of the mind-substances of other people, making one able to infer the thoughts or objects of thought of others; and *kevaljñāna* is omniscience (Shah 2002: xxvi-xxvii). These *jñānas* could be correct or incorrect, depending upon the spiritual state of the cognizer. Thus a *jñāna* accompanied by *samyagdarśana* (right faith or view) is right (*samyak*), while *jñāna* accompanied by *mithyājñāna* (incorrect faith) is wrong (*mithyā*) (ibid: xxx).

In the *Anuyogadvāra*, belonging to the late stage of Jain āgamic literature (1st-6th century A.D.) (Dixit 1971: 31), an alternative list of four *jñānas* is given, and here they are given as *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (analogy) and *śabda* (scriptural authority), clearly borrowing from the Nyāya *pramāṇas* (ibid: 71). The Nandīsūtra (also from the late stage of the āgamic age) attempts to classify the *jñānas* under the headings *pratyakṣa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect) (ibid: 73), and later Umāsvāti, in the *Tattvārthasūtra* (also late āgamic age), is the first to call the usual five *jñānas* for *pramāṇas* (Dixit 1971: 7, 22-3). Umāsvāti was also the first Jain thinker, except from the isolated passage in the *Anuyogadvāra*, to clearly suggest that *anumāna* (inference) be accepted as a *pramāṇa*, falling in under the category of *parokṣa* (indirect) (Bhattacharyya 1976: 161). According to Umāsvāti, and contrary to the other Indian philosophical systems, sensory and scriptural knowledge are indirect, while clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience are direct (Soni 2007: 19).

Feeling that the Jains did not yet have a suitable list of *pramāṇas*, Akalaṅka (8th century AD) formulated one comprising *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception), *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñā*, *tarka*³⁴, *anumāna* (inference) and *āgama*, while trying to show that these were reducible to the five *jñānas*, the final five of these being collected under the heading *parokṣa-pramāṇa* (indirect means of knowledge) (Dixit 1971: 99; Bhattacharyya 1976: 161). This seems to have been an attempt at bringing Jain philosophy in line with the development of the other schools while at the same time not contradicting the earlier doctrine of *jñānas*. The most important part of this contribution was the clear inclusion of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, which the previous lists had not had (with the exception of the curious, borrowed list in the *Anuyogadvāra*) (ibid: 99-100). Akalaṅka moreover also brought Jain epistemology in line with the other Indian schools in including sensory perception into the category of direct knowledge (Soni 2007: 21).

Now the Jains could match the other schools with respect to *pramāṇas* (Dixit 1971: 99-100), and could thus more efficiently engage in logical debate with them. It was in this early phase of Jain logic that the Jain evaluation of the validity and invalidity of knowledge changed. Instead of being valid or invalid from a spiritual standpoint, knowledge was now deemed valid or invalid from the standpoint of logic (Shah 2002: xxx). As the concept of *pramāṇas* is important for understanding the SŚP, the two *pramāṇas* used in the SŚP for evaluating the doctrines of the other schools, *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception) and *anumāna* (inference), will now be presented.

***Pratyakṣa* (perceptual cognition)**

In shifting the evaluation of knowledge as valid or invalid from the spiritual standpoint to correspondence or non-correspondence with the cognized object or fact, the Jains shifted the evaluation to be made from the standpoint of logic. Thus valid knowledge is that which cognizes its object as its object really is, while invalid knowledge does not. The early Jain logicians gathered sensory perception, *avadhi-*, *manahparyāya-* and *kevalajñāna* under the head of *pratyakṣa* (direct perceptual cognition). The first of these four was deemed *sāṃvyaavahārika-pratyakṣa* (empirical perception), while the remaining three were deemed *mukhya-pratyakṣa* (transcendent perception), corresponding to non-Jain philosophers differentiation between *indriyapratyakṣa* (sensory perception) and *yogipratyakṣa* (yogic perception) (Potter 1977: 35).

Hemacandra (11th century) defines *pratyakṣa* as “immediate-cum-lucid”, in addition to its more general characteristic of giving an “authentic definitive cognition of an object” as it is a *pramāṇa* (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, §44 Book 1 lecture 1). By “immediate-

³⁴ here defined as that which makes known *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance, or pervasion) (Dixit 1971: 145)

cum-lucid” he means that *pratyakṣa* is independent of other valid means of knowledge, as another valid means of knowledge, such as an inferential premise etc., is not necessary in order to have valid perceptual cognition. Moreover, perceptual cognition always refers to a particular, existing individual. The *vā* (or) in Hemacandra’s definition, *idantayā pratibhāso vā*, indicates that other definitions are possible (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* §46 Book 1, lecture 1).

He further defines empirical perception (*sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa*) as cognition that is “conditioned by a sense and the mind and that is of the nature of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgement, and retention”³⁵ (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* kārikā 20 Book 1 Lecture 1). It is thus an authentic, definitive cognition of an object which is conditioned by the senses and the mind, and thus has a determinate nature. Thus indeterminate cognition is not regarded as *pratyakṣa* as it is not valid (cf. Akalaṅka’s *Siddhiviniścaya* quoted above).

In the SŚP *pratyakṣa* (perceptual cognition) is used only in the sense of “sensory perception”, i.e. what the Jain logicians defined as *sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa* (empirical perception) and what non-Jain logicians call *indriyapratyakṣa* (sensory perception). Vidyānandin’s understanding of *pratyakṣa* seems to correspond to Hemacandra’s definition of *sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa*³⁶, ignoring the *avadhi-*, *manaḥparyāya-* and *kevalajñāna* mentioned above. What Vidyānandin means when using the term *pratyakṣa* is a cognition that is conditioned by a sense (*indriya*) and the mind (*manas*) and which has a determinate nature. This stands in strong contrast to the Buddhist understanding of *pratyakṣa*, defined as *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate), i.e. without any mental construction. This conflict is succinctly illustrated by §15 in the Bauddha chapter of the SŚP, where Vidyānandin argues that only determinate cognition is valid as only determinate cognition corresponds to the object (SŚP 22, 25-23, 5). By referring to *pratyakṣa* which contradicts (*virodha*) the opponents position, Vidyānandin tries to show that the doctrines of his rivals, being absolute assertions of specific standpoints (*durnaya*)³⁷, are contradicted by *pramāṇas* (valid means of knowledge) and thus incorrect.

Anumāna (inference)

While sensory perception, *avadhi-*, *manaḥparyāya-* and *kevalajñāna* were grouped under *pratyakṣa* by the early Jain logicians, *śrutajñāna* (verbal knowledge), *smṛti* (memory), *saṃjñā* or *pratyabhijñā* (recognition), *cintā* or *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning) and

³⁵ *indriyamanonimitto ‘vagrahehāvāyadhāraṇātmā sāṃvyavahārikam ||20||*

³⁶ it is here of course not at all suggested that the former derived his understanding of this term from the latter, as Vidyānandin lived in the 10th century CE while Hemacandra lived in the 11th. The point is simply that Hemacandra’s definition of *sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa* is a good illustration of how the term is used in the SŚP.

³⁷ cf. *anekāntavāda* and *nayavāda* below

anumāna or *abhinibodha* (inference) were gathered under *parokṣapramāṇa*, or indirect means of knowledge, i.e. in that they cannot be directly ascertained by any of the senses (Shah 2002: xxxi).

Hemacandra defines inference as “knowledge of the probandum (major term) on the strength of the probans (middle term)” (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* kārikā 7 Book 1, lecture 2) and states that it is of two kinds, “for one’s own self (subjective) and for others (sylogistic)” (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* kārikā 8 Book 1, lecture 2). He further defines *svārthānumāna* (inference for one’s own self) as consisting in “the knowledge of the probandum from the probans ascertained, by one’s own self, as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum” (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* kārikā 9 Book 1, lecture 2), while *parārthānumāna* (inference for the sake of others, i.e. sylogistic inference) is a direct cognition which results from a statement, made by another person, of a probans (*hetu*, i.e. premise or reason) which has necessary concomitance with the probandum (*sādhya*, that which is to be proved) (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* kārikā 1 and §2 of Book 2, lecture 1).

Inference rests on perception, but while perception is confined to objects which are within the reach of perception and in present time, inference can also relate to the past and future and to distant objects. In addition to resting on perception, inference requires the remembrance of a *vyāpti* (universal relation, pervasion, necessary concomitance). Its field of application is neither that which is definitely known nor the unknown, but that which is doubtful or uncertain. Inference is employed to connect a part of an existing thing with a part of it which is not directly perceived (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 72-3).

The standard inferential syllogism in Indian philosophy, developed by the Nyāya, consists of five members. 1) *pratijñā*, the proposition, which comprises the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) and the *pakṣa* (the subject); 2) *hetu*, the premise or probans; 3) *udāharāṇa*, the explanatory example, including a general statement which establishes necessary concomitance or pervasion (*vyāpti*), a positive example (*sapakṣa*) and a counter-instance (*vipakṣa*); 4) *upanaya*, the application; and 5) *nigamana*, the conclusion (ibid: 75).

The standard example of such a syllogism is inferring that the mountain has fire because it has smoke. In this inference the *pratijñā* (proposition) is that there is a fire on the mountain. Making up this proposition are the *sādhya* (that which the inference intends to prove), in this case the fire, and the *pakṣa* (the subject of the inference), in this case the mountain. The *hetu* (the premise or logical reason/probans) is that it has smoke, i.e. smoke is perceived on the mountain. The *udāharāṇa* (explanatory example) consists of three parts. The first establishes *vyāpti* (necessary concomitance, i.e. that the *hetu* is necessarily found where the *sādhya* is found), i.e. “wherever there is smoke there is fire”.

The second, the *sapakṣa* (positive example), illustrates the general statement. In this case it is “like a kitchen”, the point being that fire and smoke are observed to appear together in the kitchen. The third member of the *udāharaṇa* is the *vipakṣa* (counterinstance), in this case “like a lake”, which is an example of the *hetu* not being found as the *sādhya* is not found. The important point is not necessarily stating a counter-example, but that there are no known cases where the *hetu* (premise) is found while the *sādhya* is not. The *upanaya*, application, is the relating of the general principle to the specific case in question, thus establishing that the subject (*pakṣa*) has the premise or logical reason (*hetu*) which is invariably associated (*vyāpta*) with that which is to be proved (*sādhya*). In this case the *upanaya* is “there is smoke (*hetu*) on the mountain (*pakṣa*)”. Finally, on account of this, the *nigamana* (conclusion) is formulated, “therefore there is fire on the mountain”.

It should be noted that in practice all these members are almost never all used in syllogism in the SŚP, most of them being taken for granted. While the Nyāya hold that a syllogism must have five members, the Jains do not posit any fixed number of members, but rather hold that the number of members needed depends on the syllogism and the context (Bhattacharyya 1976: 161). In the SŚP it is often just the *pratijñā* (proposition), *hetu* (premise) and positive example (*sapakṣa*) which are explicitly stated, but there are exceptions to this as well. Thus, for instance, while discussing whether or not the atoms are perceptible, this partial syllogism is given by Vidyānandin in SŚP 22, 2-3 (§9 Bauddha chapter) against the status of indeterminate cognition as a *pramāṇa*:

“For it is as follows – That which lacks correspondence, that is not a valid means of knowledge, just as the seeing of poison by one who does not know [poisons]. And the perception postulated by the followers of the Sugata lacks that [correspondence].”³⁸

Analyzing this inference by means of the model presented above, it would look as follows: 1) **pratijñā* (proposition): *indeterminate perception is not a *pramāṇa*; 2) **hetu* (premise): *because it lacks correspondence with the object; 3) *udāharaṇa* (example with a general statement): That which lacks correspondence, that is not *pramāṇa*, just as the seeing of poison by one who does not know poisons; 4) *upanaya* (application): And the perception postulated by the followers of the Sugata (i.e. indeterminate perception) lacks that correspondence; 5) **nigamana* (conclusion): *thus indeterminate perception is not *pramāṇa*. Here only the *udāharaṇa* and *upanaya* are given. The immediately preceding sentence, reading: “If it is objected: there is indeterminate perception [of the atoms]. [It is answered:] no, because that which has indeterminate nature is invalid, because it is

³⁸ *tathā hi – yad avisamvādavikalāṃ na tat pramāṇam, yathā ajñasya viśadarśanam, tad vikalaṃ ca saugataparikalpitam darśanam* |

devoid of correspondence [with the object]” (SŚP 22, 1-2)³⁹, in practice containing the *pratijñā* and *hetu*, makes the stating of the rest of the members of the syllogism unnecessary.

In the SŚP most refutations or rejections of inferences are formulated in terms of *hetvābhāsa* (fallacies of the premise). As there are many different lists of the possible fallacies a logical premise can suffer from (Potter 1977: 198), listing them all or giving a summary overview of them is here not possible. I will thus only list and explain the fallacies which are found in the SŚP:

- *anaikāntika* (inconclusive), also called *savyabhicāra*, is the fallacy of the *hetu* leading to more conclusions than one, i.e. not being uniformly concomitant with that which is to be proved (*sādhya*). This fault has three subdivisions: *sādhāraṇa*, where the *hetu* is too wide; *asādhāraṇa*, where the *hetu* is too narrow; and *anupasaṃhārin*, where the *hetu* cannot be verified (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119). In the SŚP only the fault of *sādhāraṇasavyabhicāra* is raised. Cf. SŚP §22 Vaiśeṣika chapter for an example.
- *viruddha* (contradicting), i.e. the fallacy of the *hetu* contradicting the proposition (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119). Cf. SŚP §22 Vaiśeṣika chapter for an example.
- *asiddha* (“unproved” or “proved absent”) is the fallacy of the *hetu* being unproved or proved absent in the *pakṣa* (subject) (Ghokale 1992: 28). Cf. SŚP §10 Vijñānādvaita chapter for an example.
- *āśrayāsiddha* (the fault of not being proved to reside in its abode) is a variety of *asiddha* (unproved), and is the fallacy occurring because the *pakṣa* (the subject of the inference) does not exist. The standard Nyāya example of this fallacy is “The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus” (Ghokale 1992: 53). It occurs once in the SŚP (Vaiśeṣika chapter §22), but here it is used in the sense of the *pakṣa* not being perceived, and not in the sense of it being non-existent.
- *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* (mistimed premise) is also known as *bādhita* (negated), and denotes a *hetu* that states the opposite of that which is shown to be true by means of other evidence (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 120). Cf. SŚP §22 Vaiśeṣika chapter for an example.
- *satpratipakṣa* (lit. “that the opposite is true”), also called *viruddhāvyabhicāri*, is the fault of there existing an equally strong counter-inference. In other words, there exists another *hetu* which negates the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) (Gokhale 1992: 50, 107), and thus the *hetu* is fallacious because it does not establish the *sādhya*. Cf. SŚP §22 Vaiśeṣika chapter for an example.

The *pramāṇas* explained above are regarded as essential for acquiring philosophical understanding of reality. As also noted above they are, however, not regarded as in themselves sufficient for doing so by the Jains. In addition to the *pramāṇas* philosophical understanding also depends upon the *anekāntavāda* with its two “wings”, the *nayavāda* and the *syādvāda*. It is to this that we now turn.

***Anekāntavāda* as ontology**

³⁹ *nirvikalpakam pratyakṣam astīti cet; na; tasyāvyavasāyātmakasyāpramāṇyāt, avisaṃvādavaikalpyāt |*

While the ontological and epistemological facets of the *anekāntavāda* cannot be strictly separated (as indeed ontology and epistemology cannot be strictly separated), one can say that ontologically the *anekāntavāda*, recognizing the objectivity of the material universe, posits that reality has innumerable or infinite characters (*anantadharmātmika*), forming a multifaceted structure in which all the parts making up the whole are related by specific relations and inter-dependencies with each other. Moreover, discarding the notions of absolute difference or identity of such things as parts and wholes, universals and particulars etc., the *anekāntavāda* maintains a relationship of identity-in-difference with regard to these things. The universal and the particulars are not completely different, independent entities, but interdependent and both different and non-different *sui generis* (*jātyantara*). Reality, being both different and non-different, permanent and impermanent etc., thus contains what appear to be mutually contradicting characters, though they are in fact only contradictory if they are unconditionally asserted. The truth can only be reached by synthesizing all the varying views and characters (Balcerowicz 2002: 37-39; Padmarajiyah 1963: 124; Shah 1998: 343; Shah 2000: ix).

The basis of this ontology lies in the Jain identification of an existent entity as *dravya* (substance), which supports *guṇa* (quality) and *paryāya* or *bhāva* (mode) (Balcerowicz 2002: 38; Matilal 1981: 37). A substance is the *āśraya* (substratum or support) of *guṇas*. While the *guṇas* do not themselves have qualities, they do undergo modifications (*pariṇāma*) as they acquire (*utpāda*) new modes (*paryāya*) and lose (*vyaya*) old modes. An existent thing is thus characterized by origination (*utpāda*), continued existence (*sthiti*) and destruction (*bhaṅga* or *vyaya*) as the modes, which belong to the qualities, last only a moment; the qualities, belonging to the substance, inhere forever in the substances while continuously undergoing change; and the substances remain as the support of the qualities and their modes⁴⁰ (Balcerowicz 2002: 38; Jaini 1979: 90). An existing thing is that which is characterized by origination, destruction and continued existence⁴¹ (Matilal 1981: 35), and it is this definition, positing that reality is characterized by these contradictory characteristics, which stands as the starting point of the development of the *anekāntavāda* (Dixit 1971: 97).

It should here be noted that although the above definition of *dravya* (substance) as the *āśraya* (substratum) for qualities (*guṇa*), and *guṇas* (qualities), defined in TS 5.41 as located in substances (*dravya*) and themselves devoid of qualities (*guṇa*), are very similar

⁴⁰ This triple character of existing things can be illustrated by the atom (*paramāṇu*), which is a substance. Being a substance the atom has four qualities (*guṇa*); these are color (*varṇa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*) and palpability (*sparsā*). All atoms always have these four qualities, although they do not remain static. So while an atom will always have color, this color need not always be the same color but can change from red to blue etc.. In other words the quality (*guṇa*) color (*varṇa*), residing in the substance (*dravya*), changes modes (*paryāya*). Thus the atom, being an existing thing, is characterized by origination (*utpāda*), continued existence (*sthiti*) and destruction (*vyaya*) (Jaini 1979: 90).

⁴¹ *Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya*'s commentary to sūtra 5.29

to the definitions given by the Vaiśeṣika school and perhaps derived from these, there is an important difference between *dravya* (substance) and *guṇa* (quality) as envisioned by the Jains and the Vaiśeṣika. For while the Vaiśeṣika hold that *dravya* and *guṇa* are absolutely different, it is an important element of the Jain *anekāntavāda* that they are indeed not (Matilal 1981: 39). According to the *anekāntavāda* they are, from a certain point of view, different and, from another point of view, not different. The precise mechanism of predications such as these will be explored below. In any case, the main point of interest here is that reality can thus be said to be both permanent and impermanent etc. depending on what point of view it is regarded from. This brings us over to our next point, the *nayavāda* or doctrine of viewpoints.

The Nayavāda

On the side of epistemology the *anekāntavāda* also posits a theory of manifold methods of analysis, the *nayavāda* or doctrine of viewpoints, which maintains that any statement made concerning the nature of reality or any existing thing is necessarily made from a certain viewpoint. The point here is that while a statement may be true from a certain point of view, this does not mean that the validity of this conditional statement prevents the opposite from being true from another point of view.

Matilal (1981: 7-8) considers the Buddhist *vibhajyavāda* (theory of analysis and differentiation), used by the Buddha to answer questions that were deemed *avyākata* (skt. *avyākṛta*, “unanswerable”) by specifying or relativizing the predicate, as a forerunner to the *anekāntavāda*. While the Buddha answered these questions, such as questions pertaining to the afterlife etc., by analyzing the question (i.e. breaking it up into its component parts, thus the name *vibhajyavāda*) to show that neither a straight yes or no answer could suitably answer them, Mahāvīra, using a similar method, would accept both possibilities. The following illustration from a dialogue between Mahāvīra and Gotama (one of Mahāvīra’s main disciples) in the *Bhagavatīsūtra* shows this quite well:

“‘Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?’ ‘The souls, O Gautama, are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect.’ ‘With what end in view, O Lord, is it so said that the souls are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect?’ ‘They are eternal, O Gautama, from the point of view of substance, and non-eternal from the point of view of modes...’” (BhSū VII 2.273 quoted in Tatia 1951: 22)

While the details of the historical evolution of the *anekāntavāda* and *nayavāda* are beyond the scope of this chapter, this example is quoted here as it gives a good indication of the workings of the *nayavāda* and the broad twofold division of *nayas*, the *dravyārthikanaya* (substance-expressive) and *paryāyārthikanaya* (mode-expressive), the former dealing with the substance-perspective of reality while the latter deals with its

attributive side.⁴² In other words, while the former emphasizes the continuity and identity of any evolved thing (such as the soul in the above example), the latter emphasizes the mutability of phenomena and their impermanent character (Balcerowicz 2002: 46-47).

Although the Jains admit an infinite number of such viewpoints, these two main divisions are usually further subdivided into the following seven types of *nayas*:

Dravyārthikanaya (substance expressive viewpoint)

- 1) *naigama* (comprehensive)
- 2) *saṃgraha* (collective)
- 3) *vyavahāra* (empirical)

Paryāyārthikanaya (mode-expressive viewpoint)

- 4) *rjusūtra* (direct)
- 5) *śabda* (verbal)
- 6) *samabhirūḍha* (etymological)
- 7) *evaṃ-bhūta, itthaṃ-bhāva* (factual)

This scheme of seven *nayas* is not universally followed throughout Jain literature. The *Nyāyāvātāravṛtti* groups *rjusūtra* (direct) with the three first under the heading *arthadvāreṇa* (object-bound) while the last three are grouped under the heading *śabdadvāreṇa* (speech-bound). The *Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya* (Tbh) of Umasvāti only admits five *nayas*, making *samabhirūḍha* and *evaṃ-bhūta* in the table above subgroups of *śabda* while also adding two subgroups to the first *naya*, *naigama*, and a third subgroup to *śabdanaya* (ibid: 47-49; Matilal 1981: 41-42). These variations do not here concern us as the point is merely to give the reader an introduction into the main points of the *anekāntavāda*.

The complex and manifold nature of reality makes it impossible to accurately and fully describe or express it verbally. All expressions of it must necessarily be tied to a specific viewpoint, or rather, as one can never express the “whole truth” about any object all expressions concerning reality are contextual. No statement can encompass all the *pramāṇa*-based knowledge available about any given object. Thus the *Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya* states that philosophical understanding is generated by both *pramāṇas*, i.e. valid means of knowledge, and *nayas*. While the *pramāṇa* grasps the thing as a whole, the *naya* reveals a portion of it (Matilal 1981: 41). The object is thus referred to by a given set of features according to context and the point of the statement (i.e. why the object is described etc.). The *naya* theory is a formalized account of how the various modes of reference function (Balcerowicz 2002: 61-62). A short description of the

⁴² it should however be noted that this quote from the *Bhagavatsūtra* predates the *nayavāda* as presented below. Even the twofold division of *nayas* into *dravyārthikanaya* and *paryāyārthikanaya* was hardly known in the old āgamic texts, though it is here shown to be found in the *Bhagavatsūtra* (Dixit 1971: 24).

various *nayas* should help make the operation of the *nayavāda* and the logic of the *anekāntavāda* clear.

The *naigamanaya* (comprehensive viewpoint) grasps the phenomena referred to by a given utterance in the most general way and takes recourse to the most extensive and inclusive context possible, not discriminating between particular and universal. It is thus imprecise, but conventionally accepted and thus not incorrect. Tbh 1.35 explains that the *naigamanaya* consists in the comprehension of a “pot” etc. without making any distinction between such an individual thing, having particular features, and a thing belonging to its class (ibid: 49-50; Matilal 1981: 43).

The *saṃgrahanaya* (collective viewpoint) refers to the universal. “The collective viewpoint [consists in] the comprehension of, [say,] present, past and future pots, distinguished by the name and other [standpoints (*nikṣepa*)], whether with regard to one [individual] or to many [things belonging to its class]” (Tbh 1.35 quoted and translated in Balcerowicz 2002: 51; italics in original).

The *vyavahāranaya* (empirical viewpoint) refers to the particular, i.e. it is when one particular of a class (i.e. the universal which is the object of the *saṃgrahanaya*) is referred to by an utterance or is the object of an action. The particular here meant is the particular of everyday experience, such as an individual pot etc. (Balcerowicz 2002: 52-53).

The *ṛjusūtranaya* (direct viewpoint), which in the scheme presented above is the first *naya* under the heading *pariyāyārthikanaya* but in other schemes falls in under *dravyārthikanaya*, narrows the viewpoint even further from the particular (which is dealt with by the *vyavahāranaya*), dealing only with the present manifestation of a particular thing. It is in other words concerned with the present *pariyāya* (mode) of the particular, disregarding the substance aspect and the past and future modes, emphasizing the transient aspects of things (ibid: 54).

The three remaining *nayas*, *śabdanaya* (verbal viewpoint), *samabhirūḍhanaya* (etymological viewpoint) and *evaṃ-bhūtanaya* (factual viewpoint) operate on the speech level, having objects that are namable within a limited range of verbal expression. In other words, their object is the thing as it enters into linguistic practice (ibid: 55).

The first of these, the *śabdanaya*, has been interpreted in different ways in the Jain tradition. As the particularities of these interpretations do not here concern us, the common core of these interpretations will suffice. This core is that it refers to the recognition of linguistic conventions, overlooking the subtle differentiation between meanings of synonymous expressions etc.. It thus takes linguistic units such as *Indra*, *Śakra*, *Purandara* etc., which by convention are used to denote the same object (in this case the god Indra), to refer to one object (ibid: 56-7). It also views the two forms *rājā*

and *rājānam* (nominative and accusative singular of *rājan*, “king”, respectively) as referring to the same thing, i.e. the king (Matilal 1981: 45).

The *samabhirūḍhanaya* (etymological viewpoint), on the other hand, functions in a further limited context and distinguishes between the synonyms on account of their differing derivation, i.e. words that in most cases are synonyms can in some contexts refer to different things. Using the same example as above, although the three terms *Indra*, *Śakra* and *Purandra* all normally refer to Indra, *Indra* strictly speaking refers to the god Indra, *Śakra* to a being possessing might and *Purandara* refers to a being that destroys strongholds (Balcerowicz 2002: 57-8).

The third of the *nayas* relating to speech, and the seventh and last *naya* in the total enumeration of *nayas*, the *evaṃ-bhūtanaya* (factual viewpoint), functioning in the narrowest context, further differentiates between the synonyms. From this viewpoint one may thus only refer to Indra by the word *Indra* when he is displaying his sovereign authority, *Śakra* when he is exhibiting his might, and *Purandara* when he is destroying strongholds. Likewise the word *go* (meaning cow and being derived from the root *gam* which means “to go”) can from this viewpoint only be used to describe a cow when it is actually walking (ibid: 59).

As seen, these seven viewpoints, describing seven different positions from which an object may be ascertained, are applied in a gradually limited context, *naigamanaya* being the broadest context, *evaṃ-bhūta* being the narrowest. As the context gets narrower the information content of the statements goes up. Thus the *naigamanaya*, functioning in the broadest contexts, is the vaguest and least informative, while the *evaṃ-bhūta*, functioning in the narrowest context, is the most precise and contains the greatest amount of information (ibid: 61). With this scheme in mind, it is concluded that, since every statement is made in a particular situation, it communicates some truth as long as its context is kept in mind. Thus two seemingly mutually contradictory statements can both be true, or rather, the same sentence may be either true or false, depending on context. The statements “the hedgehog is” and “the hedgehog is not” can be stated without any contradiction, for they will be relatively true, i.e. relative to the viewpoint. It can thus mean “there is a hedgehog here, but it is not a hog that is presently in a hedge” (ibid: 62, 64), the first statement thus being true from the empirical (*vyavahāra*) viewpoint, and the second from the factual (*evaṃ-bhūta*) viewpoint. In other words the statement “the hedgehog is” can both be correct and incorrect; correct from the empirical viewpoint and incorrect from the factual viewpoint. In order to accurately describe reality, all these viewpoints must be considered. A point of view held to be unconditionally true is known as a *durnaya* (defective viewpoint). When the viewpoints are recognized as mutually dependent they are conducive to truth, and it is through considering all viewpoints,

combined with employing valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), that truth can be reached.

The Syādvāda or Saptabhaṅgī

The second major element making up the *anekāntavāda*, and closely related to the *nayavāda*, is the *saptabhaṅgī* (sevenfold predication), also known as the *syādvāda*. While the *nayavāda* describes seven different viewpoints from which an object may be described, moving from the most inclusive (*naigama*) to the most exclusive (*evaṃ-bhūta*), the *syādvāda* offers a set of seven predications one can make about an object. The difference between the *syādvāda* and *nayavāda* can be viewed as one of “sphere of application”. While the analysis of the *syādvāda* is philosophical, the everyday predications made by all people are made from the standpoints of the various *nayas* depending on the purpose of the statement (Shah 1998: 347). Or, as put by Padmarajiah (1963: 304), the *nayavāda* is principally an analytical method which analyzes a particular standpoint of a factual situation according to the purpose of the experient (*jñātrī*), while the *syādvāda* is essentially a synthetical method aimed at harmonizing the various viewpoints the *nayavāda* arrives at.

The Jains maintain that all propositions of philosophical importance should be subject to the seven formulations of the *syādvāda* in order to ensure that they are not “one-sided” (*ekānta*) (Matilal 1981: 47; Jaini 1979: 94-95). The list of seven predicates⁴³ is as follows:

- 1) From a certain point of view, x in fact exists (*syād asty eva*)
- 2) From a certain point of view, x in fact does not exist (*syān nāsty eva*)
- 3) From a certain point of view, x in fact exists, and from another point of view, x in fact does not exist (*syād asty eva syān nāsty eva*)
- 4) From a certain point of view, x is in fact inexpressible (*syād avaktavya eva*)
- 5) From a certain point of view, x in fact exists and is inexpressible (*syād asty eva syād avaktavya eva*)
- 6) From a certain point of view, x in fact does not exist and is inexpressible (*syān nāsty eva syād avaktavya eva*)
- 7) From a certain point of view, x in fact exists, in fact does not exist and is in fact inexpressible (*syād asty eva syān nāsty eva syād avaktavya eva*)

⁴³ The following scheme of the seven predicates is based on Matilal 1981: 54-55; Jaini 1979: 95-96 and Malliṣeṇa’s *Syādvādamañjarī* (quoted in footnote 13 in Jaini 1979: 95). Siddhasena, in his *Sanmati*, adopts a slightly different interpretation and setup of the seven predications, the third predication being that x is inexpressible (from the point of view of its own as well as alien properties) and the fourth being that it both exists and does not exist (in that one part of it exists and another does not exist) (Dixit 1971: 26), but this is not so important for our present context. The scheme presented here is found in Malliṣeṇa’s *Syādvādamañjarī* and Samantabhadra’s *Āptamīmāṃsā* (ibid: 26), and is the one most commonly met with.

This list of seven possible predications consists of the seven possible combinations of the two most basic answers to any question, i.e. affirmation and negation⁴⁴. In other words, when predicating anything about any one of the infinite attributes or characters of reality, these are the seven possible predications that can be made (Shah 1998: 347-8).

The basis for affirmation or negation is that every assertion is made within the framework four factors: *svadravya* (the specific being or substance), *svakṣetra* (the specific location), *svakāla* (the specific time) and *svabhāva* (the specific state or nature) of the object in question (Jaini 1979: 95). Thus, taking a pot as an example, the first predication, “from a certain point of view, the pot indeed exists”, refers to the pot existing with respect to its own specific properties, i.e. to the specific pot (*svadravya*), in a specific place (*svakṣetra*), at a specific time (*svakāla*) and with regard to its specific state or nature (*svabhāva*). The second predication, “from a certain point of view, the pot does not exist”, on the other hand, refers to the pot not existing with respect to alien properties, i.e. another being or substance (*paradravya*), another place (*parakṣetra*), another time (*parakāla*) and another state or nature (*parabhāva*). The third predication combines the two in a sequential order (*krama*), while the fourth combines them simultaneously (*yugapat*), and is thus “inexpressible”⁴⁵ (Jaini 1979: 95). These should, however, not be understood as mere conjunctions of the first and second predication, but as together making up a whole that is in some ways different from its parts. Such a compound proposition is necessary for a comprehensive view of an object’s positive and negative aspects (Shah 1998: 351). The fifth, sixth and seventh predications are further combinations of the first three with the fourth. In other words, the pot surely exists as a pot etc., but surely does not exist as cloth etc., and so on.

It should here be noted that the term *syāt*, the third person singular optative form of the verb root *as* (to be), is not here used in its usual sense of “may be”. It is by reading it as having this meaning that some get the erroneous notion of the *syādvāda* is an expression of skepticism. This is not the case. The word *syāt* here expresses the notion of “from a certain point of view” or “in some respect”, qualifying the statement. Thus the statement is indeed (*eva*) valid when subject to the conditions under which the statement is made, as any true or valid statement is only true or valid under certain conditions. The *syādvāda* should thus rather be viewed as a theory of conditional certainty (Matilal 1981: 52-3; Shah 1998: 345-6).

⁴⁴ To illustrate: affirmation and negation, making up the first two predications, can be marked as “+” and “-” respectively. The third predication can be marked as “+” and “-” and the fourth (being a simultaneous combination of + and -, and thus different than +-) as “0” (which should here be considered a separate, non-compound member). The remaining three predications are thus “+0”, “-0” and “+0” respectively. The internal order in the combinations being without any consequence, this exhausts the possible combinations of +, - and 0, which make up the three primary and non-compound members (Matilal 1981: 54-55).

⁴⁵ It is said that this simultaneous predication of the existence and non-existence of a thing is inexpressible on account of there being no word that can express it. Language does not have any way of expressing such an idea (Shah 1998: 351-2).

The *saptabhaṅgī* is thus used when predicating any particular attribute of a thing, i.e. “an object x is permanent”, “the universal is different from the particular” etc.. According to the *anekāntavāda* these attributes cannot be asserted categorically (often indicated, as seen in the SŚP, by the word *sarvathā*, “completely”) with respect to any thing. For the predication to be valid the statement must thus be qualified by the use of *syāt*.⁴⁶ Thus it is said that from the standpoint of substance (*dravya*) a pot is permanent (*syān nitya eva ghaṭaḥ*), while from the standpoint of modes (*pariyāya*) a pot is not permanent, i.e. it is transient (*syād anitya eva ghaṭaḥ*). The term *syāt* or *kathamcit* makes it clear that the first predication, i.e. that the pot is permanent, does not exclude the second, i.e. the pot is impermanent, as both assertions are qualified (Shah 1998: 346-7).

Though Vidyānandin does not refer directly to any of the seven *nayas* explained above, nor explicitly discuss matters through using the sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*), the *anekāntavāda* forms an essential backdrop and foundation in his discussion of the doctrines of the other philosophical systems. This use of the *anekāntavāda* is strongly influenced by Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka. While previous authors, such as Siddhasena and Jinabhadra developed and utilized the *anekāntavāda*, they worked within the framework of the *nayas*. Such an approach had its limitations. Moreover, they did not make any serious or sustained efforts to evaluate the rival philosophical systems from the standpoint of the *anekāntavāda* (Dixit 1971: 135-6). This task was taken up by Samantabhadra, later carried on by Akalaṅka and culminated with Vidyānandin (ibid: 147-8).

The *anekāntavāda* in polemics

Demonstrating the validity of the *anekāntavāda* was one of the main occupations of what Dixit calls the “Age of Logic” within Jainism, and this was done by arguing against the positions of the other schools (1971: 10-11). The first step in doing so was Siddhasena’s (ca 550 AD⁴⁷) introduction of the twofold division of the seven *nayas* into *dravyārthika* (substance-expressive) and *pariyāyārthika* (mode-expressive) discussed above.

Siddhasena thus understood the *nayavāda* as essentially propounding two positions:

- 1) “a physical substance is absolutely permanent qua a physical substance , it is more or less permanent qua a lump of clay or a jar, it is absolutely transient qua a seat of its momentary properties” (ibid: 91).
- 2) “Two physical substances are absolutely alike in so far as both are physical substances, partly alike so far as one is a lump of clay and the other a jar, and not at all alike so far as each is a seat of its momentary properties” (ibid: 91).

⁴⁶ in the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*, the term *kathamcit* (*katham*, “how”, generalized by the particle *cit*) is used in the same way. In other places *kadācid* (*kadā*, “when”, generalized by the particle *cit*) is found as well (Matilal 1981: 53).

⁴⁷ This date is given by Malwania & Soni (2007: 176-77) based on A.N. Upadhye’s arguments.

The first of these positions relates to the Buddhist vs Brahmanic⁴⁸ discussion of *kṣaṇikatva-nityatva* (impermanence and permanence), i.e. is a physical substance permanent or impermanent? The second relates to the discussion concerning *sāmānya-viśeṣa* (universal and particular or individual), i.e. is there such a thing as a universal? And if there is, what is its exact relation to the particulars/individuals? Siddhasena's division and interpretation of the *nayavāda*, most notably describing the Sāṃkhya philosophy as *dravyārthikanaya*; the Buddhist philosophy as *paryāyārthikanaya*; and the Vaiśeṣika philosophy as a mechanical combination of the two, i.e. not *sui generis* (*jātyantara*) like that of the Jains and thus suffering from the faults of both, came to serve as a model for later writers (ibid: 91-2).

It was Mallavādin (5th century C.E.) who first attempted to assign the various other philosophical schools to the various *nayas* (ibid: 92), the point being that the various schools are expressions of various forms of *ekāntavāda* (one-sided or extremist doctrines), unconditionally asserting *nayas* (points of view) to be the absolute truth (i.e. thus making them *durnayas*)⁴⁹ (ibid: 92). But it was Samantabhadra (ca 600⁵⁰), in his *Āptamīmāṃsā*, who was the first to make use of the *syādvāda/saptabhaṅgī* doctrine in formulating philosophical problems.⁵¹ Indeed, taking the position that the core of the *anekāntavāda* is that one thing must be characterized by contradictory attributes at one and the same time, he was the first to thoroughly examine and criticize the doctrines of other schools by using the *anekāntavāda*, investigating two one-sided (*ekānta*) views, such as permanence vs impermanence etc., and showing them both to be permeated by faults, before offering a *sui generis* (*jātyantara*) synthesis of the two which avoids the faults of both positions (Dixit 1971: 136).

The foundation Samantabhadra had laid with his *Āptamīmāṃsā* was then later built upon by other writers, especially Akalaṅka (ca 770⁵²) and Vidyānandin, who both composed commentaries to the *Āptamīmāṃsā*. Thus the main task of later Jain thinkers was to master the doctrines of the other schools and criticize them by means of the *anekāntavāda* (Shah 1999: 10).

⁴⁸ All the major Brahmanical schools, viz. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, hold, in varying degrees, that there are eternal/permanent (*nitya*) things.

⁴⁹ The detailed manner in which Mallavādin did this is not so important here, especially since his model of pairing the various schools and the *nayas* was not later followed.

⁵⁰ This date is adopted from Malvania and Soni (2007).

⁵¹ Cf. verse 14 of the *Āptamīmāṃsā*: *kathañcit te sadeveṣṭam kathañcid asadeva tat | tathobhayam avācyam ca nayayogān na sarvathā ||14||*. Shah (1999: 17-18) translates as: "On your showing, on the other hand, an entity is somehow possessed of the character 'being', somehow possessed of the character 'nonbeing', somehow possessed of both, while it is somehow indescribable – all these four features characterizing it in accordance with the speaker's intention (alternatively, in accordance with the conditions of assertion) and not in an absolute fashion".

⁵² This date is adopted from Malvania and Soni (2007).

Aṣṭaśatī, Akalaṅka's commentary to the *Āptamīmāṃsā*, is deemed by Shah (1999: 11) to be his most crystal-like and concentrated enunciation and defense of the *anekāntavāda*. Continuing where Samantabhadra had begun, Akalaṅka had the opportunity to approach the views dealt with in the *Āptamīmāṃsā* in much greater detail, especially focusing on criticizing Buddhist doctrines (ibid: 11, 34). Vidyānandin's sub-commentary to the *Aṣṭaśatī*, the *Aṣṭasahasrī*, goes into even greater detail, building upon the collective work of Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka paired with a thorough understanding of the philosophies of the rival schools (Dixit 1971: 148).

Confining himself to Samantabhadra's treatment of ontological issues, Dixit finds that the following six pairs of mutually contradictory views are dealt with in the *Āptamīmāṃsā*⁵³:

- 1) i) only positive entities exist, and no negative ones
ii) only negative entities exist and no positive ones
- 2) i) all things are absolutely one with each other
ii) all things are absolutely separate from each other
- 3) i) everything is absolutely permanent
ii) everything is absolutely transient
- 4) i) a cause is absolutely different from its effect, a substance from its properties, and so on and so forth
ii) a cause is absolutely identical with its effect, a substance with its properties, and so on and so forth
- 5) i) the properties of a substance are absolutely dependent upon their substance
ii) the properties of a substance are absolutely independent of their substance
- 6) i) whatever exists [exists] in the form of mental happening
ii) whatever exists [exists] in the form of external happening" (Dixit 1971: 137)

This list has been quoted in its whole as it will be shown below that, although the structure of the text is different as it is not structured around these views but rather around chapters concerned with clearly identified philosophical schools, this list lists many points discussed in Vidyānandin's *SŚP* as well.

Although Samantabhadra never names the proponents of these views, their identity is in many cases quite clear. Of interest here, and found in the *SŚP*, are views 2-ii and 3-ii, belonging to the Sautrāntika Buddhists (referred to as the Bauddha in the *SŚP*); view 6-i belonging to the Vijñānādvaita Buddhists (Yogācāra); views 4-i and 5-ii belonging to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; view 2-i belonging to the Advaita Vedānta; and view

⁵³ This list roughly corresponds with the sections in the *Āptamīmāṃsā*, i.e. points 1-5 correspond to sections 1-5 respectively, while point 6 corresponds to section 7 (See Shah 1999: 23-25 for a list of the sections of the *Āptamīmāṃsā* and their content). Sections 6, 8, 9 and 10 are here not included as they do not deal with strictly ontological issues.

3-i belonging to several schools, among others to the Sāṃkhya as they hold the *puruṣa* (soul) to be absolutely permanent and unchangeable (Dixit 1971: 137).

In the following chapter we will examine Vidyānandin's arguments in the SŚP. There we will see how he is influenced by and builds on the model provided for him by Samantabhadra, but also how he transcends it, not merely confining himself to criticize his rivals from the standpoint of the *anekāntavāda*.

3. Subject matter of the Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā

The purpose and content Vidyānandin's *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* is best made clear by Vidyānandin himself, who in his introduction to the text declares:

“For here there are various teachings: ‘The teachings of the Puruṣādvaita, Śabdādvaita, Vijñānādvaita and Citrādvaita, the teachings of the [materialistic] Cārvaka, Bauddha, theistic and non-theistic Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Bhāṭṭa [mīmāṃsā] and the Prabhākara [mīmāṃsā], the teaching of Tattvopaplava and the Anekānta-teachings.’ And all those are not true, because they give ideas that contradict each other, such as duality and non-duality, existence and non-existence etc..

[Still], there it is not to be suspected [that] ‘Nothing can [then] be true’. Because it is impossible to negate [both] of two [doctrines] that are mutually contradictory like light and dark, such as one-sidedness and many-sidedness, dualism and non-dualism or existence and non-existence, just like the affirmation [of both is impossible]. Because an affirmation of one [of the two] is necessarily found, as some truth is inevitably to be acknowledged. And thus, in such a situation, ‘Verily, what teaching may be the true one?’ is investigated. For that which is not contradicted by perception and inference, only that is called the truthfulness of the true teaching” (SŚP 1, 8-15 §2-3 Introduction).

Clearly, Vidyānandin intends to discuss 14 schools of philosophy. As he elaborates, their doctrines are mutually contradictory. Thus they cannot all be true. Yet, it is not to be assumed that none of them can be true.⁵⁴ The teaching which is not contradicted by any valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is true, and this truthfulness can be ascertained through investigation (*parīkṣā*).⁵⁵ The matters Vidyānandin discusses in doing so are mainly ontological⁵⁶, though he inevitably also touches upon some epistemological points.

While Vidyānandin gives a list of 14 schools, not all of these will be treated here. As the text of the SŚP is not complete, the chapters dealing with the Tattvopaplavavāda and Anekāntavāda are lost, and are therefore not included here.⁵⁷ Moreover, both the Śabdādvaita and Citrādvaita are not discussed in separate chapters of the SŚP, as Vidyānandin considers them refuted by the arguments raised against the Puruṣādvaitins and Vijñānādvaitins respectively. These too are therefore not included here. In addition, Vidyānandin, in the list in his introduction (above), differentiates between theistic⁵⁸ and atheistic Sāṃkhya and between Prabhākara- and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. These are not treated separately by Vidyānandin, nor are these distinctions of any importance in the respective

⁵⁴ This principle is set forth by the Nyāya: “parasparavirodhe hi na prakārantarasthitih” (*Kusumāñjali* quoted in Radhakrishnan 1966b: 113 footnote 3). “For, in the case of two mutually contradictory [judgements], it is not established that there is another way” (My translation). Radhakrishnan explains: “Two contradictory judgements cannot both be false, nor can they both be true. A is either B or not B. One or the other of two contradictories must be true since no other course is possible” (1966: 113).

⁵⁵ Defined by Vidyānandin, drawing on the explanation found in Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Introduction to the commentary on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.3, cf. footnote to the translation of *parīkṣā* in SŚP 1, 5 §1 Introduction), as: “Examining: ‘is this [definition] applicable to this [defined thing], or is it not?’, this is indeed investigation” (SŚP 1, 5 §1 Introduction).

⁵⁶ The ontological issues which make up the main points discussed by Vidyānandin are clearly influenced by Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*. Cf. the section on the *anekāntavāda* in polemics.

⁵⁷ For a short discussion of the Tattvopaplavavāda, cf. footnote 140. For the Anekāntavāda see Chapter 2.

⁵⁸ *Seśvarasāṃkhya* or theistic Sāṃkhya refers to the Yoga school (Chatterjee and Datta 2007: 237)

uttarapakṣas (refutations) of the chapters dealing with these schools. They are therefore not treated separately here.

The Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya are neither treated entirely as one school by Vidyānandin, nor are they treated completely separately. Both are presented in separate *pūrvapakṣas* (opponent's side of the debate, i.e. presentation of the doctrines of the school in question), but it is stated at the beginning of the Naiyāyika *uttarapakṣa* that the Nyāya doctrine is considered refuted by the arguments presented against the Vaiśeṣikas.⁵⁹ Moreover, the Vaiśeṣika chapter is not concluded by the usual verses which end the other chapters. Instead, the Naiyāyika doctrine is presented and refuted, and the verses at the end Nyāya chapter, though they do not mention the Vaiśeṣikas explicitly, conclude the treatment of both the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya.⁶⁰ The Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya will therefore here be treated together.

The purpose of the present chapter is threefold. Firstly, it highlights the main issues discussed by Vidyānandin throughout the various chapters of the SŚP. Due to restrictions of space, it is not here possible to summarize and examine all of Vidyānandin's arguments. Thus only a selection of the main points will here be discussed. Secondly, it presents the views held by Vidyānandin's opponents as these are presented in secondary literature on Indian philosophy and, in some cases, as these are presented in the primary texts of the schools in question, with special reference to the issues discussed by Vidyānandin in the chapters dealing with these schools. Thus it also supplements the respective *pūrvapakṣas* of the various chapters of the SŚP. Thirdly, it attempts to unite the two main points by discussing the correspondence between Vidyānandin's arguments and the doctrines of the schools in question. These discussions will occasionally point out issues on which this correspondence is uncertain and requires further investigation.

The Buddha or Sautrāntika

The Sautrāntika school, discussed by Vidyānandin in the fourth chapter of the SŚP, belongs to the Śrāvakayāna branch of Buddhism. Unlike the Vijñānādvaitins, the Sautrāntikas acknowledge the existence of an external world, though they do not acknowledge that one may have a direct perception of it. The existence of an extra-mental

⁵⁹ "This very doctrine of the logicians is contradicted by perception and inference, because contradiction by perception and inference is found even here by means of that which was expounded in the immediately preceding [section dealing with the Vaiśeṣika]. Therefore a separate justification of [it being] contradicted by those [perception and inference] is not undertaken here." (SŚP 42, 26-27 §6 Nyāya chapter).

⁶⁰ This is made clear by the statement immediately preceding the verses: "Enough with excessive argumentation, for the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika doctrines are proved to be false on account of being contradicted by perception and inference!" (SŚP 43, 6 §8 Nyāya chapter).

reality is thus inferred from mental presentations of this external reality⁶¹ (Radhakrishnan 1966a: 619).

As Vidyānandin's refutation of Sautrāntika philosophy touches upon many of the main issues discussed throughout the SŚP, it is well suited as a starting point for this presentation. He focuses on three main points: 1) the bare particular, momentary atom as accepted by the Sautrāntikas is contradicted by perception, which only perceives gross forms etc.; 2) the gross form etc., held by the Sautrāntikas to merely be a mental construction, is real; and 3) an existing thing cannot be absolutely momentary. Though these issues are framed in a mostly ontological way, the first two points, which are actually two sides of the same coin, to a large extent also focus on epistemological issues, namely that the Sautrāntikas distinguish between *savikalpaka* (determinate, i.e. involving conceptual construction) and *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate, i.e. not involving conceptual construction) cognition, only accepting the latter as perception (*pratyakṣa*) and as a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). These epistemological issues are closely tied to the ontological issues of parts and wholes (*avayava-avayavin*) and universals and particulars (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*). This interconnectedness, along with the difference between determinate and indeterminate cognition, is succinctly illustrated by Dignāga:

“The object to be cognized has [only] two aspects. Apart from the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception has only the particular for its object and inference the universal.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanā*); The cognition in which there is no conceptual construction is perception. What, then, is this conceptual construction? The association of name (*nāman*), genus (*jāti*), etc. [with a thing perceived, which results in verbal designation of the thing]” (Hattori's translation, quoted in Soni 1999: 144)

Dharmakīrti defines perception (*pratyakṣa*) in the following way: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhrāntam* (*nyāyavi* - 1|4 quoted in SŚP 21, 23-24 §7 Bauddha chapter), i.e. “sensory perception is devoid of conceptual construction and not confused”. The Sautrāntika Buddhists hold that only the parts, i.e. the atoms, really exist. A direct perception, i.e. *pratyakṣa*, is only of a collection of such particulars. In other words, only parts are perceived. Any notion of a whole object, which is nothing more than a conglomeration (*sañcita*) of atoms, is due to conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) (Soni 1999: 145).

In the words of Matilal (1986), according to the Buddhists, “no seeing is seeing as...” (Matilal 1986: 316). While true seeing, i.e. perception *per se*, is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanā*), and is thus *nirvikalpa* (or, in the definition of Dharmakīrti, *kalpanāpodham*), seeing something *as X* necessarily involves the

⁶¹ How this is inferred is not touched upon by Vidyānandin in his treatment of the Sautrāntika, though it is brought up in the *Vijñānādvaita pūrvapakṣa* §2.

intervention of conceptual construction, i.e. it is *savikalpa*. In other words, since neither the word “camel” nor the concept “camel” are found in the object, an awareness of a camel as a camel can strictly speaking not be perceptual. Thus seeing a camel *as a camel* involves *kalpanā* (conceptual construction), and is according to the Sautrāntika Buddhists not perception (Matilal 1986: 316-17). Such conceptual construction conceals the true nature of things, which is that all particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) are unique, and superimposes identity on them (Shah 1968: 88-9).

Thus the word and concept “camel”, cognized in determinate cognition, is merely a mental creation. A camel is not only a whole (*avayavin*), but it also depends on a notion of similarity, or, in other words, on a universal (*sāmānya*). Seeing something *as a camel* necessarily involves *recognizing it as a camel*. To do so there must be some similarity, some identity, between the thing cognized *as a camel* and other, previously cognized camels. But this identity, this *camelness*, is not real. Only the unique particulars, the parts, are perceived.⁶²

The indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*), not involving conceptual construction, of these particulars gives rise to determinate (*savikalpaka*) cognition (Shah 1968: 225). The arising of determinate, conceptual cognition is due to the *vāsanās* (impressions or predispositions) of the cognizer. It is these dispositions, based on previous experiences and continually fuelled by further experience, which cause the mental construction to take place immediately after perception (Matilal 1986: 327). Or rather, it is the intellect which, by force of beginningless predispositions, connects the really unconnected things⁶³ (Shah 1968: 88-89).

This determinate cognition in turn validates the indeterminate cognition. In the words of Stcherbatsky: “For neither sensation alone, as pure sensation, affords any knowledge at all; nor conception alone, i.e. pure imagination, contains any real knowledge. Only the union of these two elements in the judgment of perception is real knowledge” (1958: 212).

It must be added that the determinate cognition validates the indeterminate cognition only in so far as it leads to purposeful action (*vyavahāra*) (Shah 1968: 225). The relation between indeterminate and determinate cognition, as held by the Sautrāntika Buddhists, is succinctly summed up by Siderits: “...the relation between indeterminate and determinate perception...in the former we directly grasp particulars, while in the latter we directly grasp mentally constructed universals but thereby indirectly grasp

⁶² While the Nyāya hold that cognitions and statements such as “this is a camel” are due to, and also prove the existence of, the universal camelness, the Sautrāntikas reject the true existence of such universals. They explain such cognitions by means of the *apoha* theory, introduced by the Buddhist logician Dignāga. As this is not discussed by Vidyānandin, it will not be explained here. For treatment of the *apoha* theory see Frauwallner (1937), Sharma (1968) and Patil (2003).

⁶³ Cf. Dharmakīrti’s *Svārthānumānapariccheda*: “buddhir anādivāsanāsāmāthyād asaṃsṛjān api dharmān saṃsṛjantī jāyate |” (quoted in Shah 1968: 89, footnote 58).

particulars. When we determinately perceive a set of particulars *as a mango*, this enables us to act in relation to these (and their successor) particulars in such a way as to satisfy our hunger for mango” (2004: 371, italics added).

Lastly, the concept of *svasaṃvedana* (self-cognition), which is a fundamental thesis of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school (Stcherbatsky 1958: 163) and was first introduced by Dignāga (Soni 1999: 141), must be mentioned. Unlike the Naiyāyikas, the Buddhists, Sautrāntikas and Vijñānādvaitins alike, hold that cognition is self-cognized, i.e. knowledge is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*). Like a lamp illuminates both its surrounding objects and itself, so cognition cognizes its object and itself (Stcherbatsky 1958: 163). Being perception (*pratyakṣa*), *svasaṃvedana* is, according to the Buddhists, necessarily indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*). While the Jains too accept cognition to be self-cognized, they do not hold that self-cognition need be indeterminate (Shah 1968: 227-8).

In opposition to this Sautrāntika view of perception, Vidyānandin argues that seeing something *as X* is indeed perception. In fact, the *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* (indeterminate perception) of the Buddhists, free from conceptual construction, is not perception at all, he argues, because it is not valid as it lacks correspondence⁶⁴ with the cognized object (§§6-9). The syllogism Vidyānandin employs in arguing this is taken from the *Siddhiviniścaya* (1.24) of Akalaṅka, which is quoted in §15 of the Bauddha chapter. Indeterminate cognition, being non-conceptual, is unable to determine the nature of the object. The Sautrāntika Buddhist cannot argue that indeterminate perception does indeed have correspondence with the object by giving rise to determinate (*savikalpa*) cognition. Vidyānandin claims that it is impossible that the indeterminate cognition, which is free from conceptual construction, should give rise to determinate cognition, which is characterized by conceptual construction. Determinate cognition cannot arise from indeterminate cognition any more than a horse can arise from a donkey. And if it could, why should not the particular itself, which according to the Buddhist is also free from conceptual construction, give rise to the determinate, conceptual cognition (§10, 12-13)? The determinate nature of determinate cognition can also not be established by self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*), for, as the Sautrāntikas hold self-cognition to be indeterminate, as it is perception and thus free from conceptual construction, this will merely make determinate cognition unnecessary or end in infinite regress (§10-11). Vidyānandin here draws on one of Akalaṅka’s arguments for proving that *svasaṃvedana* (self-cognition) is not necessarily indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*), as the Buddhists maintain. Shah (1968) explains:

⁶⁴ Vidyānandin, rather peculiarly, uses the term *abhiprāyanivedana* (relating the intention [of the speaker]), which is used in Dharmakīrti’s discussion on the validity of *śabda* (verbal testimony). (cf. footnote 775), throughout much of his discussion on this topic. It is however clear from the context that Vidyānandin’s intended argument refers to relating the nature of the object, and not the intention of the speaker, which is irrelevant in a discussion on perception.

“...Akalaṅka rightly observes that the self-cognition of a determinate knowledge at least could never be indeterminate. Dharmakīrti holds that the self-cognitions of all knowledge – including even determinate knowledge – is indeterminate. **This would mean that even a determinate knowledge is not self-determined but requires another knowledge to determine its self; this would involve an infinite regress detrimental to all purposive action.** Through all this Akalaṅka proves that though all cognitions are self cognized, a self-cognition is not necessarily indeterminate; that the self-cognition of a determinate knowledge is always determinate; and that only a determinate self-cognition deserves to be called *pramāṇa*.”⁶⁵ (Shah 1968: 227-8 italics in original, my bold).

Vidyānandin is here not making the same point as Akalaṅka, but clearly draws on his argument to reach his own point. Akalaṅka has shown that the self-cognition of a determinate cognition must be determinate, otherwise it will end in infinite regress. Vidyānandin draws on Akalaṅka’s argument when he here argues that determinate cognition, according to the Sautrāntikas, cannot be self-cognized and is thus not possible.

Positing that indeterminate cognition gives rise to determinate cognition on account of predispositions (*vāsanā*) does not help, as the same contingency of rendering the indeterminate cognition unnecessary will arise. Thus it is determinate cognition which corresponds to the object. Therefore it is determinate cognition, which cognizes the whole, the universal etc., which is a valid means of knowledge (§15).

Since he shows that indeterminate cognition is not valid, as it does not correspond to the cognized object, it is proved that it is not perception. Consequently the particular accepted by the Buddhists is not perceived. Not only that, but as there is thus no perception, inference can also not prove the particular, for inference depends upon perception. Thus the particular held by the Sautrāntikas is not proved (§16).

Having thus shown that the unique particular is not perceived, Vidyānandin turns his attention to the other side of this coin, namely proving that the gross form, the whole, the universal etc. is indeed perceived. This is so because it would be unsuitable, he says, for the determinate cognition to cognize something which is not cognized by the indeterminate cognition. There can be no determinate cognition of gross form etc. from the indeterminate cognitions of bare particulars. The determinate cognition of gross form must arise from the indeterminate cognition of gross form, just as the determinate cognition of blue arises only from an indeterminate cognition of blue, and not from an indeterminate cognition of yellow. Here again, the positing of predispositions will not help the Buddhist, as then the determinate cognition of gross form would not even have to depend on any perception at all, but could be fully explained by predispositions. And then, Vidyānandin argues, everything accepted by the Buddhists is lost. Thus, if the real existence of the particular “blue” is established by the determinate cognition of blue, then the real existence of the gross form etc. is established by their determinate cognition as

⁶⁵ “sarvavijñānām svasaṃvedanaṃ pratyakṣam avikalpaṃ yadi, niścayasyāpi kasyacit svata evāniścayāt | niścayāntaraparikalpanāyām anavasthānāt kutaḥ tatsaṃvyavahārasiddhiḥ |” (*Akalaṅkagranthatrāya* quoted in Shah 1968: 228, footnote 63).

well. And it is then established that gross form etc. is not only a mental creation, but a really existing thing (§19-23).

Now Vidyānandin raises two objections on behalf of the Buddhists against his own arguments. The first of these, discussed in §§24-26, argues that the universal or whole cannot be real, for the contingency of whether it resides wholly or partly in its particulars or parts will arise.⁶⁶ This argument, Vidyānandin says, does not apply to the Jain conception of the universal, because the Jains do not hold the universal to be one or absolutely different from the particulars, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika do.⁶⁷

The second argument raised on behalf of the Buddhists, discussed in §§27-30, is that it is not proved that atoms (*paramāṇu*) can combine.⁶⁸ In the Bauddha *pūrvapakṣa* Vidyānandin has already explained the *rūpaskandha* as “The atoms of color, taste, smell and touch, which are different from [both] the similar and dissimilar [atoms], **and unconnected with one another**” (SŚP 20, 3-4). According to Vasubandhu, the *paramāṇu* is the smallest particle of *rūpa* (matter) (Radhakrishnan 1966a: 617). While the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas do not accept double or triple atoms⁶⁹, they do allow for indefinite atomic aggregations. The perceptible atomic unit is the *aṇu*, which is a combination of *paramāṇus* (1966a: 617). Though the Sautrāntikas do thus accept some kind of relation between the atoms making up atomic aggregates, according to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) I. 43, Bhadanta Dharmatrāta maintains that “atoms don’t enter into direct contact with one another. If atoms touched completely, they would merge. If atoms touched partially, there would be parts to atoms, but atoms have no parts” (Anacker 1999a: 523). Vasubandhu, who is said to have written the *bhāṣya* from a Sautrāntika perspective, agrees, and adds that one merely says that there is contact between atoms when there is no interval between them, really there is no such contact. One cannot make a radical distinction between atoms and aggregates of atoms (ibid: 523). So while the Sautrāntikas do accept atomic aggregates, they in fact do not accept combination of atoms in the sense of atoms coming into direct contact with each other.

We note the similarity of the statement in the AKBh to the objection raised on behalf of the Sautrāntikas by Vidyānandin. A similar and more detailed objection,

⁶⁶ The argument presented here is taken from Samantabhadra’s *Āptamīmāṃsā*, where it is used against the Vaiśeṣika. Parts of the argument are taken directly from Akalaṅka’s commentary to the *Āptamīmāṃsā*, the *Aṣṭaśatī*. Cf. Chapter 4.

⁶⁷ The doctrine of absolute difference between parts and the whole, individuals and the universal etc. and Vidyānandin’s refutation of it is dealt with in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika section of the present chapter (below).

⁶⁸ “Because, if [the atoms] relate partly, [i.e.] if they have simultaneous contact with six atoms from different directions, it results in [the atom] having six parts. If [the atoms] relate wholly, it results in a [composite atomic] aggregate having [the dimension] of only a single atom” (SŚP 24, 25-25, 1 §27 Bauddha chapter).

⁶⁹ Double and triple atoms here probably refers to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that two *paramāṇus* make up a *dvyāṇuka* (binary) and three *dvyāṇukas* make up a *tryāṇuka* (tertiary), which is the smallest visible unit (Kharwandikar 2004d: 299).

containing several of the elements found in the argument as presented in the SŚP, is also raised by Vasubandhu in his *Viṃśatikā*, which is a Yogācāra work:

“An object can be neither one thing nor several things. If it were a unity, it would have to be like the composite whole constructed by the Vaiśeṣikas. It cannot be plural, either, because atoms can’t be apprehended singly. An atom, in fact, can’t be demonstrated either, because *by the simultaneous contact with, say, six elements, the atom comes to have six parts, and is thus no longer an atom. If it is maintained that the locus of each single atom is the locus of all six elements, then the molecule would be only one atom, because of the mutual exclusion of occupants of a locus.* Vaibhāṣika: It’s only when atoms are in a molecular state that they can join together. Reply: But atoms can’t join together to form molecules unless they have parts which contact each other. And if they have parts they’re not atoms” (Anacker 1999b: 642, italics added)

That this idea of atoms not coming into contact with each other is recorded and attributed to Bhadanta Dharmatrāta already in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (1st century AD) (Buswel & Jaini 1996: 79; Ichimura, Kawamura, Buswell Jr. & Cox 1996: 562-3) makes it clear that it is old. Noting the similarities with Vasubandhu’s argument in the *Viṃśatikā* and the AKBh, Vidyānandin’s source for this objection on behalf of the Buddhists requires further investigation.

In any event, Vidyānandin refutes this argument as pertaining only to the Naiyāyikas, who hold that the atoms have a static nature, which is not accepted by the Jainas.⁷⁰ He moreover asserts that causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*), here perhaps more in the sense of the capacity to perform functions in general, would be impossible if the atoms did not combine, and thus, as causal efficacy is observed, the combination of atoms must take place.

Vidyānandin further argues that there could also not be any variegated cognition, i.e. cognition of variegated color, if the atoms did not combine and did not have some identity, i.e. if they did not change their nature when combining. Vidyānandin thus considers the external object having a nature that is *sui generis* both minute and gross, and the universal, defined as similar modification, to be proved.

It is thus seen that even though the main issue in these two first major points which Vidyānandin takes up⁷¹ are phrased ontologically, Vidyānandin’s argumentation is by and large of an epistemological nature. The issue to which the most space and energy is devoted is the question, “what is perception?”. As stated above, the Sautrāntikas hold that perception is *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate or free from conceptual construction). In

⁷⁰ Cf. Tatia’s summary of Siddhasenagaṇi’s *Svopajñabhāṣyaṭīkā*’s (SBṬ) commentary to TS 5, 28, where he says: The problem of perceptibility is essentially connected with the integration of atoms which is a difficult issue. An atom has no parts. How can two atoms, both of which are partless, combine together to make a single cluster? How can many imperceptible units create a perceptible one? The SBṬ discusses this problem at length (5.1, 5.11, 5.25, 5.26) and attempts to solve the issue by distinguishing two aspects of atoms: an atom as partless matter (matter without parts) and an atom as the integrated qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour. These two aspects are respectively called “matter-atom” and “quality-atom”. The integration of the qualities of touch, taste, and so on, to a point of saturation, may result in perceptibility” (Tatia 1994: 134).

⁷¹ i.e. the non-existence of the particular as accepted by the Sautrāntikas and the existence of the gross form etc., which the Sautrāntikas deny real existence.

other words, perception according to the Sautrāntikas per definition does not cognize the gross form etc.. To prove that these exist and that the particular held by the Sautrāntikas does not, Vidyānandin sets out to prove that perception, as defined by the Sautrāntikas, is not perception and thus cannot establish their doctrines.

Vidyānandin again returns to discussing epistemological questions towards the end of the Bauddha chapter (§§48-49), after his third main point against the Sautrāntikas is concluded. Here he argues against the Sautrāntika definition of determinate (*savikalpaka*) cognition, which is held to cognize the object associated with the word denoting it. Vidyānandin argues that this is not possible. Thus, since determinate cognition as accepted by the Sautrāntikas is impossible, there can be no perception at all, as perception is valid only when generating a later determinate cognition. Since there is no perception, the objects of perception cannot be established, and thus “all is lost” for the Sautrāntikas.

The third main point Vidyānandin discusses in this chapter, also this closely tied to the previous two, is the impossibility of the absolutely momentary thing. For the solid form accepted by the Jains is proved to be both permanent and impermanent *sui generis* in that it successively pervades manifold forms. Thus the absolutely momentary thing accepted by the Sautrāntika Buddhists is not real. The way in which Vidyānandin sets out to prove the non-existence of the absolutely momentary thing builds upon Dharmakīrti’s definition of the existing thing as causally efficient. For Dharmakīrti has stated: “sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ” (*Pramāṇavārtika* III 165 quoted in Shah 1968: 45), i.e. that which is causally efficient, that truly exists. According to Shah (1968), Dharmakīrti was probably the first philosopher to ever define reality in terms of causal efficacy. Moreover, he used this definition in his argumentation against the absolutely permanent thing, establishing that only the absolutely momentary thing may be causally efficient, while the absolutely permanent thing cannot, and thus cannot be real⁷² (1968: 45).

The first philosopher to adapt this argumentation and turn it against Dharmakīrti, arguing that the absolutely momentary thing can also not be causally efficient, seems to have been the Buddhist Bhadanta Yogasena. Other philosophers followed suit, and the first Jaina philosopher to argue in this way seems to have been Akalaṅka (Shah 1968: 60 footnote 33). Following these, and among them, as will be shown below, especially Akalaṅka, Vidyānandin’s purpose is to establish that the momentary thing cannot be causally efficient, and thus prove that the absolutely momentary thing does not exist.

⁷² Though criticism arguing for the impossibility of causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) in the absolutely permanent cause had previously been set forth by Buddhist philosophers such as Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, Āryadeva and Vasubandhu, they did not, as Dharmakīrti later did, make it the ultimate test of reality (Shah 1968: 44-45).

Another important concept in this discussion is the Buddhist epistemological concept of *anvayavyatireka*, or agreement and contrariety, especially used by Dharmakīrti in describing the relation between cause and effect. It is explained by Bartley (2005) as

“a mode of reasoning (*yukti*), stating that when A is present, B is present, and when A is absent, B is absent. This is used to establish a relation of cause and effect. For example: given that we see that our own actions happen after our intentions and that they do not happen in the absence of our intentions, there is a causal connection between intention and the occurrence of an action. The causal relation is established by perception and non-perception and consists in positive and negative agreement.” (2005: 25).

The Jaina position on causation is that the effect is a new modification which occurs in an already existing and permanent substance. This substance is the cause. The Sautrāntika position, on the other hand, is that both the cause and the effect are momentary, and that the effect immediately succeeds the cause (Shah 1968: 61). They moreover hold that a momentary cause, such as a *rūpa-kṣaṇa*, can produce various effects according to circumstance, i.e. whether it acts as the material cause or auxiliary cause. Thus a *rūpa-kṣaṇa*, acting as the material cause, can produce a following *rūpa-kṣaṇa*. But, acting as an auxiliary cause, it can also produce *rasa-*, *gandha-* and *sparśa-kṣaṇas*, depending on the circumstances, i.e. depending on which kind of *kṣaṇa* is the material cause. Thus when the *rasa-kṣaṇa* is the material cause and the other *kṣaṇas* are auxiliary causes, a *rasa-kṣaṇa* is produced etc. (Shah 1968: 64-5).

One of the main points Vidyānandin makes is that the principle of *anvayavyatireka*, i.e. that when on the presence of one thing another thing comes into existence, the former is the cause and the latter the effect (Shah 1968: 61), is not possible in the Sautrāntika theory of momentariness. In other words, the momentary cause cannot have agreement and contrariety with respect to the effect.

Vidyānandin starts this discussion by highlighting the difference in the ontological positions of the Jainas and the Sautrāntika Buddhists. Quoting Akalaṅka he says:

Indeed thus it is said by the master, Bhaṭṭākalaṅka:

“Just as one [thing] may simultaneously produce or pervade [many] objects in different places. Just so one [thing] may successively produce or pervade [many] modes at different times.’

Because, if [it is maintained that] the previous and following moments are completely unconnected, it is contradicted by causal efficacy. For, causal efficacy is not found in the absolutist doctrine of the destruction of moments. Because it is seen that [the theory of momentariness] contradicts the production [of effects], on account of resulting in the effect not having a cause if the external and internal objects are absolutely destroyed” (SSP 26, 6-11 §31 Bauddha chapter).

The momentary cause is not synchronous with the effect, i.e. when the effect arises the cause has already been destroyed, and thus cannot be its cause. That the cause is held to immediately precede the effect does not help, as its non-existence at the time of the effect makes it no more suitable for it to be the cause than for a moment that was destroyed a long time before. Their non-existence at the time of the effect is the same (§32). The

absolutely momentary cause cannot have agreement and contrariety with respect to the effect any more than the absolutely permanent cause can, because the momentary cause does not exist at the time of the effect and the effect must then arise from itself (§§33-34).

Akalaṅka has argued similarly. In his *Siddhiviniścaya*, he states: “[if] the effect [is produced] from a potent [cause] that has previously perished, [then] why [can it] not [be produced] from an imperishable cause? Let not the existence of the cause contradict the arising of the effect”⁷³. In summarizing Akalaṅka’s further argumentation in the *Siddhiviniścaya*, Shah writes:

“Dharmakīrti should not consider what immediately precedes the effect to be the cause of it just as he does not consider that which is separated from the effect by a gap of time to be the cause of it; for, both are similar so far as their utter non-existence at the time of the effect is concerned...If the effect is held to come into existence as a result of the absence of something (say X) that immediately precedes the effect, then the effect should be existent at all moments save the moment of X’s existence because at all those moments there is the ‘absence of X’. If the momentarist is to avoid this contingency, he will have to accept that the effect comes into being by itself. Dharmakīrti should not qualify one non-existent and thus seeking to differentiate it from another non-existents. The reason is that non-existents are essenceless and hence in no way can they be differentiated from one another” (1968: 63-4).

Vidyānandin further argues that the Sautrāntikas cannot argue that, just as the effect does not need to arise in the place of the cause, it does not need to arise at the time of the cause. In other words, the cause need no longer exist at the time of the effect, for the effect arises at its own time. For if this is held then the same may be argued to hold true for the permanent cause (§34). This too resembles an argument raised by Akalaṅka:

“Akalaṅka says that we may grant that the momentary cause can produce the effect even when it itself is absent but that it must produce a particular effect at that particular time which is appropriate for the production of this effect and at no other time. Dharmakīrti’s possible reply to this is that it is not that the cause produces the effect but that the effect itself comes into being (immediately after the cause). Akalaṅka points out that the same thing can be said with equal cogency with regard to a non-momentary cause. The non-momentary cause does not produce the effects, but that the effects themselves, one after another, come into existence at their own destined time” (Shah 1968: 62).

The difference between Vidyānandin’s argument and that of Akalaṅka is that, though they both have the opponent solve the problem by having the effect arise at its own destined time, it does not seem that Vidyānandin presupposes the counter-argument of the Sautrāntikas to be that the cause does not give rise to the effect, though this is set forth as a consequence in the argument in §§33-34. It rather seems that Vidyānandin’s proposed objection of the Sautrāntikas builds upon the idea of the immediately preceding cause giving rise to the effect. This is expressed by the use of *sati* and *asati*, i.e. “on the existence/presence [of the cause]” and “on the non-existence/absence [of the cause]”, which is used in the sentence concerning the effect only arising at its own time.⁷⁴ Thus the cause produces the effect, though the effect arises later at its own time, and by that

⁷³ “pūrvam naśvarāc chaktāt kāryam kinnāvinaśvarāt | kāryotpattir virudhyeta na vai kāraṇasattayā ||” (*Siddhiviniścaya* quoted in Shah 1968: 61, footnote 35)

⁷⁴ *svadeśavat svakāla sati samarthe kāraṇe kāryam jāyate nāsati* (SŚP 26, 19 §34 Bauddha chapter).

time the cause has perished. Both Vidyānandin and Akalaṅka hold that this would be applicable to the permanent cause as well. It has been argued that the permanent cause, being unchanging, would continuously be causally efficient. Thus it would constantly produce all its effects simultaneously. But, Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin argue, following the example of the Sautrāntikas, it can then be argued that this will not happen, as the effect will only arise at its own destined time. If the Sautrāntikas ask how it is that the permanent cause can have accordance in agreement and contrariety with the effect when it is always efficient yet the effect only arises at its own time, Vidyānandin answers that they must then answer how this can be true for the momentary cause when the effect only arises in a moment characterized by its non-existence (§35).

The Sautrāntikas may object that if the permanent cause produces various effects successively, it cannot have a unitary nature, i.e. its nature would have to be slightly different when producing the different effects, and thus it would not be permanent. But, Vidyānandin argues, the same problem is found for the impermanent cause, which too, even though it is one, produces various effects and thus has a manifold nature as if it was several objects. Just as cognition of color, smell and touch depend on the object of cognition having multiple capacities, so the cause, such as a momentary lamp, must have multiple capacities to produce its various effects such as the burning of the wick etc. (§§35-36). For, as mentioned above, the momentary cause is held by the Sautrāntikas to be capable of producing various effects depending on whether it is the material or an auxiliary cause. This argument too has been raised by Akalaṅka.⁷⁵ Shah (1968) writes:

“Dharmakīrti argues that an eternal cause, because it gives rise to ever new effect every moment, is not really one indivisible ‘uni-natured’ whole. Akalaṅka rightly points out that an identical difficulty arises in the case of the momentary cause. A momentary cause is multi natured because it gives rise to a number of effects, just as a number of different objects have different natures of their own. Unless the cause possesses the multiplicity of capacities it cannot produce multiple effects, just as knowledge of colour etc.. is impossible unless the object of knowledge possesses a multiplicity of capacities. A lamp, because of its multiple capacities, burns up a wick and dries up the oil at one and the same moment” (Shah 1968: 65).

Vidyānandin argues that only the cause which is both permanent and impermanent *sui generis* can be causally efficient, for only it can have manifold capacities, which are an essential condition for the capability to produce effects both simultaneously and successively. The momentary and permanent causes cannot have such capability, as they

⁷⁵ This argument, worded almost identically to how it is presented in the SŚP, is moreover also found in Vidyānandin’s Aṣṭasahasī, which is a commentary to Akalaṅka’s Aṣṭaśatī: “*nityasya pratikṣanam anekakāryakāritve kramaśo ‘nekasvabhāvatvasiddheḥ katham ekatvaṃ syād iti cet kṣaṇikasya katham iti samah saryanuyogaḥ | sa hi kṣaṇasthitir eko ‘pi bhāvo ‘nekasvabhāvaś citrakāryatvān nānārthavat | na hi kāraṇaśaktibhedam antareṇa kāryanānātvaṃ yuktaṃ rūpādijñānavat | yathaiva hi karkaṭikādau rūpādijñānāni rūpādisvabhāvabhedanibandhanāni tathā kṣaṇasthiter ekasmād api bhāvāt pradīpāder vartikāmukhadāhatatāiśośādivicitrakāryāni śaktibhedanimittakāni vyavatiṣṭhante | anyathā rūpāder nānātvaṃ na sidhyet, cakṣurādisāmāgrībhedāt tajjñānirbhāsabhedo ‘vakalpyeta,*” (Aṣṭasahasī 183/6-8 quoted in Soni 2009: 455-56; italics and bold in original). When compared to §§35 and 36 of the SŚP Bauddha chapter, they are found to be almost identical.

are of a uniform nature. He further shows that this problem cannot be solved by appealing to the assisting causes. Thus only the object accepted by the Jainas, i.e. the permanent substance which abandons previous modes and appropriates future modes, exists, as only it can be causally efficient (§43-46).

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, originally two separate systems which then merged, to put it somewhat simply (and thus necessarily simplified), into one in that the categories of the Vaiśeṣikas were accepted by the Naiyāyikas and the categories of the Naiyāyikas, dealing mostly with inference and argumentation, were accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas. This merging process was already well under way by the time the Praśastapādabhāṣya, which is the main source for Vidyānandin's *pūrvapakṣa* in the Vaiśeṣika chapter of the SŚP, was composed, and it seems to have reached its final stage by the 9th century (Jha 2004: 51-2). According to Jha (2004: 52-3), the two systems were completely merged by the time of Udayana (10th century). The merged school then became known by the name Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

This explains Vidyānandin's combined treatment of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines as described above. The SŚP was composed during the final stage of the merger between the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, but before the complete merger had taken place. Thus Vidyānandin treats them as very closely related yet separate systems. However, as shown above, Vidyānandin considers the arguments raised against the Vaiśeṣikas as refuting the Nyāya teachings as well. The *uttarapakṣa* of the Nyāya chapter is very short, briefly mentioning some objections against the Nyāya categories. Vidyānandin moreover quotes the Nyāyasūtra in the Vaiśeṣika *pūrvapakṣa* (SŚP 34, 23-24). As both the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya categories are clearly explained in their respective *pūrvapakṣas* in the SŚP, they will not be discussed here.

The first of the two main topics discussed by Vidyānandin in the Vaiśeṣika chapter is their view of the parts and the whole, the universal and the individual⁷⁶ etc. as being completely different from each other. Vidyānandin refutes this by proving that the relation of *samavāya* (inherence) accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas is impossible. He then shows how all the categories accepted by the Vaiśeṣika are impossible, since they all depend on *samavāya*. Vidyānandin's main purpose, however, is to show that the parts and the whole

⁷⁶ Also referred to as the particular (*viśeṣa*), as for example: “atha kathamcid abhinnāḥ, tadā siddham sāmānyasya *viśeṣapratyaya*viśayatvam, *viśeṣapratyaya*viśayebhyo *viśeṣebhyaḥ* kathamcid abhinnasya sāmānyasya *viśeṣapratyaya*viśayatopapatteḥ *viśeṣasvātmavat* | tato naikam eva sattādisāmānyam | nāpy anamśam, kathamcit sāmśatvapatīteḥ; sāmśebhyo *viśeṣebhyo* ‘narthāntarabhūtasya sāmśatvopapatteḥ tatsvātmavat |” (SŚP 47, 12-15 §16 Mīmāṃsā chapter). It should be pointed out that particular is here then not used in the sense of the Vaiśeṣika *padārtha* particular (*viśeṣa*, cf SŚP 44, 6 and 44, 18-19 §§1 and 3 Vaiśeṣika chapter).

etc. are not absolutely different, but both different and non-different *sui generis*.

Vidyānandin starts the *uttarapakṣa* by declaring:

Firstly, this very doctrine of the Aulūkyas is contradicted by perception. Because the one-sided difference which is desired by them of the part and the whole, quality and that which has qualities, activity and that which possesses activity and universal and individual is contradicted by sensory experience, which grasps the non-difference of those. For, when there is sensory perception, it is not so that the whole etc. appears only as completely different from [its] parts etc., but it does indeed [appear] as non-different in some ways (SSP 35, 25-28 §§8-9 Vaiśeṣika chapter).

In defence against this, Vidyānandin has the Vaiśeṣika reply: “Certainly the whole etc. appears as if not being a separate entity from those [parts] on account of inherence.” (SSP 36, 1 §10 Vaiśeṣika chapter). Thus Vidyānandin sets out to disprove the relation of inherence (*samavāya*).

The Vaiśeṣika concept of *samavāya* underwent reinterpretations in early Vaiśeṣika philosophy (Halbfass 1992: 74-75), but these do not concern us here. It is the later meaning, or focus of meaning, of the inherence of attributes in their substrates, such as qualities inhering in substance etc., which became the most conspicuous function of *samavāya* in the work of Praśastapāda (Halbfass 1992: 75), who, as mentioned above, is the main source for Vidyānandin’s Vaiśeṣika *pūrvapakṣa*, which is of importance here.

Samavāya is in the classical Vaiśeṣika texts described as a relation (*sambandha*) which relates inseparable (*ayutasiddha*) things, i.e. things that are incapable of existing separately as their relationship is one of dependence and support (*āśrayāśritabhāva*)⁷⁷ (Halbfass 1992: 147). *Samavāya* explains the residence (*vṛtti*), i.e. dependent occurrence, of wholes in their parts etc.. Unlike *saṃyoga* (conjunction) which relates separable things and is destroyed upon their separation, *samavāya* is one and permanent, and is not affected by what happens to its relata (Halbfass 1992: 147-8). Halbfass (1992) describes *samavāya* as: “...an indispensable cornerstone of the classical Vaiśeṣika system, in particular its ontology” (1992: 149), and states that “what is perhaps most frequently misunderstood or overlooked is the ontological significance of the term” (Halbfass 1992: 147). As will be shown, this significance was not lost on Vidyānandin.

As shown above, the start of Vidyānandin’s discussion on inherence is the Vaiśeṣika objection that the parts and wholes etc. are indeed absolutely different, but only appear not to be so on account of inherence. To this Vidyānandin replies that if it were so, the *Nyāyasūtra*’s definition of perception as “that which arises from the ‘contact’ of a sense-organ with its object, inexpressible by words, *unerring* and well defined”⁷⁸ (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 49; my italics) is inapplicable, as the perception of the wholes as

⁷⁷ More specifically referring to parts and wholes (*avayavāvayavin*), substrates and their qualities (*guṇa*) and activities (*karman*), eternal substances and the particular (*viśeṣa*) and substances (*dravya*), qualities and activities and their universals (*sāmānya*) (Halbfass 1992: 147).

⁷⁸ *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam avyapadeśyavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam* | nyāyasū- 1|1|4|

not absolutely different from the parts etc. is then clearly erroneous (§10). For it is not so that the difference between the parts and whole etc. is perceived by means of perception (§11).

Inherence, as accepted by the opponent, is not established. For, Vidyānandin argues, if it does it must be answered whether this inherence reside in its substrate or not. And if it does, whether it really resides in its substrate or figuratively resides in its substrate (§12). These three options are then refuted in §§12-22.

Having thus refuted the relation of inherence, Vidyānandin sets out to show how this results in the impossibility of any of the existents posited by the Vaiśeṣika. Thus since inherence does not exist, conjunction, being a quality and thus depending on inherence, cannot exist (§23). Since conjunction does not exist, conjunction of atoms cannot take place. Since the conjunction of atoms cannot take place, the fourfold elements cannot exist, and since the fourfold elements elements do not exist, the individual atoms, which are thought to be the cause of the elements, cannot exist, for the Āptamīmāṃsā states that the cause is that which the effect as its mark (§24).

There being no objects or atoms, space and time cannot exist. On the non-existence of conjunction, sound cannot exist. And on the non-existence of sound, ākāśa, which is accepted to be the material cause of sound, also cannot exist. As there can be no conjunction of the mind and the soul, the qualities of the soul cannot arise, and thus the soul too cannot exist (§24). In the end all substances, and with them all qualities, actions, the universal and the particular, all having substance as their substrate, cannot exist as their substrate does not exist, and thus all is lost for the Vaiśeṣikas (§25).

The main point that Vidyānandin has been driving at throughout his refutation of inherence is that its non-existence would result in the completely different parts and wholes, universals and individuals etc., being cognized as such. But they are not, and thus it is proved that the parts and whole etc. are not completely different, because their absolute difference is contradicted by sensory perception (§26). Wilhelm Halbfass is quoted above saying that the ontological significance of *samavāya* (inherence) is often not understood. Vidyānandin's employment of this term clearly shows that he did understand its ontological significance. Vidyānandin's quote from the Yuktyanuśāsana of Samantabhadra⁷⁹ shows that this was also understood by the Jaina philosophers preceding him.

The second major point discussed by Vidyānandin in the Vaiśeṣika chapter is the non-existence of a creator god. God was originally only found in the Nyāya system, but

⁷⁹ “The nature of the objects of your [doctrine] [O Arhat] is a nature that is [both] different and non-different [*sui generis*]. That which is independent of one of the two [i.e. difference or non-difference] [is non-existent] [just like] the sky-flower. All objects are abandoned because relation is abandoned on account of the inherence-relation not possessing [another] relation [by which it can reside in that which it is to relate].” (*Yuktyanuśāsana* 7 quoted in SSP 39, 12-13).

was incorporated by the Vaiśeṣika by the time of the Praśastapādabhāṣya (Jha 2004: 52). The Nyāya, and thus also the Vaiśeṣika, infer the existence of God from the body, the world etc. being effects. Just like a pot must have an intelligent creator, so the world, being a product, must have an intelligent creator. This intelligent creator is held by the Naiyāyikas to be an omnipotent, personal being. Moreover, he has knowledge (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*) and active effort (*prayatna*), which makes him capable of creation. God has, however, not created the soul or the atoms, which are both eternal, but fashioned the world out of the eternally existing atoms (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 167-72).

God, according to Udayana's *Kusumañjali*, supervises the activity of *adr̥ṣṭa* (the unseen), which in turn explains such phenomena as merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*) and the connection of souls with organic bodies. These phenomena cannot be explained by natural causes alone, and are accounted for by *adr̥ṣṭa*. But *adr̥ṣṭa*, being a non-intelligent cause, cannot by itself cause happiness (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*) at the suitable time and place. Thus *adr̥ṣṭa* acts under the direction of God, who governs its operation (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 167).

Contrary to that which is held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Jains hold that it is the transmigrating beings themselves who, through the workings of their karma, create the body and suitable objects of experience. While arguing for this, Vidyānandin puts forward several arguments against the existence of God. These may be categorized as follows: 1) problems concerning whether or not God has a body (§§27-28); 2) God cannot possess knowledge (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*) or active effort (*prayatna*), necessary for creation, as the liberated soul does not possess these (§29); 3) The problem of evil (§§30-32); and 4) even if it is conceded that the Nyāya syllogism proves the existence of an intelligent creator, it does not prove an intelligent creator with the characteristics ascribed to him, such as omnipotence etc., by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (§§33-35).

The Mīmāṃsā

The Mīmāṃsā system, founded by Jaimini, has the defense of Vedic ritualism as its primary object. In attempting to do so, it developed a philosophy which could support this ritualistic world view. As one of its main concerns is defending the validity of the Vedas, it developed an elaborate theory of knowledge (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 43-44). This, however, is not discussed by Vidyānandin, at least not in the part of the Mīmāṃsā chapter which has survived, who focuses on the doctrine of the universal.

Contrary to the Sautrāntika Buddhists, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas, like the Jains, regard the universal (*sāmānya*) to be a really existing thing. However, unlike the Jains, both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Prābhākara-mīmāṃsakas regard the

universal as a separate category.⁸⁰ There are several more aspects in which their doctrines concerning the universal differ, both with relation to the Jaina concept of universal and with each other. These, along with Vidyānandin’s arguments against these doctrines, are examined here.

The universal as really existing thing is not, as might have been expected, discussed in the Vaiśeṣika chapter of the SŚP, but in the Mīmāṃsā chapter. Moreover, the Mīmāṃsā chapter is directed against both the Bhāṭṭa-mīmāṃsakas and Prābhākara-mīmāṃsakas. Though he distinguishes between the Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the Mīmāṃsaka chapter, Vidyānandin does not distinguish between them in his discussion on the universal. The starting verse of Vidyānandin’s *uttarapakṣa* in the Mīmāṃsaka chapter is here worth quoting in full, as it clearly reveals this treatment of the Mīmāṃsakas and elucidates the features of the universal against which Vidyānandin’s arguments are directed.

“That very doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas is firstly contradicted by perception. The categories, earth etc., are [held to be] caused to appear after the universal, existence-ness etc., by [both] the followers of Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara, who are called Mīmāṃsakas. And this is accepted by them: “The universal, existence etc., is completely permanent, without parts, one and [all]-pervading”. But that is certainly contradicted by perception, because the universal, defined as similar modification, is impermanent and not contained in everything, is cognized, through sensory perception, as having many forms by having the nature of many individuals, just like color [has the nature of many individuals]. For a unitary universal [existing] in [many] individuals found in various places, like [one piece of] bamboo etc. [existing] in [several] pillars etc., is not cognized through sensory perception, nor is there non-origination and non-destruction [of the universal] while there is origination and destruction of the individual, from which there could be sensory perception of that [permanent universal]. This very universal, of the nature declared by the opponents, does not make itself fit with respect to perceptual cognition, and [yet] desires to claim perceptibility for itself. Thus [the Mīmāṃsakas] are a laughingstock for the wise, because they are customers that do not want to pay the price [of that which they desire to buy]. [The universal as described by the Mīmāṃsakas] is only a word” (SSP 45, 8-14 §6 Mīmāṃsa chapter).

As this paragraph shows, the universal against which Vidyānandin argues is 1) completely permanent; 2) without parts; 3) one; and 4) all-pervading. This characterization is very similar to the universal as accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, and before discussing the Mīmāṃsaka view of universals and how the above described universal fits with the known doctrines of the Mīmāṃsakas, it will be helpful to give a brief description of the universal as accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

The Vaiśeṣika doctrine of universals is described by Vidyānandin in the Vaiśeṣika *pūrvapakṣa* by quoting the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.⁸¹ The explanation given there focuses only on the distinction between “higher” and “lower” universals. In short, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that the universal (*sāmānya*), which is the cause of the cognition of

⁸⁰ Cf. SŚP 34, 3-7 §1 Vaiśeṣika chapter and SŚP 44, 6-14 §2 Mīmāṃsā chapter. The Bhāṭṭa-mīmāṃsakas do not consider the universal a separate category, and view it as included in the 11 categories accepted by them. Cf. SŚP 44, 3-5 §1 Mīmāṃsā chapter.

⁸¹ §§2-4 SŚP 34, 8-24.

similarity, is an objectively existing real.⁸² The universals, such as “substanceness”, “whiteness”, “cowness” etc. reside in individual substances, white things, cows etc., and account for the fact that numerically different things, such as cows, can all be associated with the same concept, referred to by the same term, identified as belonging to the same class and distinguished from members of other classes (Halbfass 1992: 71). In other words, it is the reason for many numerically different cows all being identified as cows, called “cows” and distinguished from sheep. The universal is eternal, it is one and it is without parts. Moreover, it is different from the substance, quality or action in which it inheres, because if it were identical with them it would be destroyed when one specimen of these is destroyed. There is some disagreement as to whether this one, eternal universal is all-pervading or not. While the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* holds that it only exists in the concerned individuals and not in the space between them, Jayanta (a Naiyāyika) holds that it exists both in the individuals and in the intervening space. The reason for it not being perceived in the intervening space is that it can only reveal itself through the individuals (Shah 1968: 78-9).

The universal is moreover of two different kinds, “higher” and “lower”, according to the level of inclusivity. The highest, or most inclusive, universal is existence-ness (*sattā*), as it inheres in all substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*) and actions (*karman*). Its function is purely inclusive. The lower, more specific, universals, such as substanceness (*dravyatva*) etc., have both an inclusive and an exclusive function as they cause identification with members of the same class and distinguishing from members of other classes (Halbfass 1992: 71).

The universal as accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas differs from that accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in several ways. Moreover, the universal as accepted by the Bhāṭṭas differs from that accepted by the Prābhākaras. The Prābhākaras, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, hold the universal to be one, eternal and different from the individuals. They differ from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view in some respects though, as they do not hold that the inherence relation between the universal and the individual is eternal; they do not acknowledge the existence of the universals existence-ness (*sattā*), word-ness (*śabdatva*) or brahmin-ness (*brahmaṇatva*) (the last of these accepted by the Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭa-mīmāṃsakas); and they do not accept that qualities (*guṇa*) and actions (*karman*) can have universals (Shah 1968: 80-81). Shah (1968) does not say whether or not the Prābhākaras accept the universal to be all-pervasive, not mentioning it in the list of issues on which their view of the universal differs from the Naiyāyikas, some of whom accept the universal to be all-pervasive (1968: 80-81).

⁸² The universal (*sāmānya*) is included within the six categories (*padārtha*) accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas. Cf. SSP 34, 3-7 §1 Vaiśeṣika chapter.

According to Shah (1968), the Bhāṭṭa-mīmāṃsakas, the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, on the other hand, hold the universal to be not one but both one and many⁸³, not absolutely eternal but both eternal and non-eternal, and not different from the individual but both different and non-different from the individual.⁸⁴ Like the Prābhākaras, they do not accept the universal *sattā* (existence-ness), but they do, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, accept that qualities (*guṇa*) and activities (*karman*) can have universals. Concerning the all-pervasive-ness of the universal, the Bhāṭṭa view is that it should be regarded as present only in a select group of individuals⁸⁵, though Jayanta’s view of the universal being all-pervasive is viewed as a possible alternative⁸⁶ (Shah 1968: 83-5). As Shah (1968: 86) points out, this view of the universal seems clearly influenced by the Jain *anekāntavāda* (theory of non-absolutism). However, the *Ślokavārtika* (*Ślokavārtika Ākṛtivāda* verse 46-7) also expresses the view that the universal and individual are identical. This will be discussed below. As will be shown, it is not clear if all the views described by Shah can be found expressed by Kumārila himself, as some of his references are to the *Śāstradīpikā*, written by Pārthasārathi. Pārthasārathi is dated to 1300 A.D. by Radhakrishnan (1966b: 377). Thus it is not at all certain that these views were current in Vidyānandin’s time.

With the various stances taken with respect to the universal by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Prābhākara-mīmāṃsakas and Bhāṭṭa-mīmāṃsakas in mind, we note several interesting aspects concerning the the universal described by Vidyānandin in §6 of the Mīmāṃsā chapter (quoted above), which he intends to refute. Firstly, it is not described as absolutely different from the individuals. This is the position taken by the Prābhākaras (as well as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas). Secondly, the example here used for a universal is *sattā* (existence-ness) (which is also used as an example of the universal throughout the Mīmāṃsā chapter), which is not accepted by both the Prābhākaras and Bhāṭṭas, but which is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. And thirdly, it is claimed that both the Prābhākaras and Bhāṭṭas accept the universal as described in this paragraph, while, as will be shown,

⁸³ *ekatve ‘py ākṛter yadvad bahutvam vyaktypeksayā | bahutve hi tathā vyakter ekatvam jāyapeksayā || 85 || ekānekābhīdhāne ca śabdāḥ niyataśaktayaḥ | (Ślokavārtika Vanavāda verse 85-86a). Jhā (1900) translates: “Just as, even though the Class by itself is one, yet it has multiplicity, in view of the individuals (included therein),— so too, though the individuals are many, yet they may be considered as one, in view of the Class (to which they belong)” (Jhā 1900: 345).*

⁸⁴ “tasmāt pramāṇabalena bhinnābhinnatvam eva yuktam |” (*Śāstradīpikā* quoted in Shah 1968. 83 footnote 38). It should be noted that the *Śāstradīpikā* was not written by Kumārila, who seems to be Vidyānandin’s main source in his refutation of the Mīmāṃsā view of the universal, but by Pārthasārathi, dated by Radhakrishnan (1966b: 377) to 1300 A.D., a later commentator on the *Ślokavārtika*.

⁸⁵ *Piṇḍeṣv eva ca sāmānyam nāntarā grhyate yataḥ | na hy ākāśavad icchanti sāmānyam nāma kiṃ cana ||25|| (Ślokavārtika Ākṛtivāda verse 25). “The Class resides in the Individuals, because the Class is not perceived in the interval between the perception of two Individuals. And we do not admit of any (omnipresent) Class like ‘Ākāśa’.” (Ślokavārtika Ākṛtivāda verse 25 translated in Jhā 1900: 286).*

⁸⁶ *yad vā sarvagatatve ‘pi vyaktiḥ śaktyanurodhataḥ | śakriḥ kāryānumeyā hi vyaktidarśanahetukā ||26|| (Ślokavārtika Ākṛtivāda 26). “Or, even if it be admitted to be omnipresent, its manifestation would depend upon certain capabilities (in the Individuals composing it). And such capability would be inferred from its effect in the shape of the manifestation (of the Class)” (Jhā 1900: 286).*

according to other sources, the views of the Prābhākaras and Bhāttas differ widely with respect to the nature of the universal. The question then arises, whose universal is Vidyānandin really arguing against in this chapter? This matter is further complicated by several additional factors which appear in Vidyānandin's arguments against the universal described by him in §6.

Firstly, the arguments in §§7-8 are based on Dharmakīrti's objections against the real universal in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.⁸⁷ The verse quoted in §8 seems clearly to be directed against the universal of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (Matilal 1986: 382), though the absolute difference between the universal and particular is not explicitly stated. That the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika universal is the target of these arguments is explicitly stated in the SŚP itself, which, on behalf of the Mīmāṃsakas, objects to them by saying: "certainly, this fault [applies] only to those who hold that there is [absolute] difference [between the universal and the particular], but not to the Mīmāṃsakas" (SŚP 45, 30 §9 Mīmāṃsā chapter). Such a use of arguments originally intended against another system would not in itself be problematic, as long as they fit the view held by the Mīmāṃsakas. In this case the arguments seem to accurately fit the views of the Prābhākaras, though, as will be shown, the arguments raised from §9 onward, at least in some respects, clearly do not.

Secondly, in §9 it is objected that the faults in §§7-8 do not apply to the Mīmāṃsakas as the Mīmāṃsakas hold the universal to be identical to the individual. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika* is quoted saying this (*Ākṛtivāda* 47, cf. below). That Vidyānandin considers the Mīmāṃsakas, as opposed to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, to hold that the universal and individual are identical is made clear in §15:

"If it is objected: The cognition of difference has a [particular] individual [which is united with] that [universal] as its object. [It is answered:] In that case, if the individuals are accepted to be completely different from the universal, then the Mīmāṃsakas enter into the Yauga doctrine, and that is not suitable because the statement "[this universal is] of these [individuals]" is not acceptable on account of relation being refuted in that [Yauga] doctrine."

Holding that the universal and individual are different is here clearly taken to characterize the Naiyāyikas, as opposed to the Mīmāṃsakas. This view does not seem to be held only by Vidyānandin, as he in §10 quotes the *Hetubindhuṭīkā*, a Buddhist work, which also criticizes the concept of the universal being identical to the individual.

To support this view of the Mīmāṃsakas, Vidyānandin, as mentioned above, quotes the second half of verse 47 of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika Ākṛtivāda*, which says that the universal and the individual are identical. As Vidyānandin only quotes half the verse, it is useful to see this in context:

⁸⁷ The identification of the verse quoted in SSP 45, 27-28 §8 Mīmāṃsā chapter was made by Prof. Shah, but as I have not had recourse to the *Pramāṇavārttika*, I have not been able to confirm it. The verse discussed by Matilal (1986: 382) in his discussion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika universal seems to be the same as the one quoted in SSP 45, 27-28, but as he does not quote the verse this cannot be known for sure.

“And when there is no absolute difference between the dewlap, &c., and the individual cow, and again between the class ‘cow’ and the individuals (composing it), then the reply to the question – “how is it that the class ‘cow’ applies only to the objects endowed with the dewlap, &c.?” – would be that it does so simply because the Class consists of (is identical with) it (the individual endowed with the dewlap, &c.). Then as for the question – “Whence is this identity?” – you must understand that it lies in the very nature (of the Class and the individuals composing it)”⁸⁸ (Jhā 1900: 289).

It does not seem entirely clear if the view of the universal as being identical to the individuals is exhaustive of Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa’s position on this matter. Elsewhere in the *Ślokavārttika* it is said:

“(In the case of the cognition of the forest as one), when one gets near the trees, the singleness, of the idea (of the forest) with regard to the them, ceases; whereas, by no means whatever, is the idea of Class (being an entity apart from the Individuals) ever found to be set aside”⁸⁹ (*Ślokavārttika* Vanavāda 56 in Jhā 1900: 339-340).

This statement seems to imply that the universal is also something different from the individuals, which would seem to make their identity non-absolute. That the universal is both different and non-different from the individual is clearly expressed by Pārthasārathi (author of the *Nyāyaratnākara*, a commentary on Kumāriḷa’s *Ślokavārttika*) in his *Śāstradīpikā*, which states: “tasmāt pramāṇabalena bhinnābhinnatvam eva yuktaṃ” (*Śāstradīpikā* quoted in Shah 1968: 83, footnote 38), i.e. “[the universal] being both different and non-different from that [individual] is suitable on account of the valid means of knowledge”. Whether or not this position is clearly expressed by Kumāriḷa himself warrants further investigation. Be this as it may, Vidyānandin seems to use Kumāriḷa’s *Ślokavārttika* as his main source for refuting the Mīmāṃsā view of the universal, since it is the only Mīmāṃsā work he quotes in this respect.⁹⁰

Whatever the true position of Kumāriḷa may be with regard to the relationship between the universal and the particular, Vidyānandin clearly takes him to hold that the universal and the individual are absolutely identical. The Prābhākaras, however, according to Shah (1968: 79-80), do not accept this, and like the Naiyāyikas hold the universal to be different from the individuals. It moreover seems very clear that Kumāriḷa did not hold the universal to be completely one, since the *Ślokavārttika* states that: “Just as, even though the *Class* by itself is *one*, yet it has multiplicity, in view of the individuals (included therein), – so too, though the individuals are many, yet they may be considered as *one*, in view of the *Class* (to which they belong)”⁹¹ (Jhā 1900: 345, italics in original).

⁸⁸ *sāsnādibhyas tu piṇḍasya bhedo nātyantato yadā | sāmānyasya ca piṇḍebhyas tadā syād etad uttaram ||46|| kasmāt sāsnādimsy eva gotvaṃ yasmāt tadātmakam | tādātmyam asya kasmāc cet svabhāvād iti gamyatām ||47||* (*Ślokavārttika Ākṛtivāda* 46-47).

⁸⁹ *samnikṛṣṭasya vrkṣeṣu buddhyekatvaṃ nivartate | kena cit tu prakāreṇa jātibuddhir na naśyate ||56||* (*Ślokavārttika Vanavāda* 56).

⁹⁰ Cf. SŚP 46, 1 §9 Mīmāṃsā chapter and SŚP 46, 18-22 §11 Mīmāṃsā chapter.

⁹¹ *ekatve ‘py ākṛter yadvad bahutvaṃ vyakṛteḥ sayā | bahutve hi tathā vyakter ekatvaṃ jāyapekṣayā || 85 || ekānekābhīdhāne ca śabdāḥ niyataśaktayaḥ |* (*Ślokavārttika Vanavāda* verse 85-86a).

On the other hand, in the *Ślokavārttika Vanavāda* 32 he says: “Just as a single individual, even when met with at different times (and in different places), is recognized to be the same, – so, in the same manner, would also the Class, though inhering in different (individual) substrates (be yet recognized to be *one*).”⁹² (Jhā 1900: 334). Taken together, this seems to be an acceptance of the universal being both one and many.

Kumārila also does not hold the idea that the universal is all-pervading: “The Class resides in the Individuals, because the Class is not perceived in the interval between the perception of two Individuals. And we do not admit of any (omnipresent) Class like ‘Ākāśa’.”⁹³ (Jhā 1900: 286), though he does admit it as a possible alternative: “Or, even if it be admitted to be omnipresent, its manifestation would depend upon certain capabilities (in the Individuals composing it). And such capability would be inferred from its effect in the shape of the manifestation (of the Class)”⁹⁴ (Jhā 1900: 286). Pārthasārathi states in his *Śāstradīpika* that the universal is not eternal but both eternal and non-eternal (Shah 1968: 85), but it is not clear if this is clearly expressed by Kumārila himself.

Thus the universal argued against by Vidyānandin in this chapter (as described in §6 and above), does not seem to fit the known views of either the Bhāṭṭa- or Prābhākara-mīmāṃsakas, or the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. It seems, however, that the universal Vidyānandin is arguing against is by and large the universal of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, who hold the universal to be one and permanent, who differ on whether or not it is all-pervasive and who accept “existence-ness” (*sattā*) as a universal. Especially the illustration of the universal by referring to *sattā* is peculiar, as it is explicitly denied by both the Prābhākaras and Bhāṭṭas. The only aspect of the universal argued against by Vidyānandin which does not fit with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is the idea that it should be identical to the individuals, which is clearly taken from the *Ślokavārtika*. The Prābhākara view differs from the universal described by Vidyānandin with respect to two points, i.e. *sattā* as universal and the universal and individual being identical, while the only clear correspondence with the Bhāṭṭa view seems to be that of the universal and individual being identical.

As noted above, it is not entirely clear whether Kumārila accepted the universal to be permanent. According to Shah (1968: 85), Pārthasārathi, in his *Śāstradīpika*, holds it to be both eternal and non-eternal, but does not mention any earlier source for this. In §13 Vidyānandin has the Mīmāṃsakas object: “The universal, existence-ness etc., is

⁹² *yathā ca vyatirekaiva dr̥śyamānā punaḥ punaḥ | kālabhede 'py abhinnaiva jātie bhinnāśrayā satī ||32||* (*Ślokavārtika Vanavāda* verse 32).

⁹³ *piṇdeṣv eva ca sāmānyam nāntarā gṛhyate yataḥ | na hy ākāśavad icchanti sāmānyam nāma kiṃ cana ||25||* (*Ślokavārtika Ākṛtivāda* 25).

⁹⁴ *yad vā sarvagatatve 'pi vyaktiḥ śaktyanurodhataḥ | śakriḥ kāryānumeyā hi vyaktidarśanahetukā ||26||* (*Ślokavārtika Ākṛtivāda* 26).

permanent, because [the universal] is recognized, like words”.⁹⁵ The argument of recognition is slightly reminiscent of *Ślokavārttika Vanavāda* 32 quoted above, but I have not been able to find any clear statement by Kumāriḷa concerning the permanence or impermanence of the universal.

One possible interpretation is that Vidyānandin is here not arguing against one concrete doctrine about the universal, but rather against several doctrines which he has conveniently integrated into one. Thus he refutes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika universal (and by this also the Prābhākara universal, which agrees with it on all the major points), by relying mostly on Buddhist arguments, but as the complete difference between the universal and individual has already been refuted in the Vaiśeṣika chapter (as the relation between absolutely different things is rendered impossible by the refutation of *samavāya*), he includes the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of the universal being identical to the individual. Thus the refutation of the universal in the Mīmāṃsā chapter kills two birds with one stone. On the one hand the unitary, permanent and all-pervading universal is refuted, and on the other the universal being identical to the individual is refuted. As the possibility of the universal being completely different from the individual has already been refuted in the Vaiśeṣika chapter, and the view that the universal is merely a mental construct is refuted in the Bauddha chapter, all the major rival views on the universal have thus been taken care of.

It is clear that Vidyānandin had recourse to Kumāriḷa’s *Ślokavārttika*, and used it extensively for understanding the Mīmāṃsā view on the universal. Another possibility is therefore that the universal presented and refuted by Vidyānandin here is the universal Kumāriḷa was understood, by Vidyānandin, to adhere to. A closer study of the views held by Kumāriḷa, as compared to his commentators, is needed to fully understand Vidyānandin’s treatment of the Mīmāṃsā here, which seem to indicate that not all the views held by the later Bhāṭṭas were held or explicitly stated by Kumāriḷa Bhāṭṭa himself. This interpretation does, however, not account for two things. Firstly, it is explicitly stated that the universal refuted here is accepted by both the Prābhākaras and Bhāṭṭas, something which does not seem to be the case; and secondly, the inclusion of *sattā* (existence-ness), which is explicitly denied by both Kumāriḷa and the Prābhākaras, as the recurring example of a universal. A third possibility is that §§7-8 discuss the Prābhākara universal, while the remaining chapter discusses the Bhāṭṭa universal. This too faces the problem of why *sattā* is used as an example. Moreover, it is then not clear why this is not stated by Vidyānandin instead of saying that both Prābhākaras and Bhāṭṭas accept the universal he describes.

⁹⁵ *nityaṃ sadādi sāmānyaṃ pratyabhijñāyamānatvāt, śabdavat iti cet* (SSP 46, 29).

The Vijñānādvaita or Yogācāra school of Buddhism

The Vijñānādvaita is so called by Vidyānandin because they reject the existence of external objects, holding that only self-cognized consciousness exists. The Vijñānādvaitins reject the grasped-grasper (*grāhyagrāhaka*) or cognized-cognizer (*vedyavedaka*) duality. They are illusions. The apprehensible form (*grāhyākāra*) and the apprehension form (*grāhakākāra*) of cognition, bound by *svasaṃvedana* (self-cognition), are both identical to cognition itself. Thus the duality of subject and object is illusory in all cognitions, as consciousness is unitary (Shah 1968: 166, Matilal 1986: 151-2).

The Sautrāntikas hold the external object to cause the object-form of the cognition and impart its form on it (Matilal 1986: 151). Likewise the Naiyāyikas hold the object to be the cause of cognition: “Sense perception is that cognition – (a) which is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ, – (b) which is not expressible (by words) – (c) which is not erroneous, – (d) and which is well-defined” (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4. translated in Jha 1984: 111; original has the whole verse in italics).⁹⁶ They thus both infer the existence of external objects from the object-form of cognition (Matilal 1986: 151). This is rejected by the Vijñānādvaitins.

Dharmakīrti infers the identity of the cognition and its object from their invariably appearing together (*sahopalambhaniyama*). It is only due to illusion that the object appears to be different from the cognition, as things that are different from one another are not invariably cognized together. There is no cognition of an object that is not being cognized, and there is no object-free cognition (Shah 1968: 166-7). What is mistaken for external objects is merely the form in the consciousness, which itself is unreal as consciousness is unitary. The subject-aspect and object-aspect of cognition is essentially one (Shah 1968: 167-170).

Though the Vijñānādvaitins hold that only self-cognized, non-dual consciousness exists, they are not solipsists, i.e. they do not reject the existence of other conscious beings. Dharmakīrti devoted a separate work, the *Santānāntarasiddhi*, to proving the existence of other minds. Stcherbatsky summarizes Dharmakīrti’s inference as follows:

“Those representations in which our own movements and our own speech appear to us as originating in our own will are different from those which do not originate in our own will. The first appear in the form ‘I go’, ‘I speak’. The second appear in the form ‘he goes’, ‘he speaks’. Thereby it is established that the second class has a cause different from the first. This cause is a foreign will” (1958: 522).

As will be shown, both of Dharmakīrti’s inferences play an important part of Vidyānandin’s argumentation. He argues that external objects exist as the grasped-grasper duality is not disproved, because the Vijñānādvaitins themselves depend on it in

⁹⁶ *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam* (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4)

order to prove several of their doctrines, such as momentariness and the existence of other minds. For these doctrines must be proved inferentially. Being inferentially proved, they must in some way be “grasped”. Thus the characteristic of “being grasped” is somehow established, for the Vijñānādvaitins cannot hold it to apply to inferential cognition and not to cognition of external objects (§§6-7).

Vidyānandin infers that all cognitions have an object different from themselves, because cognition has the form of grasped and grasper just like Dharmakīrti’s inference of other minds. For, he argues, if the form of grasped and grasper is illusory, Dharmakīrti’s inference of other minds is invalid. Accepting Dharmakīrti’s syllogism, one must accept Vidyānandin’s syllogism as well (§8). The answer Vidyānandin here gives on behalf of the Vijñānādvaitin, and its refutation, is strongly influenced by Akalaṅka. The proposed answer is moreover the answer to a problem Vidyānandin does not explicitly raise, namely what is to be accepted as valid cognition. For, as the Vijñānādvaitins do not accept external objects, the validity of a cognition cannot depend on its correspondence to external objects. To this he has the Vijñānādvaitin answer that valid knowledge is a special impression or predisposition (*vāsanā*). In other words, the validity of cognition does not depend on an external object but on the quality of the impression. But this, Vidyānandin argues, must then apply to the cognitions of actions ascribed to other minds as well. Thus they too are not due to the existence of other minds, but merely caused by impressions (§9). This point is made by Akalaṅka in his *Nyāyaviniścayavivarāṇa*. Shah explains:

“If there were no external objects, how would Dharmakīrti account for the fact that some cognitions lead to successful purposeful activity and others do not?...The idealist Dharmakīrti should not reply that a difference in the previous dispositions (*vāsanā*) leads to a difference in the nature of the cognition that arises subsequently, for then he would have to concede that the cognition of other minds (*santānāntara*) is also due to the internal force of illusion or previous dispositions, without there being any actual other mind in reality”⁹⁷ (Shah 1968: 177-8; italics in original).

Vidyānandin then has the Vijñānādvaitin reply with Dharmakīrti’s inference of *sahopalambhaniyama*, i.e. that cognition and its object are identical as they are invariably cognized together. Against this Vidyānandin argues that the premise is contradictory, as the term “together” implies the presence of two different things. Nor are they invariably perceived together as people perceiving the same object do not perceive each other’s cognitions of it, which they would if the cognitions and the object were identical, and

⁹⁷ “tatrāpi santānābhedaḥjñāne ‘pi siddho niścito vāsanābhedaḥ bhedo ‘yam | tathā ca tato ‘pi katham tadbhedasiddhiḥ? mā bhūt, tadbhedasya tajñānasatyatvaniścayasya ca vāsanābhedaḥ eva bhāvāt” (*Nyāyaviniścayavivarāṇa* quoted in Shah 1968: 178). “There, the difference that is determined on account of difference of impressions is proved even with respect to cognition of the difference between continuances. And thus, how is it proved that there is difference of those continuances from that [cognition of the difference of continuances]? It cannot be, because the difference of those [continuances], which is determined on account of the cognition of that [difference between continuances] is only on account of difference of impressions” (my translation).

because one who can know the minds of others does not know the objects of other peoples thoughts (§10). Similar arguments have been raised by Akalaṅka in his *Akalaṅkagranthatraya* and *Siddhiviniścayavṛtti*. Shah explains:

“To prove the identity of the blue thing and its cognition Dharmakīrti gives the reason – ‘their being apprehended together.’ This reason is fallacious. It is contradictory (*viruddha*) because the term ‘together’ always implies a difference between the things that go together, in other words, the probans ‘being apprehended together’ has for its probandum ‘difference’ (rather than ‘identity’). Again, this probans is not free from the fallacy of the unproved middle (*asiddha*)... Many persons perceive a blue thing at one and the same time. Now here though a person cognizes *the blue* he does not cognize *the cognition of the blue* occurring in another person’s mind” (1968: 174-75; italics in original).

Moreover, Vidyānandin argues, one cannot infer the non-existence of external objects, as the premise (*hetu*) and that which is to be proved (*sādhyā*) are external objects (§§11-14).

Sāṃkhya

The Sāṃkhya metaphysics concerning the evolution of the tattvas from *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* rests on their theory of causation, the *satkāryavāda*, which states that the effect (*kārya*) already exists (*sat*) in the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) prior to its production.⁹⁸ While the Sāṃkhyas hold that the effect is a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the material cause, the Advaita Vedāntins, who also accept the *satkāryavāda*, hold that the effect is merely a unreal transformation (*vivarta*) of the material cause. The *satkāryavāda* is rejected by the Buddhists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 238-41). The Jainas hold a somewhat similar theory to the Sāṃkhya, as they posit the effect to be a modification of a pre-existing continuing substance (*dravya*), which is its material cause (Shah 1968: 61).

Sāṃkhya holds that *puruṣa*, which is an eternal, intelligent principle, i.e. the soul, and *prakṛti* or *pradhāna*, the original cause of the material world, made up of the three *guṇas sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, are completely different. The *puruṣa* has consciousness as its very essence and witnesses the change in *prakṛti* without itself ever acting or changing. It is the enjoyer (*bhokṛ*) of the products of *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* is, on the other hand, an eternal, insentient principle (*jaḍa*) which transforms into the material world. It is on the association of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, upsetting the equilibrium between *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, that the evolution of the world takes place (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 39-40).⁹⁹ The important point here is that, following the *satkāryavāda*, the effects of *prakṛti* are essentially identical to *prakṛti*, as the effect is the manifested condition of the cause (ibid: 39).

⁹⁸ The arguments for this theory are given in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* verse 9 (quoted in SŚP 32, 8-9) and need therefore not be repeated here.

⁹⁹ How this transformation takes place is succinctly explained in the Sāṃkhya *pūrvapakṣa*, and need not be repeated here.

Vidyānandin raises two main points against the Sāṃkhya: 1) if everything is identical to Pradhāna, which is eternal, partless and all-pervading, then everything should exist everywhere; and 2) the soul is not absolutely permanent but both permanent and impermanent.

Concerning the first point, Vidyānandin posits the following argument for the Sāṃkhya: “everything does indeed exist everywhere, but not everything is manifest everywhere. Therefore not everything is perceived everywhere, for only that which is manifest is perceived, while that which is concealed is not” (§§6-8). Vidyānandin then asks if the manifestation is eternal or non-eternal. If not, this implies that it comes into existence from not existing, which would contradict the *satkāryavāda*. If it is eternal, the problem is not solved as everything would be eternally manifest everywhere (§8). Positing another manifestation results in infinite regress (§9), and the manifestation cannot manifest itself either (§10). Concealment is refuted by the same arguments (§11). Thus Vidyānandin concludes that *Pradhāna* does not exist, and on its non-existence its evolutes too do not exist (§12).

If it is still held that the evolutes arise from *prakṛti/pradhāna*, then the Sāṃkhya must answer whether they are transformations or products of *pradhāna*. And if they are transformations, it must be answered whether they are different or identical to *pradhāna*. All these possibilities are then refuted (§§12-14). And if the Sāṃkhya objects that the transformations are neither different nor identical to *pradhāna*, then, Vidyānandin argues, one accepts the *anekānta* view of both difference and non-difference *sui generis*, which goes against the Sāṃkhya one-sided view of permanence (§15).

Thus Vidyānandin considers *pradhāna* disproved. The *puruṣa*, which is defined as the experiencer or enjoyer (*bhoktr*), can then also not exist, for, as *pradhāna* is disproved, there is nothing to experience. Consequently all the tattvas accepted by the Sāṃkhya are lost, for *pradhāna* is contradicted by perception (§16).

Vidyānandin then infers that the soul is not absolutely permanent, but both permanent and impermanent *sui generis*, from it being non-different from experience, which is impermanent (§§17-18). Thus the Sāṃkhya teaching is contradicted by inference as well.

The Puruṣādvaita or Advaita Vedānta

According to the monistic Puruṣādvaitins, all is brahman (*sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma*). The reason it is not experienced as such is because of *māyā* (illusion) or *avidyā* (ignorance). This *māyā* has a twofold aspect. From the point of view of brahman, it is a power that creates the world illusion. From the point of view of the ignorant person deceived by it, it is illusion-producing ignorance (*avidyā*). Like when someone mistakes a

rope for a snake, superimposing something else on the substratum due to one's ignorance of it, *avidyā* or *māyā* has a twofold function of concealing the true nature of brahman and making brahman appear as the world of multiplicity (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 48, 338).

As mentioned above, the Puruṣādvaitins, like the Sāṃkhyas, hold to the *satkāryavāda* theory of causation. Contrary to the Sāṃkhyas, however, they do not accept the effect to be a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the cause, but merely an illusory transformation (*vivarta*) (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 238-41, 339-40). The underlying substance, the material cause of which all that is cognized is an unreal transformation (*vivarta*), is pure existence. This existence is formless, though it appears in various forms, it is part-less, though appearing as divisible into various forms, and it is infinite, though it appears as finite forms. Śaṅkara calls this existence brahman (ibid: 346-7).

The main issues Vidyānandin focuses on are the doctrine of non-dualism (*advaita*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) as postited by the Puruṣādvaitins. The first main point raised by Vidyānandin against the Puruṣādvaita is that multiplicity is perceived. The perceived multiplicity is incompatible by the monism held by the Puruṣādvaitins, and thus the Puruṣādvaita is contradicted by perception. Potential objections raised on behalf of the Puruṣādvaitins comparing sensory perception with dream perception or illusion are refuted (§§13-18). During this discussion Vidyānandin, in §17, refutes the view that only the universal, and no particular or individual, exists, clearly implying that this view is held by the Puruṣādvaitins. In his refutation Vidyānandin quotes the *Ślokavārtika*.

Arguing that perception cannot refute brahman as perception can only affirm, and not negate, is rejected by Vidyānandin, who establishes that perception also negates (§19). Vidyānandin then refutes the possibility of proving non-dualism through inference (§§20-21. An argument against disproving perception by means of inference is also raised in §28), resorting to the scriptural tradition (§§22-24) or through self-cognition (§§25-27), and the possibility of brahman negating perception (§§29-30). Moreover, Vidyānandin argues, the concept *advaita* (non-dualism) depends on the existence of *dvaita* (dualism) to make sense, as a negation must be of something that exists (§31). Not only that, but non-dualism implies the non-existence of any difference between merit and demerit and any other such dualism (§32). Thus none of the statements of the Puruṣādvaitins can be established as the dualism of *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge) and *prameya* (object of knowledge) is impossible, and illusory *pramāṇa* cannot establish anything (§33).

Next, *avidyā* (ignorance) as accepted by the Puruṣādvaitins is refuted. They hold *avidyā* to be indescribable with respect to existing and non-existing. Sureśvara's *Sambandhavārttika* is quoted to illustrate the Puruṣādvaita position that *avidyā* is not the

object of *pramāṇa* and that it is indescribable. In opposition to this, Vidyānandin argues that *avidyā* is indeed an object of *pramāṇa* and is in fact a really existing thing (§§34-41).

Cārvāka or the Materialists

No original work of the Materialist Cārvāka¹⁰⁰, commonly held to have been founded by Bṛhaspati and also called the Lokāyata, has survived, and thus their views are chiefly known through the presentations of other philosophical schools.

The Cārvāka only accept perception (*pratyakṣa*) as a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), rejecting both inference (*anumāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*). They reject the existence of God and acknowledge only the four elements, i.e. fire, water, wind and earth, as *tattvas*, as only these can be perceived. They also reject the soul, accepting only the consciousness, which is a product of the body which is again made up of the four elements. Like molasses, which originally does not have an intoxicating effect, may become intoxicating as a result of fermentation, so consciousness may arise from the elements even though they are not conscious (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 53-61).

Main points discussed by Vidyānandin in his refutation of Cārvāka philosophy are: 1) the four elements are rejected as *tattvas* on account of it being shown that they are each other cause and effect (§§5-6); 2) The transmigrating soul, subject to merit and demerit, exists (§§7-19); 3) omniscience exists (§20-24).

Points of interest in the *pūrvapakṣas* of the SŚP

As was noted in Chapter 1, Jain philosophical texts are a rich and to a large extent still unexplored source of knowledge about the doctrines of various Indian philosophical systems. Due to constraints of time and space, this thesis does not have the capacity to thoroughly investigate Vidyānandin's entire treatment of all the philosophical systems discussed in the SŚP. The focus has thus far here therefore been placed on the main points in Vidyānandin's arguments in the *uttarapakṣas* of the various chapters, where some have received more attention than others. This does not mean that there may not be things of interest in the chapters that have here received comparatively less attention, nor that the *pūrvapakṣas* do not contain interesting presentations of the systems in question that also warrant further investigation. Here some particularly interesting examples of Vidyānandin's presentations of the doctrines of his rivals in the *pūrvapakṣas* are briefly presented.

¹⁰⁰ It is here specified that the Cārvāka in question is the materialistic branch of the Cārvāka, as differentiated from the skeptical branch referred to by Vidyānandin as the *Tattvopaplavavāda* in his introduction to the SŚP. The Materialistic Cārvāka is referred to simply as Cārvāka throughout the rest of this section for the sake of convenience.

While presenting the Bauddha philosophy, Vidyānandin starts off the *pūrvapakṣa* by presenting the five *skandhas* (aggregates) as the five Buddhist *tattvas*.¹⁰¹ Though he refers to the five *skandhas* by the names found in other sources, his explanations of the *viññānaskandha* and *saṃjñāskandha* differ from that found in other sources. While the *viññānaskandha* is usually associated with *nirvikalpapratyakṣa* and *saṃjñāskandha* with *savikalpapratyakṣa*, Vidyānandin explains the former as cognition as a whole, i.e. comprising both *nirvikalpa*- and *savikalpapratyakṣa*, and the latter as associated with names (*nāman*). While Dignāga’s explanation of perception (*nirvikalpapratyakṣa*) and conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) quoted in the Sautrāntika section above makes clear that names are conceptual constructions, and thus the link between *savikalpapratyakṣa* and *saṃjñāskandha* is somehow maintained, the identification of *viññānaskandha* with both determinate and indeterminate cognition is puzzling. Determining Vidyānandin’s source for his presentation of the *skandhas* as a whole requires further investigation.

Later in the Bauddha *pūrvapakṣa*, Vidyānandin explains the eightfold path (§§4-5). The first interesting feature of his presentation is the use of the word *mārgaṇa* (“desiring”, “requiring”, “seeking” etc., not recorded with the meaning “path” in the MMW) instead of *mārga* (“way”, “path”). The use of *mārgaṇa* is clearly deliberate, as it occurs twice in the Bauddha *pūrvapakṣa*.¹⁰² Furthermore, the members of the eightfold path do not fully correspond to its usual presentation. Limitations of space do not allow for a detailed presentation of these differences here.¹⁰³ Here, one example will suffice. Buddhist sources present the fifth member of the path, *saṃyagājīva*, as right livelihood. This is explained as earning one’s livelihood by honest means. Vidyānandin, on the other hand, presents *ājīvasthiti* (lasting for life), the closest corresponding member to *saṃyagājīva*, at least in name, as the seventh member of the path and explains it as “holding one’s breath until there is cessation of life”. The inclusion of such a point in the eightfold path seems to bear considerable Jain ascetic influence, but what source Vidyānandin might have had for this presentation of the Buddhist eightfold path, and for the use of the term *mārgaṇa*, requires further investigation.

The third example is from Vidyānandin’s presentation of the Sāṃkhya in the Sāṃkhya *pūrvapakṣa*. In ŚŚP 30, 22-23, Vidyānandin explains how the subtle elements (*tanmātra*)¹⁰⁴ give rise to the gross elements (*bhūta*)¹⁰⁵. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (SK) itself simply asserts that the subtle elements give rise to the gross elements without explaining how. While Gauḍapāda’s commentary to the SK posits that each subtle element singly gives rise to a gross element. The Chinese commentary to the SK adds that each subtle

¹⁰¹ ŚŚP 20, 3-10

¹⁰² ŚŚP 20, 23 & ŚŚP 21, 4

¹⁰³ Cf. footnote 760 for a more thorough discussion of this.

¹⁰⁴ i.e. *śabda* (sound), *sparsā* (touch), *rūpa* (form), *rasa* (taste) and *gnadha* (smell)

¹⁰⁵ i.e. *ākāśa* (space/ether), *vāyu* (wind), *tejas* (fire), *āp* (water) and *prthivī* (earth)

element in addition also generates the respective sense capacity as well. Most commentaries, however, hold to the “accumulation theory”, i.e. that each succeeding subtle element combines with the preceding to generate the next gross element. Thus the subtle sound (*śabda*) element generates space (*ākāśa*), the subtle elements touch (*sparśa*) and sound (*śabda*) combine to generate wind (*vāyu*), and so on (Larson 1987: 51). The generation of the gross elements as explained by the accumulation theory can thus be expressed as follows: “ $a > 1$ ”, “ $a+b > 2$ ”, “ $a+b+c > 3$ ” etc..

Vidyānandin’s explanation of how the subtle elements give rise to the gross elements closely resembles the accumulation theory described by Larson, but also differs from it. According to Vidyānandin ether or space (*ākāśa*) arises from sound (*śabda*); wind (*vāyu*) arises from touch (*sparśa*); fire (*tejas*) arises from form (*rūpa*) and touch (*sparśa*); water (*āp*) arises from taste (*rasa*), form (*rūpa*) and touch (*sparśa*); and earth (*pr̥thivī*) arises from smell (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*), form (*rūpa*) and touch (*sparśa*). The generation of the subtle elements as presented by Vidyānandin can be expressed as follows: “ $a > 1$ ”, “ $b > 2$ ”, “ $b+c > 3$ ”, “ $b+c+d > 4$ ”, “ $b+c+d+e > 5$ ”. It is thus clear that Vidyānandin’s explanation basically follows that of the accumulation theory, except that *sparśa* alone generates *vāyu*, and the accumulation starts in the generation of the third gross element (*tejas*), resulting in *śabda* only being involved in the generation of *ākāśa*. What the model here presented by Vidyānandin is based on requires further investigation.

Lastly it is also noted that SK 13, mentioned in Chapter 1, quoted by Vidyānandin in the Sāṃkhya *pūrvapakṣa*, is somewhat different from the SK 13 found in other consulted versions of the SK¹⁰⁶, which read: *sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam upaṣṭambhakaṃ calaṃ ca rajaḥ | guru varaṇakam eva tamaḥ pradīpavac cārthato vṛttiḥ* ||. The verse quoted in the SŚP, however reads: *sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam upaṣṭambhakaṃ calaṃ ca rajaḥ | guru varaṇakam eva tamaḥ sāmyāvasthā bhavet prakṛtiḥ* ||. This is not the only quoted verse in the SŚP which differs from the available versions of the quoted work, and is here primarily highlighted as an example. Whether the reading found in the SŚP is based on manuscripts of the SK which had other readings than those manuscripts that have been preserved is unknown.

Conclusions

¹⁰⁶ These versions are: Sastri, S.S. Suryanarayana (ed. and transl.) 1948, *The Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa*, University of Madras, Madras; and the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* printed in Larson, Gerald James 1969, *Classical Sāṃkhya – An interpretation of its History and Meaning*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. The version included by Larson in appendix C is primarily based on the Colebrooke-Wilson edition, the *Bhāṣya* of Gauḍapāda and Sastri’s edition (Larson 1969: 257, footnote 1). Sastri gives a list of verses of the SK quoted in other works and compares them to the reading found in the *Kārikā* manuscripts (Cf. his Appendix, Sastri 1948: 111-13), but does not mention verse 13. None of the above mentioned versions notes the reading found in the SŚP as a variant reading.

The present chapter has presented Vidyānandin's main points and arguments for refuting the other philosophies and his presentation of the rival systems in the *pūrvapakṣas* in the SŚP, and has in some instances highlighted areas where the correspondence between the views ascribed by Vidyānandin to his rivals and the presentation of their doctrines as found in secondary literature, and in some cases their own authoritative texts, requires further study. A good example of such a case is Vidyānandin's refutation of the universal (*sāmānya*) in the Mīmāṃsā chapter.

The SŚP contains many interesting claims and pieces of information about the various philosophical schools at the time of Vidyānandin. However, before drawing any clear conclusions on the basis of the information provided by the SŚP, further study is needed. The present chapter has highlighted several sections in need of such study, which would hopefully contribute to increasing current knowledge about Indian philosophies and their doctrines.

Keeping the above presentation of Vidyānandin's main arguments in mind, we recall the one-sided (*ekānta*) views examined by Samantabhadra, forming the framework of his *Āptamīmāṃsā*, presented in the previous chapter.¹⁰⁷ We see that many of these views are refuted in the SŚP as well. View II (i), "All things are absolutely one with each other", is refuted in the refutation of the Puruṣādvaita doctrine of non-dualism (*advaita*); view II (ii), "All things are absolutely separate from each other", is refuted in the refutation of the particular as held by the Sautrāntikas; view III (i), "Everything is absolutely permanent", is refuted in the refutation of the soul (*puruṣa*) as held by the Sāṃkhya and in the establishing of only the cause that is both permanent and momentary *sui generis* being causally efficient in the Bauddha chapter; view III (ii), "Everything is absolutely transient", is refuted in the refutation of the absolutely momentary particular of the Sautrāntikas; both view IV (i), "A cause is absolutely different from its effect, a substance from its properties etc.", and view V (ii), "The properties of a substance are absolutely independent of their substance", are refuted in the refutation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of absolute difference; and view VI (i), "Whatever exists exists in the form of a mental happening", is refuted in the refutation of the Vijñānādvaita's non-acceptance of external objects. There are also cases in which doctrines combining several of these one-sided views are refuted, such as the universal (*sāmānya*) Vidyānandin argues against in the Mīmāṃsā chapter. This universal is said to be absolutely permanent (view III-i) and absolutely identical to the individuals (view II-i).

Dixit, while discussing Vidyānandin's *Tattvārthaślokaṅkārikā* and *Aṣṭasaḥsṛī*, which he designates as "immortal works" (Dixit 1971: 101), states that while the latter of these follows the pattern set up by Akalaṅka's *Aṣṭaśatī* (which it is a commentary on) in

¹⁰⁷ Cf. "The anekāntavāda in polemics" in Chapter 2.

that non-Jain philosophical positions are criticized in terms of the model set up by Samantabhadra in his *Āptamīmāṃsā*, in the former, earlier work, which is a commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, Vidyānandin, according to Dixit, planned his strategy by himself. This gave him the opportunity to launch independent criticism against various non-Jain positions. Thus, unlike in the *Aṣṭasahasrī*, Vidyānandin was here not bound to attack his rivals only from the standpoint of the *anekāntavāda* (ibid: 101).

This even more holds true for the *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā*, as it is an independent work. It incorporates many elements from the *Āptamīmāṃsā* and, as will be shown below, the *Aṣṭaśatī*. But Vidyānandin is also here not bound to attack his rivals exclusively from the standpoint of the *anekāntavāda*, and so there are also occasions on which he launches independent criticism against the rival doctrines. Two good examples of such criticism are the refutation of *avidyā* (ignorance) as held by the Puruṣādvaita and presented by Sureśvara in his *Sambandhavārttika*, and the refutation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *īśvara* (God), neither of which are refuted from the standpoint of the *anekāntavāda*. As the SŚP is an independent text, its structure is entirely Vidyānandin's own. Instead of structuring it around paired one-sided views, like Samantabhadra had done in his *Āptamīmāṃsā*, Vidyānandin has structured the SŚP around the rival schools as a whole, dedicating a separate chapter to each school. He is thus free to criticize whatever doctrines he sees fit from whatever standpoint he chooses, and while he utilizes the approach and model created by Samantabhadra, he does not consequently do so throughout.

The investigation of Vidyānandin's arguments against the Buddhist philosophies have revealed two especially interesting features. Firstly, many of the arguments raised by Vidyānandin are strongly influenced by arguments raised by his predecessor Akalaṅka. This influence is explored even further in the next chapter, where some of the paragraphs of the SŚP in which Vidyānandin quotes Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā* are compared to Akalaṅka's commentary to the *Āptamīmāṃsā*, the *Aṣṭaśatī*.

The influence of Akalaṅka, visible in the above investigation of Vidyānandin's arguments against the Buddhists, has moreover also revealed that many of Vidyānandin's arguments are probably directed towards Dharmakīrti. As Shah (1968)¹⁰⁸ has convincingly shown, Akalaṅka's arguments against Buddhist philosophy are to a large extent directed towards Dharmakīrti. Drawing on these arguments and arguing against the same points, this seems to hold true for Vidyānandin as well, though a more thorough investigation of this is required. That Dharmakīrti is an important opponent in the argumentation of the SŚP against Buddhist philosophies is also revealed by the prominent roles played by his inferences of *sahopalambhaniyama* and *santānāntara* in the

¹⁰⁸ "Akalaṅkas Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy – a study", L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad.

Vijñānādvaita chapter, and that it is Dharmakīrti's definition of perception that is quoted in the Bauddha chapter (SŚP 21, 23-24). Vidyānandin also quotes Dharmakīrti in SŚP 22, 4; 23, 27; and 26, 2.

4. The influence of Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka

While many examples of Akalaṅka's influence on Vidyānandin's argumentation have already been pointed out in the previous chapter, the present chapter more thoroughly investigates some paragraphs where this influence is particularly clear. The SŚP quotes 8 verses from the *Āptamīmāṃsā* (ĀM). Verses 24-27 are quoted in the Vedānta chapter, verse 62 is quoted in the Bauddha chapter, verses 39 and 42 in the Sāṃkhya chapter and verse 68 in the Vaiśeṣika chapter. The present chapter shows how Vidyānandin utilizes the ideas and points found in these verses and Akalaṅka's commentary on them in his *Aṣṭaśatī* (AS) by translating and comparing verses 24, 27, 62, 68 and the partial quotes from verses 39 and 42 of the ĀM and Akalaṅka's commentaries on these verses¹⁰⁹ to the paragraphs in which they are quoted by Vidyānandin.¹¹⁰ The parts of the AS and the SŚP which correspond very closely in wording are highlighted with bold typing. There are also parts where the influence from the ĀM is not made explicit as Vidyānandin does not quote Samantabhadra. Verse 6 of the ĀM is therefore here compared to §24 of the Cārvāka chapter of the SŚP as an example of such a case.

On doing so, some of the most explicit examples of the influence of Akalaṅka are discovered. Here Vidyānandin at times draws heavily upon Akalaṅka without giving any reference to him, taking whole sentences from his commentary. But some times, however, Vidyānandin's utilization of Akalaṅka's AS is quite creative, like in §§24-26 of the Bauddha chapter where Akalaṅka's commentary on Samantabhadra's critique of the Vaiśeṣika notions of universal and particular in verse 62 of the ĀM are put into the mouth of the Sautrāntikas as an argument against the Jains. In yet other instances he does not utilize Akalaṅka's commentary at all, merely taking a point or argument from the ĀM.

The purpose of the present investigation is to show not only Vidyānandin's links to, and the influence of, his predecessors Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka, but also his ingenuity. As will be shown, though Vidyānandin draws strongly on both Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka, he expands their arguments, and his utilization of them is at times quite creative.

As is shown in Chapters 2 and 3 above, the influence of both Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka on the SŚP extends far beyond the quoting and utilization of the arguments

¹⁰⁹ Though verse 42 is quoted by Vidyānandin in the same paragraph as verse 39, only the translation of the commentary to the latter of these is included here. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, my translation of Akalaṅka's commentary on verse 42 is still full of unclear portions, and secondly, the paragraph in question does not at all seem to be influenced by Akalaṅka's commentary on verse 42. The Sanskrit text is supplied, so that the reader may himself judge whether or not Vidyānandin's brief argumentation on the point the quoted extract of ĀM 42 takes up bears any similarity to Akalaṅka's commentary on it.

¹¹⁰ The extracts from the SŚP are here given without the notes. Cf. the translation of the relevant portions of the SŚP in the appendix, where the notes are given. Unfortunately I do not have recourse to Vidyānandin's *Aṣṭaśatī*, his commentary to the *Aṣṭaśatī*, and time constraints prevent me from including this most difficult text in this comparison.

dealt with in the present chapter. That this influence should be great is not at all surprising. In addition to Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka being Vidyānandin's predecessors and very important figures in the development of Jain philosophy and logic preceding Vidyānandin, Vidyānandin wrote a commentary on the *Aṣṭaśatī* of Akalaṅka and on the *Yuktyanuśāsana* of Samantabhadra. He also wrote the *Āptaparīkṣā*, modelled after the *Āptamīmāṃsā*, and the *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*, modelled after the *Pramāṇasaṅgraha* of Akalaṅka (Triha 2009: 105). For all these reasons Vidyānandin was of course very familiar with the works of both Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka.

In addition to the points discussed in Chapter 3 and the utilization of the ĀM and AS, Vidyānandin moreover also quotes Samantabhadra's *Yuktyanuśāsana*¹¹¹ and Akalaṅka's *Siddhiviniścaya*¹¹². The comparison with the ĀM and AS undertaken here is thus only a small contribution to a much needed, larger comparison of the collected works of Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin.

Āptamīmāṃsā verse 24:

*advaitaikāntapakṣe 'pi dr̥ṣṭo bhedo viruddhyate |
kāraṅkāṇaṃ kriyāyās ca naikaṃ svasmāt prajāyate ||24||*

The difference of actions and factors pertaining to actions which is seen, is contradicted in the view of the one-sided non-dualism.
A thing cannot be produced from itself.

Aṣṭaśatī commentary to ĀM verse 24:

*sadādyekānteṣu doṣodbhāvanam abhihitam | advaitaikāntābhyupagamāt na tāvatā anekāntasiddhir iti cet,
na, pratyakṣādivirodhāt | na hi kasyacid abhyupagamamātram pramāṇasiddham kriyākārabhedam
pratirunaddhi, kṣaṇikābhyupagamavat | na svato jāyate parato vā | api tu jāyate aveti susuptāyate¹¹³,
pratipattiyupāyābhāvāt | ¹¹⁴tasmāt yat dr̥ṣṭaviruddham tat na samañjasam, yathā nairātmyam viruddhyate ca
tathaiva advaitam kriyākārabhedapratyakṣādibhiḥ" || 24||*

The arising of faults in the one-sided doctrine of existence etc. is declared. If it is objected: The many-sided doctrine is not proved at the same time, because one-sided non-dualism is accepted. [It is answered:] no, because [one-sided non-dualism] is contradicted by perception etc.. **For it is not so that the mere acceptance of something refutes the difference between actions and the factors pertaining to actions,**

¹¹¹ Cf. SŚP 23, 12-13; 37, 22; 37, 24; 39, 12-13; 13, 15-16; 17, 16-21; and 27, 15-16. It has been suggested by Prof. Shah that the verses quoted in SŚP 13, 15-16; 17, 16-21; and 27, 15-16 are from Vidyānandin's *Yuktyanuśāsanaṭīkā*. I have not had recourse to the *Yuktyanuśāsana* or the *Yuktyanuśāsanaṭīkā*, and have therefore not had the opportunity to check this. Jain however identifies them as from the *Yuktyanuśāsana*.

¹¹² Cf. SŚP 9, 10 and 23, 3-4.

¹¹³ int. of *svap*? What is then the *ta*?

¹¹⁴ Shah's edition reads the concluding part as: "tasmāt yat dr̥ṣṭaviruddham tat na samañjasam, yathā nairātmyam | viruddhyate ca tathaiva advaitam kriyākārabhedapratyakṣādibhiḥ |". It does not seem to make any sense to have a daṇḍa separating *yathā* and *tathā*. Moreover, *virudhyate* seems a preferable reading to *virudhyate*.

which is proved by *pramāṇas*, just like the mere acceptance of momentariness [does not refute continued existence which is established by valid means of knowledge].

[If there is one-sided non-dualism] [a thing] cannot arise from itself nor from [anything] else, but yet one repeatedly dreams¹¹⁵ that it does arise. [This is unacceptable] because there is no way for [this] to be perceived [if there is one-sided non-dualism]. That which is contradicted by perception, that is not true. Therefore, just as [the doctrine of] no self is contradicted [by perception], just so non-dualism is contradicted by perception of the difference between actions and the factors pertaining to actions etc..

Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā Puruṣādvaiva chapter §29 & 30

SŚP §§29-30 6, 21-7, 1-11

kaścid āha – brahmādvaitasyāmīthyā samvinmātrasya svataḥ siddhasya kriyākārahakabhedapratyakṣādīnām bādhakasyābhāvāt teṣāṃ bhrāntatvaṃ tato na tadvirodhakatvaṃ iti; tad api na sādhyāḥ, tathā sati bādhyabādhakayor bhedāt dvaitasiddhiprasaṅgāt |

*na ca paropagamamātrāt tayor bādhyabādhakabhāvaḥ, paramārthatas tadabhāvāpatteḥ | tataḥ sakalabādhakābhāvāt abhrāntena pratyakṣena prasiddho ‘yaṃ bhedaḥ katham advaitaṃ na virundhyāt | tayor parasparavirodhāt | tata eva bhedam advaitaṃ virundhyād iti cet; na; advaitasyābhyupagamamātratvāt, tatsādhakapramāṇābhāvasya prāg evoktatvāt, bhedasya ca pramāṇasiddhatvāt, tadgrāhipratyakṣasya bādhakābhāvāt abhrantatvena sādhitatvāt | **na hi kasyacid abhyupagamamātram pramāṇasiddham kriyākārahakabhedam pratirūddhi, kṣaṇikābhyupagamavat | tad evaṃ sakalabādhakavaidhuryād abhrāntapratyakṣaprasiddhakriyākārahakabhedāḥ, so ‘yam advaitaikāntapakṣe virudhyata eveti siddham paramabrahmādvaitaśāsanam pratyakṣaviruddham iti | tad uktaṃ śrīsvāmisamantabhadraḥcāryaiḥ –***

advaitaikāntapakṣe ‘pi dṛṣṭo bhedo viruddhyate |

kārahāṇām kriyāyās ca naikaṃ svasmāt prajāyate || [āptamī- ślo- 24]

SŚP §§29-30 English

Some say: Those [perceptions of the difference between actions and factors pertaining to actions etc.] are illusory because the sensory perceptions of the difference of actions and the factors pertaining to actions etc. do not negate the non-dual brahman, which is true, [characterized by] pure cognition and proved from itself. Therefore that [brahman] is not contradicted [but rather contradicts the difference between actions and the factors pertaining to actions]”. [To this it is answered:] That is not any better, because then there [would be] adhering to dualism being proved on account of there being difference of that which is to be negated and that which negates.

And the relation between those two, i.e. that which is negated and that which negates, [can] not merely be accepted [for the sake of argument because it is accepted] by the opponent. Because it [will] result in that [relation] really not existing. Therefore, since there is no negation [of sensory perception of difference], this difference is well known by means of non-erroneous sensory perception. How can non-dualism not be contradicted? For those two [non-difference, i.e. non-dualism, and difference] mutually contradict each other.

If it is objected: “Indeed, therefore non-dualism can contradict difference”. [It is answered:] No; because non-dualism is merely admitted for the sake of argument, because the non-existence of [any] valid

¹¹⁵ *śuṣuptāyate*. Int. of *svap*? What is then the *ta*?

means of knowledge or proof of that [non-dualism] has been previously stated, and because difference is proved by valid means of knowledge, on account of there being no negation of sensory perception which grasps that [difference]. Because [difference] is proved by non-erroneous [perception]. **For, the mere admitting of something for the sake of argument does not contradict the difference of actions and the factors pertaining to actions, which is proved by means of valid means of knowledge, just like momentariness, which is admitted for the sake of argument, [does not contradict that which is established by means of valid means of knowledge].** Thus, on account of the absence of all negations, there is difference of actions and the factors pertaining to actions, which is known by means of non-erroneous sensory perception. This very [difference] is contradicted in the view of one-sided non-dualism. Thus the teaching of the non-dualism of the Supreme Brahman is proved to be contradicted by sensory perception. It is said by the teacher śrīsvāmi Samantabhadra –

The difference of actions and the factors pertaining to actions which is seen, is contradicted in the view of the one-sided non-dualism.
A thing cannot be produced from itself.

The point being made by Vidyānandin in §§29-30 of the Puruṣādvaita chapter is that perceptions of the difference between actions and the factors pertaining to action¹¹⁶ contradict the non-dualism propounded by the Puruṣādvaitins, because the difference between actions and the factors pertaining to actions and non-dualism are mutually excluding. Thus non-dualism is refuted. This argument is found in the ĀM. Vidyānandin then brings up a possible objection on behalf of the Puruṣādvaitin, who might argue that if the two are mutually excluding, it should rather be concluded that non-dualism negates the perceived difference between actions and the factors pertaining to actions, and not the other way around. This is rejected by Vidyānandin on the grounds that the difference between actions and factors pertaining to actions, which is perceived, cannot be contradicted by non-dualism which is merely accepted for the sake of argument. This argument is found in the AS.

One must here recall Vidyānandin's statement in the introduction: "For that which is not contradicted by perception and inference, only that is that which is called the truthfulness of the true teaching. If something which is not contradicted by those [valid means of knowledge] were untrue, then nothing can be true" (SŚP 1, 14-16). Thus difference of actions and the factors pertaining to actions, which is perceived and thus true, refutes non-dualism, which is only granted for the sake of argument, and not the other way around. Vidyānandin then quotes the ĀM, which states that the difference between actions and the factors pertaining to actions is contradicted in the non-dualist position. The implication of the ĀM is that this renders causation impossible, as a thing cannot be produced by itself and, as the difference between action and the factors pertaining to actions is denied, it also cannot be produced by something else.

¹¹⁶ Cf. footnote 200

The imagined objection of the Puruṣādvaitin is thus not found in the ĀM. It is, however, found in the AS. The meaning of the objection raised there seems clearly to be the same as that raised by Vidyānandin on behalf of the Advaitins, though the wording is quite different. No only that, but in refuting this objection, Vidyānandin has copied, word for word, parts of Akalaṅka's refutation without mentioning the AS or Akalaṅka at all.

But Vidyānandin's use of this argument, comprising both the objection and its refutation, is not restricted to mere copying. For the idea that non-dualism should contradict the perceived difference between actions and the factors pertaining to actions is also stated in §29, where it is refuted as resulting in dualism of the negator and negated. Vidyānandin has thus taken Akalaṅka's objection and proposed two separate refutations of it. One is that proposed by Akalaṅka, while the other is, to my knowledge, his own. Taking the arguments of Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka as a basis, Vidyānandin thus expands them and uses them for making the point he is arguing.

Āptamīmāṃsā verse 27:

*advaitaṃ na vinā dvaitād ahetur iva hetunā |
saṃjñīnaḥ pratiṣedho na pratiṣedhyād ṛte kvacit ||24||*

There is no advaita without dvaita
as [there is no] ahetu [without] hetu.
There is no negation of something denoted by a term
unless that which is to be negated [exists].

Aṣṭaśatī caommentary to ĀM verse 27:

*advaitaṃ śabdaḥ svābhidheyapratyanīkaparamārthāpekṣaḥ, nañpūrvākhaṇḍapadatvāt,
ahetvabhīdhānavat, ity anumānāt | nātra kiñcit atiprasajyate, tādrśo naño vastupratiṣedhanibandhanatvāt |
sarvatra pratiṣedhyāt ṛte saṃjñīnaḥ pratiṣedhābhāvaḥ pratyetyaḥ ||27||*

Because of the inference: 'The word advaita depends on something real that is the opposite of that which it itself expresses, on account of being a whole word prior to negation. Like saying ahetu'.
Here there is no unwarranted extension. Because such a negation has the negation of a really existing thing as its support. In all cases it is to be acknowledged that there is no negation of something denoted by a term unless that which is to be negated [exists].

Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā Puruṣādvaita chapter §31

SŚP §31 7, 12-17

*etenaiva iṣṭaviruddhaṃ cādvaitaśāsanam | uktaṃ ca advaitasādhakānumānāgamābhyāṃ dvaitasya siddher
uktatvāt | advaitaśabdaḥ svābhīdhēyapratyanīkaparmārthāpekṣaḥ, nañ pūrvākhaṇḍapadatvāt;
'ahetvabhīdhānavat', ity anumānavirodhāc ca | tad apy uktaṃ bhagavadbhiḥ svāmibhiḥ –*

advaitaṃ na vinā dvaitād ahetur iva hetunā |

saṃjñīnaḥ pratiṣedho na pratiṣedhyād ṛte kvacit || [āptamī- ślo- 27] iti

SŚP §31 English

Indeed, by this the teaching of non-dualism is also contradicted by inference. And [this] is said because proof of dualism has [already] been stated by the inference and scriptural tradition which [were meant to] prove non-dualism. **And because [non-dualism] is contradicted by the inference: “the word ‘advaita’ depends on something real which is the opposite of that which it itself expresses, because the state of the word [dvaita] is a whole concept prior to negation, like saying ahetu”.** That is also said by the blessed master [Samantabhadra] –

There is no advaita without dvaita
as [there is no] ahetu [without] hetu.

There is no negation of something denoted by a term
unless that which is to be negated [exists].

Here, Vidyānandin's general point and argument, i.e. that a negated word presupposes the existence of that which the negated word refers to, is taken from Samantabhadra, while the syllogism to prove this is taken from Akalaṅka. With the exception of minor changes in syntax (such as compounding the words *advaita* and *śabda*), the syllogism, which is not found in the ĀM and which Vidyānandin makes his main argument in this short paragraph, is taken from the AS. Also here Vidyānandin gives no reference to Akalaṅka or the AS.

Āptamīmāṃsā verse 62

*ekasyānekavṛttir na bhāgābhāvād bahūni vā |
bhāgitvād vāsya naikatvaṃ doṣo vṛtter anārhate || [āptamī- ślo- 62]*

The “fault of residing” in a [certain] Non-Jain [doctrines] is:

The one [whole or universal] cannot reside in the many,
on account of not having parts. [In order to do so] it [must be] many.
[Then] it [the whole or universal] is not one because of consisting of parts.

Aṣṭaśatī commentary to ĀM verse 62:

*tatra ekam anekatra vartamānaṃ pratyadhikaraṇaṃ na tāvad ekadeśena, niṣpradeśatvāt | nāpi
sarvātmanā avayavyādibahutva prasamgāt | athāpi kathañcit pradeśavattvam, tatrāpi vṛttikalpano
'navasthā ca | tad ekam eva na syād iti | nāyam prasaṅgo 'nekānte, kathañcit tādātmyāt,
vedyavedakākārajñānavat ||62||*

In that case, the unitary [whole], existing in many places and in each substratum, firstly, does not [reside] [in its parts] partly, on account of having no parts. Neither does it [reside] [in its parts or individuals] wholly, because [then there would be] adherence to a multitude of wholes. Now [if it is conceded that] it somehow possesses parts, then the determination of [the whole of these parts]

residing [in its parts partly or wholly] [remains] and there is infinite regress. It cannot be only one. There is no adhering to this in the Anekānta[vāda], because [according to the Anekāntavāda] there is some identity [between the parts and the whole etc.], like cognition and the form of cognized and cognizer [are in some ways identical].

Satyāsāsanaparīkṣā Bauddha-chapter §24-26

SŚP §§24-26 24, 6-24

*nanu [na] paramārthāḥ sthūlādyākārāḥ bādhakasadbhāvāt | tathā hi – sthūlākāro ‘vayavī, sādharmaṅkāraḥ sāmānyam | tatra caikasyāvayavīno ‘nekeṣv avayaveṣu sāmānyasyaikasya anekavyaktiṣu vṛtṭiḥ parair iṣṭā, pratyāśrayam kim ekadeśena, sarvātmanā vā syāt prakārāntarābhāvāt | samavāyaḥ prakārāntaram iti cet; na; ayutasiddheṣu vartate samavaitīty anayor arthabhedābhāvāt | **tatraikam anekatra vartamānaṃ pratyadhikaranaṃ na tāvad ekadeśena, niḥpradeśatvāt | nāpi sarvātmanā, avayavyādibahutvaprasaṃgāt;** yāvanto ‘vayavādayas tāvanto ‘vayavyādayaḥ syuḥ, teṣāṃ pratyekaṃ sarvātmanā vṛttatvāt |*

***atha pradeśavattvaṃ manyeta avayavyādīnāṃ tatrāpi vṛttivikalpo ‘navasthā ca | tathā vāvayavyādi sarvaṃ tad ekam eva na syād iti** vṛtter doṣasya bādhakasya bhāvād iti cet; tad asat; bhedaikāntavādināṃ pratipāditadoṣopanipātāt | syādvādibhir api*

*ekasyānekavṛttir na bhāgābhāvād bahūni vā |
bhāgitvād vāsya naikatvaṃ doṣo vṛtter anārhate || [āptamī- ślo- 62] iti*

tān prati taddoṣapratipādanāt |

*nanv evaṃ vṛtter doṣaḥ syādvādināṃ ca prasajyate iti cet; tarhi **nāyaṃ prasamgo ‘nekānte kathamcit tādātmyāt vedyavedakākārajñānavat** | yathaiva hi jñānasya vedyavedakākārābhyāṃ tādātmyam, aśakyavivedanatvāt “kim ekadeśena sarvātmanā vā” iti vikalpayor na vijñānasya sāvayavatvaṃ bahutvaṃ vā prasajyeta, anavasthā vā, tathā avayavyāder apy avayavādibhyas tādātmyam aśakyavivecanatvād eva naikadeśena pratyekaṃ sarvātmanā vā; yatas tāthāgataḥ sarvathā bheda iva avayavāvayavyādīnāṃ kathamcit tādātmye ‘pi vṛtṭiṃ dūṣayet |*

SŚP §§24-26 English

[The Buddhists say:] Certainly, the forms, gross etc., are [not] real, because of the existence of negations. [They] are as follows – The gross form is a composite whole. The common form is a universal. There, it is maintained by the opponents that the one whole resides in [its] many parts [and] the one universal (resides) in many individuals. Is [its] seat partly [with each part], or wholly [with each part]? Because there is no other way. If it is objected: inherence is another way. [It is answered:] no, “it inheres” [means that] it resides in inseparable [things]. Because thus the two adversaries do not have the status of separate objects. **In that case, the unitary [whole], existing in many places and in each substratum, firstly, does not [reside] [in its parts] partly, on account of having no parts. Neither does it [reside] [in its parts or individuals] wholly, because [then there would be] adherence to a multitude of wholes.** There would be as many wholes as there are parts. Because each [whole] [would] reside wholly [in each part].

Now, one may think that the whole etc. have parts. In that case, the is determination of [the whole of these parts] residing [in all of its parts partly or wholly] [remains], and [the result is]

infinite regress. And thus the whole etc. cannot be completely one, because of the existence of the fault of residing which negates [that] [for the upholders of the Syādvāda as well].

If it is argued thus, [then it is answered]: That is untrue, because of the occurring of the fault that is set forth only for those who propound the doctrine of absolute difference [between the whole and its parts]. [For this fault is pointed out] by the Syādvādins as well:

The “fault of residing” in a [certain] Non-Jain [doctrines] is:

The one [whole or universal] cannot reside in the many,
on account of not having parts. [In order to do so] it [must be] many.
[Then] it [the whole or universal] is not one because of consisting of parts.

Because the fault of that [residing] is set forth with regard to those [Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas].

If it is objected: Certainly, the fault of residing then results for the Syādvādins. Then [it is answered]: **there is no adherence [to that] in [the doctrine of] non-absolutism, on account of [it positing] some identity [between the whole and its parts], like cognition and the forms of known and knower.** For, just as the cognition has [some] identity with the forms of known and knower on account of it being impossible to distinguish [one of] the two alternatives: “Does it [reside in them] partly or wholly?”, and there is no adherence to cognition having parts or being manifold, nor infinite regress, just so there is [some] identity of the whole etc. with [its] parts etc. because it is impossible to distinguish [one of the two alternatives]. Neither does it [reside in its parts] partly nor wholly, from which the followers of the Tathāgata could ascribe the fault of residing even [in the doctrine that posits] some identity of the parts and the whole etc., like [they do] in the [doctrine that holds them to be] completely different.

Verse 62, quoad by Vidyānandin here, is found in section 4 of the ĀM. This section deals with the one-sided views of absolute difference and absolute identity, verse 62 refuting the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the universal, which holds the universal to one and completely different from the individuals in which it resides. The context in which this verse is quoted is a discussion, starting in §18, concerning whether or not the gross forms, the whole, the universal etc. really exist, or if they are mere mental creations.

Vidyānandin here utilizes the whole of the AS’s commentary on verse 62 of the ĀM. The commentary of the AS is split into three parts, two of which are put in the mouth of the Buddhist objector, the last used by Vidyānandin in §26 to answer the Buddhist assertion that these faults apply to the Syādvādins as well. He thus has the Buddhist declare the faults of the one-sided view of absolute difference, as these are set forth in the ĀM and AS, and then shows that these objections do not apply to the *anekāntavāda*, also here copying a sentence from Akalaṅka.

Vidyānandin’s utilization of the AS here, using the arguments of the ĀM and AS to make clear the Jain doctrine of the universal and showing that it does not suffer from the faults the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika universal suffers from, is quite ingenious. It would, moreover, be very interesting to compare these paragraphs of the SŚP with

Vidyānandin’s commentary to verse 62 of the ĀM and its AS commentary in his *Aṣṭasahasrī*, as parts of the sections of the SŚP following those that are copied from the AS seem to be a commentary to the parts found in the AS. For example, having stated that “There is no adherence [to the ‘fault of residing’] in [the doctrine of] non-absolutism, on account of [it positing] some identity [between the whole and its parts], like cognition and the forms of known and knower”, which is taken from the AS, Vidyānandin continues:

“For, just as the cognition has [some] identity with the forms of known and knower on account of it being impossible to distinguish [one of] the two alternatives: “Does it [reside in them] partly or wholly?”, and there is no adherence to cognition having parts or being manifold, nor infinite regress, just so there is [some] identity of the whole etc. with [its] parts etc. because it is impossible to distinguish [one of the two alternatives]”.

This following sentence explains Akalaṅka’s comparison of the universal and the individuals to cognition and the forms of cognizer and cognized, much like a commentary would do.

Āptamīmāṃsā verse 39 and 42

*yadi sat sarvathā kāryaṃ puṃvan notpattum arhati |
pariṇāmaprakṛptiś ca nityatvaikāntabādhinī ||39||*

“If an effect is something completely existent, it cannot be a produced entity – just as *puruṣa*, i.e. the soul (on the Sāṃkhya philosopher’s showing) is not. On the other hand, to posit the possibility of a thing undergoing transformation goes counter to the thesis that things are possessed of the character ‘absolute permanence’” (Shah 1999: 41)

*yady asat sarvathā kāryaṃ tanmā jani khapuṣpavat |
mopādānaniyamo bhūnmāśvāsaḥ kāryajanmani ||42||*

“If an effect is absolutely non-existent, then it should rather never be produced just as sky-flower is never produced, then there should rather be no fixed rule that this material cause will bring about that effect, then there should rather be no confident feeling that this effect will be forthcoming out of that cause” (Shah 1999: 44)

Aṣṭaśatī commentary to ĀM verse 39 and 42:

*na tāvat sataḥ kāryatvaṃ caitanyavat | nāpy asataḥ siddhāntavirodhāt, gaganakusumādivat | nāparam
ekāntaprakārantaram asit, vivartādeḥ pūrvottarasvabhāvapradhvaṃsitpattilakṣaṇatvāt | tad etat trailokyam
vyakter apiti nityatvapratiśedhāt | apetaṃ apy asti vināśapratiśedhāt, iti anekāntoktiḥ
andhasarpabilapraveśanyāyam anusarati || 39 ||*

Firstly, that which exists [completely] is not an effect, like the soul [is held by the Sāṃkhya not to be an effect]. **The [completely] non-existent is also not [an effect], because it contradicts the established conclusion [of the Sāṃkhya themselves]**, like the sky flower [cannot be an effect as it is completely non-existent]. Moreover, there is no other one-sided way [except for the effect to completely exist or not exist],

because transformation being characterized by the destruction and arising of prior and posterior modes [of the thing that transforms] [is the non-one-sided view] [because transformation is not compatible with the one-sided permanence which is held by the Sāṃkhya].

This very triple world vanishes on account of manifestation, because permanence is denied. It also vanishes because destruction is denied. Thus the speech of the Anekānta[vādin] follows the analogy of the blind snake entering a hole.

kathañcit sataḥ kāryatvam, upādānasyottarībhavanāt, sakṛd api viruddhadharmādhyāsānirākṛteḥ | tathā cānvayavyatirekapratīteḥ bhāvasvabhāvanibandhanāyāḥ kiṃ phalam apalāpena? tadanyataranirākṛtau ubhayanirākṛtiḥ, abhedāt | tan na asat kāryam, sarvathānutpādaprasaṅgāt, khapuṣpavat | na tādṛk kāraṇavat, sarvathābhūtāt vandyāsutavat kathañcid asthitānutpannatvāt iti yoḥyam | saty api prabhavalakṣaṇe pūrvapūrvasyottarībhāvanam ṛtṣiṇḍasthāsakośakuśūlādiṣu sakalalokasākṣikam siddham | svamanīṣikābhīḥ sadṛśāparāparotpattivipralambhānavadhāraṇāvakṣiptim āracayatām mā upādānaniyamo bhūt, kāraṇāntaravat, tadanvayābhāvāviśeṣāt sarvathā vailakṣaṇyāt | niranvayasyāpi tādṛśī prakṛtir ātmānam kāraṇāntarebhyo yayā viśeṣayatīti cet, nan atyantaviśeṣānupalabdheḥ | tadaviśeṣādarśane sarvathā āndhyam syāt | tasmāt iyam asya prakṛtir yayā pūrvottarasvabhāvahānopadānādhikaraṇasthitim pratikṣaṇam bibharti yataḥ ayam upādāna niyamaḥ siddhaḥ | athāpi kathañcit upādānaniyamaḥ kalpyeta, kāryajanmani katham āśvāsah? tadatyantāsataḥ kāryotpatteḥ tantubhyaḥ paṭādir eva na ghaṭādir iti nirhetuko niyamaḥ syāt | pūrvapūrvaviśeṣāt uttarottaraniyamakalpanāyām anupādāno ‘pi syāt | tathādarśanam ahetuḥ, atraiva vicārāt | kathañcid āhitaviśeṣatantūnām paṭasvabhāvavpratilambhopalambhāt tadanyataravidhipratīṣedhaniyamanimittāyāt pratīter alam apalāpena | tasmāt upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalabdhiḥ anvayasyaiva, na punar abhayarūpasya | ity alam prasamgena ||42||

Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā Sāṃkhya-chapter §12:

§12 SŚP 32, 1-13

*tathā saty upalabdhiyogyatve saty anupalabdheḥ nāsti pradhānam | tadabhāve tannimittakā mahadādayo ‘pi na siddheyur iti sarvābhāvaḥ | tathāpi vaiyyātyāt mahadādisṛṣṭiprakriyocyate tadāyam praṣṭavyaḥ - kim idaṃ mahadādikam pradhānasya kāryam vā pariṇāmo vti, prathamampakṣe na tāvat satastasya kāryatvam; sarvathā sataḥ kāraṇavaīyyarthāt puruṣavat | yadi sat sarvathā kāryam puṃvan notpattum arhati | [āptamī-ślo- 39] iti vacanāt | **nāpy asataḥ** |*

asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvāsaṃbhavaabhāvāt | śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca satkāryam || [sāṃkhyakā. 9]

*iti **svasiddhāntavirodhāt** | sarvathāpy asataḥ utpattivirodhāc ca | yady asat sarvathā kārya tan mā jani khapuṣpakavat | [āptamī- ślo- 42] iti vacanāt |*

SŚP §12 English

This being so, Pradhāna does not exist, because there is no cognition [of Pradhāna] even though [Pradhāna] is fit to be cognized. If that [Pradhāna] does not exist, [then] also the Great etc.. which are caused by that [Pradhāna] cannot be proved. Thus there is non-existence of everything. If it, even though it is thus, is said, on account of shamelessness, that the process of creation, mahat etc., [arises from Pradhāna]”, then it is to be asked: “Is this, mahat etc., an effect or a transformation of Pradhāna?” In the first case, that [the Great etc.], which exists, [can] not be an effect, because of the uselessness of [positing] a cause for that which

exists completely, like the Puruṣa. Because it is said: “If the effect exists completely it is not able to be an effect, like the soul”. **And that which is [completely] non-existent [can] also not [be an effect], on account of it contradicting your own established conclusion:**

“The effect must be pre-existent in the cause
because the non-existent cannot act, because there is an apprehension of a material cause,
because the possibility of everything does not exist,
because the making of the possible [must be] of the possible and because a cause exists”

And because the arising of that which is completely non-existent [in the cause] is contradictory. Because it is said: “If the effect is completely non-existent, it cannot be produced, just like the sky-flower [can never be produced].”

Here Vidyānandin refutes two one-sided doctrines by using the arguments of Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka. Only a very short sentence, saying that the completely existing thing cannot be an effect on account of it contradicting the own doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, is copied from the AS’s commentary on verse 39 of the ĀM. But while Akalaṅka does not identify the doctrine he refers to explicitly, Vidyānandin makes clear that this doctrine is the *satkāryavāda* by quoting verse 9 of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. It is interesting to note that portion of the AS’s commentary on verse 39 of the ĀM here copied by Vidyānandin refers to a point, i.e. that that which is completely non-existent cannot be produced, which is not taken up by the part of ĀM 39 Vidyānandin quotes, but which is taken up by the part of ĀM 42 quoted below.

While the verses of the ĀM and the AS’s commentaries to these deal with refuting two one-sided views of causation, i.e. that the effect already completely exists in the material cause and that the effect is not at all pre-existent in the material cause, these views and arguments are only brought up here by Vidyānandin to refute the possibility of the transformations being effects of *pradhāna/prakṛti*, thus taking the role of parts of a greater argument.

Āptamīmāṃsā verse 68

*kāryabhrānter aṇubhrāntiḥ kāryaliṅgaṃ hi kāraṇam |
ubhayābhāvatas tatsthaṃ guṇajātītarac ca na ||68||*

“And when their effects (viz. the basic elements earth, water, fire, air) thus turn out to be illusory appearances, these atoms themselves follow suit, for the nature of cause is inferred from that of its effect. Again, in the absence of all cause and all effect there also do not exist qualities, universals etc.. supposedly residing in a cause or an effect” (Shah 1999: 61).

Aṣṭaśatī commentary to ĀM verse 68:

*cakṣurādibuddhau sthūlaikākāraḥ pratibhāsamānaḥ paramāṇubhedaikāntavādaṃ pratihanti
tadviparītānupalabhir vā | tatraitat syāt bhrāntaikatvād apratipattir iti cet, na, pāramāṇūnām
cakṣurādibuddhau svabhāvaman arpayatām kāryaliṅgābhāvāt tatsvabhāvābhyupagamānupapatteḥ |
taddvayābhāvāt tadvṛttayo jātiḡuṅakriyādayo na syuḥ, vyomakusumasaurabhavat ||69||*

The perception of a unitary, gross form, when there is cognition by means of the eye etc., strikes down the one-sided doctrine of [absolute] difference between the atoms. Or, [alternately], the lack of perception of the opposite of that [unitary, gross form]¹¹⁷ (strikes down the one-sided doctrine of [absolute] difference between the atoms).

If it is objected: There is no perception [of the atoms] because the unity [of the gross form] is an illusion. [It is answered:] no. Let that which possesses the own nature [of the atoms] deliver [itself up] when those which are made up of atoms are cognized by means of the eye etc., because it is not found that it is accepted that that [gross form] has the own nature [of the atoms] on account of that which has the effect as its mark¹¹⁸ not existing.

The universals, qualities, activities etc., which reside in those [causes and effects, i.e. atoms and gross forms] cannot exist, because both of those [cause and effect, i.e. atoms and gross forms] do not exist, just like the fragrance¹¹⁹ of the sky-flower (cannot exist) [on account of the sky-flower not existing].

Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā Vaiśeṣika-chapter §24:

SŚP §24 38, 25-39, 7

*evaṃ sambandhābhāve na kiṃcit vastu bhedaikāntavādimate vyavatiṣṭhate | tathā hi – tāvat paramāṇūnām
saṃyogābhāve dvyaṅkādiprakrameṇāvayavino ‘nutpateḥ kāryarūpabhūtacatuṣṭayābhāvaḥ, tadabhāve
tatkāraṇacaturvidhaparamāṇavo ‘pi na sambhāvvyante; kāryaliṅgatvāt kāraṇasya | “kāryabhrānter
aṅubhrāntiḥ kāryaliṅgaṃ hi kāraṇam |” [āptamī- ślo- 68] iti vacanāt | tathā bhūtacatuṣṭayāsattve
parāparādipratyayāpāyāt | “idam ataḥ pūrveṇa” ity ādi pratyayāpāyāc ca [na] kālo dik ca vyavatiṣṭhate |
tathā bherīdaṅḍādyākāśasaṃyogābhāvāt saṃyogajaśabdasyānutpattiḥ, sarvatrāvayavasamāyogābhāve
tadvibhāgasyāpy ayogād vibhāgajaśabdasyāpy anutpattiḥ; tayor anudaye śabdajaśabdasyāsambhavaḥ; iti
sakalaśabdānutpatter ākāśavyavasthāpakopāyād ākāśahāniḥ | tathā buddhyanutpattau manaso ‘siddhiḥ
kramato jñānotpatter manoliṅgatvāt | “yugapajjñānānutpattiḥ manaso liṅgam” [nyāyasū- 1|1|16] iti vacanāt
|*

SŚP §24 English

Thus, since [all] relations do not exist, it is established that there is no really existing object in the doctrine of those who propound one-sided difference. It is as follows – firstly, the fourfold elements, which have being the effect [of the atoms] as [their] nature, do not exist on account of the whole not being found by way of combination of two atoms etc. since conjunction of the atoms does not exist. The fourfold atoms, which are the cause of those [elements], are not [thought] possible if the [elements] do not exist, on account of the cause being that which has the effect as its mark. Because of the statement: “The atoms are illusory on account of [their] effects being illusory. For the cause is that which has the effect as its mark” [There are no existing objects according to the Vaiśeṣika] because, in the same way, if the fourfold elements do not exist, the cognition of remote and proximate etc. is lost. And space and time is not established on account of the loss of cognitions such as “this is to the east of that” etc.. In the same way,

¹¹⁷ i.e. there not being perception of the atoms.

¹¹⁸ i.e. the cause, i.e. the completely different and unchanging atoms.

¹¹⁹ which is a *guṇa* (quality).

sound that arises from conjunction is not found on account of the non-existence of conjunction of the drum, the stick etc. and ākāśa. And sound arising from disjunction is also not found, because it is logically unsound that there be disjunction of those [drum, stick etc. and ākāśa] if there is complete non-existence of conjunction. Sound arising from sound is impossible since there is non-arising of those two [sound from conjunction and sound from disjunction]. Thus there is abandonment of ākāśa because the means that establish ākāśa are lost on account of no sound being found. In the same way, the qualities [of the soul], knowledge etc. do not arise, because there is no proof of conjunction of the mind and the soul. The essence of the soul is abandoned because the means that establish the soul [i.e. its qualities] do not exist if those [qualities, i.e. knowledge etc.] do not exist. In the same way the mind is not proved since there is no arising of knowledge, because the successive arising of [the five kinds of] [sensory] cognition is the mark of the mind. On account of the saying: “the [five kinds of] [sensory] cognition not arising simultaneously is the mark of the mind”.

Here too Vidyānandin has used a verse directed at a different doctrine than the one he is currently discussing. Cf. the preceding verse in the *Āptamīmāṃsā*:

ananyataikānte 'nūnāṃ saṅghāte 'pi vibhāgavat |
asamhataṭvaṃ syād bhūtacatuṣkaṃ bhrāntir eva sā ||67||

“If one maintains that the effect is absolutely non-distinct from atoms (that are to act as its cause), then there arises the difficulty that these atoms should remain as much unrelated after their mutual conjunction (that is to give rise to the effect in question) as they were in the early state of mutual disjunction; moreover, in that case the four basic elements (viz. earth, water, fire, air) will turn out to be but illusory appearances” (Shah 1999: 61).

Both Akalaṅka’s commentary and the preceding verse make it clear that the intended opponent for the verse quoted by Vidyānandin is not the Vaiśeṣika, as the Vaiśeṣika do not at all hold that the atoms are identical to the gross form, i.e. that the parts are identical to the whole. Nor would they ever say that the unity of the gross form is merely an illusion. As Shah (1999: 63) points out, the opponent might here be what he calls “the empiricist Buddhist”, referring to the Sautrāntika, though the position here does not accurately describe their position, even though they do not believe that the gross form exists as something over and above the atoms.

This being as it may, the phrase Vidyānandin quotes from *ĀM* 68 still fits his point against the Vaiśeṣika well. Unlike when quoting verse 62 of the *ĀM*, which is also directed against another school than the chapter in which it is quoted is concerned with, Vidyānandin does not here at all utilize Akalaṅka’s commentary. He takes only the part of the *ĀM* useful in the present context, and leaves the rest.

Though the verse of the *ĀM* is likely directed towards Buddhist philosophy, the Vaiśeṣikas do hold the elements to be the effects of the atoms. Thus Vidyānandin can here utilize Samantabhadra’s point of the atoms not existing if the elements do not exist because the effect is the mark of the cause. Vidyānandin, however, adapts the argument

to a different context, for while Samantabhadra’s argument is that the elements do not exist if the effect is held to be non-distinct from the cause, which in this case is the atoms, Vidyānandin, on the other hand, argues that the elements cannot exist since there is no inherence, because the whole, i.e. the element, cannot inher in its parts, i.e. the atoms. Then follows the argument of the atoms not existing on account of the elements not existing.

Āptamīmāṃsā verse 6:

*sa tvam evāsi nirdoṣo yuktiśāstrāvirodhivāk |
avirodho yad iṣṭaṃ te prasiddhena na bādhyate || 6 ||*

“And such an omniscient personage you alone are whose utterance is neither in conflict with logic nor in conflict with scripture. As for the proof of such an absence of conflict, it is the circumstance that what you seek to establish is never contradicted by what is known to be the case” (Shah 1999: 5).

Extract of Aṣṭaśatī’s commentary to ĀM verse 6

*viprakarṣy api bhinnalakṣaṇasambandhitvādīnā kasyacit pratyakṣam | so ‘tra bhavān arhann eva, anyeṣāṃ
nyāyāgamaviruddhabhāṣitvāt |*

Direct perception of anything, even that which is in the [remote] distance, by means of connection with separate characteristics¹²⁰, only you, the Arhat, [has that] with regard to these [things that are remote], because the speech of others is contradicted by logic and scripture.

Satyāśānaparīkṣā Cārvāka chapter §24

SŚP §24 19, 12-15

*tad evaṃ bādhakābhāvād asti sarvajñaḥ | sa ca syādvādī bhagavan arhann evānyayogavyavacchedena
niścīyate, tasyaiva yuktiśāstrāvīrudhāvākyatvāt | anyeṣāṃ nyāyāgamaviruddhabhāṣitvāt | tatas tadukto
dharma mokṣaś ca vyavatiṣṭhate | tannirākaraṇe cārvākānāṃ pramāṇābhāvasya pratipāditaprayatvāt |
pralāpamātrasya ca prekṣāvātām anādaraṇīyatvād iti sthitaṃ dṛṣṭeṣṭaviruddhatvāt cārvākamatam asatyam
iti |*

SŚP §24 English

Thus the omniscient [being] exists, on account of the non-existence of [any] negation [of its existence]. And, because the fitness of others is excluded, only the blessed Arhat, propounder of the *Syādvāda*, is ascertained [to be omniscient], on account of only him teaching that which is not contradictory to logic and the scriptures. Because the speech of the others is contradicted by logic and the [scriptural] tradition. Therefore the dharma and liberation declared by those [omniscient beings] is established. Because it has been demonstrated that the Cārvākas do not have [any] valid means of knowledge when denying them [the dharma and liberation]. It is established: “Because that which is merely talk is not to be attended to by the wise.” “The Cārvāka-doctrine is untrue, because it is contradicted by perception and inference.”

¹²⁰ *bhinnalakṣaṇa*? The meaning of this is unclear.

In his refutation of the Cārvāka denial of the existence of omniscience, Vidyānandin here, having established the existence of omniscience, argues that only the Jina is one whose teaching is not contradicted by logic and scriptures. This idea is also found expressed in verse 6 of the ĀM. It is interesting to note here that Vidyānandin does not at all seem to be influenced by Akalaṅka's commentary to this verse, as their formulations are quite different. Vidyānandin uses the same terms as Samantabhadra (*yukti-śāstra*) while Akalaṅka uses the terms *nyāya* and *āgama*. What separates this from the other instances of influence from the ĀM discussed above is that Vidyānandin here does not quote the ĀM even though he is clearly influenced by it. A more thorough comparison of the ĀM, AS and SŚP would probably reveal more examples like this.

Conclusions

The comparison of the above verses of the ĀM and the AS's commentary on them with the paragraphs in the SŚP in which they are quoted has shown the different ways in which Vidyānandin utilizes the arguments found in the ĀM and AS. In the case of verse 62 he copies the whole AS commentary, but puts it into the mouth of the Sautrāntika Buddhist; with regard to verses 68 and 42 he does not use it at all; and in the remaining cases he uses only parts of it. His use depends on the context and the point he is making.

The examination above, together with the influence of Akalaṅka pointed out in Chapter 3, makes it clear that the influence of Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka on Vidyānandin goes beyond that of supplying a model for refuting the rival schools and tools with which to do it. Vidyānandin also uses them both as rich sources of arguments to raise against the other Indian philosophical systems. The above comparisons also makes clear, however, as does the investigation of Vidyānandin's argumentation in the SŚP in general, that Vidyānandin is by no means bound by the arguments and models provided by his predecessors. In order to fully understand the extent of Samantabhadra's and Akalaṅka's influence on Vidyānandin, a thorough examination and comparison of all the relevant works of Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin is herefore needed.

As noted above, Vidyānandin has written a commentary on the ĀM and AS, the *Aṣṭasahasrī*. It would be very interesting to compare the paragraphs examined above with the relevant portions of the *Aṣṭasahasrī* in order to see how much of the argumentation found in the SŚP which cannot be traced back to Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka can be found there. Jain's footnote¹²¹ to §31 of the Puruṣādvaita chapter, where verse 27 of the ĀM is quoted, indicates that it contains similarities to the *Aṣṭasahasrī*. This may be the case elsewhere as well. As noted in Chapter 3, a comparison with the few translated

¹²¹ Cf. footnote 359.

portions of Vidyānandin's critique against Buddhism in his *Aṣṭasahasrī* has revealed portions in which the argumentation and wording of the SŚP and the *Aṣṭasahasrī* is almost identical.¹²² Tatia's introduction to Jain's edition of the SŚP, discussed in Chapter 1, also indicates that there may be many similarities between the SŚP and the *Aṣṭasahasrī*, and Jain also points out several other places in which the two are similar.¹²³

¹²² Cf. also footnote 927.

¹²³ Cf. footnotes 448 and 470.

5. Conclusions

This thesis has investigated the *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* of Vidyānandin on the basis of the English translation supplied in the appendix. This has been done through several steps. In Chapter 1, the main focus was on the *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* itself, its structure and content, its previous treatment and how it has been approached in the making of the present thesis. In Chapter 2, we gave a basic presentation of the doctrines of *pramāṇa* and *anekānta* as they developed in the Jain philosophical tradition, and placed Vidyānandin's authorship within this tradition. Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*'s use of the *anekāntavāda* in polemics and its establishing of a model which came to influence later philosophers, among them Vidyānandin, was also presented.

The third chapter, forming the main part of the thesis, investigated the arguments employed by Vidyānandin in his refutation of non-jain philosophies. It also investigated his presentation of these, comparing them to presentations found in secondary literature and in some cases also the primary literature of the rival philosophies in question. Some points were highlighted as in need of further research and investigation. In several cases, Vidyānandin's presentation of the rival philosophical systems against which he argues differs from the presentations given of these systems in secondary literature and in the texts of these schools themselves. These instances call for further study. This chapter also pointed out the influence of Samantabhadra's *syādvāda* model on Vidyānandin, and that Vidyānandin does not always follow it.

Chapter 3 in several places also pointed out the influence of Akalaṅka on Vidyānandin's arguments. Though Akalaṅka is in some instances quoted, most of the arguments which have influenced Vidyānandin give no reference to him. It was suggested that a more thorough investigation of the collected works of Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin would probably reveal even more such examples. Chapter 4 is a contribution to the start of such a study, comparing Akalaṅka's commentary (*Aṣṭaśatī*) on a selection of the verses of Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā* with the paragraphs in the SŚP in which these verses are quoted. As these paragraphs quote the ĀM, the influence of Samantabhadra on the arguments employed there is explicit. The comparison conducted in Chapter 4, however, also found several cases of strong influence from Akalaṅka, showing that Vidyānandin in some places has copied entire sentences from Akalaṅka's *Aṣṭaśatī*.

This small contribution strengthens the claim that a thorough investigation of the works of Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin is needed, as it reveals even more influence from Akalaṅka on the text of the SŚP. As Vidyānandin has also written a commentary on Akalaṅka's *Aṣṭaśatī*, the *Aṣṭasahasrī*, it was further suggested that the

paragraphs investigated in Chapter 4 should also be compared to this work, as it is possible that some of the arguments and sentences not tracable to the *Aṣṭaśatī* could be found in the *Aṣṭasahasrī*. For it has been poined out in Chapter 3 that such parallel portions have been identified elsewhere in the SŚP. Moreover, similarities between the SŚP and Vidyānandin's *Āptaparīkṣā* have been pointed out by Jain, as mentioned in Chapter 1. This agains suggests the need for a thorough investigation and comparison of all of Vidyānandin's works.

It is hoped that the effors and contributions made in this thesis towards investigating the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* of Vidyānandin will contribute to increasing the interest and research into his work in particular, and this period of Jain philosophy in general.

APPENDIX
TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSLATION
OF VIDYĀNANDIN'S SATYAŚĀSANAPARĪKṢĀ
WITH NOTES

Preface to the translation

The following translation is based on Gokulchandra Jain's edition of the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*. The references to this edition, given for each paragraph of Sanskrit text, are to the page and line of Jain's edition. The ordering according to paragraphs and their numbering follows that of Jain's edition. In the few cases where Jain's paragraphs have been modified, this has been clearly indicated in the accompanying footnotes. Where the editor has added to the Sanskrit text and indicated these additions with brackets these brackets are included in the transliterated text, except for the cases in which the editor has kept the reading of the manuscripts and added his amendment in brackets. In such cases only the amendment of the editor is included, without brackets, and the reading of the printed edition is quoted in a footnote.

The references to quotes from other works also follow Jain's edition. Those texts that have been available to me have been checked, and variant readings have been recorded in footnotes. The identification of Bhāmati (quoted in SŚP 2, 13-16), identified by Tatia (1964: 11, footnote 5), has been added. Those quotations that have not been identified are marked as such. The following quotes have been checked:

- Āptamīmāṃsā quoted in SŚP 5, 3-4; 7, 9-10; 7, 15-16; 7, 20-21; 24, 15-16; 32, 5; 32, 12; and 38, 28.
- Bhagavadgīta quoted in SŚP 5, 23-24.
- Bhāmati quoted in SŚP 2, 13-16.
- Hetubinduṭīkā quoted in SŚP 46, 7-14.
- Nyāyasūtra quoted in SŚP 23-24; 39, 7; 41, 18-19; 42, 4-5
- Praśastapādabhāṣya quoted in SŚP 34, 5-7; 34, 8-22; 36, 27-28; and 38, 4.
- Saṃbandhavārttika quoted in SŚP 8, 17-30 and 9, 4-5.
- Sāṃkhyakārikā quoted in SŚP 30, 6-7; 30, 13-14; 30, 26-27; and 32, 8-9.
- Saundarānanda quoted in SŚP 21, 12-15.
- Ślokaṃvārttika quoted in SŚP 3, 28-29; 4, 7-8; 45, 2-3; 46, 1; and 46, 18-22.

Prof. Shah has suggested that the quoted verses in SŚP 13, 15-16; 17, 16-21; and 27, 15-16 are from the *Yuktyanuśāsanaṭīkā* and not the *Yuktyanuśāsana* as the editor has indicated. I have not had recourse to the *Yuktyanuśāsana* or the *Yuktyanuśāsanaṭīkā*, and have therefore not had the opportunity to check this. It is however noted that Vidyānandin specifically refers to Samantabhadra when quoting the *Yuktyanuśāsana* in SŚP 23, 12-13 and 39, 12-13. He does not refer to Samantabhadra in SŚP 37, 22 and 37, 24, but the extracts quoted there are from the verse that is quoted in SŚP 39, 12-13. In the above

mentioned verses, on the other hand, no reference to Samantabhadra is given. As I have not been able to check this, Jain's references are not altered.

Prof. Shah has also identified the verse quoted in SŚP 45, 27-28 as belonging to Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika. As I have not had recourse to this work I have not been able to confirm this. Prof. Shah's identification is noted in a footnote to the verse.

The Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā

Introduction

vidyānandiviracitā satyaśāsanaparīkṣā

“The investigation into the true teaching¹²⁴”, composed by Vidyānandin.

SŚP 1, 3-4

vidyānandādhipaḥ svāmī vidvadevo jineśvaraḥ |

yo lokaikahitas tasmai namastāt svātmalabdhave¹²⁵ || 1 ||

SŚP English

Obeisance for him who is the king of those whose happiness is knowledge¹²⁶, the master, the lord of the wise, the lord of the conquerors¹²⁷ and the only friend of the world, is for understanding one’s own self.¹²⁸

§1 SŚP 1, 5-7

atha satyaśāsanaparīkṣā | iyam eva parīkṣā yaḥ “asyedam upapadyate na vā”¹²⁹ iti vicāraḥ |
sā ca śāsanasya satyatva evopapadyate tatraiva vivādāt vaktur āptatvavat | na tu
śāsanatvamātre¹³⁰ tadabhāvāt vaktṛtvamātravat |

SŚP §1 English

Now, “The investigation into the true teaching”. Examining: “is this [definition] applicable to this [defined thing], or is it not?”, this is indeed investigation.¹³¹ And that

¹²⁴ The sense in which the title, *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*, should be understood is “investigation into [which teaching is] the true teaching”. Cf. SŚP 1, 15 *kiṃ tu khalu śāsanam syāt satyam iti parīkṣyate* (“verily, which teaching may be the true one, is investigated”).

¹²⁵ Ed. note: “tulanā – jayanti nirjitāśeśasavathāikāntavādinah | satyavākyādhipaḥ śaśvad vidyānandāḥ jineśvarāḥ || – pramāṇaparīkṣā maṅgalācaraṇa |”. Trikha (2009: 152) translates as “Die sämtliche in jeder Hinsicht einseitige Argumente überwunden haben – die siegen! Die Herrscher über diejenigen, denen ganz und gar wahre Rede eignet, die ihre Freude aus dem Wissen (schöpfen), deren gebieter der Jina ist.” The relevance of this verse here is the use of *vidyānanda*, which is here clearly used in the plural and thus does not refer to Vidyānandin, the author of the text. Cf. note to the translation of *vidyānanda*.

¹²⁶ *Vidyānanda* can here also be read as referring to Vidyānandin, the author of the text. Trikha argues that the Maṅgala verse of Vidyānandin’s *Pramāṇaparīkṣā* (cf. editors note in footnote 125), justifies reading *vidyānanda* as a plural *bahuvrīhi* compound (2009: 152). It can thus be assumed that Vidyānandin uses this word in the same way in the opening verse of this text, making the reading of *vidyananda* as a *bahuvrīhi*, and not as referring to the author Vidyānanda, preferable.

¹²⁷ i.e. Jinas or Tīrthāṅkaras.

¹²⁸ This verse pays homage to the Jina or Tīrthāṅkara. Which one is not specified.

¹²⁹ Cf. Nyāyabhāṣya’s introduction to its commentary on verse 1.1.3 of the Nyāyasūtra, which reads: “lakṣitasya yathālakṣaṇam *upapadyate na veti* pramāṇair avadhāraṇam parīkṣā”. Cf. footnote 131.

¹³⁰ ed. note: “vivādābhāvāt |”

[investigation] is suitable only with respect to a teaching being true, on account of there being dispute with respect to that, just like [investigation is suitable with regard to] the reliability of a speaker. But it is not [suitable] with regard to only the “teachingness”, because of absence of that [dispute with respect to that], like [there is no dispute regarding the speaker] merely being a speaker.¹³²

§2 SŚP 1, 8-13

iha hi puruṣādvaitaśabdādvaitavijñānādvaitacitrādvaitaśāsanāni
cārvākabauddhaseśvaranirīśvarasāṃkhyaniyāyikavaiśeṣikabhāṭṭaprābhākaraśāsanāni
tattvopaplavaśāsanam anekāntaśāsanam cety anekāśāsanāni pravartante | na ca sarvāny
api tāni satyāni bhavanti dvaitādvaitabhāvābhāvādīparasparaviruddhārthapratipādanāt | na
ca tatra na kiṃcidapi satyaṃ syād ity ārekitavyam ekāntānekāntayor dvaitādvaitayor
bhāvābhāvayor vā tejasṭimirayor iva parasparam¹³³ vipratīṣiddhayor dvayor api vidhivat
pratīṣedhasyāpy asaṃbhavena anyatarasya niyamena vidher upapatteḥ kasyacit
satyasyāvaśyam abhyupagantavyatvāt |

SŚP §2 English

For here there are various teachings: “the teachings of the Puruṣādvaita¹³⁴, Śabdādvaita¹³⁵,
Vijñānādvaita¹³⁶ and Citrādvaita¹³⁷, the teachings of the [materialistic] Cārvāka¹³⁸,

¹³¹ As Trikha (2009) points out, the formulation *upapadyate na vā* in Vidyānandin’s definition of *parīkṣā* (investigation), corresponds to the definition of *parīkṣā* in the Nyāyabhāṣya’s introduction to its commentary on verse 1.1.3 of the Nyāyasūtra, which reads: “lakṣitasya yathālakṣaṇam *upapadyate na veti* pramāṇair avadhāraṇam parīkṣā” (2009: 154, my italics). Jhā translates: “*Examination* is the investigation, by means of argumentation, of the question as to whether or not the definition is applicable to the thing defined” (Jhā 1984: 97-98; italics in original).

¹³² just like it is suitable to investigate whether or not a speaker is reliable or not on account of there being differing opinions on this, but it is not suitable to investigate the “speaker-ness” of the speaker as there is no dispute regarding this (no one doubts that the speaker speaks, it is whether or not what he says is true that is worth investigating as it is the object of dispute), just so investigation is only suitable with respect to whether or not a teaching is true as there are differing opinions with respect to this, but it is not suitable to merely investigate the “teaching-ness” of the teaching as there is no dispute regarding this. In other words, examining whether or not the teaching is a teaching, or maybe rather what a teaching teaches, is not investigation (*parīkṣā*). Investigating whether or not what the teaching teaches is true is, on the other hand, suitable, as there are differing opinions concerning this.

According to Trikha (2009) the comparison with the reliability of a speaker has here probably been chosen because Vidyānandin has dedicated a separate investigation to the question of a speaker’s reliability in his *Ātmaparīkṣā* (Trikha 2009: 154).

¹³³ ed. note: “viruddhayoḥ |”

¹³⁴ refers to the Advaita Vedānta.

¹³⁵ refers to the grammatical philosophy of Bhartrhari who was the first to systematically equate brahman (the Absolute) with language (*śabda*), arguing that everything arises as a manifestation of this Śabda-brahman (Coward & Raja 1990: 34).

¹³⁶ refers to the Yogācāra school of Buddhist philosophy.

¹³⁷ It is not clear what the Citrādvaita refers to. It is also mentioned in Tatia’s treatment of the Vijñānādvaita in his “Studies in Jaina Philosophy” (1951), which is based on Vidyānandin’s *Aṣṭasahasrī*. But here it is also dismissed as refuted by the same arguments that refute the Vijñānādvaita, and thus not presented.

¹³⁸ Cārvāka here refers to the materialistic school of philosophy, which is said to have been founded by Bṛhaspati. It is also known as *Lokāyata*. For a discussion of the existence of a materialistic and skeptical branch of the Cārvāka cf. footnote 140 below.

Bauddha¹³⁹, theistic and non-theistic Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Bhāṭṭa [mīmāṃsā] and the Prabhākara [mīmāṃsā], the teaching of Tattvopaplava¹⁴⁰ and the Anekānta¹⁴¹-teachings.”¹⁴² And all those are not true, on account of giving ideas that are contrary to one another, such as duality or non-duality, existence or non-existence etc..¹⁴³

[Still], there it is not to be suspected [that] “nothing can [then] be true”.¹⁴⁴ Because of the impossibility of negation [of both] of two [doctrines] that are mutually contradictory like light and dark, such as one-sidedness and many-sidedness, dualism and non-dualism or existence and non-existence, just like the affirmation [of both is impossible]. Because an affirmation of one [of the two] is necessarily found, as some truth is inevitably to be acknowledged.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁹ Litt. “the Buddhists”. Here it refers to the Sautrāntika.

¹⁴⁰ *Tattvopaplavavāda* literally translates as “the teaching on the destruction of the tattvas”. What is here probably referred to is the kind of skeptical doctrine expressed in Jayarāsi’s *Tattvopaplavasimha* (The lion that destroys the principles).

Eli Franco (1994) has argued that the *Tattvopaplavasimha* should be understood as a part of the Cārvāka school, and that the view of this school as strictly materialistic must thus be given up. Rather, the Cārvāka consisted of a materialistic branch and a skeptical branch. Franco argues that this skeptical branch evolved as a response to the philosophical development in India from the time of Dignāga, during which epistemological issues became the main concern of Indian philosophers. The development of the *tattvopaplavavāda* was thus a response to the attacks of other philosophers against the Cārvāka school’s assertion of perception (*pratyakṣa*) as the only valid means of knowledge. While Lokāyatikas such as Purandara responded to this by a limited acceptance of inference, others, such as Jayarāsi, responded by rejecting even perception (Franco 1994: 8).

Franco’s arguments for taking his position are that Bṛhaspati is the only philosopher which Jayarāsi quotes to show that his arguments are compatible with his own (ibid: 4). Jayarāsi also explicitly says at the beginning of the *Tattvopaplavasimha* that there are no discrepancies between his own philosophy (*tattvopaplavavāda*) and the philosophy of Bṛhaspati (ibid: 5). These arguments for considering Jayarāsi and his *tattvopaplavavāda* as belonging to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata school are thus based on the impression that Jayarāsi himself seems to have considered himself as part of the Cārvāka.

Another argument for doing so is that Jaina philosophers such as Anantavīrya and Vidyānandin explicitly associate a well known Cārvāka/Lokāyata fragment, which reads: “*sarvatra paraparyanuyogaparāny eva bṛhaspateh sūtrāni*” (ibid: 6) and which Franco translates as: “Everywhere (i.e. throughout the text) the sūtras of Bṛhaspati have the sole purpose of questioning [the opinions or doctrines] of others” (ibid: 6), with Jayarāsi (ibid: 6). An example of such an association is the following quote from Vidyānandin’s *Tattvārthaśloka-vārttika*: “*tattvopaplavavādināḥ paraparyanuyogaparadvād*” (2002: 80), “Because the purpose of the *Tattvopaplavavādin* is solely the questioning of [the doctrines] of others” (My translation).

It thus seems reasonable to say that the *tattvopaplavavāda* should be considered as a part of the Cārvāka school, even though they in the SŚP are treated separately, just like the SŚP treats the two Buddhist schools, here referred to as Bauddha and Vijñānādvaīta, in two separate chapters, and referring to one of them (the Sautrāntika) as merely Bauddha (Buddhist) without any further specification. In the same way the materialistic Cārvāka is here referred to simply as Cārvāka, while the skeptical branch of Cārvāka is referred to as the *tattvopaplavavāda*, just like the idealistic branch of Buddhism is merely referred to as Vijñānādvaīta (non-dualism of consciousness).

¹⁴¹ Refers to the Jaina doctrine.

¹⁴² It is here implied that these are the teaching that will be presented and discussed in the following chapters. This list quite accurately represents the layout of the SŚP, with the exception of the Vaiśeṣika being dealt with before the Nyāya. The end of the SŚP is however missing. It ends during the discussion of Mīmāṃsā. Thus the section concerning the *Tattvopaplava*- and Jain doctrines are lost.

¹⁴³ i.e. since these teachings contradict each other, they cannot all be true.

¹⁴⁴ i.e. even though the teachings mutually contradict each other, one should not conclude that none of the doctrines are true.

¹⁴⁵ As already stated (in SŚP 1, 10-11), when two doctrines contradict each other it is not possible for them both to be true. It is however not to be assumed that they are then both false, as one of them may be affirmed. This is a principle set forth by the Nyāya, “*parasparavirodhe hi na prakāraṅtasthitih*” (Kusumāñjali quoted in Radhakrishnan 1966b: 113 footnote 3). “For, in the case of two mutually contradictory [judgements], it is not established that there is another way” (My translation). Radhakrishnan

SŚP §3 1, 14-17

tathā ca tatra kiṃ tu khalu śāsanam syāt satyam iti parīkṣyate idam eva hi satyaśāsanasya satyatvaṃ nāma yad dṛṣṭeṣṭāvīruddham | pratyakṣānumānādīpramāṇavīruddhasyāpi satyatve na kiṃcid asatyam jagati syāt | ¹⁴⁶tadavīruddhasyāpy asatyatve kim api na satyam syāt | ato ‘vyāptyativyāptyasaṃbhavāsaṃbhavād aduṣṭam idaṃ satyalakṣaṇam upalakṣyate |

SŚP §3 English

And thus, in such a situation, “verily, what teaching may be the true one?” is investigated.¹⁴⁷ For that which is not contradicted by perception and inference¹⁴⁸, only that is that which is called the truthfulness of the true teaching.¹⁴⁹ If something which is contradicted by the valid means of knowledge¹⁵⁰, such as sensory perception, inference etc.. were true, nothing in the world can be untrue.¹⁵¹ And if something which is not contradicted by those [valid means of knowledge] were untrue, then nothing can be true. This definition of truth is regarded as not being incorrect, because of the impossibility of being too wide, being too narrow and inapplicable.¹⁵²

§4 SŚP 1, 18-19

tac ca dṛṣṭeṣṭāvīruddhatvam anekāntaśāsanane eveti tad eva satyaśāsanadhavīm ārodhum iṣṭe, ekāntaśāsanam tu sarvam asatyam eva dṛṣṭeṣṭāvīruddhatvāt | tathā hi –

SŚP §4 English

writes: “Two contradictory judgements cannot both be false, nor can they both be true. A is either B or not B. One or the other of two contradictories must be true since no other course is possible” (1966: 113).

¹⁴⁶ ed. note: “pramāṇavīruddhasya |”

¹⁴⁷ In such a case (i.e. when one is presented with two contradictory doctrines) one determines which one is true by means of investigation (*parīkṣā*, defined in §1 above).

¹⁴⁸ i.e. the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), here referred to as *dṛṣṭa* (perceived) and *iṣṭa* (accepted) respectively.

¹⁴⁹ i.e. it is that which makes the true teaching true. Being *dṛṣṭeṣṭāvīruddha* (not contradicted by perception and inference) is here set forth as the criteria of truth.

¹⁵⁰ *pramāṇa* [from pra+mā (to measure)] is a technical term referring to valid epistemological means.

Pratyakṣa (sensory perception) and *anumāna* (inference) are here mentioned as examples of *pramāṇas*. The number of *pramāṇas* accepted varies from school to school. Cf. Chapter 2.

¹⁵¹ i.e. something that did not conform to these criteria were to be considered to be true, then nothing could be untrue as it one would not have any means for disproving anything.

¹⁵² *avyāpti*, *ativyāpti* and *asaṃbhava* are the three kinds of fallacies possible with respect to a definition, as defined by the Nyāya. *Ativyāpti*, being “too wide”, is when the attribute used to define a phenomenon also occurs in other kinds of phenomena, such as if one defines a cow as a horned animal (a characteristic which also occurs in other kinds of animals). *Avyāpti*, “too narrow”, is when the attribute only cover a portion of the kind of phenomena one is trying to define, such as if one defines a cow as a white animal. *Asaṃbhava*, inapplicable, is when the attribute does not exist in the phenomena one is trying to define, such as if one defines a cow as an animal with uncloven hoofs (Radhakriahnan 1966b: 47). The point here is that as these fallacies do not apply to this definition of truth, it is not incorrect.

And that state of not being contradicted by perception and inference is [found] only in the non-one-sided teaching. Only it is qualified¹⁵³ to ascend the tree¹⁵⁴ of the true teaching. And the one-sided teaching is wholly untrue, because it is contradicted by perception and inference¹⁵⁵. For it is as follows –

Parabrahmaśāsanaparīkṣā

The investigation into the teaching of the Parabrahmādvaita¹⁵⁶.

SŚP 1, 22

tāvat parabrahmādvaitam dr̥ṣṭeṣṭāvairuddham eva | idaṃ hi brahmavādimatam –¹⁵⁷

SŚP 1, 22 English

Firstly, the Parabrahmādvaita is indeed contradicted by perception and inference. For this is the doctrine of the¹⁵⁸ Brahmavādins –

[pūrvapakṣa]

The opponent's side.

SŚP §5 1, 22-24

¹⁵³ 3rd. sg. pres. ātmanepada of the root ṛṣ. Lit. “goes”. “It goes to attain...”. ṛṣ is a transitive verb in Sanskrit, but it is difficult to find a corresponding transitive verb to represent it in English.

¹⁵⁴ *Dhavī*, here with the feminine accusative singular ending *-īm*, cannot be found in any dictionary. *Dhava*, which is a masculine noun, has two entries in the MMW, one as meaning man, husband, lord or possessor, the other as referring to one of two plants, the *Grislea Tomentosa* or the *Anogeissus Latifolia*. According to Trikha (2009) the *Grislea Tomentosa* is a bush with red flowers, while the *Anogeissus Latifolia* is a rubber tree that can reach a height of up to 24 meters. He further, mentioning *dhātakī* as a feminine alternative for *dhava* in referring to the *Grislea Tomentosa*, suggests that *dhavī* may here refer to a tree and thus metaphorically express an exalted point of view, or that it may be a feminine version of *dhava* here in the sense of “possessing” (157).

Here Trikha's first suggestion has been adopted. It is difficult to see why this word should be in the feminine if *dhavī* should mean “possessor”, as the subject of the sentence is clearly the *anekāntavāda*, which is masculine. Interpreting *dhavī* as meaning tree is also problematic, as it has not been recorded anywhere as having this meaning. It still seems preferable to read *satyaśāsanadhavīm* as “the tree of the true teaching”, perhaps metaphorically characterizing the “true teaching” as a lofty tree with branches (doctrines) that only the *anekāntavāda* is qualified to climb.

¹⁵⁵ This last paragraph makes clear the purpose of the rest of the treatise. Having ascertained that a true teaching may be ascertained among the mutually contradictory teachings by means of investigation, and having defined the conditions for the state of truth, Vidyānandin declares that only the Jain doctrine is worthy of this position. The purpose of the rest of the treatise is to prove this by means of investigation (*parīkṣā*).

¹⁵⁶ i.e. “the non-dualism of the Supreme brahman”. This teaching is referred to as Puruṣādvaita in the introduction and designates the Advaita Vedānta.

¹⁵⁷ Amended. This opening part is included in the pūrvapakṣa by the editor. It is strictly speaking not part of the pūrvapakṣa (opponent's side) as it states that the Puruṣādvaita is contradicted by perception and inference. It has therefore been separated from the rest of §5 (in which it was included by the editor), which starts the pūrvapakṣa.

¹⁵⁸ i.e. those who hold the doctrine of brahman.

deśakālākāravyavacchinnanirvyabhicārasakalāvasthāvyāpipratibhāsamātram
akhaṇḍajñānānandāmṛtam ayaṃ parabrahmaikam evāsti na tu dvitīyam | **ekam
evādvitīyaṃ brahma ity ādy āmnāyāt** | [chāndo- 6.2.1.]

SŚP §5 English

Only this Supreme Soul alone, which is not delimited by space, time and forms, constant¹⁵⁹, pervading all states, consciousness-only and [characterized by] perfect knowledge, bliss and immortality, exists. A second does not [exist]. Because the sacred tradition¹⁶⁰ [says] “Only brahman alone [exists], having no second” etc..

SŚP §6 2, 1-6

katham ekam eva parabrahmāsti, parasparam bhinnānām nānātmanām¹⁶¹ pratīter iti cet,
na, ekasyāpi tasya bhūte bhūte vyavasthitasya jaleṣu candravat anekadhā
pratibhāsaṃbhavāt | tad uktam –

eka eva tu bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitaḥ |

ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat || [amṛtavi- upa- pa- 12 pṛ- 15] iti

SŚP §6 English

If it is objected, “How can the Supreme Soul alone exist, when there is cognition of [objects that are] different from one another and have various natures”¹⁶², [It is answered:] no, because appearing as many is possible even though that [Supreme Soul], contained in all existing things, is one¹⁶³, just like the moon [appears as many in many different vessels] in [different vessels of] water [but is seen to be one in the sky]. It is said –

But only One soul exists, it abides in all beings.

It is seen singly and manifoldly, like the moon in waters.

¹⁵⁹ *Nirvyabhicāra* is not found in the MMW. It is made up of the negating prefix *nis* and *vyabhicāra*, and should literally mean “non-deviating”. *Avyabhicāra* (*vyabhivāra* negated by prefix *a*, “non-deviating”) is however found in the MMW, where it is also recorded as an adjective with the meaning “constant”. This meaning has been adopted here.

¹⁶⁰ i.e. the Veda

¹⁶¹ ed. note: “nānāsvarūpāṇām ghaṭapaṭādyarthānām |”

¹⁶² *Nānātmanām* could here also be read as referring to “the various souls”. It has been found better to follow the suggestion of the editor (cf. editors note in footnote 161) and see the intended (but not directly expressed) subject here as the various objects, which are described as *parasparam bhinnānām* (mutually different) and *nānātmanām* (having various natures). This reading seems preferable because the objections raised in this chapter against the non-dualism of brahman do not restrict themselves to the perceptions of a variety of souls, but variety in general. A further advantage of this reading is that the objection raised here then explicitly states two levels of variety or difference which can be raised against the Brahmadvaita, not only the difference between the various objects but also the fact that the various objects are not uniform, i.e. they have various natures.

¹⁶³ i.e. the one Supreme Soul appears as many, just like the one moon appears as many when it is reflected on different waters.

SŚP §7 2, 6-8

tathā pṛthivyādayo ‘pi na tatas tattvāntarāṇi¹⁶⁴, tadvivartatvāt | tac
coccāvacarācararūpaprapaṅcasyāsyā tata¹⁶⁵ eva janmādibhāvāt | tathaivoktaṃ bhagavatā
bādarāyaṇena – janmādy asya yataḥ [brahmasū- 1.1.2]¹⁶⁶ iti |

SŚP §7 English

Thus earth etc.¹⁶⁷ are not different tattvas than that [Supreme Soul], because they are unreal modifications¹⁶⁸ of that [Supreme Soul]. Because the origination etc.¹⁶⁹ of this visible world of high and low¹⁷⁰, movable and immovable¹⁷¹ forms is only from that [Supreme Soul]. Just so it is said by the Blessed Bādarāyaṇa, “[brahman is that] from which [springs] the origination etc.. of this [world]”¹⁷².

SŚP §8 2, 9-10

atha kathaṃ prapaṅcādhyavasāyavidhvamsanakarāt paramapuruṣāt janmādīti cet; na;
anādyavidyāsacivād eva tasmāt¹⁷³ tasya bhāvāt |

SŚP §8 English

If it is objected: “How is origination etc.. of the world from the Supreme Spirit which causes the destruction of the determinate cognition¹⁷⁴ of the world?”¹⁷⁵ [It is answered:]

¹⁶⁴ ed. note: ”bhinnatattvāni |”

¹⁶⁵ ed. note: ”paramapuruṣāt |”

¹⁶⁶ The context of this verse in the brahmasūtra is: *athāto brahmajijñāsā | janmādyasya yataḥ | śāstrayonitvāt* | (brahmasūtra 1,1.1 – 1,1.3). “Now, from this is the desire to know brahman. It is that from which [springs] origination etc.. of this [world], and its source is the śāstras (translation here follows that of Ghate 1960: 53). Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbāraka, Vallabha and Madhva, all agree, in their commentaries on the brahmasūtra, that this verse describes Brahman as “that from which spring the origination etc., of this world” (Ghate 1960: 53).

¹⁶⁷ refers to the five elements (pañcabhūta): earth, fire, water, air and ether?

¹⁶⁸ *vivarta* is a technical term referring to an unreal transformation, as opposed to *pariṇāma* which is an actual material transformation. Penna (2004c) explains: “Vivarta is an apparent change. When a thing changes itself into another thing, it is pariṇāma (actual change). Milk becoming curds is pariṇāma and a rope appearing as snake in dim light is vivarta. Vivarta is another name for superimposition or adhyāsa...According to the Advaita concept, the creation is vivarta of the Absolute Consciousness or Brahman. It is against the pariṇāma theory of the Sāṃkhya which states the creation to be an effect of Prakṛti, the primordial cause, and against the Ārambhavāda of the Naiyāyikas which propounds that the creation is a product from atoms.” (417).

¹⁶⁹ i.e. arising, sustaining and destruction

¹⁷⁰ high and low is here meant to express the idea of diversity.

¹⁷¹ i.e. living and not living.

¹⁷² The translation of this quote follows that of Ghate 1960: 53. Cf. footnote 166.

¹⁷³ ed. note: ”paramapuruṣāt |”

¹⁷⁴ *Adhyavasāya* is here translated as “determinate cognition”. Bartley (2005) explains that “*Adhyavasāya* involves the structuring of the information supplied by the senses in such a way that it can be converted into action and be communicated” (10, italics and bold in original). It thus corresponds to *vikalpapratyakṣa* (conceptual perception) as opposed to *nirvikalpapratyakṣa* (non-conceptualized perception). This distinction is styled by Matilal (1986) as a “time honoured distinction found in the entire classical literature on the Sanskrit philosophy of perception” (312-13), and is especially frequently used in the Bauddha chapter of the SŚP. *Adhyavasāya* is here used as a synonym for *vikalpapratyakṣa*.

no. Because the existence of that [world] arises from that [Supreme Soul] assisted by beginningless ¹⁷⁶ignorance.¹⁷⁷

SŚP §9 2, 11-17

avidyā tarhi dvitīyā syād iti cet; tad asat; tasyāḥ¹⁷⁸ sadasattvavicārābhyām
pramāṇapadavīm avigāhamānāyāḥ, anirvācyatvāt | tad uktam –

anirvācyāvidyādvitayasacivasya prabhavato

vivartā yasyaite viyadanilatejobavanayaḥ¹⁷⁹ |

yataścābhūd viśvaṃ caram acaram uccāvacam idam

namāmas tad brahmāparimitasukhajñānam amṛtam || [Bhāmati 1¹⁸⁰] iti

SŚP §9 English

If it is objected: “ignorance must then be the second”¹⁸¹. [It is answered:] that is wrong. Because, as the investigation of its [i.e. ignorance’s] state of existence or non-existence does not enter into an epistemological object¹⁸², [ignorance] is indescribable [with respect to existence or non-existence]¹⁸³. It is said –

The use of *adhyavasāya* here, i.e. not only the seeing (cognition) of the world, but the determinate cognition of the world, seems to imply that what is destroyed (when one realizes brahman) is not the seeing of the visible world as such, but its determinate cognition.

¹⁷⁵ the objection here is that as brahman is the cause of the destruction of the world, since once there is realization of Brahman the *vivarta* (unreal modification), and thus the appearance of the world, ceases. How can it then be the cause of the unreal world as well? In other words, how can one and the same thing be both the poison and the antidote?

¹⁷⁶ *Avidyā* is a key concept in Advaita Vedānta, and is, along with the concepts of *māyā* (illusion) and *adhyāsa* (superimposition) used to explain the appearance of plurality and subject-object consciousness. Tatia (1951), while examining Śaṅkara’s understanding and use of *avidyā*, explains: “The world is an illusion in the sense that it is a compound of truth and untruth. The unreal is superimposed upon the real. This superimposition or *adhyāsa*, as it is called, is the prius of experience... Our common experience is based on this *adhyāsa*... The transcendental error can, in brief, be defined as the mutual identification of the not-self and the self. This transcendental error is called *avidyā*... Thus there is beginningless, endless, naural (*naisargika*) *adhyāsa* (superimposition) of the nature of wrong cognition (*mithyāpratyaḥarūpaḥ*), the cause of agency and enjoyment (of the individual souls) and patent to all” (121-22).

¹⁷⁷ i.e. while origination of the world is from brahman assisted by the beginningless ignorance, its cessation is from brahman alone. In the words of the above metaphor, the poison and the antidote are thus not identical.

¹⁷⁸ ed. note: “avidyāyāḥ |”

¹⁷⁹ Amended. Printed edition reads “vīyadanilatejo’vanayaḥ |”. *Ap* (water) is missing from the enumeration of the five elements (*pañcabhūta*). The first line is also one syllable shorter (33 syllables) compared to the second line (34 syllables). Adding *ap* thus makes the enumeration of elements complete and rectifies the discrepancy with respect to the amount of syllables.

¹⁸⁰ This verse is the introductory prayer verse of Vācaspati Mīśra’s *Bhāmati*, a commentary to the Śaṅkarabhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtra*. This identification was made by Dr. Srinivasan and Tatia (1964: 11).

¹⁸¹ i.e. since brahman is assisted by *avidyā* (ignorance) there must be at least two things that exist: brahman and *avidyā*, which results in dualism.

¹⁸² *pramāṇapadavīm* is a *bahuvrīhi* compound, lit. “that which has valid means of knowledge as its path”, i.e. an epistemological object. It here refers to *vicāra* (investigation). The implication is that *avidyā* (ignorance) is not an epistemological object.

¹⁸³ Since *avidyā*, not being an epistemological object, cannot be said to exist or not-exist, the objection is refuted. Cf. SŚP *Parabrahmaparīkṣā* §34-41 for a presentation of the Advaitin Sūreśvara’s arguments on this and Vidyānandins refutation of this idea.

The powerful one, assisted by twofold ignorance¹⁸⁴ which is indescribable, of which ether, wind, fire, water and earth¹⁸⁵ are unreal transformations, from which arose everything moving and non-moving, great and small, that brahman, which is unlimited happiness, knowledge and immortality, we bow to.

SŚP §10 2, 18-22

nanv evam api vivartavivarte dvaitasya bhāvāt katham advaitasiddhir iti cet; na; vivartānāṃ rajjau¹⁸⁶ bhujāṅgākāravat māyārūpāṇām eva tasmin¹⁸⁷ pratibhāsanāt | tad uktam –

**yasmin rajjubhuṅgavat tribhuvanāṃ bhāti bhramān nirbhaye |
so ‘haṃ nityanirāmayāmṛtavapuḥ saṃsārasāraḥ param || [source not found] iti**

SŚP §10 English

If it is objected: even so, how is non-dualism proved from the existence of dualism if unreal modification is unreal modification [of brahman, which is its substratum]?¹⁸⁸ [It is answered:] this is not so, because the appearance of the unreal transformations in [the Supreme Soul] only have the nature of illusion¹⁸⁹, like the form of a snake in a rope¹⁹⁰. It is said –

¹⁸⁴ the twofold *avidyā* (ignorance) here refers to *kāraṇāvidyā* or *mūlāvidyā*, the cause- or root-ignorance, i.e. the primal ignorance which is the root cause of all superimposition, and *kāryāvidyā* or *tūlāvidyā*, the derivative- or effect-ignorances which depend on the root-ignorance. These latter ignorances are sublatale by cognitions of the objects to which they relate, i.e. ignorance of a stick, which leads to the cognition of it as a snake, is sublatale by knowledge of the stick. Primal ignorance, on the other hand, is only sublatale by realization of brahman (Sastri & Raja 1933: xxvi-xxvii, 247).

¹⁸⁵ *avanāya* is not found with this meaning in the MMW, which gives it as an equivalent of *avanāya* (“placing down”). From the context it should however be read as referring to the element of earth.

¹⁸⁶ Amended in accordance with alternate ending supplied by the editor. Printed edition reads: “rajvo”.

¹⁸⁷ ed. note: “paramapuruse |”

¹⁸⁸ the objection seems to be that *vivarta* (unreal transformation) presupposes that it is the unreal transformation of something, i.e. brahman, which is its substrate. Thus there is dualism between brahman and its unreal modifications, the former being the substratum of the latter.

¹⁸⁹ *Māyā* (illusion) is a very important concept in Advaita Vedānta philosophy. In the R̥gveda it is used in the sense of a supernatural power which Indra uses to assume his many forms. In the Mahābhārata it generally designates the power of God. It is first in the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad that the term is used in a way which has philosophical connotations, but Śāṅkara was the first to develop a full-fledged *mayavāda* (*māyā*-doctrine) (Kharwandikar 2004c: 397). Śāṅkara himself never seemed to try to draw a clear distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* (Tatia 1951: 126). The two concepts are thus linked and in many respects overlapping. According to Tatia (1951) Śāṅkara seems to postulate *māyā* mainly for explaining the origination of the world appearance, while *avidyā* is postulated to explain the individual’s attachment to this appearance (126).

Śāṅkara (in his commentary on the Brahmasūtra) explains the nature of the illusory appearance (*vivarta*) in the following way: “It is *māyā* pure and simple, that the Great Self (*Ātman*) appears as the threefold states (*viz.* waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep) even as a rope appears as a snake and the like” (Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra II. I. 9. quoted in Tatia 1951: 125; italics in original).

¹⁹⁰ just like the snake is not real, the unreal modifications are not real, they simply appear in the Supreme Soul like the snake appears in the rope. Even though the snake, caused by ignorance of the rope, is not real, it is still experienced as such. In the same way, even though the world is not real, it is experienced as such because of ignorance. The objection thus does not disprove the argument. The example of the snake in the rope is used by Śāṅkara in his commentary to the Brahmasūtra (cf. note to the translation of *māyā* as

The fearless¹⁹¹ one in which the world appears like a snake from a rope because of confusion, that ‘I’ [Supreme Soul], whose essence is eternal, pure and immortal, is the essence of the world.

SŚP §11 2, 23-29

sakalo ‘py eṣa vivartaḥ satyām avidyāyām pratibhāti, na tv avidyānivṛttau | sā
cāvidyānivṛttir eva mokṣaḥ | tasya copāyo brahmasākṣātkāra eva | so ‘pi
śravaṇamananadhyānair bhavati | tathaiva śrutiḥ – ātmā vā¹⁹² are¹⁹³ draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo
mantavyo¹⁹⁴ nididhyāsityaḥ [brhadā- 2.4.5.] tathā smṛtiś ca –

śrotavyaḥ śrutivākyebhyo mantavyaś copapattibhiḥ |
matvā ca satataṁ dhyeya ete darśanahetavaḥ || [source needed] iti

SŚP §11 English

When there is ignorance, all the unreal modifications appear. But not when there is cessation of ignorance. And that cessation of ignorance is liberation. And the means for [attaining] that [liberation] is only the realization of brahman. And that [realization] is achieved by means of hearing [the words of the Upaniṣads explained], contemplation [on their meaning] and meditation [on their meaning]. Indeed, thus is the revelation: “The soul is to be realized¹⁹⁵. It is to be heard, contemplated and meditated on”. And thus the tradition [says] –

It is to be heard from the words of revelation. It is to be contemplated by means of arguments¹⁹⁶. Having contemplated [thus], it is to be continuously meditated on. These are the causes of realization [of brahman].

SŚP §12 2, 30-3, 2

tatropaniṣadvākyānām parabrahmaṇi tātparyāvadhāraṇaṁ śravaṇaṁ | śrutārthasya yuktyā
vicāraṇaṁ mananaṁ | śravaṇamananābhyām niścītārthasya manasā paricintanaṁ
dhyānaṁ | tac ca nityānityavastuvivekaḥ śamadamādisaṁpattir atrāmutra ca vairāgyaṁ

illusion above), and is according to Kharwandikar (2004c) one of the two most common illustrations used in explaining *māyā* (398).

¹⁹¹ Clearly refers to brahman, here described as fearless, perhaps because it alone exists. Since nothing else exists, it has nothing to be afraid of (?).

¹⁹² here used in the sense of *eva*?

¹⁹³ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “re”.

¹⁹⁴ Amended. Printed ed. reads “anumantavya”. This does not fit what is said above in the same paragraph and in the *smṛti* quote below.

¹⁹⁵ *draṣṭavya* literally means “is to be seen”. Here it is used in the same sense as *sakṣātkāra*.

¹⁹⁶ i.e. it is to be contemplated on by means of logical arguments.

mumuṣṣutvam iti sādhanacatuṣṭayasampannasya sampadyate | tasmiṃś ca
brahmasākṣātkārah | tatra ca parabrahmaikābhāvalakṣaṇamokṣaprāptir iti |

SŚP §12 English

There¹⁹⁷, “hearing” is understanding that the words of the Upaniśads refer to the Supreme Soul. Contemplation is consideration of the meaning of that which is heard by means of logical argument. “Meditation” is reflecting upon the ascertained meaning [attained] by means of hearing and contemplation with the mind. And that [meditation] is achieved for one who has accomplished the fourfold accomplishment: (1) the power of separating eternal and the impermanent objects, (2) the attainment of calmness, self control etc., (3) freedom from all worldly desires both here [in this world] and there [the other world] (4) the desire to be liberated. The realization of brahman is in him [the one who has accomplished the fourfold accomplishment and thus hearing, contemplation and meditation]. And in that case [when there is realization of brahman] there is obtaining of liberation, which is characterized by becoming one with the Supreme Soul.

[uttarapakṣa]

The refutation.

SŚP §13 3, 4-7

tad etad advaitaikāntaśāsanam pratyakṣaviruddham; pratyakṣena
deśakālākārabhedaviśiṣṭānām kriyākāraṇām
sthānagamanādigrāmāramakarituragādirūpānām nānābahirarthānām
tadviśayavicitrapratibhāsaviśeṣānām paramārthānām parasparato vyāvṛttānām
prasphoṭam adhyavasāyāt | bhedāvabhāsinā ca pratyakṣeṇādvaitasya viruddhatvāt |
sarvathaikasmin bhedapratyakṣasyānupapatteḥ |

SŚP §13 English

This one-sided teaching of non-dualism¹⁹⁸ is contradicted by sensory perception. Because there is clearly¹⁹⁹ determinate cognition, by means of sensory perception, of various external objects which are real, characterized by being different with respect to

¹⁹⁷ i.e. in the verse quoted above. *Tatra* (there) often introduces a commentarial paragraph in which a verse, a set of terms etc. is explained. The rest of this paragraph is a commentary explaining the terms *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyāna*.

¹⁹⁸ i.e. the teaching that presents nondualism as the only truth.

¹⁹⁹ *Prasphoṭa* (from *pra* + *sphu*, “to burst open”, “to split”) is not given in the MMW. *Prasphoṭana* (“splitting”, “bursting”, and thus “to make manifest”) however, is. As the form *prasphoṭa* is not attested in the dictionary, there are also several possibilities for interpreting its role in this sentence: 1) *prasphoṭa* is the subject qualified by the genitives and *pratyakṣena*. This would then form a factual statement to which *adhyavasāya* is simply added. 2) *adhyavasāya* is qualified by the genitives and *pratyakṣena*, while *prasphoṭam* is an adverb qualifying *adhyavasāya* meaning something like “clearly” or “evidently” (from the

place, time and shape, which are actions and factors pertaining to actions²⁰⁰, have the forms of elephants and horses etc. in villages and gardens that are standing, walking etc. and which [give rise to] various manifold cognitions which are different from each other and whose objects are those [various external objects], [i.e.] because non-dualism is contradicted by sensory perception which illuminates²⁰¹ difference. Because sensory perception of difference is not found in that which is completely unitary.

SŚP §14 3, 8-13

nanv ekasminn api kriyākārahedapratyakṣādeḥ saṁbhavāt svapnasamvedanavat
katham advaitam [pratyakṣa²⁰²]viruddham iti cet, na, svapnasamvedanasyāpy ekatve
tadvirodhasya²⁰³tadvasthāt²⁰⁴ | tatrānyad eva hi kriyāviśeṣasamvedanam
svavāsanottham, anyad eva ca kārahaviśeṣasamvedanam pratyakṣam, na punar ekam eva,
taddhetuvāsanābhedaḥbhāvaprasaṅgāt | jāgraddaśāyām iva svapnādidaśāyām api puṁso
'nekaśaktyātmakasya kriyākārahaviśeṣapratibhāsavaicitryavyavasthiteḥ | kasyacid
ekarūpasyātmaganāder apy anekāntavādinām
anekakriyākārahaviśeṣapratibhāsālambanatvāsiddher viruddham eva
tatpratyakṣeṇādvaitam |

SŚP §14 English

If it is objected: [This is not correct], because sensory perception of the difference between actions and factors pertaining to actions etc. is possible even in that which is [completely] unitary, like when [actions and factors pertaining to actions are perceived in one] dream-cognition²⁰⁵. How [then] can non-dualism be contradicted [by sensory perception]?" [It is answered:] no. Because the contradiction of that [oneness] remains the same²⁰⁶ on account of that [perception of manifoldness] even in the case of the oneness of dream-cognition. For even there [in a dream], the cognition of a particular

meaning "to make manifest" attested for *prasphoṭana*). 3) *prashoṭa* is the object of *adhyavasāya*, the sense being something like "because there is determinate cognition of (this relationship is for some reason expressed by the accusative instead of the genitive, as would be expected) splitting/manifestation of....", then followed by the genitives and *pratyakṣena*. Alternative 2 clearly seems to be the preferable reading, and has here been chosen.

²⁰⁰ In the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, five *kāraṅkas* (factors participating in an action) are enumerated. They are 1) *kartr* (agent), 2) *karman* (object), 3) *apādāna* (point of departure), 4) *sampradāna* (recipient) and 5) *adhikaraṇa* (substrate or locus) (Bartley 2005: 74-75). According to Pāṇini, the agent (*kartr*) is independent in the sense that it takes precedence over the other *kāraṅkas* and bestows particular roles on the other *kāraṅkas* (Coward & Raja 1990:164).

²⁰¹ *avabhāsin* (from *ava* + *bhās*, "to shine"). Sensory perception "is that which shines on difference", i.e. it illuminates difference.

²⁰² *pratyakṣa* seems here to have been added by the editor.

²⁰³ Amended. Printed ed. reads: "tadvasthatvāt". Cf. SŚP 3, 16 §15 above for the same phrase.

²⁰⁴ same structure as in SŚP 3, 15-16 §15 above.

²⁰⁵ i.e. different actions and factors pertaining to actions are seen in a dream, though the different actions and factors pertaining to actions are not real in the sense that they are not cognitions of external objects. It all happens in one consciousness.

²⁰⁶ *tadvasthāt*, the state of stability (i.e. remaining the same) as that (which it previously was).

action, arising from one's own impressions²⁰⁷, is different, and the perception which is a cognition of particular factors pertaining to actions is different²⁰⁸. Again, they are not one²⁰⁹. Because [otherwise there would be] adhering to the non-existence of different impressions [which act as] the causes of those [dream-cognitions]²¹⁰. Because it is established that the soul, whose nature is characterized by manifold powers²¹¹, [processes] a variety of cognitions of particular actions and factors pertaining to actions in the sleep state just as in the waking state.²¹² Non-dualism is contradicted by the sensory perception of those [actions and factors pertaining to actions] because, for the Anekāntavādins²¹³, there is no proof of any one form, [be it] the self, the sky etc., being the object of manifold cognitions of particular actions and factors pertaining to actions.

SŚP §15 3, 14-19

nanu bhedāvabhāsīdaṃ pratyakṣaṃ bhrāntam, indrajālādipratyakṣavad iti cet; tad etad bhrāntataram, uktadoṣāparihārāt | sarvathaikasmin bhrāntasyā 'bhrāntasya vā bhedapratyakṣasya drṣṭāntābhāvenāsambhavāt | bhrāntenāpi²¹⁴ tenādvaitavirodhasya tadavasthātvāt²¹⁵ yathā kathañcid uktam apy etad ayuktam, yasmād indrajālādikam eva bhrāntam, bādhakasadbhāvāt | na hi "karoti kumbhaṃ kumbhakāro daṇḍādīnā, bhūṅkte pāṇinaudanam" ity ādi kriyākārahedapratyakṣaṃ bhrāntaṃ bādhakābhāvād iti bālābalādayo 'pi pratipadyante | tad uktam bhaṭṭākalaṅkadevaiḥ –

**indrajālādiṣu bhrāntam īrayanti na cāparam |
api cāṇḍālagopālālabālālolavilocanāḥ || [nyāyavi- 1 | 52]**

SŚP §15 English

If it is objected: Surely, this sensory perception which illuminates difference is erroneous, like sensory perception of magic etc.. [It is answered:] This very [statement] is even more

²⁰⁷ Grimes (1996) explains *vāsanā* as "a latent potency or residual impression which clings to an individual. It is also called *samskāra*." (338). Here an impression one has had in the waking state is meant, the point being that the sensation of a particular action etc. in a dream arises from impressions one has had in the waking state.

²⁰⁸ i.e. arisen from a different impression.

²⁰⁹ dream perception is thus not one, because the specific actions and factors pertaining to actions seen in the dream arise from different impressions.

²¹⁰ The implication here is clearly that the Advaitin will not want to say that different *vāsanās* are not the cause of dream-cognition. I have not been able to ascertain whether or not the Advaitavedānta has a doctrine which states that this is the case.

²¹¹ the role of this description of the *pums* (soul) as *anekaśaktyātmaka* (whose nature has manifold powers) is not quite clear here. The point may simply be that it is capable of performing the complex task of processing the various cognitions in the sleep state just as in the waking state.

²¹² just as a person processes different impressions in the waking state, so he also processes different impressions in the dream state.

²¹³ i.e. the Jains, "those whose teaching is *anekānta* (non-absolutist)"

²¹⁴ ed. note: "bhedapratyakṣeṇa |"

²¹⁵ The structure here is similar to the structure in the answer in SŚP 3, 8-9 §14 Advaita-chapter, only here the instrumental is used.

erroneous, because of not avoiding the fault that has already been mentioned²¹⁶. Because sensory-perception of difference, erroneous or not, in that which is completely unitary is logically impossible on account of there not being [any] example²¹⁷. Because the contradiction of non-dualism remains the same, even with that [perception of difference] being erroneous²¹⁸. In whatever way it is said, [such as comparing ordinary sensory perception with a magic trick] from which²¹⁹ only the magic etc. is erroneous because there exists negation [of it] [by a later cognition], it is unsuitable²²⁰. For the [ordinary] sensory perception of the difference between actions and factors pertaining to actions [as in] “the pot maker makes the pot with a stick etc.. and eats the porridge with the hand” etc., is not erroneous because there is no negation [of it by any later cognition]. Even children and women realize that.²²¹ It is said by the learned lord Akalaṅka –

Even the eyes of the outcasts, cowherds, fools and the lustful proclaim error in the case of [cognitions of] magic etc., but not [in the case of] other [cognitions].

SŚP §16 3, 23-25

nanv atrāpi bādhakam asty eveti cet; tad asat;
 pratyakṣaviṣayabhedānyathābhūtaparamabrahmādvaitasādhakasya kasyacid api
 pramāṇasyāsaṃbhavāt | viṣayānyathātvasādhakasyaiva bādhakatvopapatteḥ śuktau
 rajatajñānasya śuktikājñānavat |

SŚP §16 English

If it is objected: certainly there is negation [by a later cognition] even in the case of this [ordinary perception of difference]²²². [It is answered:] That is not true. Because of the impossibility of any valid means of knowledge which proves the non-dual Supreme Soul

²¹⁶ i.e. this has already been disproved by a previous argument. Seeing difference in that which is one alone is still not possible. It being an illusion makes no difference.

²¹⁷ The argument given in SŚP 3, 6-7 and 3, 7 (§13) is taken up again here, because it also applies to the objection raised in SŚP 3, 14-15 in the current paragraph. The point seems to be that perception of difference in that which is completely unitary, i.e. that it appears as many, is not possible, not even if the perception is false.

²¹⁸ i.e. the fault remains even though the perception is erroneous. The structure here is very similar to the structure of the answer in SŚP 3, 8-9 §14 Advaita-chapter above.

²¹⁹ i.e. the perception of a magic trick etc..

²²⁰ i.e. no matter how the Vedāntin tries to claim that normal sensory perception is erroneous, be it by comparing it with dream perception (as in §14) or with a magicians trick (as is done in this paragraph), it is unsuitable, i.e. the argument does not hold.

²²¹ Unlike a magic trick or an illusion, ordinary perception is not disproved later. When one sees a serpent in a piece of rope, the serpent is proven to be non-existent upon inspecting the rope. But ordinary perception, such as that of a potter making a pot with a stick or eating porridge with his hand, is not disproved by a later cognition. This is the difference between ordinary perception and erroneous perception (such as magic etc.).

²²² i.e. there is negation even of normal sensory perception referred to in Vidyānandin’s example with the potter above.

which is different from the difference²²³ which is the content of sensory perception. Because that which proves the opposite of an object [of cognition] is the negator [of that cognition], just like the cognition of mother of pearl [is the negator of] the [erroneous prior] cognition of silver in mother of pearl.²²⁴

SŚP §17 3, 26-4, 9

nanu ca pratyakṣam eva paramabrahmasādhakam, akṣivisphālanānantaram
nirvikalpakasya sanmātravidhiviṣayatayotpatteḥ, sattāyās ca paramabrahmasvarūpatvāt |

asti hy ālocanajñānam²²⁵ prathamam nirvikalpakam |

bālamūkādivijñānam sadṛśam śuddhavastujam || [mī- ślo- pratyakṣa- ślo- 120²²⁶]

iti vacanād iti cet; tad etat sutarām pratyakṣabādhitam; sakalaviśeṣarahitasya sarvathā
nityasya niravayavasya vyāpakasya sanmātrasya paropavarṇitasya jātucid apy
ananubhavāt | akṣivisphālanānantaram api
pratiniyatadeśakāladraṣṭavyatvādiviśeṣaviśiṣṭasyaiva sattādisāmānyasya sāksātkaraṇāt;
apratiniyatadeśasya draṣṭur ananyasyādarśanāt, anyathā pratītyapalāpaprasaṅghāt |
daṇḍakuṇḍalādyākārakuṇḍalinor iva sāmānyaviśeṣayor
anyonyaparihāreṇāvasthānānupapatteḥ; anyatarasyābhavate ‘nyatarasyāpy abhāvac ca | tad
uktam –

nirviśeṣam na sāmānyam bhavet²²⁷ kharaviśānavat |

sāmānyarahitatvāc ca viśeṣas²²⁸ tadvad eva hi || [mī- ślo- ākṛti- ślo- 10]

²²³ i.e. plurality

²²⁴ According to Tatia’s introduction, the point here is that if one could prove that brahman was different from the objects of the everyday world, one would end up proving both the objects and brahman, just like mistaking a shell for silver ends up proving the existence of shell and silver as two different entities (Tatia 1964: 14). The point seems to be that this would result in dualism.

This does not seem to be the point being made here. The point seems simply to be that the *bādhaka* (the negator) of a cognition is another cognition which shows the opposite of that cognition, i.e. “the negator” is a subsequent cognition which disproves a prior cognition, just as, when one has mistaken mother of pearl for silver, the later cognition of mother of pearl (when one investigates if it is really silver) negates (i.e. opposes) the prior (mistaken) cognition of silver with respect to the mother of pearl. Thus a negation of sensory perception of difference and diversity in general would depend upon a subsequent cognition of the non-dual brahman being everything, and this is not found. Thus ordinary sensory perception of diversity is not proved to be erroneous.

It may be argued that Tatia’s reading would be a further consequence of the fact that the negator of a cognition must be a different subsequent cognition, or that it might be implied. While this may very well be, it still does not seem to be the point Vidyānandin was here trying to make. The point being made here seems to be much more basic: if one wants to disprove cognition of difference, one needs a cognition which negates it. Seeing as there is no such cognition, difference is not negated.

²²⁵ Amended according to variant readings recorded by the editor. Printed ed. reads: “ālocanajñānam”. Tailanga’s edition reads “ālocanā jñānam”, recording “ālocanam jñānam” as an alternate reading. “Ālocanajñānam” or “ālocanam jñānam” is clearly preferable.

²²⁶ Tailanga’s edition has this verse as 112.

²²⁷ Tailanga’s edition of the *Ślokavārttika* reads: “bhavete chaśaviśānavat”.

²²⁸ Tailanga’s edition of the *Ślokavārttika* reads: “viśeṣas”.

SŚP §17 English

If it is objected: Certainly there is sensory perception that proves the Supreme Brahman²²⁹, because there is arising of indeterminate cognition²³⁰, which has pure existence as its positive object²³¹, immediately after opening²³² the eyes. Because the nature of the Supreme Brahman is [pure] existence. Because of the saying –

For the indeterminate perceptual cognition, which arises from the pure²³³ objects and is like the cognition of a child, a dumb man etc.²³⁴, arises first.²³⁵

[It is answered:] then this is negated by sensory perception and [thus] easily overcome, because there is no experience at all of [something] that is free from all particularity²³⁶, completely eternal, indivisible, [all-]pervading, existence-only and has a character as that which is described by the opponent²³⁷. Because, even immediately after opening the eyes, the universal, existence etc., which is indeed characterized by particularity with respect to a definite place, time, object²³⁸ etc., is seen. Because there is no seeing of that which is not different from the seer and which does not [occupy] a specific [point of] space [relative to the seer].²³⁹ Because otherwise there would be holding to a denial of

²²⁹ i.e. the assertion that there is no *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge) which proves brahman is not valid

²³⁰ Cf. footnote to the verse quoted from the Mīmāṃsāsūtra below for an explanation of the concept of *nirvikalpapratyakṣa* (indeterminate cognition) in the Vedānta. Cf. also the footnote 174.

²³¹ *vidhiviṣaya*. *Karmadhāraya* compound. Cf. SŚP §19 4, 16-18

²³² *visphālana* is not found in MMW, and information on *vi + sphal* is scarce in the MMW. Perhaps best to see it as somehow derived from *vi + sphar* (to open [wide])? But Whitney mentions *sphālana* as a derivative of *sphal*, not *sphar*. From the context it is anyway clear that *visphālana* should be read as “opening”, thus reading *akṣivisphalanānantara* as “immediately after opening the eyes”.

²³³ i.e. the non-conceptualized objects themselves.

²³⁴ According to Shah (1968: 242) the analogy here offered by Kumārila is misleading, as it might be understood as saying that the determinate, thought-involving cognition of a person that does not know conventions is a case of indeterminate cognition. It is not. Such a cognition, though nameless (as the person in question is ignorant with respect to conventions), would surely not be thoughtless, as thought is the assimilation of a present experience to past, similar experiences. And this is found in the cognition of the dumb and children. For Kumārila, who recognizes the categories substance, quality, action and universal and distinct and objectively real, indeterminate cognition is a cognition that perceives all the categories in an undifferentiated form, i.e. though they are different they are not categorized as such (ibid: 242). The Advaitins, not accepting the categories as real, do not agree to this definition of indeterminate cognition. To them, indeterminate cognition is a primary awareness of an object that takes place prior to the determinate perception of it. This primary experience cognizes mere existence (*sattāmātra*). Many Advaita thinkers thus, like the Buddhists, regard indeterminate cognition as the only source of true knowledge (ibid: 243).

²³⁵ i.e. this indeterminate, non-conceptual cognition is the *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge) that proves brahman.

²³⁶ the impossibility of seeing something that is completely free from particularity is expounded in SŚP 4, 2-9.

²³⁷ i.e. there is no experience of anything which has the characteristics of brahman as described by the Vedāntins.

²³⁸ lit. “that which is to be seen”, i.e. an object.

²³⁹ i.e. this pure existence is never experienced as not relative to time, place etc., not even in indeterminate cognition immediately after opening the eyes. A universal, such as Existence etc., is always seen as existing in a specific place, at a specific time and as a specific object. That which is seen, even immediately after opening the eyes, is always experienced as being something different than the seer (i.e. the one who has the cognition) and as occupying a specific space (which is different from the space occupied by the seer). In

experience. Because the establishing of a universal or a particular by excluding the one or the other is not found, just like a snake and the form of a staff, a coil etc.²⁴⁰, because the non-existence of the one is in the non-existence of the other²⁴¹. It is said –

For the general cannot exist without specific characteristics, just like a donkey’s horn²⁴² [does not exist]. And it is likewise with the particular with respect to not having general [traits]²⁴³.

SŚP §18 4, 10-11

tato na pratyakṣaṃ paramabrahmasādhakaṃ pratyuta tadbādhakam eva syāt, vidhivat
parasparavyāvṛtter apy adhyakṣataḥ pratīteḥ |

SŚP §18 English

Therefore, sensory perception does not prove the Supreme Brahman. On the contrary, it negates it, because, just as identity²⁴⁴ is cognized through observation, [so] mutual exclusion too is (cognized through observation)²⁴⁵.

other words, even indeterminate cognition is never free from the subject-object duality. Pure existence (which would not be tied to a specific time, place etc.) is thus never cognized.

²⁴⁰ the point of this example seems to be that a snake, having the forms of a stick, a coil of rope etc., and the forms of a stick, a coil etc. are mutually dependent. The snake must have a form of some kind, and in order for the forms to exist, something must possess them. If there was no such thing as a staff-shaped thing, the staff-shape would not exist. Thus a form and a thing possessing form are mutually dependent. Likewise the universal and particular are mutually dependent.

The phrase *daṇḍakuṇḍalādyākārakuṇḍalinor iva* can also be interpreted in a different way by reading *kuṇḍalin* as “one who wears an ear-ornament” instead of meaning “snake”. Dr. Srinivasan has thus suggested reading the example as: “just like [as if there is excluding of one or the other] of the form of a staff-ear-ornament etc.. and someone wearing [such] ear-ornaments.” The sense is then that there is no general without the particular and no particular without the general, just as there can be no notion of a person wearing earrings without having the notion of earrings and no notion of earrings without a notion of a person who wears them. If one has no notion of earrings one cannot possibly have the notion of a person who wears them. Likewise, if one has no notion of anyone wearing earrings one cannot recognise anything as earrings since this notion presupposes that one has a notion of someone wearing the thing in question on his/her ears. The two concepts are inseparable, just like the states of “general” and “particular”.

Though the example of the earrings and the person wearing earrings would fit the context, it seems unclear why the specific form, “staff shaped” should be specified for the earrings. It is also not clear why the form (*ākāra*) of the earring is specifically referred to. If the example referred to an ear-ornament and a person wearing an ear ornament, it would suffice for it to read something like **kuṇḍalakūṇḍalinor iva*, as it is the earring and the person wearing them, and not the form of the earring specifically, which is relevant to the point. This reading has therefore not been adopted.

²⁴¹ i.e. all things must have both common properties and particular properties (cf. SŚP 4, 6-9). It is not possible to exclude one of them. A thing that has no particular properties cannot have general characteristics, and vice versa. The argument is directed against the here not explicitly formulated interpretation of brahman as only having common properties, as all specific things, and thus particular properties, are said to be unreal. It was argued above that brahman, which has pure existence (i.e. existence-ness) as its nature, is perceived by indeterminate cognition. Brahman is real, but the particulars, the separate individual things that are cognized by determinate cognition, which arises after indeterminate cognition, are not real. Vidyānandin here argues that this is not possible as a thing with no specific characteristics cannot exist.

²⁴² the donkey’s horn is, like the sky-flower (*khapuṣpa*), a standard example of something that does not exist. Both the donkey’s horn and the sky-flower are used as examples of this throughout the SŚP and in texts quoted in the SŚP. Other common examples include *khacitra* (a picture in the sky) and *kākadanta* (crow’s tooth).

²⁴³ i.e. it must have general traits

SŚP §19 4, 12-24

nanu na pratyakṣam advaitabādhakam tasya²⁴⁶vidhātṛtvena niṣeddhṛtvābhāvāt |

āhur vidhātṛ pratyakṣam na niṣeddhṛ vipaścitaḥ |

naikatva āgamas tena pratyakṣeṇa prabādhyate || [brahmasiddhiḥ]²⁴⁷

iti vacanād iti cet; tad asaṃgatam; pratiniyatārthavidhiviṣayasya pratyakṣasyāgamasya vā niṣeddhṛtvopapatteḥ, kevalavidhipratipatter eva anyapratīṣedhapratipattirūpatvāt, kevalabhūtalapatipatter eva ghaṭābhavapatipattirūpatvasiddheḥ | na hy ayam pratipattā kiṃcid upalabhamānaḥ pararūpaiḥ saṃkīrṇam upalabhate, yataḥ pramāṇāntarāt²⁴⁸tatpratiṣedhaḥ sādhyate | tato vidhātṛeva pratyakṣam upaniṣadvākyañ ceti niyamasyāsaṃbhavaḥ, anyathā tato vidyāvadavidyāvīdhānānuṣaṃgāt | so ‘yam avidyāvivekena sanmātram kutaścit pratīyann eva “na niṣeddhṛ pratyakṣam anyad vā” iti bruvānaḥ katham svasthaḥ ? katham vā pratyakṣāder niṣeddhṛtvābhāvam pratīyāt ? yatas²⁴⁹tatpratipattiḥ tasyaivā ‘bhāvaviṣayatvasiddheḥ | pratyakṣāder vidhātṛvapatipattir eva niṣeddhṛtvābhāvapatipattir iti cet; tarhi siddham bhāvābhāvaviṣayatvaṃ tasya²⁵⁰ | tathā ca pratyakṣenādvaitaikānto bādhyata eveti katham tat tasya²⁵¹ sādhakam syāt |

SŚP §19 English

If it is objected: “Certainly, sensory perception does not negate non-dualism, because it [sensory perception] is an affirmer on account of it not being a negator.”²⁵² Because of the saying –

The wise say that sensory perception is an affirmer, not a negator. Therefore the tradition is not contradicted by sensory perception with respect to the oneness [of brahman]²⁵³.

²⁴⁴ *vidhi* usually means “rule” or “affirmation”. Here it seems to be contrasted with *parasparavyāvṛtti* (mutual exclusion), and has thus been translated as “identity”

²⁴⁵ i.e. both identity and difference are cognized, and not just identity. Thus sensory perception contradicts the monism of the Vedānta.

²⁴⁶ ed. note: “vidhiviṣayatvena |”, i.e. “state of having a positive object”. *Vidhātṛ* (from *vi* + *dhā*) literally means something along the lines of “arranger”. In this context it clearly acts as the opposite of *niṣeddhṛ* (negator) and thus means “affirmer”.

²⁴⁷ The reference supplied by the editor is here incomplete.

²⁴⁸ ed. note: “paramapurusaṇiṣedhaḥ |”

²⁴⁹ ed. note: “vidhātṛtva |”

²⁵⁰ ed. note: “pratyakṣasya |”

²⁵¹ ed. note: “advaitasya |”

²⁵² i.e. sensory perception cannot negate non-dualism because sensory perception cannot negate anything, it can only affirm things. The point is that one can never see the non-existence of anything. One can never see the non-existence of a jar on a table. If the jar is not there, one simply sees the table, not the non-existence of the jar. Sensory perception can thus only affirm things, not negate them. Cf. editors note to *vidhātṛtvena* in footnote 246.

[It is answered:] that is unsatisfactory, because it is found that that which has a specific positive object as its object, be it tradition or sensory perception, is a negator. Because the mere cognition of a positive [object] has the nature of cognizing the negation of another [object]²⁵⁴. Because it is proved that the mere cognition of earth has the nature of cognizing the non-existence of a jar.²⁵⁵ For, a perceiver, while perceiving some thing, does not perceive it is mixed with other forms, from which²⁵⁶ the negation of that [object] [would require to be] ascertained through another valid means of knowledge²⁵⁷. Therefore the rule: “sensory perception and the word of the Upaniṣads only affirm” is impossible. Because otherwise²⁵⁸ it will result in the affirmation of ignorance like [there is affirmation] of knowledge.²⁵⁹ The [person] that somehow²⁶⁰ experiences existence only by discriminating ignorance²⁶¹ [from knowledge], [at the same time] says “sensory perception or another [valid means of knowledge such as the scriptural tradition] is not a contradictor”. How is this sound?²⁶² Because how can one know the non-existence of the state of being the contradictor belonging to sensory perception²⁶³ etc.?²⁶⁴, from which²⁶⁵ the knowledge [of sensory perception etc. not being a negator] [would be known] by

²⁵³ i.e. the tradition, which is revealed in the Vedas, cannot be contradicted by sensory perception with respect to the oneness of brahman. Vidyānandin thus here has the Advaitin shift the proof of the non-dual brahman over to scripture, dismissing sensory perception as capable of negating it.

²⁵⁴ i.e. both sensory perception and scriptural tradition both affirm and negate, as affirmation is also negation, i.e. the affirmation of one thing entails the negation of other things. A cognition which affirms a pot is simultaneously the negation of a pen, a boat etc. (i.e. all the things that the pot is not), i.e. a cognition of one thing also has characteristics of absence of other things. This applies to tradition (scripture) as well as sensory perception. When the scriptures affirm one thing, they simultaneously deny other things.

²⁵⁵ i.e. when there is no jar one only sees the ground. Thus the cognition which affirms the presence of mere earth is simultaneously the negation of the pot.

²⁵⁶ i.e. if there was perception of the object being mixed with other forms. This use of the relative pronoun is difficult to transfer to English. This statement is added to the main clause, i.e. that things are not cognized as mixed with other forms, by means of the relative pronoun in a way that is not found in the English language.

²⁵⁷ the point seems to be that the cognition of a jar is not seen as mixed with other forms (such as a pen etc.), thus negation is entailed in (i.e. is an aspect of) affirmation. Had the cognition of a pot been mixed with other cognitions, sensory perception would not be able to negate the presence of other forms by cognizing a specific form, i.e. cognition could then not tell whether or not there is a pen on the table by cognizing a pot there, as the cognition of the pot would somehow be intermixed with the cognition of a pen etc.. Negation would then require a valid means of knowledge other than *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception).

²⁵⁸ i.e. if this rule that sensory perception (*pratyakṣa*) only affirms is accepted

²⁵⁹ i.e. Ignorance is the absence of knowledge. But if the view that perception only affirms is accepted, the result would be that *avidyā* (ignorance) would have to be seen as a separate positive object, which would not fit well with the Advaita position, which maintains that *avidyā* is indeterminable with respect to existence and non-existence (Cf. Advaita-chapter pūrvapakṣa §9 and uttarapakṣa §§34-5).

²⁶⁰ *kutaścit* here indicates that this is here only stated for the sake of argument. It is not really possible (to know existence only), but it is the position of the opponent.

²⁶¹ i.e. removing ignorance

²⁶² i.e. how can this be true? How can such a position be maintained?

²⁶³ i.e. the other *pramāṇas*

²⁶⁴ i.e. if this position is maintained, how can it be known that perception does not negate? In other words, how is the contention “*pratyakṣa* (sensory perception) is a negator” negated?

²⁶⁵ i.e. if it were to be known

means of that [state of being the affirmer], because it is proved that [affirmation] has non-existence as its object.²⁶⁶

If it is objected: Cognizing that sensory perception etc. is not a contradictor is merely cognizing that (sensory perception etc.) is an affirmer.²⁶⁷ [It is answered:] then it is established that that [sensory perception] has existence and non-existence as its content.²⁶⁸ And thus the extremist non-dualism is negated by sensory perception. How can that [sensory perception] be the proof of that [non-dualism]?

SŚP §20 4, 25-5, 5

nanv anumānaṃ tatsādhakam asti “vivādāpannaṃ sarvaṃ paribhāsāntaḥpraviṣṭam, pratibhāsamānādhikaraṇatvāt, yat pratibhāsamānādhikaraṇam tat pratibhāsāntaḥpraviṣṭam; yathā pratibhāsasvarūpam, pratibhāsamānādhikaraṇam ca sarvaṃ” iti nirduṣṭatvād²⁶⁹ dhetoḥ pratibhāsamātrārūpaparamabrahmasiddhir iti cet; tad etad svavadhāya ²⁷⁰krtyotthāpanaṃ brahmavādinām, pratibhāsamānādhikaraṇatvād dhetoḥ sarvasya pratibhāsāntaḥpraviṣṭatvena puruṣādvaitasiddhau hetusādhyadvaitasya durnivāratvāt | tad uktaṃ svāmisamantabhadrācāryaiḥ –

hetor advaitasiddhiś cet dvaitaṃ syād dhatusādhyāyoḥ |

hetunā ced vinā siddhir dvaitaṃ vānmātrato na kim || [āptamī- ślo- 26] iti

SŚP §20 English

If it is objected that: Certainly, inference is the proof of that [non-dualism]. “All [objects]²⁷¹ that have entered into the dispute²⁷² enter within cognition²⁷³, because they are coincidental with cognition²⁷⁴. That which is coincidental with cognition enters within

²⁶⁶ i.e. if such a knowledge (of perception etc. not being the negator, only the affirmer) is to be found, it must then be found in affirmation, as there cannot be any perception of perception not being a negator (as such a perception would entail perception being a negator as it would negate “negatoriness” with respect to perception), this must then be found in affirmation (which Vidyānandin has shown to also have negating content). But if that is the case the *anekānta* view of perception is accepted and the Vedāntin’s argument is void.

²⁶⁷ i.e. if the Vedāntin argues that cognizing that *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception) affirms somehow also entails that it is not a negator.

²⁶⁸ i.e. then the Jain view of perception as having both existence and non-existence as its object (i.e. being both an affirmer and a negator *sui generis*) is admitted, and the Vedāntin’s argument is void, as perception can then, in practice, negate.

²⁶⁹ *nirduṣṭa* is not given in MMW. *Duṣṭa* (ppp of the root *duṣ*), meaning wrong, spoiled, corrupted etc., is given. On account of the context it is here reasonable to read *nirduṣṭa* as “not wrong”, “uncorrupted” etc..

²⁷⁰ ed. note: “krtyā – piśācinīti | ‘krtyāśabdenātharvamantraiḥ pāvake homavidhānena krtena puruṣo yo niṣkrāmati saḥ kartuḥ śatruṃ vyāpādayati yadi vā śatruḥ balavān bhavati japhomadānais tadā sāvā yenoṭthāpitā tam eva vināśayati | ‘ – nītivā- saṃ- tī- pṛ- 135 |”

²⁷¹ i.e. that which is cognized, the content of cognition. Though *sarvaṃ* is here in the singular, the sense of the statement is much clearer in English if translated in the plural, as *sarvaṃ* here refers to all objects.

²⁷² i.e. the existence of these objects is what is here disputed.

²⁷³ i.e. they do not have a separate existence outside that of cognition. They exist only in the cognition.

²⁷⁴ *pratibhāsamānādhikaraṇatva*, lit. “having the same substratum as cognition”, i.e. all things always appear through cognition. There is some uncertainty regarding the use of the term *samānādhikaraṇa* here.

cognition, just as cognition itself. And everything is coincidental with cognition^{275,276}. There is proof of the Supreme Brahman whose form is cognition only, on account of the premise [in this inference] not being false.²⁷⁷ [It is answered:] Then this [argument] is the summoning of an evil spirit that [ends up] harming oneself for the Brahmavādins²⁷⁸, because, if the Puruṣādvaita is proved by means of all [objects] being coincidental with cognition on account of a premise, [i.e.] being coincidental with cognition, dualism of the premise and that which is to be proved is unavoidable.²⁷⁹ It is said by the teacher, Master Samantabhadra –

If the establishment of non-dualism is made on account of a premise, there must be dualism of that which is to be proved and the premise. If [non-dualism] is established without a premise, why [is then] not dualism [established] on account of mere words [as well]?²⁸⁰

The MMW gives the meaning “grammatical agreement in case with (comp)”, “common or same government or case-relation”, “common substratum”, “being in the same case relation with (instr. or comp)”. Tatia (1964: 15), however, clearly here reads *samānādhikaraṇa* as synonymous with *samānādhikarānya* (which is not found in the MMW). *Samānādhikarānya* is used in SŚP 5, 12-13 and 5, 13-16 in §21 below. Bartley (2005) explains *samānādhikarānya* in the following way: “in logic, *samānādhikarānya* means **co-occurrence** of two or more items (for example an individual substance and its properties) in the same substrate. In grammatical usage, it means the reference to one object by terms that have different grounds for their application (*pravṛtti-nimitta*)” (129; diacritics added, bold added, italics in the original). There is also the question of whether *samānādhikaraṇa* and *samānādhikarānya* should here be taken as synonymous or if Vidyānandin deliberately uses *samānādhikarānya* in SŚP 5, 12-13 and 5, 13-16 in a sense that is distinct from the sense in which he uses *samānādhikaraṇa* in the preceding sentences.

Thus it is possible to read *samānādhikaraṇa* as meaning “having the same case ending” (and also reading *samānādhikarānya* in SŚP 5, 12-13 and 5, 13-16 as having this meaning). This is the meaning found in the MMW for *samānādhikaraṇa*. The idea is then that the object and the cognition are expressed through the same case ending, i.e. they are the same.

I have here chosen to translate *pratibhāsasamānādhikaraṇa* as “coincidental with cognition”, following Bartley’s explanation of *samānādhikarānya* as used in logic, and to treat *samānādhikaraṇa* and *samānādhikarānya* as synonymous as they seem to be used to express the same idea.

²⁷⁵ i.e. and thus everything has the nature of cognition

²⁷⁶ this is a syllogism. 1) *pratijñā* (proposition): all things that are here in question exist only within cognition. 2) *hetu* (premise): because they are coincidental with cognition. 3) *udāharaṇa* (explanatory example with a general statement): that which is coincidental with cognition only exists within it, just as cognition itself. 4) *upanaya* (application): and all things are coincidental with cognition.

²⁷⁷ Cf. SŚP 13, 1-2 for Dharmakīrti’s argument of *sahopalambhaniyama*, which resembles the Advaitin’s *pratibhāsasamānādhikaraṇa* argument here.

²⁷⁸ *svavadha* (*sva* + *vadha*, “harmful to one’s self”), *krtya* (an evil spirit), i.e. then this argument is like summoning an evil spirit in order to harm someone else, only to have this evil spirit harm oneself instead. i.e. (to use a more modern metaphor) the argument backfires.

²⁷⁹ i.e. if this *hetu* (premise) were to be correct, then it establishes dualism of premise and subject, thus negating non-dualism. Coincidentiality must necessarily entail difference. Even if two things are coincidental they are still two different things. The argument backfires because it traps the Advaitin in a loop. The argument to prove non-dualism presupposes the distinction between *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) and *sādhana* (proof). But if there is such a distinction the argument fails because such a distinction would prove that there is indeed dualism. However, if there was non-dualism, there would be no distinction between the two. The argument could then anyway not work as it presupposes such a distinction.

²⁸⁰ Cf. also Akalaṅka’s commentary to this verse in his *Aṣṭaśatī*:

yad asiddham tat na hitepsubhir ahitajihāsubhir vā pratipattavyam | yathā śūnyataikāntaḥ tathā cāsiddham advaitam | atra nāsiddho hetuḥ | tatsiddhir yadi sādhanāt, sādhyasāadhanayos tarhi dvaitam syāt | anyathā advaitasiddhivat dvaitasiddhiḥ katham na syāt? svābhilāpamātrād arthasiddhau sarvam sarvasya siddhyet
||26||

SŚP §21 5, 6-18

nanu hetor advaitasiddhāv api na hetusādhyayor dvaitam bhaviṣyati, tādātmyopagamāt |
na ca tādātmye sādhyasādhanayos tadbhāvavirodhaḥ; ²⁸¹sattvanityatvayor api tathā
bhāvavirodhānuṣaṅgāt | kalpanābedād iha sādhyasādhanadharmabhede²⁸² prakṛtānumāne
'pi katham avidyopakalpita hetusādhyayos tadbhāvaviḡhātaḥ; sarvathā viśeṣābhāvād iti
cet, na; śabdādu ²⁸³sattvanityatvayor api kathamcit tādātmyāt sarvathā tādātmyāsiddheḥ,
tatsiddhau sādhyasādhanabhāvavirodhāt | kiṃ ca na samyag idaṃ sādhanam viruddhatvāt,
pratibhāsatadviṣayābhimatayoḥ kathañcid bhede satī samānādhikaraṇatvasya pratīteḥ
sarvathā pratibhāsantaḥ praviṣṭatvāsādhanāt svaviṣayasya²⁸⁴ | na hi śuklaḥ paṭaḥ ity ādāv
api sarvathā guṇadravyayos tādātmye sāmānādhikaraṇyam astī, sarvathābhedavat |
“pratibhāsasvarūpaṃ pratibhāsate” ity atrāpi na pratibhāsatatsvarūpayor
llakṣyalakṣaṇabhūtayor sarvathā tādātmyam astī; pratibhāsyā
sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇadharmādhikaraṇasya svasvarūpād asādhāraṇadharmād kathañcid
bhedaprasiddheḥ, anyathā tatsāmānādhikaraṇyāyogyāt “suvarṇam suvarṇam” iti yathā,
sahyavindhyavad vā | tad evaṃ yat pratibhāsamānādhikaraṇam tatpratibhāsāt kathañcid
arthāntaram; yathā pratibhāsasvarūpam; pratibhāsamānādhikaraṇam ca sukhanīlādī
sarvam itī sādhyaviparītasādhanāt hetor nādvaitasiddhiḥ |

SŚP §21 English

[If it is objected:] Certainly, even if the establishment of non-dualism is from a premise, dualism of that which is to be ascertained and the premise will not arise, because [their] identity is accepted. And there is no contradiction with respect to the natures of those, i.e. proof and that which is to be ascertained, if there is identity, because [otherwise] even contradiction of the natures of 'existence' and 'permanence' would result. Since difference of the characteristics of that which is to be ascertained and the proof [appears] because the difference is [merely] imagined in this world [because of ignorance], how then is there removal of the state of difference of the premise and the proof, which are

“That which is not proved [by a premise] is not fit to be ascertained by those desirous of reaching the advantageous or those desirous of giving up the disadvantageous. Just as one sided voidness [is not proved], just so non-dualism is not proved. A premise is not proved with respect to this [non-dualism]. If [non-dualism] is proved on account of a premise, then let there be dualism of the premise and that which is to be proved! In the opposite case [i.e. if non-dualism is not proved on account of a premise], why cannot dualism be proved in the same way as non-dualism is proved? There would be proving of everything for everyone if a matter/object is proved on account of one's own words only.” (my translation)

²⁸¹ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “sattvānityatvayor”. For the end of the Advaitin's argument to make sense the *dvandva* compound must be made up of *sattva* and *nitya*, as the Advaitin would indeed see the two states of existence and impermanence as contradictory.

²⁸² ed. note: “sattvam asattvavyāvṛṭtyātmakam, anityatvañ ca nityavyāvṛṭtyātmakam iti vyāvṛṭtibhedāt tayor bhede |”

²⁸³ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “sattvānityatvayor”. This has been amended to match the amendment in the argument of the Vedāntin. The discussion does not seem to make sense otherwise. Cf. footnote 288.

²⁸⁴ The placing of this genitive at the end is unusual. There seems to be no special reason for why it should not be placed with the other genitives.

fictitiously arranged by ignorance, in the undertaken ²⁸⁵inference?²⁸⁶ Because the particular is completely non-existent.²⁸⁷

[It is answered:] no. Because complete identity is unproved even from some identity being established between the existence and permanence of a word etc.²⁸⁸. Because, if that [complete identity] were established, there [would be] contradiction of the states of that which is to be established and the proof.²⁸⁹

Moreover, the proof [in the Advaitin's syllogism] is not correct, because it is contradictory²⁹⁰. Because the experience of co-occurrence [is only possible] if there is some difference between the supposed cognition and the object of that [cognition]²⁹¹. Because there is no proof of that which is its own object entering completely within cognition²⁹². For even though there is not²⁹³ complete identity between the quality and the substance even in a case such as “the cloth is white”, just like there is not complete difference [between the quality and the substance in such a case], there is ²⁹⁴co-occurrence.²⁹⁵ Even in this [statement] “Cognition itself shines”²⁹⁶, there is not complete identity between cognition and the nature of that [cognition], i.e. that which has the mark

²⁸⁵ i.e. the syllogism in ŚŚP 4, 25-5, 1.

²⁸⁶ rhetorical question.

²⁸⁷ The idea thus seems to be that there is identity between everything, including, of course, the premise and that which is to be proved in the Advaita syllogism because particularity (i.e. difference) is illusory.

²⁸⁸ Tatia (1964: 15) does not amend the text to read *sattvanityayor*, and takes *sattvānityayor* to refer to the Buddhist inference of the momentariness of a word from its existence. He writes: “Even in the Buddhist philosopher's inference of ‘momentariness’ of a word (śabda) and the like from their ‘existence’, the probans (viz existence) and the probandum (viz momentariness) are not felt as absolutely identical” (ibid: 15). I find it difficult to make this reading make sense. If *sattvānityayor* should refer to a Buddhist inference in the Jain answer, then so should the *sattvānityayor* in the Vedāntin's objection. But this does not seem to make any sense.

On the other hand, this sentence of Tatia's introduction is taken directly from pp 184-185 of his “Studies in Jaina Philosophy” (Cf. Chapter 1). This section of Tatia's book seems primarily to be based on Vidyañandin's Aṣṭasahasrī (and not at all on the ŚŚP). Thus there might be more information available in the Aṣṭasahasrī which could resolve this matter. Tatia's references to the Aṣṭasahasrī are however scarce at best. In addition to this I do not have recourse to a copy of the Aṣṭasahasrī, nor do time constraints allow for this most difficult text to be used in this investigation of the ŚŚP. Also, Tatia does not mention how the first occurrence of *sattvānityayor* (in the Advaitin's objection) should then be interpreted. Based on the information currently available to me I thus find my amendment and reading preferable.

²⁸⁹ i.e. if they are completely identical, one of them cannot be said to be the proof while the other is that which is to be proved. Such a distinction presupposes that there must be some difference between the two.

²⁹⁰ i.e. because it suffers from the fallacy of *viruddha*, i.e. when the premise contradicts the proposition to be established (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119).

²⁹¹ because if they were completely identical, they could not be coincidental. In order to be coincidental, they must be two separate things. They are neither completely different, nor completely identical.

²⁹² i.e. being completely identical to cognition

²⁹³ the *na* here seems to qualify *sarvathā tādātmye*, and not the verb form *asti*. If it were to qualify *asti* the argument does not seem to make any sense. Reading it as qualifying *sarvathā tādātmye* fits the context.

²⁹⁴ for a discussion of the relation between the terms *samānādhikaraṇa* and *samānādhikaraṇya* cf. footnote 274.

²⁹⁵ just as there is not complete identity between the *guṇa* (quality, here “white”) and the *dravya* (substance, here “cloth”) in a statement such as “the cloth is white”, they are not completely different either, as the cloth has whiteness. If they were completely identical the one would be reducible to the other, which is not the case. Still there is co-occurrence. Thus it is shown that co-occurrence does not entail complete identity.

²⁹⁶ i.e. when cognition itself is the content of cognition. This is the *dr̥ṣṭānta* (example) in the Advaitin's syllogism in §20 above. This may be raised here by the Advaitin, claiming that when cognition is the content of cognition, there must surely be complete identity of cognition and its content, i.e. the *lakṣya* (that which has the mark) and *lakṣaṇa* (the mark).

and the mark. Because cognition, which is the support of both common and non-common²⁹⁷ attributes, possesses its own nature, which is a non-common attribute²⁹⁸, [and thus] establishes some difference.²⁹⁹ Because otherwise³⁰⁰ it [would be] unsuitable that they should coincide, as [in the case of statements such as] “gold is gold” or “the Sahya is the Vindhya³⁰¹”.³⁰² Thus, that which coincidental with cognition is in some ways a different object than cognition, such as cognition itself. And everything, happiness, blue etc., is coincidental with cognition”³⁰³ [and thus] non-dualism is not established, because the proof is contrary to that which is to be established [by the Vedāntins].

SŚP §22 5, 19-20

athāgamas tatsādhako ‘sty eva **sarvaṃ vai khalv idaṃ brahma** [maitrā- 4| 6] ity ādy āgamasya paramabrahmasādhakasya sadbhāvād iti cet; tad api svavadhāya kṛtyotthāpanam eva, advaitatadāgamayor dvaitaprasaṅgāt |

SŚP §22 English

If it is now objected: The tradition is indeed the proof of that [non-dualism], because of the scriptural tradition, [with statements such as] “Everything is really this brahman” etc., really is the proof of the Supreme Brahman. [It is answered:] Then this is the summoning of an evil spirit that [ends up] harming oneself for the Brahmvādins³⁰⁴, because then [there would be] adhering to dualism of non-dualism and its scriptural tradition.

SŚP §23 5, 21-27

yadi punar āgamo ‘py advayapuruṣasvabhāva eva na tato vyatirikto yena dvaitam anuṣajyate iti matam,

²⁹⁷ i.e. attributes shared with other kinds of things and attributes not shared with other kinds of things.

²⁹⁸ i.e. an attribute which is not shared with other kinds of phenomena but is specific to cognition.

²⁹⁹ The idea that there should here be complete identity is here refuted, as what is really being cognized here is not the act of cognition as such, but its specific (non-common) nature, i.e. cognitionhood. Cognition also has other characteristics, such as existence, which are common, i.e. which it shares with other kinds of phenomena. So also here there is some identity and some difference between the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) and that which has the mark (*lakṣya*).

³⁰⁰ i.e. if one does not agree to there being both identity and difference

³⁰¹ the names of two mountains

³⁰² If two things are to coincide, they must have some difference and some sameness. If they are completely different, how can they then coincide? Nor can they be said to coincide if they are absolutely identical as coinciding presupposes the existence of at least two separate things that coincide (as shown in SŚP 5, 10-12), just as there can be no logical proposition or judgment consisting of two completely identical terms (such as gold is gold) or two completely different terms (the Sahya is the Vindhya). Thus it would be improper for them to coincide if they were identical.

³⁰³ here Vidyānandin has adopted the syllogism presented on behalf of the Advaitin in SŚP 4, 25-5, 1 (§20 above). 1) pratijñā* (proposition): *all things are in some way different from cognition*. 2) hetu* (premise): *because they are coincidental with cognition*. 3) udāharaṇa (general statement and example): that which is coincidental with cognition is in some ways different from it, just as cognition itself., 4) upanaya (application): and all things, such as happiness, blue etc., are coincidental with cognition. The hetu and the upanaya are the same as in the Advaitin’s syllogism.

³⁰⁴ i.e. the argument backfires. Cf. footnote 278.

ūrdhvamūlam adhaḥ śākhā aśvatthaṃ prāhur avyayam |
chandāmsi yasya parṇāni yas tam veda sa vedavit || [bhagavadgī- 15. 1] iti vacanāt|

tadā brahmavat tadāgamasyāpy asiddhatvaṃ syāt sarvathāpy asiddhasvabhāvasya
siddhatvavirodhāt, siddhāsiddhayor bhedaprasakteḥ |

SŚP §23 English

Moreover, if it is thought that: tradition only has the nature of the [Supreme] Spirit that has no second. It [tradition] is not different from that [Supreme Spirit], by which³⁰⁵ dualism [would be] clung to, because of the words –

They say that there is an imperishable fig tree that has its roots upwards and branches downwards and which has sacred [Vedic] hymns as its leaves. He who knows that [tree], he is a knower of the Veda.³⁰⁶

Then [it is answered:] the tradition of that [non-dualism] must also be unproved, just like brahman, because that which has a nature that is unproved is in complete opposition to that which has the state of being proved³⁰⁷, because [otherwise] there [would be] adhering to³⁰⁸ [the tradition having] different [natures], [one that is] proved and [one that is] unproved³⁰⁹.

SŚP §24 5, 28-6, 3

kiṃ ca **sarvaṃ vai khalv idaṃ brahma** [matrā- 4 | 6] ity ādy āmnāyād api dvaitasiddhir
eva syāt, sarvasya prasiddhasyāprasiddhena brahmatvena vidhānāt | sarvathā
prasiddhasya vidhānāyogād aprasiddhavat³¹⁰ | kvacid ātmavyaktau
prasiddhasyaikātmyarūpasya brahmatvasya sarvātmasv anātmābhimateṣu ca vidhānāt |
dvaitaprapaṅcāropavyavacchede ‘pi tadāgamād

³⁰⁵ i.e. if it was different from brahman.

³⁰⁶ This verse is quoted to support the Vedāntin’s claim, i.e. that brahman and the Veda (*āgama*) are the same. Brahman is the tree whose leaves are the Vedic texts.

³⁰⁷ i.e. that which has a nature that is unestablished cannot have the state of being established. So if tradition has brahmaness (which is not established) as its nature, it too must then not be established.

³⁰⁸ *prasakti* is not given in the MMW. It is, however, derived from the same root and prefix as *prasaṅga* (*pra + saṅj*), and is here used in the same way.

³⁰⁹ i.e. if the nature of the tradition is brahman-ness, then the tradition is also not proved, since brahman is not proved to exist. It can then not prove the existence of brahman, as the proof and that which is to be proved cannot both be unestablished. If it is not agreed that there is an absolute difference between that which is proved and that which is not, i.e. that a thing is not either proved or not, then the Advaitin would have to accept that the tradition has a dual nature, i.e. both established and unestablished. The last point seems to suggest that this would involve dualism, though this is not explicitly stated.

³¹⁰ ed. note: “yathā sarvathā’prasiddhaṃ kharaviṣaṇādi na vidhīyate |”. Just as the donkey’s horn, which is unknown, is not predicated in any way.

vyavacchedyavyavacchedakasadbhāvasiddheḥ katham advaitasiddhiḥ [?] āmnāyasya
paramabrahmasvabhāvatve na tatas tadadvaitasiddhiḥ | svabhāvasvabhāvavatos
tādātmyaikāntānupapatteḥ |

SŚP §24 English

Moreover, dualism is established from the tradition [with statements like] “Everything is really this brahman” etc., because “everything”, which is well known, is predicated³¹¹ as brahman, which is not known. Because it is unsuitable that that which is completely known should be predicated, like (it is unsuitable to predicate) that which is [completely] unknown.³¹²

Even if there is exclusion of the superimposition of the dual world on account of the [non-dualist] tradition³¹³ because brahman-ness, which has a homogenous form, is well known in some individual soul, [and thus] it [can be] predicated in all souls and that which is thought to be non-soul, how is non dualism proved from proving the existence of that which is excluded [i.e. dualist manifoldness] and that which excludes [i.e. the non-dualist tradition]?³¹⁴

³¹¹ *vidhāna* (formed from from prefix *vi* and the root *dhā*, meaning “to distribute”, “apportion”, “grant”, “arrange”, “perform”, “establish” etc.) is found with many meanings in the MMW, such as “disposing”, “arranging”, “possessing”, “order”, “measure”, “arrangement”, “rule”, “method” None of these seem to fit very well here. Tatia (1964: 17) summarizes the beginning of this paragraph as follows: “Moreover, the meaning of the proposition ‘All that exists is the Absolute’ (*sarvaṃ vai khalvidam brahma*) is not unqualified monism. In it the subject is all existents’ which are revealed to us in knowledge and thus a known factor. The predicate is unknown. In all judgements the subject is a known fact and the predicate must be unknown. If the predicate were equally known with the subject, it would not be judgement or a proposition. So the very form of a proposition implies that the subject or the predicate cannot be identical”.

It seems clear from the context that *vidhāna* should here be read as meaning “predicating” or “describing” (*sarvasya prasiddhasyāprasiddhena brahmatvena vidhānāt* thus meaning “there is predicating/describing of ‘everything’, which is known, as possessing brahman-nature, which is unknown”, or, in other words, “‘everything’, which is known, is predicated/described as having brahman-nature, which is unknown”, *aprasiddhena brahmatvena* here being instrumental predicate). This seems to be Tatia’s interpretation as well, though his explanation of this passage does not explicitly make clear how he would translate *vidhāna*. The point Vidyānandin seems to be making is that the subject and the predicate of a proposition cannot be identical, because the subject must be known while the predicate must be unknown. Otherwise it is not a proposition, merely a meaningless statement.

Vidhāna is however not found with the meaning “predicate” or “describe”. None of these meanings are found in the MMW. The closest equivalent is perhaps the meaning of *vi + dhā* as “to establish”. I have here chosen to translate *vidhāna* as “to predicate”, following my reading of Tatia and the context.

³¹² i.e. if the predicate is already known with respect to the subject, it is not a proper proposition. If both the predicate and the subject are completely known (i.e. thus also known with respect to each other), there is no point in making the statement, just like the predicate cannot be completely unknown. Thus it is implied in the very form of a proposition that the subject and predicate are not completely identical (cf. footnote 311). As they are not identical there is some difference, and thus dualism is established by means of this āgamic statement.

³¹³ i.e. the scriptural passage quoted above (*sarvaṃ vai khalv idam brahma*)

³¹⁴ i.e. even if the meaning of the predicate (brahmaness) is the self-identity which is realized in some individual self, and this self-identity is then asserted of everything (all souls and all that is not soul). Seen thus, the point of the statement is the negation of plurality as real (and not stating brahman as a positive characteristic belonging to everything). If the statement is seen thus, it does not lead to dualism on account of a subject-predicate relationship. Even if this argument were accepted and the scriptural passage is not to be interpreted as a subject-object relation between all things and brahman, but rather that the realization of brahman in one’s own individual self is extended to all things (souls and that which is assumed to be non-soul), negating the existence of the empirical world and thus avoiding dualism of subject and predicate, it would still result in dualism because the establishing of non-dualism is simultaneously the exclusion (i.e.

And even if the tradition has the nature of the Supreme Brahman, the proving of the non-dualism of that [brahman] is not on account of that [either], because one-sided identity³¹⁵ of that which possesses a nature³¹⁶ and the nature itself is not found³¹⁷.

SŚP §25 6, 4-6

atha svasaṃvedanam eva puruṣādvaitasādhakam iti cet; na; svasaṃvedanātmanor
dvaitaprasaṃgāt | na hi svasaṃvedanam api sādhanam ātmano ‘nanyad eva;
sādhanatvavirodhāt, anumānāgamavat sādhyasyaiva sādhanatvopapatteḥ,
prakṛtānumānāgamayor iva svasaṃvedanapratyakṣasyāpi sādhanatva³¹⁸]syābhāvāt |

SŚP §25 English

If it is now objected: self-cognition proves the non-dualism of the [Supreme] Spirit.³¹⁹ [It is answered] no, because then there [would be] adhering to dualism of the self/soul and self-cognition.³²⁰ For even self-cognition, being the proof, is certainly not identical³²¹ with the self [which is that which is to be proved], just like inference and tradition [cannot be identical to that which is to be proved]. Because it is contradicted by having the nature of proof, on account of it being found that that which is to be proved has the nature of being the proof.³²² Because even self-cognizing cognition is not the proof [of non-dualism], just

negation) of the entire world. If the tradition were to establish non-dualism, it would then also negate the world, which is characterized by dualism. The result would be a dualism between the negator and the negated.

³¹⁵ i.e. complete identity only

³¹⁶ in this case the Veda (tradition)

³¹⁷ in this case “brahman-ness” is the nature in question. Just as “cowness” and a cow (which possesses the nature of cowness) are not completely identical, so “brahman-ness” and that which possesses it cannot be completely identical. On the other hand they cannot be said to be completely different. The relationship is one of both identity and difference *sui generis* (*jātyantara*), which is not compatible with non-dualism.

³¹⁸ the ending *-iva* has here been added by the editor as the point being made is not that there is no proof (*sādhanasyābhāvāt*) but that self-cognizing cognition (*svasaṃvedanapratyakṣasya*) is not the proof (*sādhanatvasyābhāvāt*).

³¹⁹ The term *svasaṃvedana* is encountered in the discussion of how it is that a person knows that he knows. In other words, is cognition/knowledge self-cognizing, or does it require another cognition etc. in order to be known? While the Naiyāyikas hold that knowledge/cognition is cognized by another cognition (called *anuvyavasāya*) and the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that it is inferred, the Buddhists, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins accept that knowledge/cognition is self-cognized, though there are significant differences of opinion among them as regards how exactly this works (Matilal 1986: 142-44).

The details of its use here are a bit difficult to understand. The argument here seems to be that the self/soul (*ātman*), being identical to brahman and having the nature of cognition, proves brahman by self-cognition. In other words, the self/soul, which has the nature of cognition and brahman (all three, i.e. *ātman*, brahman and cognition sharing the same nature), is cognized by self-luminous cognition, thereby proving brahman. The point thus seems to be that cognition, which cognizes itself, also cognizes the self/soul and brahman.

³²⁰ i.e. the self-cognition and the soul/self which is established by this self-cognition cannot be completely identical.

³²¹ *ananya*, lit. non-different

³²² i.e. if the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) and *sādhana* (proof) are identical, the *sādhya* having *sādhanatva* (“proof-ness”, i.e. the nature of proof). As both *sādhya* and *sādhana* have *sādhanatva* it would be a case of the proof proving itself, which is not valid.

like the undertaken inference³²³ and tradition [cannot be the proof of non-dualism as it cannot be identical with the non-dual brahman which is that which is to be proved].³²⁴

SŚP §26 6, 7-8

na ca puruṣādvaitam svataḥ siddhyati, vijñānādvaitavat, svarūpasya svatogater abhāvāt, anyathā kasyacit tatra vipratipatter ayogāt, vijñānādvaitasyāpi prasiddher iṣṭahānīprasamgāc ca³²⁵ |

SŚP §26 English

And the Puruṣādvaita is [also] not self-proved³²⁶, like the Vijñānādvaita [is not self proved], because of the non-existence of [it having] a nature that can be reached from its self. Because otherwise any disagreement with respect to that [would be] unsuitable.³²⁷ Because [then there would be] adhering to the abandoning of that which is desired [by the Vedāntins³²⁸] for the Vijñānādvaita, which [by the same kind of argumentation could be regarded as] established.³²⁹

SŚP §27 6, 9-15

nanu³³⁰ vijñānādvaitam na svato ‘vasīyate, tasya³³¹ kṣaṇikasyaikakṣaṇasthāyitasyā niramśasyaikaparamānurūpatayā sakṛd apy anubhavābhāvād iti cet; na; puruṣādvaitasyāpi nityasya sakalakālakālāpavyāpitayā sarvagatasya ca sakaladeśapratīṣṭhitayā sakṛd apy anubhavābhāvāviśeṣāt | “svataḥ siddham brahma” ity upagame; dvaitam api svataḥ sakalasādhanā’bhave ‘pi kim na siddhyeta; tattvopaplavamātram vā nairātmyam vā

³²³ i.e. the Advaitin’s inference in §20 above.

³²⁴ i.e. just like the two *pramānas* (valid means of knowledge) *anumāna* (inference) and tradition (being a case of *āptavacana*, “word of an authoritative person”) cannot function as *sādhana* (proof) if they are identical with the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved), neither can *svasamvedana* (self-cognition). The *sādhana* and *sādhya* can never be identical. And as they cannot be identical, the argument will result in dualism (*dvaita*).

³²⁵ ed. note: *tulanā* – “taddhi samvedanādvaitam na tāvat svataḥ siddhyati puruṣādvaitavat, svarūpasya svatogater abhāvāt, anyathā kasyacit tatra vipratipatter ayogāt, puruṣādvaitasyāpi prasiddher iṣṭahānīprasamgāc ca |” *āptapa- pr-* 182 |. This argument is also found in Vidyānandin’s *Āptaparīkṣā*, where it is used against the Vijñānādvaita (*Samvedanādvaita*).

³²⁶ here the objection has been skipped. One could expect there to have been an objection along the lines of “nanu puruṣādvaitam svataḥ siddhyatīti cet;”, whereupon a refutation of this would follow. Here this idea is merely refuted without any such supposed objection.

³²⁷ If it could be proved from itself then it would be universally accepted, as it could not be contradicted by anyone (seeing as it is self evident).

³²⁸ i.e. the doctrine of the Vedāntins

³²⁹ if a nature could be self evident there is no need for proof, and then even the Vijñānādvaita can be regarded as well known, as they too could claim that it is self-evident.

³³⁰ ed. note: *tulanā* – “nanu ca puruṣādvaitam na svato ‘vasīyate, tasya nityasya sakalakālakālāpavyāpitayā sarvagatasya ca sakaladeśapratīṣṭhitayā vā’ nubhavābhāvād iti cet; na; samvedanādvaitasyāpi kṣaṇikasyaika-kṣaṇasthāyitasyā niramśasyaikaparamānurūpatayā sakṛd apy anubhavābhāvāviśeṣāt | *āptapa- pr-* 182 |” This too is a modified version of the argument found in the *Āptaparīkṣā* (used against the Vijñānādvaita). Cf. footnote 325.

³³¹ ed. note: “yathā hi vijñānādvaitavādinoktam – ‘svarūpasya svatogater’ [pra- vā- 1|5] iti nopapadyate tathaiva |”

svābhilāpamātrāviśeṣāt³³² ? sarvasya sarvamanorathasiddhir api durnivārā syāt | evaṃ
parabrahmasādhakasya kasyacid api pramāṇasyābhāvāt bhedaḡrāhipratyakṣasya
bādhakābhāvo vyavatiṣṭhata eva, etad anyasyāpi bādhakasyāyogāt³³³ |

SŚP §27 English

If it is objected: Certainly, the Vijñānādvaita is not ascertained from itself. Because there is no experience, even once, of that non-dual consciousness, which is momentary and impartite, as having the durability of a single moment and the nature of a single³³⁴ atom. [It is answered] no; because there is no difference [compared to the Vijñānādvaita] regarding the non-existence of [any] experience, even once, of the permanent non-dual Soul which is within everything as pervading the totality of all parts and the whole of time and abiding in the totality of space.³³⁵

If one agrees [with the statement] “Brahman is proved from itself”, even though there is no proof, [then] cannot even dualism be proved from itself? Or [cannot then] the Tattvopaplavamātra³³⁶, or the Nairātmya³³⁷ [be proved from themselves], because there is no difference [between this and] your own mere prattle. The fulfilment of all the wishes of everyone is unavoidable³³⁸. Thus the non-existence of [any potential] negators of the sensory perception which grasps difference is established, on account of the non-existence of any valid means of knowledge which proves the Parabrahman. Because any negator [of this sensory perception] other than those [valid means of knowledge] is unsuitable³³⁹.

SŚP §28 6, 16-20

syād ākūtam – vivādāpannam pratyakṣādi mithyaiva, bhedaḡratibhāsatvāt,
svapnapratyakṣādivad iti; tad asat; prakṛtānumāne

³³² ed. note: “katham na siddhyet?”

³³³ Amended according to sandhi rules. Printed ed. reads: “bādhakasya ayogāt”.

³³⁴ *Paramāṇu* is, according to Vasubandhu, the smallest possible particle of *rūpa* (matter) (Radhakrishnan 1966a: 616-17), and is rendered as “atom” throughout this translation.

³³⁵ just as there is no experience of anything momentary and atomic etc., there is no experience of anything that is permanent and all-pervasive etc.. In order to experience something that is in all places and all times one would have to be able to experience all places and all times simultaneously, which is not possible. The two are equally impossible to experience. The objection is here turned against the Vedāntin. The characteristics of the Vijñānādvaita are simply replaced by the characteristics of the Puruṣādvaita.

³³⁶ “[the doctrine that] only [accepts] the annihilation of the principles”. Cf. §2 in the Introduction to the SŚP where Vidyānandin states that this doctrine will be examined in the Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā.

³³⁷ “the doctrine of no self”, i.e. Buddhism

³³⁸ saying that something can be proved from itself is not proving it, but merely saying that it is so. And if this is accepted, then it can be done with anything, and inevitably leads to everyone having it their own way.

³³⁹ i.e. *bhedaḡrāhipratyakṣa* (sensory perception that grasps difference) being negated by anything else than a valid means of knowledge is unsuitable. Thus, it having been shown that no valid means of knowledge negate it, it is firmly established.

pakṣaheturḍṣṭāntabhedapratibhāsasyāmithyātve tenaiva³⁴⁰ hetor vyabhicārāt |
tanmithyātve tasmād anumānāt sādhyāprasiddheḥ | parābhyupagamāt
pakṣādibhedapratibhāsasyāmithyātve ‘pi na doṣaḥ iti cet; na;
svaparābhyupagamabhedapratibhāsenā vyabhicārāt | tasyāpi parābhyupagamāntarād
amithyātvād doṣābhāve sa eva tadbhedapratibhāsenā vyabhicāraḥ iti na kvacid
vyavatiṣṭheta |

SŚP §28 English

The intention [of the Advaitin] may be: “Perception etc. that has entered the dispute is incorrect, because it cognizes difference, like in dream perception [cognizes difference]”³⁴¹. [To this it is answered:] This is not true. Because, if the cognition of difference between the subject, the premise and the example in the inference that is undertaken [above] is not incorrect, the premise is erroneous.³⁴² Because that which is to be ascertained³⁴³ is not established through that inference if that [cognition of the difference of the proposition, premise and example] is incorrect.

If it is objected: “There is no fault in [assuming] the cognition of difference of the subject etc. not being false, because it is accepted by the opponent.”³⁴⁴ [It is answered:] no. Because [the premise is then] erroneous³⁴⁵ on account of the cognition of difference of that which is accepted by ones self and that which is accepted by the others.³⁴⁶ If there is no fault because also that [statement] is not wrong on account of something else that is accepted by the opponents, [then] this is by no means logically tenable [as this would only lead to the premise being] erroneous³⁴⁷ on account of cognition of difference of that³⁴⁸.

³⁴⁰ *tenaiva* (“indeed by that) here refers to *prakṛtānumāne pakṣaheturḍṣṭāntabhedapratibhāsasyāmithyātve*, i.e. “indeed, by that [being the case]”. It is superfluous in the English translation of the sentence as the meaning is clearly rendered without it, and as I have found no way to include it in the English which is not awkward it has been excluded from the translation.

³⁴¹ This is an inference. 1) *Pratijñā* (proposition): Perception etc. that has entered into the dispute is certainly incorrect; 2) *hetu* (premise) because it cognizes difference ; 3) *drṣṭānta* (example) like perception etc. in a dream [cognizes difference]. The *upanaya* (application) and *nigamana* (conclusion) are here taken for granted and not explicitly stated.

³⁴² i.e. the *hetu* (premise) suffers from the fault of *hetuivyabhicāra*, the presence of the *hetu* (premise) without the *sādhyā* (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119), i.e. in order for the inference to be valid the cognition of difference between the proposition, premise and example in the inference itself would have to be non-erroneous cognition of difference, as the proposition, premise and example of an inference cannot be identical. But this being the case would result in the premise being incorrect, making the inference invalid.

³⁴³ i.e. that cognition of difference is incorrect

³⁴⁴ i.e. the difference is accepted by the opponent (i.e. the Jains) and can thus be admitted for the sake of argument by the Advaitin

³⁴⁵ *vyabhicāra*, i.e. *hetuivyabhicāra*. Cf. footnote 342.

³⁴⁶ i.e. also this depends upon an acceptance of a cognition of difference, and since the inference is supposed to prove that all cognitions of difference are invalid, this argument would only end up proving the inference wrong.

³⁴⁷ *vyabhicāra*, i.e. *hetuivyabhicāra*. Cf. footnote 342.

³⁴⁸ i.e. this would only lead to a second acceptance of difference. If it would then be claimed that this also is not wrong because of yet another thing accepted by the opponent, this would lead to a third acceptance of

SŚP §29 6, 21-23

kaścīd āha – brahmādvaitasyāmīthyā³⁴⁹ samvinmātrasya svataḥ siddhasya
kriyākārahābhedaḥpratyakṣādīnām bādhakasyābhāvāt teṣāṃ³⁵⁰ bhrāntatvaṃ tato na
tadvirodhakatvaṃ iti; tad api na sādhyāḥ, tathā sati bādhyakabādhakayor bhedāt³⁵¹
dvaitasiddhiprasaṅgāt |

SŚP §29 English

Some say: Those [perceptions of the difference between actions and factors pertaining to actions etc.] are illusory because the sensory perceptions of the difference between actions and factors pertaining to actions etc. do not negate the non-dual brahman, which is true, [characterized by] pure cognition and proved from itself. Therefore that [brahman] is not contradicted”.³⁵² [To this it is answered:] That is not any better, because then there [would be] adhering to dualism being proved on account of there being difference of that which is to be negated and that which negates.

SŚP §30 7, 1-11

na ca paropagamamātrāt tayor bādhyabādhakabhāvaḥ, paramārthatas tadabhāvāpatteḥ |
tataḥ sakalabādhakābhāvāt abhrāntena pratyakṣena prasiddho ‘yaṃ bhedaḥ katham
advaitaṃ na virundhyāt | tayor³⁵³ parasparavirodhāt | tata eva bhedaḥ advaitaṃ
virundhyāt iti cet; na; advaitasyābhyupagamamātratvāt, tatsādhakapramāṇābhāvasya
prāg evoktatvāt, bhedasya ca pramāṇasiddhatvāt, tadgrāhipratyakṣasya bādhakābhāvāt
abhrāntatvena sādhitatvāt | na hi kasyacid abhyupagamamātraṃ pramāṇasiddhaṃ
kriyākārahābhedaṃ pratirūddhi, kṣaṇikābhyupagamavat |³⁵⁴ tad evaṃ
sakalabādhakavaidhuryād abhrāntapratyakṣaprasiddhakriyākārahābhedaḥ, so ‘yaṃ
advaitaikāntapakṣe virudhyata eveti siddhaṃ paramabrahmādvaitasāsanam
pratyakṣaviruddham iti | tad uktaṃ ṣṛīsvāmīsamantabhadrācāryaiḥ –

difference, etc.. etc.. Such a line of argumentation would only lead to infinite regress and the establishment of difference.

³⁴⁹ Amended. Printed text reads “āmīthyā savin”. *Savid* is not found. The variant reading “dvaitasya samvi-” is recorded in a footnote. It is unclear if the alternate reading reads *dvaitasya* instead of *advaitasya*, but this is not so important as reading *dvaitasya* would make no sense. There is also no reason to omit *āmīthyā*. *Samvid* (cognition) is, however, a preferable reading to *savid*, and has here been adopted.

³⁵⁰ ed. note: “kriyākārahādīnām |”

³⁵¹ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “tathā sati bādhyabādhakayor bhedāt, dvaitasiddhiprasaṅgāt |”. The comma between *bhedāt* and *dvaitasiddhiprasaṅgāt* has been removed.

³⁵² i.e. since those perceptions of difference etc. do not negate brahman, they are illusory. Thus brahman, being true, consciousness-only and self-proved, is not negated. Since only one of them can be true (as they contradict each other), perception is thus negated.

³⁵³ ed. note: “bhedaḥbhedayoḥ |”

³⁵⁴ The sentence *na hi kasyacid abhyupagamamātraṃ pramāṇasiddhaṃ kriyākārahābhedaṃ pratirūddhi, kṣaṇikābhyupagamavat* | is also found in the Aṣṭaśatī’s commentary to verse 24 of the ĀM. Cf. Akalaṅka’s Aṣṭaśatī quoted and translated in footnote 358.

**advaitaikāntapakṣe 'pi dṛṣṭo bhedo viruddhyate |
kāraṅkāṇām kriyāyās ca naikaṁ svasmāt prajāyate || [āptamī- ślo- 24]**

SŚP §30 English

And the relation between those two, i.e. that which is negated and that which negates, [can] not merely be accepted [for the sake of argument because it is accepted] by the opponent. Because it [will] result in that [relation] really not existing.³⁵⁵ Therefore, since there is no negation [of sensory perception of difference], this difference is well known by means of non-erroneous sensory perception. How can non-dualism not be contradicted? For those two [non-dualism and dualism, i.e. difference] mutually contradict each other.

If it is objected: “Indeed, therefore non-dualism can contradict difference”³⁵⁶. [It is answered:] No; because non-dualism is merely admitted for the sake of argument, because the non-existence of [any] valid means of knowledge or proof of that [non-dualism] has been previously stated, and because difference is proved by valid means of knowledge, on account of there being no negation of sensory perception which grasps that [difference]. Because [difference] is proved by non-erroneous [perception]. For, the mere admitting of something for the sake of argument does not contradict the difference between actions and factors pertaining to actions, which is proved by means of valid means of knowledge, just like momentariness, which is admitted for the sake of argument, [does not contradict that which is established by means of valid means of knowledge].³⁵⁷ Thus, on account of the absence of all negations, there is difference between actions and factors pertaining to actions, which is known by means of non-erroneous sensory perception. This very [difference] is contradicted in the view of one-sided non-dualism. Thus the teaching of the non-dualism of the Supreme Brahman is proved to be contradicted by sensory perception. It is said by the teacher śrīsvāmi Samantabhadra –

³⁵⁵ i.e. the argument that was used in SŚP 6, 18-19 (i.e. that the difference in question is merely acknowledged for the sake of argument) will not work here either, because the Advaitin's real position will still be that there is no such relation, and thus brahman cannot negate the perception of difference. For that which negates and that which is negated cannot be completely identical.

³⁵⁶ i.e. if *bheda* (difference) and *advaita* (non-dualism) are mutually contradictory, then non-dualism can contradict (i.e. disprove) the perceived difference.

³⁵⁷ This is rejected. As perception of difference is established to be true, it can negate brahman. But brahman is not established by any valid means of knowledge, so it cannot be used to negate perception of difference. Merely being admitted for the sake of argument does not put anything in the position to negate that which has been established by means of valid means of knowledge.

The difference between actions and the factors pertaining to action which is seen is contradicted in the view of the one-sided non-dualism. A thing cannot be produced from itself.³⁵⁸

SŚP §31 7, 12-17

etenaiva iṣṭaviruddham cādvaitaśāsanam | uktaṃ ca advaitasādhakānumānāgamābhyām
dvaitasya siddher uktatvāt |³⁵⁹advaitaśabdaḥ svābhidheyapratyanīkaparmārthāpekṣaḥ, nañ
pūrvākhaṇḍapadatvāt; ‘ahetvabhidhānavat’, ity anumānavirodhāc ca | tad apy uktaṃ
bhagavadbhiḥ svāmibhiḥ –

**advaitam na vinā dvaitād ahetur iva hetunā |
samjñinaḥ pratiśedho na pratiśedhyād ṛte kvacit || [āptamī- ślo- 27] iti**

SŚP §31 English

Indeed, by this the teaching of non-dualism is also contradicted by inference. And [this] is said because proof of dualism has [already] been stated by the inference and scriptural tradition which [were meant to] prove non-dualism.³⁶⁰ And because [non-dualism] is contradicted by the inference: “the word ‘advaita’ depends on something real which is the

³⁵⁸ Cf. Akalaṅka’s commentary to this verse in his Aṣṭaśatī:

*sadādyekānteṣu doṣodbhāvanam abhihitam | advaitaikāntābhyupagamāt na tāvatā anekāntasiddhir iti cet,
na, pratyakṣādivirodhāt | na hi kasyacid abhyupagamamātram pramāṇasiddham kriyākārabhedam
pratirūḍddhi, kṣaṇikābhyupagamavat | na svato jāyate paraṭo vā | api tu jāyate eveti susuptāyate,
pratipattyupāyābhāvāt | tasmāt yat dṛṣṭaviruddham tat na samañjasam, yathā nairātmyam viruddhyate ca
tathaiva advaitam kriyākārabhedapratyakṣādbhiḥ || 24||*

“The arising of faults in the one-sided doctrine of existence etc. is declared. If it is objected: The many-sided doctrine is not proved at the same time, because one-sided non-dualism is accepted. [It is answered:] no, because [one-sided non-dualism] is contradicted by perception etc.. For it is not so that the mere acceptance of something refutes the difference between actions and the factors pertaining to actions, which is proved by pramāṇas, just like the mere acceptance of momentariness [does not refute continued existence]. [If there is one-sided non-dualism] [a thing] cannot arise from itself nor from [anything] else, but yet one repeatedly imagines {*susuptāyate* denominative of intensive from *svap*? Unclear} that it does indeed arise, because there is no way for [this] to be perceived [if there is one-sided non-dualism]. That which is contradicted by perception, that is not true. Therefore, just as [the doctrine of] no self is contradicted [by perception], just so non-dualism (is contradicted) by perceptions of the difference between actions and the factors pertaining to actions etc.” (my translation). See also Chapter 4.

The meaning of the last line of ĀM verse 24 (*naikam svasmāt prajāyate*) thus seems to be that if there is non-dualism nothing at all can arise, i.e. causation is rendered impossible. Nothing can arise from itself, and since the difference between actions and the factors pertaining to actions is denied, it cannot arise from something else as the existence of “something else” implies dualism. Or rather, it implies the various factors pertaining to actions and a dualism between those factors and action.

³⁵⁹ ed. note: “tulanā – aṣṭasa-, 161 |”. According to the editor this is also found in the Aṣṭasahasrī. In addition to that, this inference is also found in Akalaṅka’s Aṣṭaśatī. Cf. footnote 364 where Akalaṅka’s commentary on this verse is given in full and translated.

³⁶⁰ i.e. the Advaita position has already been shown to be contradicted by inference as the inferences raised by the Advaitins in defense of their position have been shown to really prove dualism. Cf. the two advaita syllogisms that have been presented and shown to really prove dualism, namely the syllogism concerning everything being identical to cognition (presented in §20 above) and the syllogism concerning the falsity of perception of difference on account of it being like dream perception (presented in §28 above). Likewise it has been shown that the scriptural tradition of the monists also proves dualism (cf. §22-24 above).

opposite of that which it itself expresses, because the state of the word [dvaita] is a whole concept prior to negation,³⁶¹ like saying *ahetu*³⁶². That is also said by the blessed master [Samantabhadra] –

There is no advaita without dvaita as [there is no] *ahetu* [without] *hetu*. There is no negation of something denoted by a term³⁶³ unless that which is to be negated [exists].³⁶⁴

SŚP §32 7, 18-19

tathā brahmavādināṃ dharmānuṣṭhānaṃ na pratiṣṭhām iyarti, teṣāṃ
puṇyapāpasukhaduḥkhehaparalokavidyatarabandhamokṣāsambhavāt, tattvopaplavavādivat
| tathaiva svāminaḥ prāhuḥ –

**karmadvaitaṃ phaladvaitaṃ lokadvaitaṃ ca no bhavet |
vidyāvidyādvayaṃ na syād bandhamokṣadvayaṃ tathā || [āptamī- ślo- 25]**

SŚP §32 English

Thus, the religious practice of the Brahmavādins does not reach an exalted position. Because it is impossible [that there could be] merit and demerit, happiness and suffering, this world and the other world, knowledge and [its] opposite or bondage and liberation for them³⁶⁵, just like [none of these things are possible for] the Tattvopaplavavādins³⁶⁶. Indeed, thus it was declared by the master [Samantabhadra] –

There cannot be duality of karma [good and bad], duality of results [of that karma] [puṇya and pāpa], nor duality of worlds [this world and the other world]. The pair of

³⁶¹ i.e. the word *advaita* (non-dual) can only make sense if *dvaita* (dual) refers to something real (i.e. something which really exists). For a negation to make any sense that which is negated must be something real. Just like the term *ahetu* (not a premise) presupposes the existence of *hetu* (logical premise).

³⁶² This is a syllogism: 1) *pratiṣṭhā* (proposition): The word *advaita* depends on something real that is the opposite of that which it itself expresses; 2) *hetu* (premise): on account of being a whole word prior to negation 3) *udāharaṇa* (explanatory example with a general statement): just like saying *ahetu*. This inference is also found in the *Aṣṭaśatī*. Cf. footnote 364.

³⁶³ *saṃjñin*, “that which is referred to by a term”. From *saṃjñā*, “term” or “name”

³⁶⁴ Cf. Akalaṅka’s commentary to this verse in his *Aṣṭaśatī*:

advaitaṃ śabdaḥ svābhidheyapratyanīkaparamāṛthāpekṣaḥ, nañpūrvākhaṇḍapadatvāt, ahetvabhidhānavat, ity anumānāt | nātra kiñcit atiprasajyate, tādrśo naño vastupratiṣedhanibandhanatvāt | sarvatra pratiṣedhyāt rīe saṃjñīnaḥ pratiṣedhābhāvaḥ pratyetyaḥ ||27||

“Because of the inference: ‘The word *advaita* depends on something real that is the opposite of that which it itself expresses, on account of being a whole word prior to negation. Like saying *ahetu*’. Here there is no unwarranted extension. Because such a negation has the negation of a really existing thing as its support. In all cases it is to be acknowledged that there is no negation of something denoted by a term unless that which is to be negated [exists]” (my translation). See also Chapter 4.

³⁶⁵ i.e. if there is non-dualism, these concepts cannot exist

³⁶⁶ those who propound the teachings of the Tattvopaplava (lit. destruction of the tattvas), which is a sceptical that denies that one can have any definitive knowledge. The charge is thus that the Advaitins are no better than the Tattvopaplavavādins.

knowledge and ignorance cannot exist, thus [it is also] with the pair of bondage and liberation³⁶⁷.

SŚP §33 7, 23-29

etena yad uktam vedāntavādibhiḥ “ekam eva brahma nānātmyatayā dr̥ṣyate,
brahmavivartāḥ pṛthivyādayaḥ, brahmaprāptir mokṣaḥ, śravaṇādibhiḥ brahmasākṣātkāra”
ity ādi, tat sarvaṃ bandhyāstanandhayasaurūpyavyāvāraṇa³⁶⁸ vadupekṣam arhati, kenāpi
pramaṇena brahmasiddher abhāvāt, anyathā pramaṇaprameyadvaitaprasaṅgāt³⁶⁹ |
bhrāntena pramaṇena tatsiddhau svapnopalabdhadhūmādinā
paramārthapāvakādisiddhiprasaṅgāt | candramarīcijālasannidhiviśeṣāt
pariṇamajjalapudgalavikāratvāt paramārthenaiva pratibimbena candrapratipatteḥ |
bhrāntena pramaṇena pramaṇam antareṇa vā brahmādvaitasiddhau, tathā
dvaitanairātmyādisiddhir api durnivārā syāt | tathā dvaitādvaitayor
bādhakasādhakābhāvād vedāntināṃ dr̥ṣṭahānir adr̥ṣṭakalpanyaṃ kevalam upahāsāya
jāyate |

SŚP §33 English

By this [rejection of these paired concepts], that which is said by the Vedāntavādins:
“There is only one brahman [which] is seen as various selves. The earth etc. are unreal
transformations of brahman. Liberation is the obtaining of brahman. The realization of
brahman is by means of hearing etc..³⁷⁰” etc., all this deserves disregard, just like the
description of the beauty of the child³⁷¹ of a barren woman. Because there is no proof of
brahman by means of any valid means of knowledge. Because otherwise³⁷² there [would
be] adherence to dualism of the valid means of knowledge and the objects of [that]

³⁶⁷ Cf. Akalaṅka’s commentary to this verse in his Aṣṭaśatī:

*pramaṇapratyanīkaṃ svamanīśikābhir advaitam anyad vā kiñcit phalam uddiśyāracyet, anyathā tat prati
pravartanāyogāt prekṣāvṛtteḥ | tathā hi puṅyapāpasukhaduḥkhehāparalokavidyetaṇabandhamokṣaviśeṣa-
rahitaṃ prekṣāpūrvakāribhir anāśrayanīyam | yathā nairātmyadarśanam tathā ca prastutam || 25||*

“Let non-dualism, or [any] other [doctrine] which is opposed by the valid means of knowledge, practice
after having shown some fruit [that can result from this practice]. Because otherwise it is unsuitable to
make [any] effort towards that [practice], on account of that conduct [merely] being a public show [as it has
no fruit]. For it is as follows: that which is devoid of difference between virtue and sin; happiness and
suffering; this world and the other world; knowledge and ignorance; and bondage and liberation is not to be
taken recourse to by intelligent practitioners. Just as it is with the no-self (doctrine), so it is with the subject-
matter [here] [i.e. non-dualism]” (My translation).

³⁶⁸ ed. note: “eṣa bandhyāsuto yāti khapuṣhakṛtasekharah | mṛgatṛṣṇānmasi snātvā śaśaśṛṅgadhanur dharah
|| ityādi vyāvāraṇavat |”.

³⁶⁹ ed. note: “rūpeṇa dvaitaprasaṅgāt |”.

³⁷⁰ cf. SŚP 2, 24: “tasya [mokṣasya] copāyo brahmasākṣātkāra eva | so ‘pi śravaṇamananadhyānair bhavati
|”

³⁷¹ *stanadhaya* not found in the MMW. Formed from *stana* (breast) and *dhaya* (suckling). So, that which
suckles the breast, i.e. a child.

³⁷² i.e. if there was proof of brahman from any valid means of knowledge

knowledge. Because if there is proof of that [brahman] by means of illusory³⁷³ valid means of knowledge, there [would] be adhering to there being proof of real fire by means of smoke in a dream etc..³⁷⁴ Because the ascertainment of the moon is by means of a really existing reflection, on account of a change taking place in the water particles which are transformed by consequence of proximity to the cluster of the moon's rays.³⁷⁵ If the non-dualism of brahman is proved by means of illusory valid means of knowledge or without valid means of knowledge, then it is unavoidable that even dualism and non-self etc. is proved.³⁷⁶ Then, on account of there not being anything that proves non-dualism and negates dualism, the Vedāntins abandon that which is seen³⁷⁷ and assume that which is not seen. This only creates ridicule (for the Vedāntins).

SŚP §34 8, 1-14

kiṃ ca yady ekam eva parabrahmāsti tarhi tad eva kuto na pratītipatham avatarati, yadi vā prapañcaḥ kharaviṣāṇavad abhāvarūpaḥ kutas tarhi sa eva “ahamahamikatayā pratītipatham āpanipadyate iti prṣṭhaḥ spaṣṭam³⁷⁸ acaṣṭāṃ paraḥ avidyayā tathti cet; tad asat; avidyāyā eva paropavarṇitasvarūpāyāḥ³⁷⁹ vyavasthāpayitum aśakteḥ, vikalpanānatikramāt | avidyāyā asattve, mithyāpratītihetutvānupapatteḥ, sata eva³⁸⁰ adrṣṭadoṣasaṃskārayantrantrantrādeḥ svapnendrajālādimitiḥyāpratītihetutvapatipatteḥ | tasyāḥ sadrūpatve dvaitasiddhiḥ prasakter iti | avidyāyāḥ sadasattvābhyāṃ anirvācyatve katham “avidyā saṃsāradaśāyām asti, saṃsārasyāvidyāvīlāsavāt; muktidaśāyām tu nāsti, mukter avidyānivṛttirūpatvāt” iti śiṣyaṃ prati pratipādyeta | tadā tasyāḥ³⁸¹ sadasattvābhyāṃ vācyatvasaṃbhavāt | tathā

³⁷³ *bhrānta*, strictly speaking, means “wrong”, “erroneous”, “confused” etc.. The sense in which it is used here is however best conveyed by translating it as “illusory”. The point is that the *pramāṇas* (valid means of knowledge) do not really exist. They only seem to exist, just like smoke in a dream seems to be real though it really isn't (Cf. footnote 374)

³⁷⁴ i.e. it is also not possible to say that brahman is then established by means of illusory *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge), which are illusory because they, like everything else, are merely *vivarta* (unreal transformations) of brahman, as this would be like establishing real fire by means of the cognition of smoke in a dream, which is preposterous.

³⁷⁵ The Advaitin might contend that the ascertainment of the moon by means of its reflection is proving something from an illusory *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge). Anticipating this, Vidyānandin states that it is not. For when one ascertains the moon by means of its reflection, the reflection is real (not illusory), because a real transformation (*pariṇāma*, here as the present active participle of *pari + nam, pariṇamat*, which refers to an actual, material transformation as opposed to *vivarta*, which is only a seeming transformation) occurs in the water particles (*jalapudgala*) on account of their contact with the moon's rays. The reflection is thus not an illusory *pramāṇa*, but a proper *pramāṇa*.

³⁷⁶ if one does not need real *pramāṇas* (valid means of knowledge) or any *pramāṇas* at all to establish the non-dualism of brahman, then this must apply to the establishment of dualism or the theory of no-self (propounded by the Buddhists) as well. Thus these may also be proved in the same way.

³⁷⁷ i.e. sensory evidence.

³⁷⁸ Amended. Printed edition reads: “sprṣṭam acaṣṭāṃ paraḥ”. This does not make much sense. Changing *sprṣṭam* (touched) to *spaṣṭam* (clear, evident) makes much more sense.

³⁷⁹ Amended. Printed edition omits *visargaḥ*.

³⁸⁰ ed. note: “pūnyapāparūpakarma |”

³⁸¹ ed. note: “avidyāyāḥ |”.

cāpratipādane vineyānāṃ kathāṃ mokṣāya pravṛttiḥ, saṃsāramokṣasvarūpānavabodhāt |
“anirvācyāvidyā” ity avidyāsvarūpakathanam idam svavacanaviruddham –

yāvaj jīvam ahaṃ maunī brahmacārī ca matpitā |

mātā mama bhaved avandhyā ³⁸²smarābho ‘nupamo bhavān || [source not found]

iti vacanavat | anirvācyāśabdenāvidyābhidhāne³⁸³ cānarthakavacanatayā
nigrahassthānatvāpatteḥ |

SŚP §34 English

Moreover, if the Supreme brahman alone exists, then why does it not descend into the path of cognition?³⁸⁴ Or, if the world has a non-existent nature, like the donkey’s horn, then it is asked: “why does it force its way onto³⁸⁵ the path of cognition through self-assertion³⁸⁶?” The opponent must clearly answer: “It is thus because of ignorance”. [To this it is answered:] that is not true, on account of the inability to establish ignorance, which has a nature as that described by the opponent³⁸⁷, because it does not overcome the alternatives [of existence or non-existence]. Because it is not found that [it] is the cause of incorrect cognition if ignorance is non-existent, on account of it being seen that only that which exists, the unseen³⁸⁸, a fallacy, an impression³⁸⁹, a magical diagram, a magic formula, a spell etc. is the cause of incorrect cognitions, such as dreams, illusions³⁹⁰ etc..³⁹¹. [And] because there [would be] adhering to proof of dualism [of brahman and avidyā]³⁹² if that [ignorance] has the nature of existence. If ignorance is indescribable as existing or non-existing³⁹³, how then can the student be taught: “Ignorance exists in the state of transmigration, because the transmigratory state is the manifestation of ignorance. But it does not exist in the state of liberation, because liberation is that which has the cessation of ignorance as its nature”? Because then³⁹⁴ that [ignorance] is describable as existing and non-existing. And if the students are not taught thus, how can there be effort

³⁸² ed. note: “bhavān smarābhaḥ kāmātulyakāntiḥ tathāpi anupamaḥ upamārahitaḥ iti svavacanaviruddham |”.

³⁸³ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “anirvācyāśabdenāvidyābhidhāne”. The negation does not fit the point being made.

³⁸⁴ i.e. why is it not cognized?

³⁸⁵ intensitive of *ā + pad* (“enter”, “arrive”).

³⁸⁶ *ahamahamikā* lit. means “one who [says] ‘me [first], me [first]!’”. I.e. why do the objects of the world more or less force their way into our cognition? The point here is that, if it is so that brahman exists and the world does not, why then is the world so clearly seen while brahman is not?

³⁸⁷ i.e. such an ignorance as that which is described by the opponent cannot be established.

³⁸⁸ i.e. the workings of karma. Cf. SŚP §32 above.

³⁸⁹ see § 14 for *saṃskāra* as the cause of dream perception

³⁹⁰ “illusions” should here be understood as magical illusions. *Indrajāla* (Indras net) refers to an illusion induced by magical power.

³⁹¹ i.e. an incorrect perception must have an existing cause, such as those listed up, or it would not arise.

³⁹² Cf. §9 in the pūrvapakṣa above.

³⁹³ Cf. §9 in the pūrvapakṣa above.

³⁹⁴ i.e. the student is taught thus.

towards liberation? Because [then there would be] no knowledge of the nature of the transmigration and liberation. “Ignorance is indescribable [as real or unreal]”³⁹⁵. This statement concerning the nature of ignorance is contradicted by its own words.³⁹⁶ It is like saying –

I observe the vow of silence for life, and my father is celibate. My mother is barren. You, whose beauty is [like that of] the God of Love, are incomparable [in beauty].³⁹⁷

Because, since the word “indescribable” refers to ignorance, the point of defeat³⁹⁸ occurs [for the Advaitin] because [the Advaitin’s statement concerning ignorance being indescribable is] meaningless speech³⁹⁹.

SŚP §35, §36 & §37 8, 15-9, 7⁴⁰⁰

nanu vastuny eva pramāṇapravṛttir nāvastuni | tato ‘smābhir vastuvṛttam apekṣyāvīdyā
vyavasthāpyate | tad uktam –

brahmāvidyāvad iṣṭam cen nanu doṣo mahān ayam || 175 ||

niravidye⁴⁰¹ ca vidyāyā ānarthakyaṃ prasajyate |

nāvidyāsyeti avidyāyām evāsītvā prakalpyate || 176 ||

brahma[dvārā]⁴⁰² tv avidyāyaṃ na kathaṅcana yujyate |

³⁹⁵ stated by the Advaitin in the pūrvapakṣa. Cf. §9 in the pūrvapakṣa above.

³⁹⁶ i.e. the statement is self-contradictory. Cf. SŚP 8, 14 below.

³⁹⁷ All these are self-contradictory statements, just like the statement of the Advaitin.

³⁹⁸ *Nigrahasthāna*, the last of the 16 categories of the Naiyāyikas, is the point at which the opponent is defeated (Penna 2004b: 293-4).

³⁹⁹ here the self-contradictory statement, as ignorance clearly can be described by the word “indescribable”, is called “meaningless speech” (*anarthakavacana*) and identified by Vidyānandin as a point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*).

⁴⁰⁰ The occurrence of *nanu* (certainly) at the start of §35, the following *tad uktam* (it is said), which introduces a lengthy quote from an Advaita text, and the *iti kaścit* (someone saying) at the start of §37 makes it clear that this is an Advaitin objection starting from the start of §35 to the end of §36. Vidyānandin’s answer starts in §37. These three paragraphs are thus best read as one, and have therefore here been grouped together.

⁴⁰¹ Amended. Printed edition reads “niravadye”. The alternate reading supplied by the editor (*niravidye*) should here be preferred. This reading is also in accordance with Mahadevan’s (1958) edition of the *Śaṃbandhavārtika* (Cf. footnote 402).

⁴⁰² Amended. Printed edition reads “brahma[dhārā]”, i.e. “supporting brahman” (which seems to express the intended relationship the wrong way around). The reading of the printed edition is the amendment of the editor. All three manuscripts read “brahmādvāra”. The variant reading seems to imply a negation, which does not here fit into the argument. The preferred reading thus seems to be “brahmadvāra”, “by means of brahman”, i.e. describing *avidyā* as having brahman as its locus.

T.M.P. Mahadevan’s edition of the *Śaṃbandhavārtika* reads “brahmadṛṣṭyā”. He translates this line in the following way: “From the standpoint of brahman, however, this nescience is by no means intelligible”. Mahadevan, however, does not give any alternate readings at all throughout his edition of the text, so it is not known if this is the dominant reading of the existing manuscripts of the *Śaṃbandhavārtika* or not. Mahadevan’s edition is based on the *Ānandāśrama* edition, series no. 6, which he has compared to the “*araṇyavṛttisāṃbandhokti*”, a commentary on the *Śaṃbandhavārtika*. Two other commentaries have also been used, but they contain only isolated words and phrases from the text (Mahadevan 1958: v). I have

yato ‘nubhavato ‘vidyā brahmāmīty anubhūtivat⁴⁰³ || 177 ||
ato manotthavijñānadhvastā sāpy anyathātmatā⁴⁰⁴ |

brahmaṇy avidite bādhan⁴⁰⁵ nāvidyaty upapadyate || 178 ||
nitarāṃ cāpi vijñāte mṛṣā[dhīr] nāsty bādhitā |

avidyāvān avidyāṃ tām na nirūpayituṃ kṣamaḥ || 179 ||
vastuvṛttam ato ‘pekṣya⁴⁰⁶ nāvidyati nirūpyate |

vastuno ‘nyatra mānānāṃ vyāpṛttir na hi yujyate || 180 ||
avidyā ca na vastvīṣṭam mānāghātāsahiṣṇutaḥ |

avidyāyā avidyātva⁴⁰⁷ idam eva ca⁴⁰⁸ lakṣaṇam || 181 ||
mānāghātāsahiṣṇutvam asādhāraṇam iṣyate | [saṃbandhavā- 175b-182a]⁴⁰⁹

na caivam apramāṇikāyām avidyāyām kalpyamānāyām kaścīd doṣaḥ, tasyāḥ saṃsāriṇaḥ
svānubhavāśrayatvāt | dvaitavādina eva drṣṭādrṣṭārthaprapaṅcasya pramāṇabādhitasya
kalpanāyām anekavidhāyām bahuvīdhadoṣānusamṅāt | tad apy uktam –

tvatpakṣe bahukalpyam syāt sarvaṃ māṇavirodhi ca || 182 ||
kalpyāvidyaiva matpakṣe sā cānubhavasamśrayā | [saṃbandhavā- ślo- 182b-183a]⁴¹⁰

iti kaścīd, so ‘pi na prekṣāvān, sarvapramāṇātītasvabhāvāyāḥ svayam avidyāyāḥ
svīkaraṇāt | na hi prekṣāvān sakalapramāṇātīkrāntarūpām avidyāṃ vidyāṃ vā svīkurute |

not had recourse to these editions. As there has thus been no way of determining if the readings found in the SŚP manuscripts are likely to be mistakes made by Jain scribes (copying either the SŚP or editions of the Saṃbandhavārttika), Vidyānandin himself or if these readings represent alternate readings of Advaita manuscripts, and since the idea intended by the Saṃbandhavārttika can be expressed by modifying the reading of the SŚP manuscripts, I do not consider it necessary to change the reading to that of Mahadevan.

⁴⁰³ Amended. Printed edition reads “anubhūtimat”. Reading “vat” is here preferred.

⁴⁰⁴ Mahadevan’s edition reads the last quarter of this verse as “sāpyety athātmatām”, which he translates as “it also attains selfhood”. In the explanatory notes, Mahadevan writes: “When destroyed by *pramāṇa*, nescience attains brahman-hood and gets resolved there” (1958: 91, italics in original).

⁴⁰⁵ Mahadevan’s edition here reads “bodhāt”. He translates the first line as “When brahman is not known through valid cognition, that there is nescience is unintelligible” (1953: 92). The reading of the SŚP does not change the main point of the verse, and is thus kept.

⁴⁰⁶ Amended. Printed edition reads “nā vidyetyi”.

⁴⁰⁷ Amended according to sandhi rules. Printed edition reads “avidyātve”.

⁴⁰⁸ Mahadevan’s edition reads *tu* instead of *ca*.

⁴⁰⁹ the numbering and daṇḍas have here been amended according to the Saṃbandhavārttika (ed. by T.M.P. Mahadevan, University of Madras 1958). The pairing of the lines has however not been changed, as it has no bearing on the meaning, and as this is also how the verses are given in Mahadevan’s edition of the text.

⁴¹⁰ Numbering and daṇḍas amended according to Mahadevan’s edition (1958).

SŚP §35, §36 & §37 English

[If it is objected:] “Surely, the application of the valid means of knowledge is only with regard to really existing things, not unreal things. Therefore, having examined reality, ignorance is established by us [as indescribable with respect to existence or non-existence]⁴¹¹. It is said [by Sureśvara]⁴¹² –

If it is desired that brahman possesses ignorance, certainly this is a great fault⁴¹³. If [the soul], which is without ignorance [as it is identical to brahman], [is said to possess ignorance], [this is also a great fault].⁴¹⁴ And [if the third option is maintained]⁴¹⁵, the uselessness of knowledge is maintained.⁴¹⁶ [175b-176a]

No⁴¹⁷. Having abided in ignorance, [it is merely] imagined [by the soul] [that] “ignorance is of that [brahman]⁴¹⁸”. This ignorance [existing] by means of brahman is in no way suitable. [176b-177a]

Because ignorance is proved by experience, like the experience “I am brahman”.⁴¹⁹ From this, that [ignorance], which is destroyed by knowledge which arises from valid means of⁴²⁰ knowledge, has a nature that is different [from brahman].⁴²¹ [177b-178a]

⁴¹¹ This sentence is slightly puzzling. The sentence *tato 'smābhir vastuvṛttam apeksyāvidyā vyavasthāpyate* could be read as declaring *avidyā* (ignorance) as being a really existing thing, i.e. “therefore, having in view the real existence [of ignorance], ignorance is established by us”. This reading seems unlikely as this clearly seems to be an Advaitin objection, and the Advaita do not consider *avidyā* to be a really existing thing as, as the quote from the Sambandhavārttika in §35 and the following discussion make clear, it is not considered to be the object of any valid means of knowledge. It has thus been considered best to read the sentence as meaning that *avidyā* is established by the Advaitins as indescribable as to existing or not existing after having examined reality. This consideration, or rather investigation, is then presented in the quote from the Sambandhavārttika. The wording here also to some degree corresponds to verse 180a of the Sambandhavārttika (quoted below), which reads *vastuvṛttam ato 'peksya nāvidyēti nirūpyate* (“Because of this, ignorance is not perceived on examining reality”).

⁴¹² the following verses are all from the Saṃbandhavārtika (175b-182a), an Advaita text written by Sureśvara. The point which is here discussed is the question concerning the nature of *avidyā* (ignorance), i.e. these verses attempt to establish that neither brahman nor the *jīva* is the locus of ignorance, and that ignorance is not an independent entity, cf. Mahadevan’s translation and comments on verse 175b-176a (1958) and Tatia’s introduction to the SŚP (1964: 20) for the identification of these three possibilities, the two latter being rather cryptically referred to in the verse itself. Sureśvara concludes that ignorance is not an object of *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge). Mahadevan’s translation (Saṃbandhavārtika ed. by T.M.P. Mahadevan, University of Madras 1958) has been consulted in the translation of these verses.

⁴¹³ such a notion would not only entail that brahman is composed of parts, but would also make *avidyā* (ignorance) eternal. Such a position can thus not be maintained by the Advaitins.

⁴¹⁴ as the *jīva* (soul) is identical to brahman, it too cannot be the locus of ignorance for the same reasons.

⁴¹⁵ i.e. the possibility of *avidyā* (ignorance) being an independent entity

⁴¹⁶ i.e. if ignorance is said to be an independent entity, it could not be removed by knowledge. Ignorance would then also be eternal, which would mean that liberation, which is the removal of ignorance by means of knowledge, would be impossible.

⁴¹⁷ i.e. all three possibilities are denied.

⁴¹⁸ i.e. that brahman is its locus

⁴¹⁹ this answers the question which arises as a consequence of the preceding statement. If *avidyā* (ignorance) is not an independently existing entity, but merely imagined, how then is it established? The answer to this is that it is established by experience, just like one’s identity with brahman is established by experience. So, even though it cannot be proved by means of *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge), it is clearly experienced by the individual and thus cannot be denied.

If brahman is not known, on account of affliction, ignorance is not known. Even more so if [brahman] is known.⁴²² Un-negated false knowledge does not⁴²³ exist.⁴²⁴ [178b-179a]

An ignorant man is not able to perceive that ignorance. Because of this, ignorance is not perceived on examining reality.⁴²⁵ [179b-180a]

The operation of valid means of knowledge⁴²⁶ outside of really existing things is not suitable. And ignorance is not accepted to be a really existing thing, on account of not enduring the assault of the valid means of knowledge⁴²⁷. [180b-181a]

Since ignorance has ignorance-ness, this indeed is the definition. Not enduring the assault of the valid means of knowledge is accepted to be [its] uncommon⁴²⁸ property.⁴²⁹ [181b-182a]

And thus there is no fault if ignorance is postulated as not [known by means of any] valid means of knowledge, since it depends on the own experience of the transmigrating

⁴²⁰ here *manas=pramāṇa*.

⁴²¹ I.e. as it is proved by experience and not by *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge), it can later be negated. Anything that is known by means of *pramāṇa* cannot later be negated (as it is established by *pramāṇa*). But since ignorance is known by experience, this problem does not arise.

⁴²² i.e. if brahman is known then there is no ignorance to be known. Thus ignorance cannot be known when brahman is known either.

⁴²³ i.e. one can never have knowledge of falsity that is not negated. False knowledge can be experienced as un-negated (i.e. before one knows that it is false). But for false knowledge to become the object of one's knowledge it must be negated. If it is not negated, one does not know it to be false. And thus one does not have knowledge of false knowledge, one only has knowledge of a knowledge one believes to be true. This relates to the statement concerning the impossibility of knowing *avidyā* if one does not know brahman. If one does not know brahman, one cannot know that the impressions are false knowledge. The impressions are experienced, but one does not have knowledge of the ignorance. That is why the previous verse stated that ignorance is known from experience (*anubhava*), as opposed to being known through valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

⁴²⁴ this verse explains why *avidyā* (ignorance) cannot be known by means of *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge). This is so because this is impossible if brahman is known (as one then no longer has ignorance) and if brahman is not known (as one then does not know that which is *avidyā* as false). Thus knowledge of *avidyā* would presuppose knowledge of reality (i.e. brahman). But when there is knowledge of reality, there is no longer any *avidyā* to be known. In effect, *avidyā* can thus never be known through *pramāṇa*.

⁴²⁵ clarifies the previous point, i.e. “*mṛṣādhīr nāsty abādhitā*”. Mahadevan explains: “The ignorant do not have valid cognition of nescience and its relation, for there is no *pramāṇa*; and if there be *pramāṇa*, nescience will cease to be nescience. Nor do the wise cognize nescience, for there is no nescience for them. So, nescience is established only through the witness-self” (1958: 93, italics in original)

⁴²⁶ here *māna=pramāṇa*

⁴²⁷ *manāghātāsahiṣṇutaḥ* (*mana-āghata-asahiṣṇuta*), i.e. it does not stand up to the scrutiny of the valid means of knowledge.

⁴²⁸ i.e. a property which is specific to *avidyā* (ignorance), which it does not share with other phenomena.

⁴²⁹ i.e. the uncommon property of *avidyā* (ignorance) is not being able to stand the scrutiny of the valid means of knowledge. Thus it is shown that *avidyā* per se cannot be known.

being.⁴³⁰ Because, in the manifold postulations of the world, with objects that are seen and unseen, which are negated by valid means of knowledge, [undertaken] by the dualist, the result is manifold faults. It is said –

In your doctrine there are many postulations, and all are contradicted by valid means of knowledge. In our doctrine, only ignorance, connected with experience, is postulated⁴³¹”.

[It is answered:] Someone [who speaks like this] is not a wise man, because he himself accepts ignorance, which has a nature that is beyond all valid means of knowledge. For no wise man would accept ignorance or knowledge which has a form that transgresses all valid means of knowledge.

§38 SŚP 9, 9-13

na ca pramāṇānām avidyāviṣayatvam ayuktam; vidyāvad avidyāyā api kathamcid vastutvāt | tathā vidyātvaprasaṅgaḥ, iti cet; na kiṃcid aniṣṭam **yathā yatrāviṣamvādas tathā tatra pramāṇatā** | [siddhivi- 1 | 19] ity akalaṅkadevais apy uktatvāt | bahiprameyāpekṣyā tu kasyacit, saṃvedanasyāvidyātvam bādhakapramāṇāvaseyam katham apramāṇaviṣayaḥ, tadbādhakaṃ punar arthānyathātvāsādhakaṃ eva pramāṇam anubhūyata iti vastuvṛttam apekṣyaivāvidyā nirūpaṇīyā |

SŚP §38 English

And it is unsuitable that the the valid means of knowledge do not have ignorance as their object. Because ignorance is, like knowledge, in some ways an objectively existing thing. If it is objected: then there is adherence to [ignorance having] the nature of knowledge.⁴³² [It is answered:] That is in no way undesirable⁴³³. Because it is said by lord Akalaṅka: “So far as [the cognition] corresponds⁴³⁴ to [its object], [it has] ‘pramāṇaness’.”⁴³⁵ Some cognitions are [regarded as] characterized by ignorance with regard to external objects of knowledge. [This ignorance] is ascertained by means of valid means of knowledge which negate it. How is it [then] not the object of valid means of knowledge? Because it is experienced that a valid means of knowledge is that which negates that [ignorance] and

⁴³⁰ i.e. the fault of contradiction with respect to ones own teaching (raised against the Advaitins by Vidyānandin in §34 above) thus does not apply, for even though *avidyā* (ignorance) is not the object of *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge), it depends on the own experience of transmigrating beings.

⁴³¹ in comparison, the Advaitin only has to postulate one thing, i.e. *avidyā* (ignorance), which is not contradicted by *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge) as it is not an object of *pramāṇa*.

⁴³² i.e. if it is maintained that *avidyā* (ignorance) is a really existing thing, it becomes positive, i.e. it becomes endowed with *vidyātva* (knowledge-ness).

⁴³³ i.e. that is not against the Jain contention.

⁴³⁴ *avisamvāda*, “non-contradictory”, “non-discrepant with” etc., i.e. “corresponding to”.

⁴³⁵ i.e. a cognition is to be regarded as valid as long as it corresponds to its object.

shows the opposite state of the case of an object. Thus, on examining reality, ignorance is [found to be] perceptible [and thus an object of valid means of knowledge]⁴³⁶.

SŚP §39 9, 14-16

na ca kathaṃcid vidyāvato ‘py ātmanaḥ pratipattur avidyāvattvaṃ virudhyate yato ‘yaṃ mahān doṣaḥ syāt | nāpy avidyāśūnyatve kathaṃcid vidyānarthakyaṃ prasajyate, tatphalasya sakalavidyālakṣaṇasya bhāvāt |

SŚP §39 English

The wise man possessing ignorance is not contradicted on account of [his] self being the possessor of some knowledge, from which⁴³⁷ [there would be] great fault. And it is not so that there [would be] adhering to a moderate degree of knowledge being useless [with regard to establishing ignorance] in the case [of someone] not [completely] free from ignorance, because the fruit of that [moderate degree of knowledge], which has the characteristic [characterizing all knowledge] exists [even for one possessing ignorance and a moderate degree of knowledge].⁴³⁸

§40 SŚP 9, 17-22

na cāvīdyāyām eva sthitvā “asyeyam avidyā” ity prakalpyate, sarvasya vidyāvasthāyām eva avidyataravibhāganiniścayāt, svapnādyavidyādaśāyām tadabhāvāt | tataś cātmādvāraivāvidyā ayuktamatī | yasmād anubhavāt “avidyāvān aham asti” ity anubhavavān ātmā tataḥ⁴³⁹ eva kathaṃcit pramāṇotthavijñānābādhitād avidyāpi saivety ātmātvirodhābhāvāt | na cātmani kathaṃcid vidite⁴⁴⁰ ‘py avidyetyi nopapadyate, bādhvāvirodhāt | kathaṃcid vijñāte ‘pi vāvidyetyi nitarāṃ ghaṭate | viditātmana eva tadbādhatvaviniściteḥ kathaṃcid bādhitāyā buddher mṛṣātvasiddher |

SŚP §40 English

⁴³⁶ i.e. *avidyā* (ignorance) is an object of the valid means of knowledge (*prameya*). And since the sphere of *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge) is only objectively existing things, *avidyā* is in some ways an objectively existing thing. *Avidyā* is established by *pramāṇa* by the falsity of a cognition etc. being established by *pramāṇa*, thus establishing *avidyā*. This is the only way that ignorance can be established.

The final sentence, *vastuvṛttam apekṣyaivāvidyā nirūpaṇīyā*, closely corresponds to the assertion made on behalf of the Advaitin at the start of §35 (*vastuvṛttam apekṣyāvidyā vyavasthāpyate*) and verse 180a of the *Sambandhavārttika* (*vastuvṛttam ato ‘pekṣya nāvidyetyi nirūpyate*) quoted above.

⁴³⁷ i.e. if this was contradicted by that.

⁴³⁸ now the contention put forth by the Advaitin in SŚP 8, 25-26, “avidyāvān avidyāṃ tām na nirūpayitum kṣamaḥ |”, is refuted. There is no contradiction in possessing both knowledge and ignorance. And this moderate degree of knowledge has the same characteristic feature as all knowledge, and is thus able to establish ignorance. Thus the ignorant man can cognize ignorance.

⁴³⁹ Amended according to alternate reading supplied by the editor. Printed edition reads “tat”. *Tataḥ*, corresponding to *anubhavāt* is preferable.

⁴⁴⁰ when Tatia quotes his passage he reads *avidite*. This does not seem preferable.

Having stood in only ignorance, it is not suitable [for him to say] “this is his [i.e. “my”] ignorance”, because ascertaining the distinction between ignorance and the other [i.e. knowledge] of all things⁴⁴¹ [can take place] only in the state of knowledge. Because of the absence of that [ascertaining] in ignorant states such as dreams etc..⁴⁴²

Therefore ignorance, which is unsuitable, is indeed known through the self.⁴⁴³ Because the experience from which the soul is the possessor of the experience: “I possess ignorance”, that [experience] is in some ways not negated by the cognition arising from the valid means of knowledge. Because there is no contradiction of the natures [of ignorance and knowledge] [in saying] ”that indeed is ignorance”.⁴⁴⁴

And it is not so that ignorance is not found in the soul possessing some knowledge, because [the soul that possesses some knowledge also possessing ignorance] is not contradicted by negations. Ignorance is by all means possible even in [the soul] that [possesses] some knowledge, because it is ascertained that only the soul that [possesses] knowledge is the negator of that [ignorance] on account of the cognition, which in some ways is negated, being proved wrong.⁴⁴⁵

SŚP §41 9, 23-25

na ca kathamcid avidyāvān eva naras tām avidyāṃ nirūpayitum kṣamaḥ,
⁴⁴⁶sakalapreṣāvadvyahāravilopāt | yad api pramāṇāghātāsahiṣṇutvam asādhāraṇam
lakṣaṇam avidyāyāḥ, tad api pramāṇasāmartyād eva niścetavyam iti na pramāṇātikrāntā
kācid avidyā nāma, yad abhyupagame brahmādvaitam tu⁴⁴⁷ viruddhyate⁴⁴⁸ |

SŚP §41 English

And [it has previously been said by the Vedāntin that] a man that possesses even some ignorance is not able to ascertain ignorance. [This is false] because [then there would be]

⁴⁴¹ i.e. this is true with regard to all things.

⁴⁴² i.e. just as one is not able to realize that a dream is a dream while one is dreaming (but is able to do so when one is awake), one is not able to realize what is ignorance and what is knowledge if one is completely ignorant, i.e. unless one possesses some knowledge. Thus, only one possessing knowledge is able to ascertain ignorance.

⁴⁴³ i.e. the soul can indeed know *avidyā* (ignorance).

⁴⁴⁴ the argument seems to be that ignorance is known when the self has the experience “I am ignorant”. This experience, “I am ignorant”, is not contradicted by knowledge arising from *pramāṇas* (valid means of knowledge). As it is not contradicted by *pramāṇas*, there is not complete difference between *avidyā* (ignorance) and *vidyā* (knowledge), i.e. Vidyānandin’s contention that *avidyā* (ignorance) in some ways possesses *vidyātva* (knowledge-ness) is not contradictory. There is also no contradiction between the natures of knowledge and ignorance in the factual statement “this indeed is ignorance”, in which *avidyā* is an object of knowledge and thus in some ways possesses *vidyātva*.

⁴⁴⁵ i.e. only the self/soul which possesses knowledge can know ignorance, because recognizing ignorance requires knowledge. Only one who possesses some knowledge can know that a cognition is erroneous.

⁴⁴⁶ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “sakalapreṣāvadvyahāravilopāt |”

⁴⁴⁷ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “na”. This does not seem to make any sense.

⁴⁴⁸ ed. note: “tulanā – aṣṭasaha- pṛ- 162-163 |”

destroying of worldly life for all intelligent people⁴⁴⁹. That which is [said by the Vedāntins to be] the uncommon characteristic mark of ignorance, i.e. that it does not endure the assault of the valid means of knowledge, that [characteristic mark is really] to be ascertained by means of the valid means of knowledge. Thus, nothing which exceeds the valid means of knowledge is named 'ignorance'. But on accepting this the Brahmādvaita is contradicted.

[iti puruṣādvaitaśāsanaparīkṣā]

Thus is the investigation into the Puruṣādvaita teaching.

[śabdādvaitaśāsanaparīkṣā]

Investigation of the Śabdādvaita teaching.

SŚP §42 10, 2-10

tad etena śabdādvaitam api nirastam, puruṣādvaitavat tasyāpi
nigadītaḥ saṁśayaḥ | prakriyāmātrabhedāt tadvyavasthānupapatteḥ,
svapakṣetarasādhakabādhakapramāṇābhāvāviśeṣāt, svataḥ siddhyayogāt
gatyantarābhāvāc cety alam atiprasaṅginyā kathayā | sarvathaivādvaitasya
dṛṣṭeṣṭaviruddhatvenāsatyatvasya vyavasthitatvāt |

brahmāvidyāpramāpāyāt sarvaṁ vedāntinām vacaḥ |
bhavet pralāpamātratvān nāvadheyam vipaścītām ||

brahmādvaitamatam satyam na dṛṣṭeṣṭavirodhataḥ |
na ca tena pratikṣepaḥ syādvādasyeti niścītam ||

SŚP §42 English

The Śabdādvaita is also refuted by that [same argumentation], because it is proved that it is the sphere of the declared faults⁴⁵⁰, like the Puruṣādvaita, on account of the difference [between them] being only methodology. Because there is no proof for the establishment of that [Śabdādvaita] on account of there being no difference [with respect to the Puruṣādvaita] regarding the non-existence of valid means of knowledge that prove their own doctrine and disprove the other doctrines, because it is unsuitable that it could be proved from itself, and because of the non-existence of any other way [in which it could be established]. Enough with unwarranted discussion! For [its] untruthfulness is in all

⁴⁴⁹ i.e. this would contradict everyday experience, as there are many people who possess some ignorance that are able to ascertain ignorance (i.e. recognize that they have been mistaken about something).

⁴⁵⁰ i.e. the same arguments that have been raised against the Puruṣādvaita apply to the Śabdādvaita.

ways established by [the fact that] non-dualism is contradicted by perception and inference.

On account of the annihilation of the foundation of brahman and ignorance⁴⁵¹, the entire speech of the Vedāntin's is not to be attended to by the wise, because it is merely talk.

The Brahmādvaita-doctrine is not true, on account of it being contradicted by perception and inference. It is settled: The Syādvāda is not refuted by that [Puruṣādvaita doctrine].

[iti śabdādvaitaśāsanaparīkṣā]

Thus is the investigation of the Śabdādvaita-teaching.

⁴⁵¹ as accepted by the Puruṣādvaita.

Vijñānādvaitaśāsanaparīkṣā

Investigation into the doctrine of the Vijñānādvaita.

SŚP 11, 2

tathā vijñānādvaitaśāsanam dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddham.

SŚP 11, 2 English

In the same way the teaching of the Vijñānādvaita is contradicted by perception and inference.

[pūrvapakṣa]

The opponent's side.

§1 SŚP 11, 4-6

tathā hi – tāvad idaṃ khalu vijñānādvaitinām iṣṭam, antarāṅgasya
svasaṃviditajñānasyaiva vastutā na tu bahiraṅgasyārthasya, jaḍasya pratibhāsāyogāt,
vedyavedakalakṣaṇasya paraparikalpitasya vyabhicāritvāt |

SŚP §1 English

For it is as follows: Firstly, this is indeed accepted by the Vijñānavādins: Only the internal, self-cognized cognition is real, but the external object is not, because inanimate matter is not fit for cognition, because the defining characteristics of the cognized and cognizer⁴⁵² postulated by the opponents⁴⁵³ are erroneous.

§2 SŚP 11, 7-10

[tatra⁴⁵⁴] tāvat sautrāntikaparikalpitatajjanmatādrūpyatadadhyavasāyāḥ na pratyekaṃ
vedyavedakalakṣaṇam; cakṣuṣā⁴⁵⁵ samānārthasamanantaravedanena⁴⁵⁶ śuktikāyām

⁴⁵² The two paired concepts *vedyavedaka* (cognized-cognizer) and *grāhyagrāhaka*, which are used synonymously throughout this chapter, refer to the two forms (*ākāra*) of cognition, i.e. the grasped/cognized form or the object-form which is apprehended by awareness, and the grasper/cognizer form or “awareness” which apprehends the object-form (Matilal 1986: 151, 186-7). While the Sautrāntikas and Naiyāyikas infer the existence of external object from the object-form, the Vijñānādvaita dismisses these forms, and thus also the existence of external objects, as unreal, because cognition is held to be unitary (Shah 1968: 166; Matilal 1986: 187). According to Soni *grāhyagrāhaka* is used by Māitrya to distinguish between *nimitta* and *darśana*. Further, he explains *vedyavedaka* to refer to the subject and object characteristic of cognition (Soni 2003: 697), i.e. the subject and object form (*ākāra*) of cognition.

⁴⁵³ *para* (“other”, here meaning “opponents”) more specifically here refers to the Sautrāntika and the Nyāya, whose views are refuted in §2 and §3 below respectively. Both the Sautrāntikas and Naiyāyikas infer the existence of external objects from the cognized or grasped form of cognition (Matilal 1986: 187).

⁴⁵⁴ *tatra* seems here to have been added by the editor.

rajatādhyavasāyena⁴⁵⁷ ca vyabhicārāt | ⁴⁵⁸kāmalādyupahatacakṣuṣaḥ śukle śāṅkhe
pītākārajñānasamanantarajñānena ca vyabhicārāt |

SŚP §2 English

There, firstly, that [cognized aspect of cognition] arises from that [external object], that there is sameness of form [between the cognized and the external object] and that there is determinate cognition of that [external object], is postulated by the Sautrāntika.⁴⁵⁹ Each

⁴⁵⁵ ed. note: “cakṣuṣā ghaṭajñānam jāyate na tu tat cakṣurgrāhakam |”. “The cognition of the pot is caused to arise by the eye, yet that [cognition] is not [considered to be] the grasper of the eye”.

⁴⁵⁶ ed. note: “samānārthe yat pūrvajñānād utpannam anantarajñānam tat pūrvajñānād utpannam atha ca pūrvajñānākāram tathāpi nottaram jñānam pūrvam jānāti, jñānam jñānasya na niyāmakam iti siddhāntāt |”. “The immediately adjoining cognition which arises from a previous cognition with respect to the same object, that [cognition] arises from a previous cognition. Still the later cognition does not cognize the previous cognition [from which it has arisen], because of the established conclusion: ‘a cognition does not govern cognition’”

⁴⁵⁷ ed. note: “śuktikāyām rajatam iti śānam rajatādhyavasāyi, na ca rajate pramāṇam |”. “The cognition ‘silver’ in a shell determinately apprehends silver, but is not a valid means of knowledge with respect to silver”.

⁴⁵⁸ Amended. The printed edition reads: “saha vā samānārthasamanantarajñānena kāmalādy”. *Saha vā samānārthasamanantarajñānena* (“or with the immediately preceding cognition which has the same object”) has been removed as it does not fit in here.

⁴⁵⁹ The Sautrāntikas hold that the external object is causally responsible for the arising of the object appearance (*tajjanma*, i.e. the object appearance arises on account of the external object) or object-likeness (*sārūpya*) (Matilal 1986: 151). Concerning the first of these, *tajjanma* (arisen from that), it refers to that the Sautrāntika, who infer the the existence of the external “bare particular” (*svalakṣaṇa*) from the object-form of cognition, hold that the object is that which generates the cognition. This is Vāsubandhu’s definition of perception, who defines perception as “the awareness that arises from the very object by which that awareness is also designated” (Matilal 1986: 239). The object referred to here is the *svalakṣaṇa* (bare particular) (Stcherbatsky 1958: 149). In this respect the concept of *sārūpya* (“sameness of form”, rendered by Shah 1968 p 10 as “co-ordination” and Matilal 1986 p 151 as object-likeness), posited by both the Vāibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas in their theories of perception (Shah 1968: 10) is important as well. Matilal (1986) writes: “The ‘blue form’ is said to be the distinctive feature of what we designate as the awareness of blue. It is the ‘blue-form’ that is most immediately given to us, and from this ‘blue-form’ the Sautrāntika Buddhist would like to infer the existence of blue-object, blue atoms, as distinct from, but causally related to, the ‘blue-form’ in awareness” (Matilal 1986: 42). The Sautrāntikas believe that the momentary object, through the sense-channels, leaves an impression on the consciousness in the first moment. It is through this impression that the object is perceived in the second moment. The concept of *sārūpya* is thus important in Sautrāntika philosophy, as it is through this that they attempt to explain how the already destroyed object (as the object is momentary it has already perished by the time it is cognized) can be cognized by perception (Shah 1968: 10). The second definition, *tād rūpya* (sameness of form), referring to the object imparting its form on the cognition, is thus closely related to the first (i.e. *tajjanma*). It is through these that the Sautrāntikas infer the existence of external objects. For, as stated above, it is held that the external object gives rise to the cognition and imparts its form on it.

The third element, *tadadhyavasāya*, is a bit peculiar, as the Sautrāntika do not accept that the external object gives rise to its determinate cognition directly. The object of the determinate cognition is a mental construct and ultimately not real. According to the Sautrāntika, the external object gives rise to indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpapratyakṣa*), referred to by Stcherbatsky as simply “perception”, which then in turn gives rise to the determinate cognition (*savikalpapratyakṣa*), which Stcherbatsky calls “conception” (Stcherbatsky 1958: 511).

Alternately, this third definition may refer to the third of the four conditions the Sautrāntikas posit as necessary for the cognition of an object (*adhipati*), which Chatterjee and Datta (2007) explain as “there must be a sense to *determine* the kind of the consciousness, that is, whether the consciousness of that object would be visual, tactual, or of any other kind” (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 141; italics in original). *Adhyavasāya*, usually used in the sense of “determinate cognition” throughout the SŚP but meaning simply “determination”, could thus here be used to express this kind of determination. Though such a reading could seem to make sense, it would then not fit the counter arguments of the Vijñānavaitins (cf. SŚP 11, 8, present paragraph), where the counter argument *śuktikāyām rajatādhyavasāyena* (by there being determinate cognition of silver in a shell) is stated, clearly meant to refute the *tadadhyavasāya*. Thus *adhyavasāya* here clearly seems to mean “determinate cognition”, and thus does not refer to *adhipati*. A third alternative would be for *tadadhyavasāya* to refer to the relationship between the indeterminate

one [of these three postulation] is not the defining characteristic of the cognized and the cognizer. Because [each one of them is] discrepant because the eye [generates the cognized aspect of cognition, yet it is not the object of the cognition],⁴⁶⁰ because the immediately preceding⁴⁶¹ cognition which has the same object [generates the cognition in question, yet this preceding cognition is not the object of the cognition],⁴⁶² because there is determinate cognition of silver in a shell,⁴⁶³ and because there is discrepancy on account of the immediately following cognition being a cognition that has a yellow form with regard to a white shell because the eye is damaged by *kāmala*⁴⁶⁴ etc..⁴⁶⁵

cognition and the determinate cognition, i.e. “that there is determination of that [indeterminate cognition or cognizer-form of cognition]”, as determinate cognition is held to be produced by indeterminate perception, but this would seem a bit misplaced as the point of giving these definitions is the question of the existence of the external objects.

An important point here is that, according to the Sautrāntikas, an indeterminate cognition is only valid if it generates a corresponding determinate cognition in its wake (Shah 1968: 207). Though the determinately cognized constructs are erroneously identified as objects, there is an indirect link between the constructs and the objects. Successful action can only take place when this link between the construct and the object is correct (Matilal 1986: 327-28). It seems most probable that it is this that is referred to by *tadadhyavasāya*, i.e. that the existence of external objects is inferred on account of successful action taking place following determinate cognition.

⁴⁶⁰ i.e. the Sautrāntikas hold that that which generates the cognition is the object of the cognition (*tajjanma*). But the (appropriate) sense organ generates the cognition, yet is not regarded as the object of the cognition.

⁴⁶¹ According to the MMW *samanantara* means “immediately connected (in time)”. Whether this means immediately preceding or following seems to be left to the context. Here it denotes an immediately preceding cognition. Cf. footnote 462.

⁴⁶² Cf. editors note to *samānārthasamanantaravedanena* in footnote 456. According to the editor, the argument is that a previous cognition which gives rise to a later cognition is still not considered to be its object. For the preceding cognition cannot be the object of the following cognition, as a cognition is only self-cognized and thus cannot be the object of another cognition.

The argument here refers to one of the four causal factors of a cognition postited by the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas, i.e. *samanantarapratyaya* (immediate condition), *ālambanapratyaya* (object-condition), *adhipatipratyaya* (efficient condition) and *hetupratyaya* (attendant circumstantial condition) (Bartley 2005: 119). According to the Vaibhāṣikas a perception of, say, a red object would be analyzed as a complex event, i.e. as having these four causal factors: 1) the immediately preceding moment in the stream of consciousness (*samanantarapratyaya*); 2) a flash of red atoms (*ālambanapratyaya*); 3) an operation of the visual faculty (*adhipatipratyaya*); and 4) light (*hetupratyaya*) (Bartley 2005: 119-120). Though the Sautrāntika changed the *ālambanapratyaya* to refer to the red mental image formed in the mind after contact with the *svalakṣaṇa* (bare particular) and renamed the *hetupratyaya* the *sahakāripratyaya*, they kept the *samanantarapratyaya* and saw it as referring to the immediately preceding perception (Bartley 2005: 120). The Sautrāntikas thus view the immediately preceding cognition as one of the causes of a perception. More specifically, they hold that the state of the mind in the just preceding moment causes the consciousness of the form (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 141). Cf. also footnote 459 above. The argument of the Vijñānavādin is here that, even though it is a cause of the perception, this immediately preceding cognition is not considered to be the object of the perception.

⁴⁶³ i.e. the determinate cognition does not always correspond to the external object, like when one sees a shell and mistakes it for silver. In other words, the indeterminate cognition of shell does not always generate the determinate cognition of shell.

⁴⁶⁴ *Kāmala* clearly refers to a disease that causes one to see things as yellow though they are not, and is found in the MMW “jaundice”. Jaundice is, according to the medicinal website www.medicinenet.com, not a disease but rather a sign that can occur in many different diseases, and is “a yellowish staining of the skin and sclerae (the whites of the eyes) that is caused by high levels in blood of the chemical bilirubin” (<http://www.medicinenet.com/jaundice/article.htm#toca>). Jaundice does, however, not cause one to see things as yellow, but causes one to look yellow. Thus jaundice does not seem to be a satisfactory translation for *kāmala*.

According to the Wikipedia article on Jaundice, it was however “once believed persons suffering from the medical condition jaundice saw everything as yellow” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaundice#Signs_and_symptoms). It is possible that a similar belief was held in India, and that *kāmala* therefore does refer to jaundice, though this is not at all certain. I have therefore chosen to leave *kāmala* untranslated.

§3 SŚP 11, 11-18

⁴⁶⁶yaugāṅgīkṛtaṃ ⁴⁶⁷kāryanimittakāraṇatvam api na tallakṣaṇam, cakṣuṣānekāntāt |
⁴⁶⁸tathānyaparikalpitakāryakāraṇabhāvākhyaprabhavayogyatādikam api na tallakṣaṇam;
tenaiva vyabhicārāt⁴⁶⁹ | tataḥ kasyacid api grāhyagrahakalakṣaṇasyāyogāt sarvaṃ
grāhyagrāhakākārajñānaṃ bhrāntam eva | tathā prayogaḥ - yad grāhyagrāhakākāraṃ tat
sarvaṃ bhrāntam, yathā svapnendrajālādijñānaṃ, tathā ca pratyakṣādikam iti | na hi
bhrāntapratyakṣādikaṃ bahirarthasya vyavasthāpakam, svapnapratyakṣāder api
arthavyavasthāpakatvaprasaṅgāt | evaṃ yuktyā anupapadyamānā bahirarthā dr̥ṣṭā api na
śraddheyāḥ | **yuktyā yan na ghaṭām upaiti tad ahaṃ dr̥ṣṭvāpi na śraddadhe**⁴⁷⁰ | [source
not found] iti vacanāt |

SŚP §3 English

Also the state of being the instrumental cause and effect, which is accepted by the Yauga⁴⁷¹ [to be the defining characteristic of cognized and cognizer], is not the defining characteristic of those [cognized and cognizer] on account of inconclusiveness because the eye [generates the cognition yet is not the object of cognition]. Thus, capability of producing [the cognition] etc., which is called the relation of cause and effect⁴⁷², which is postulated by the opponents⁴⁷³, is not the defining characteristic of those [cognized and cognizer], on account of discrepancy because of that [the argument concerning the eye causing cognition yet not being its object].⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁶⁵ i.e. some people, such as those afflicted with *kāmala* (cf. footnote 464), see things as yellow. This shows that it is not always so that the object imparts its form on its cognition, as the form of the object is white, yet the form of the cognition is yellow. Thus it is shown that the reasons set forth by the Sautrāntika for inferring the existence of external objects are found elsewhere as well, and are thus inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). Defining the object of a cognition as that which gives rise to the cognition etc. is incorrect as the definition is too wide, i.e. this characteristic is also found in the eye (and other sense organs) and in the immediately preceding cognition, yet they are not considered to be the object of the cognition. Likewise, the object imparting its form on its cognition is not always found, as illustrated by the case of *kāmala*, nor is the determinate cognition always of the same object as supposedly generated the indeterminate cognition, as shown by the example of shell and silver.

⁴⁶⁶ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “yogāṅgīkṛtaṃ”. Yauga (i.e. the Naiyāyikas) must here be meant, as it is their view that is presented and argued against.

⁴⁶⁷ ed. note: “kāryaṃ jñānaṃ tannimittakāraṇaṃ bhavati vedyaṃ |”. “The cognition is the effect. The cognized is its instrumental cause”.

⁴⁶⁸ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “tathā anyaparikalpita...”. Corrected according to proper sandhi rules.

⁴⁶⁹ ed. note: “cakṣurādīnā |”.

⁴⁷⁰ ed. note: “udṣṭatam idam – aṣṭāśa- aṣṭasaha- pṛ- 234”.

⁴⁷¹ i.e. Naiyāyikas

⁴⁷² i.e. which is nothing else than the cause-effect relation

⁴⁷³ The use of *anya* here is unusual. It clearly seems to refer to the opponents, corresponding to *paraparikalpitasya* in §1 above. But the use of *anya* instead of *para* is unusual.

⁴⁷⁴ i.e. the Naiyāyikas maintain that the external object is the instrumental cause and the cognition is the effect (cf. editors note to *kāryanimittakāraṇatvam* in footnote 467). Cf. the Nyāyasūtra’s definition of perception: “indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānaṃ avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam” (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4), “Sense perception is that cognition – (a) which is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ, – (b) which is not expressible (by words) – (c) which is not erroneous, – (d) and which is well-defined” (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4. translated in Jha 1984: 111; original has the whole verse

Therefore all cognition which has the form of the grasped and the grasper is certainly illusory, on account of the unsuitability of any defining characteristic of the grasped and grasper [formulated by the opponents].⁴⁷⁵ The inference is thus – “That [cognition] which has the form of grasped and grasper is all wrong. Just as cognitions in a dream, of a magician’s spell etc., so is [cognition from] sensory perception etc.”⁴⁷⁶. For it is not so that illusory sensory perception etc. establishes an external object, because [then there would be] adhering to the establishing of an object even on account of sensory perception in a dream etc..⁴⁷⁷

Thus, the external objects, being unestablished by reason, are not trustworthy even though they are perceived. Because of the saying: “That which does not reach justification by means of reasoning, even having seen it, I do not believe it.”

§4 SŚP 11, 19-26

bahirarthānām evaṃ asaṃbhavāt saṃvittir eva khaṇḍaśaḥ pratibhāsamānā
sakalavedyavedakavyavahārāya kalpyate | tad uktam –

nāvanir na salilaṃ na pāvako na marun na gaganam na cāparam |
viśvanāṭakavilāśasākṣiṇī saṃvid eva parito vijṛmbhate || [source not found] iti

anyac ca

ekasaṃvidi⁴⁷⁸ vibhāti bhedadhīr nnīlapītasukhaduḥkharūpiṇī |
nimnanābhir iyaṃ unnatastanī strīti⁴⁷⁹ citra phalake same yathā || [source not found]
iti

SŚP §4 English

Thus, on account of the impossibility of external objects, only the⁴⁸⁰ consciousness, shining piece by piece, accounts for⁴⁸¹ all the usages of cognizer and cognized.

in italics). This is here rejected, because the same inconclusiveness arises on account of the eye being the instrumental cause of the cognition (yet it is not regarded as its object).

⁴⁷⁵ i.e. since all the reasons for inferring the existence of external objects have been shown to be wrong, all knowledge having this form must be illusory. The Vijñānādvaitins reject the reality of the forms of grasped and grasper/cognized and cognizer, maintaining that cognition is in reality unitary (Shah 1968: 166).

⁴⁷⁶ this is a syllogism: 1) *pratijñā (proposition): all cognition etc. is illusory 2) *hetu (premise): because it has the form of grasped and grasper 3) udāharāṇa (explanatory example with a general statement): that [cognition] which has the form of grasped and grasper, all that [knowledge] is illusory, just as cognition in a dream, of a magician’s spell etc.. (Here the first part is the general statement, and cognition itself is given as the illustrating example). 4) upanaya (application): and cognition etc. is thus.

⁴⁷⁷ i.e. if one were to say that this sensory perception, though false, can establish the reality of the external objects one would also have to maintain that dream-perception of an object establishes the existence of that object as an external reality, which is absurd.

⁴⁷⁸ Amended. Printed ed. reads “eka saṃvidi”.

⁴⁷⁹ Amended. Printed edition seems to read ”stroti”.

It is said –

Neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air, nor sky, nor [anything] else [exists].

Only the consciousness, witnessing the playing of the world drama,
expands and exhibits itself everywhere.

Moreover [it is also said] –

The notion of difference, which has the form of blue and green, happiness and suffering,
appears in the one consciousness.

Just as a woman with a deep navel and elevated breasts
[appears] on a flat painting.⁴⁸²

§5 SŚP 12, 1

tad evaṃ bahirarthākhyadvitīyarahitatvād advaitam anubhavasiddhaviññānamātram eva
vyavatiṣṭhata iti |

SŚP §5 English

And thus only the non-dual mere-consciousness, which is established by means of
experience, is settled, on account of it lacking a second, namely⁴⁸³ external objects.

[uttarapakṣa]

The refutation.

§6 SŚP 12, 3-10

tad etat vijñānādvaitaṃ pratyakṣaviruddham; vijñānarūpāntararthavad bahirarthasyāpi
nīlādeḥ paramārthasya pratyakṣenopalakṣaṇāt | bhrāntaṃ tad pratyakṣam iti⁴⁸⁴ cet; na,
bādhakābhāvāt | ukta eva vedyavedakalakṣaṇābhāvo bādhaka iti cet; tāvad evaṃ vadata

⁴⁸⁰ *samvitti* – is not listed as meaning “consciousness” in the MMW. Its listed meanings are “intellect”, “knowledge”, “perception”, “feeling”, “recognition” etc.. From the context it seems best to render it as “consciousness”.

⁴⁸¹ it is difficult to say how *kalpyate* should here be translated. Here it clearly takes dative (*vyavahārāya*). The MMW lists many meanings for the root *klp* with a dative object: to accommodate one’s self to, be favourable to, subserve, effect, partake of, be shared or partaken by, become. None of the listed meanings seem to fully fit the context, though the meaning seems clear enough. The point seems to be that, as there are no external objects, only consciousness can account for the occurrence of the experiences of cognizer and cognized. *Kalpyate* has thus here been rendered as “accounts for”.

⁴⁸² i.e. just as, even though the painting is flat one can see the rising of the breasts and the depth of the navel of the depicted woman, just so, even though the consciousness is only one one can experience difference.

⁴⁸³ *ākhyā* is here translated adverbially in English, though it is not an adverb in Sanskrit. In this context the Sanskrit word *ākhyā* simply means “name”. A more direct translation would thus be “on account of not having a second, which [i.e. the second] is named/called external objects”. This is, however, not very good English, and the sentence is easier to understand by giving *ākhyā* an adverbial function in English.

⁴⁸⁴ ed. note: ”bahirarthagrahi |”

yogācāreṇa vijñānānām kṣaṇikatvam anyavyedyatvam nānāsaṃtānatvam anumānenaiva vyavasthāpanīyam, svasaṃvedanāt tadasiddheḥ; saṃvidāṃ kṣaṇikatvenānyavyedyatvena nānāsaṃtānatvena ca⁴⁸⁵ nityatvena sarvavyedyatvenaikatvena paramabrahmaṇa⁴⁸⁶ iva svasaṃvedanābhāvāt | anyathā tato⁴⁸⁷ brahmasiddher api durnivārāt | tataḥ kṣaṇikatvādivyavasthāpanam anumānenaivāstu | tathā ca kṣaṇikatvādau kathamcid vedyalakṣaṇaṃ yadi vyavatiṣṭhet tadā prakṛtasaṃvidāṃ kṣaṇikatvādisādhanam laingikajñānena kṛtaṃ syān nānyathā |

SŚP §6 English

This very Vijñānādvaita is contradicted by sensory perception, because the ultimate reality of even the external objects, blue etc., is ascertained by means of sensory perception, just as (the ultimate reality) of the internal object which has the nature of consciousness (is ascertained).

If it is objected: “Sensory perception of those [external objects]⁴⁸⁸ is illusory”. [It is answered] no, because there is no negation [of that sensory perception].

If it is objected that: ”It has [already been] said [by us] that the negation [of that sensory perception] is the non-existence of the defining characteristics of the cognized and cognizer”. [It is answered that] firstly, cognitions being momentary, not being cognized by another [cognition]⁴⁸⁹, and having various continuances⁴⁹⁰ is to be established only by means of inference by the Yogācāra [adherent] who speaks thus⁴⁹¹, because there is no proof of those [vijñānādvaita doctrines concerning the nature of cognition] being self-cognized⁴⁹², on account of the non-existence of self-cognition of cognitions as

⁴⁸⁵ Amended. The printed edition reads “nānāsaṃtānatvena nityatvena ca”, which would group *nityatvena* together with *kṣaṇikatvenā* ‘nyavyedyatvena nānāsaṃtānatvena in describing *saṃvidāṃ*. This does not make sense. *Nityatvena* clearly belongs with *sarvavyedyatvenaikatvena paramabrahmaṇa*. *Ca* has therefore been moved.

⁴⁸⁶ Amended. Printed edition reads “*paramabrahmaṇā jñānavādinā iva*”. The term *jñānavādin* does not fit in here, and has thus been removed. *Paramabrahmaṇā* has also been amended to *paramabrahmaṇaḥ*.

⁴⁸⁷ ed. note: “svasaṃvedanāt |”.

⁴⁸⁸ the phrase *tatpratyakṣam* could also be read as *tat pratyakṣam*, i.e. not as a compound. The objection raised on behalf of the Vijñānādvaita would then be translated as “that sensory perception is illusory”.

⁴⁸⁹ unlike the Naiyāyikas, who maintain that cognition is cognized by another cognition (called *anuvyavasāya*), the Buddhists maintain that cognitions are self-cognized and do not require another cognition to be known (Stcherbatsky 1958: 163-5). Cf. footnote 492.

⁴⁹⁰ i.e. the existence of other individuals. According to the Vijñānādvaitin an individual is merely a string or continuum of conscious moments. Even though they maintain that the external objects are illusory, the Vijñānādvaitins are not solipsists, i.e. they maintain the existence of other individuals (Stcherbatsky 1958: 521-4). It is this which is referred to when cognition is described as *nānāsaṃtānatva*.

⁴⁹¹ i.e. who says that sensory perception of external objects is illusory.

⁴⁹² The term *svasaṃvedana* appears in the context of how it is that we know that we know, i.e. whether or not cognition or knowledge needs another cognition or knowledge to be known. The concept of *svasaṃvedana* (self-cognition) was first introduced by Dignāga (Soni 1999: 141), and holds that cognition is self-luminous (*svayam-prakāśa*). It does not depend on any other cognition etc. to be known, like a light illuminates both its surrounding objects and itself and does not need another light to be seen (Stcherbatsky 1958: 163). The point Vidyānandin is here making is that momentariness, not being known by another cognition and having various continuances, which are said to characterize consciousness, are not self-known (like cognition, according to the Buddhists, is self-known). In other words, when cognition is self-

momentary, not being known by another [cognition], and having different continuums, just like [there is non-existence of self-cognition] of the Supreme Brahman as eternal, one and making up all that is to be known. Because otherwise even proof of brahman from that [self-cognition] would be unrestrainable. Therefore the establishment of the momentariness etc. [of cognition] can only be by means of inference.

If [the momentariness etc. of cognition] can be established, then the proof of the momentariness etc. of the cognition in question is obtained by means of inferential knowledge⁴⁹³ and not otherwise, and thus the defining characteristic of the cognized is somehow (established) with respect to the momentariness etc. [of cognition].⁴⁹⁴

§7 SŚP 12, 13

na cānuktadoṣaṃ vedyalakṣaṇam asti, vijñānavādinā tajjanmāder
anaikāntikatvadoṣavacanāt | saṃvidkṣaṇikatvādāv anumānavedanasya tatsaṃbhave⁴⁹⁵
nānyatra bahirarthe tadasaṃbhavo ‘bhidheyah sarvathā viśeṣābhāvāt |

SŚP §7 English

And it is not so that the defining characteristic of the cognized is a fault that was not [previously] declared [by the Vijñānavādin], because the Vijñānavādin declares that “arising from that [cognition]” etc. [which are the defining characteristics of the cognized] [suffer from] the fault of inconsistency.⁴⁹⁶ If that [form of cognized and cognizer] is applicable to inferential cognition in the case of the momentariness etc. of cognitions, it is not to be said that that [form of cognized and cognizer] is inapplicable

cognized, it is not cognized as momentary etc.. Not being self-known, they require some kind of proof in order to be established, and this proof, Vidyānandin says, must be inference.

⁴⁹³ *laiṅgikajñāna* is here taken to be a *karmadhāraya* compound, lit. “knowledge which is based upon a characteristic mark or evidence”, i.e. “inferential knowledge”.

⁴⁹⁴ i.e. if it is so that the momentariness etc. of cognition can be established, it can only be established by means of inference, and not in any other way. The logical consequence of this is that this momentariness of cognition in some ways is “the cognized” (*vedya*) (as opposed to the cognizer), i.e. it must in some ways be the object of inferential cognition if it is to be established by inference. Thus the use of inference is an implicit acceptance of the reality of the forms of cognized and cognizer.

⁴⁹⁵ ed. note: “vedyavedakabhāvasaṃbhave |”.

⁴⁹⁶ i.e. and it is not so that the Vijñānavādins do not hold this to be a fault, for they have said (cf. §§2-3 above) that the Sautrāntika’s and Naiyāyika’s definitions of the cognized are inconsistent, i.e. they suffer from the fault of *anaikāntika* (also known as *savyabhicāra*), which is a fault of the *hetu* (premise) in an inference not being uniformly concomitant with that which is to be proved (*sādhya*) (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119). In this case it refers to the Vijñānavādin’s argument that not only the object gives rise to the cognition, and therefore the Sautrāntika’s inference of external objects from the object (cognized) form suffers from the fault of *sādhāraṇa savyabhicāra*, i.e. that there are instances where the *hetu* is present without the *sādhya* (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119). The point here seems merely to be that the Vijñānādvaitins cannot reply that the momentariness etc. of cognitions in some ways having the defining characteristics of “the cognized” is not problematic, for this characteristic has been utterly rejected by the Vijñānādvaitins.

elsewhere in the case of external objects, on account of there being no difference what so ever [between the two cases]⁴⁹⁷.

§8 12, 14-15

atrāyaṃ prayogaḥ – vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ jñānaṃ sākṣāt paramparayā vā svarūpavyatiriktārthālambanaṃ; grāhyagrāhakākāratvāt; saṃtānāntarādyanumānavat | viplavajñānagrāhyagrāhakākāritvena vyabhicāra iti cet; na, saṃtānāntarādisādhanasyāpi vyabhicāraprasaṅgāt | na hi vyāpāravyāhārabhe(da⁴⁹⁸)nirbhāso vipluto nāsti, yenāvyabhicārihetuḥ syāt | yadi jāgraddaśābhāvisatyābhimatavyāpārādihetur avyabhicārī syāt tarhi tathāvidhagrāhyagrāhakākāratvahetur⁴⁹⁹ avyabhicārī bhavet, tathaiiva vivakṣitatvāt |

SŚP §8 English

This is the inference⁵⁰⁰ with respect to this –Cognition which has entered into the state of being the topic of disagreement⁵⁰¹, directly or indirectly⁵⁰² has an object which is different from its own nature as its object, because it has the form of the grasped and the grasper, like [in the case of] the inference of other continuances⁵⁰³ etc..⁵⁰⁴

⁴⁹⁷ i.e. if inference is admitted to be valid, and thus also the characteristic of being “the cognized”, with respect to the objects of inferential cognition (so that its qualities, as they are set forth by the Vijñānavādin, can be known), which, according to Vidyānandin is implicitly done when these characteristics are asserted, then it must also be valid with respect to external objects. There is no difference. Saying it only applies to the first, which is implicitly done when the first is asserted and the other denied, makes it inconsistent.

⁴⁹⁸ The editor has here amended the text so that *bheda* and *nirbhāso* are compounded. Manuscripts Ka- and Kha- read “bhedo ni-”.

⁴⁹⁹ Amended. Printed edition reads “ākāratvahetur”.

⁵⁰⁰ here Vidyānandin has rewritten the inference given on behalf of the Vijñānādvaitins SŚP §3 11, 12-13 in the *pūrvapakṣa*.

⁵⁰¹ i.e. which is here in dispute

⁵⁰² this seems to refer to that while sensory perception rests directly upon an external object, dream-cognition etc. does so indirectly. Both, however, have an object that is different from their own nature as their object. Cf. Stcherbatsky’s rendering of Dharmakīrti’s argument (from sūtra 84 of the *Santānāntarasiddhi*): “The difference between dreams and other images is merely this, that in waking images of purposeful actions their connection with reality is *direct*, in dreams and other morbid conditions it is *indirect*; there is an interruption in time between the real facts and their image, but one cannot maintain that the connection with real facts is absent altogether...they could not exist, if there were altogether no connection with external reality.” (Stcherbatsky 1958: 523; my italics)

⁵⁰³ Dharmakīrti infers the existence of other continuances (i.e. other individuals) from the premise that we feel that our own movements and speech are engendered by our will. Our own movements and speech differ from those that are not engendered by our own will. While the first kind appears in the forms “I go”, “I speak”, the second appears in the forms “he goes”, “he speaks”. From this Dharmakīrti concludes that the two kinds have different causes. While the first is caused by our own will, the second is caused by a foreign will (Stcherbatsky 1958: 522). Thus, just like Dharmakīrti concludes that there are other individuals on account of perceiving a difference between one’s own volitional acts and volitional acts that are not one’s own (and thus it is inferred that they are the volitional acts of others), so Vidyānandin infers the existence of external objects on account of perceiving a difference between the forms of grasped and grasper.

⁵⁰⁴ This is a syllogism: 1) *pratijñā* (proposition): Cognition that enters into the state of being the topic of disagreement, directly or indirectly is one whose object is an object which is different from its own nature. 2) *hetu* (premise): because it has the form of grasped and grasper 3) *udāharaṇa* (explanatory example with a general statement): *that [cognition] which has the appearance of grasped and grasper, all that [cognition] has an object different than its own nature as its object*, like in the inference of other continuances. In other

If it is objected that: “[This] is erroneous⁵⁰⁵ because the form of the grasped and the grasper is an illusory cognition”. [It is answered] no. Because [then there would be] adhering to the proof of other continuances etc. being erroneous⁵⁰⁶. For it is not so that the appearance of the difference between the action and speech⁵⁰⁷ is not illusory, on account of which⁵⁰⁸ the premise [in your inference of other continuances] would be non-erroneous. If the premise [in Dharmakīrti’s inference of other continuances], action etc.⁵⁰⁹ which takes place in the waking state and is acknowledged as true, is not erroneous, then also the premise [in our inference of the reality of external objects], the form of grasped and grasper, cannot be erroneous, because the intended statement being only thus⁵¹⁰.

§9 SŚP 12, 20-28

atha satyābhimatajñānena vāsanābhedo gamyata iti cet; tad anyatrāpi samānam | yathaiva hi jāgraddaśāyāṃ bahirarthavāsanāyā dṛḍhatamatvāt tadākārajñānasya satyatvābhimānaḥ; svapnādidaśāyāṃ tu tadvāsanāyā⁵¹¹ dṛḍhatvābhāvāt tadvedanasyāsatyatvābhimāno lokasya na paramārthato bahirarthaḥ siddhyatīti vāsanābhedo gamyate, tathānupaplavadaśāyāṃ saṃtānāntarajñānasya vāsanāyā dṛḍhatamatvāt satyatābhimāno, anyatra tadadārḍhyād asatyatā vyavahāra iti vāsanābhedo gamyatām, na tu saṃtānāntaram |⁵¹² tadanabhyupagame svasaṃtānakṣaṇakṣayādisiddhiḥ katham abhyupagamyate; tataḥ sudūram api gatvā kiṃcid vedanaṃ sveṣṭatattvāvalambanam eṣitavyam | tasmād ayaṃ mithyādrṣṭiḥ parapratyāyanāya śāstraṃ vidadhānaḥ paramārthatas saṃvidatām⁵¹³ vācanaṃ tattvajñānaṃ ca pratirūḍdhi iti na kiṃcid etat | tad evaṃ vedyavedakākāratvasādhanam bahirarthavedanasya

words, the forms of grasped and grasper are thus not illusory, and the existence of external objects can thus be inferred from them.

⁵⁰⁵ *Vyabhicāra*. the fault of *savyabhicāra* is when the *hetu* (premise) is not uniformly concomitant with the *sādhya*. There are three kinds of *savyabhicāra*, the one intended here is probably *sādhāraṇa-vyabhicāra*, which is when the *hetu* is shown to be present in a case where the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) is not. In other words, the *hetu* is too wide. In the above syllogism the *hetu* is the form of grasped and grasper. The *sādhya* is that the object of cognition is different from the cognition. The conclusion being that it is not true that only cognition exists (and external objects do not), because a cognition has something different from itself as its object, namely the external object. The objection here refers back to the objections raised in §§2-3 of the *pūrvapakṣa*.

⁵⁰⁶ i.e. if the Buddhist objects that the above syllogism is false because even though the cognition bears the form of grasped and grasper (cognized and cognizer) the cognition still does not have anything other than itself as its object, then the Buddhist inference of the existence of other continuances is false as well, as one can then also argue that even though willful acts are seen to be either engendered by one’s own will or a foreign will there are still no other continuances. I.e. the forms of other wills in one’s own cognition does then not have to mean that there are other continuances.

⁵⁰⁷ i.e. the difference between the action and speech engendered by one’s own will and the action and speech engendered by a foreign will. This refers to Dharmakīrti’s inference of other continuances (Cf. footnote 503).

⁵⁰⁸ i.e. had this apparent difference not been illusory.

⁵⁰⁹ i.e. action and speech (*vyāpāravāhāra*).

⁵¹⁰ *tathaiva vivakṣitatvāt*. *Vivakṣitvatva* is constructed from the desiderative of the root *vac* (speak) and the suffix *-tva*.

⁵¹¹ Amended. Printed edition reads “tadvāsanāyā”. This does not make any sense.

⁵¹² ed. note: “saṃtānāntarābhyupagame |”. I find reading *tad* as referring to the difference between the form of grasped and grasper (*grāhyagrāhakākāra*) preferable.

⁵¹³ Amended. Printed edition reads “saṃvidāno”. Editor gives *saṃvidhāno* as alternate reading.

svarūpavyatiriktāmbanatvṃ sādhyatīti bādhakabādhanāt na bādhako
vedyavedakalakṣaṇābhāvaḥ |

SŚP §9 English

Now, if it is objected that: “By cognition that is acknowledged to be true, a special impression⁵¹⁴ is meant”. [It is answered] then this is the same elsewhere as well.⁵¹⁵ Just as [only] difference of impressions is meant [by the Vijñānādvaitin arguing that]: “cognition which has the form of that [external object] is felt as valid because the impression of the external objects in the waking state is intense, but the cognition of that [the form of the external object] is felt as invalid for people because of the non-existence of intensity of the impression of those [external objects] in the dream-state etc.. The external object is not proved to be ultimately real”. Just so [only] the difference of impressions, but not the [existence of] other continuances, [should be] meant [when arguing that]: “there is a feeling of validity because the impression of the cognition of

⁵¹⁴ *vāsanabheda vāsanāviśeṣa ity arthaḥ* |, i.e. a specific/special impression (*vāsanā*). Bartley (2005) explains *vāsanā* as: “...traces of past experiences, deliberate choices and actions linger in a stream of experiences that we call a person. They form a ‘mind-set’, a stock of concepts, conditioning what one decides, does and undergoes” (170). *Vāsanābheda* literally means “difference of impressions” and is used in the following sentence as well. Here it has been found best to translate as “special impression” since it is used in direct reference to *satyābhimatājñāna* (cognition considered to be true). Thus even though the idea of *vāsanābheda* refers to a difference of impressions (which in turn is used to explain why some cognitions are considered valid while others are not), what causes a cognition to be considered as true is the specific quality of the impression, as distinguished from other impressions which do not cause a cognition to be considered as true. In other words, there is a difference between impressions, and some special impressions are thus considered to make a cognition valid while others are not. Cf. footnote 515.

⁵¹⁵ This seems to be a proposed answer on behalf of the Buddhist to a problem implied by Vidyānandin in the previous sentence. The problem this answer seems to attempt to answer is on what grounds the Vijñānādvaitin can distinguish between a valid and an invalid cognition. This is prompted by the Vijñānādvaitins rejection of the form of grasped and grasper as valid while at the same time using cognitions of purposeful actions to prove the existence of other continuances. Normally the validity of a cognition is assessed by its correspondence to an external object. But this cannot be an accepted definition of the validity of a cognition as the Vijñānāvādin claims that external objects do not exist. The Vijñānāvādin considers cognitions to be valid in so far as they lead to successful purposeful action. But how can the Vijñānāvādin explain how it is that some cognitions lead to successful purposeful action while others do not?

The proposed answer and refutation here offered by Vidyānandin are heavily influenced by Akalaṅka’s Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa: “tatrāpi santānabhedajñāne ‘pi siddho niścito vāsanābhedaḥ bheda ‘yam | tathā ca tato ‘pi katham tadbhedasiddhiḥ? mā bhūt, tadbhedasya tajjñānasatyatvaniścayasya ca vāsanābhedaḥ eva bhāvāt” (quoted in Shah 1968: 178). “There, the difference that is determined on account of difference of impressions is proved even with respect to cognition of the difference between continuances. And thus, how is it proved that there is difference of those continuances from that [cognition of the difference of continuances]? It cannot be, because the difference of those [continuances], which is determined on account of the cognition of that [difference between continuances] is only on account of difference of impressions” (My translation). Shah writes: “The idealist Dharmakīrti should not reply that a difference in the previous dispositions (*vāsanā*) leads to a difference in the nature of the cognition that arises subsequently, for then he would have to concede that the cognition of other minds (*santānāntara*) is also due to the internal force of illusion or previous dispositions, without there being any actual other mind in reality” (Shah 1968: 177-8; italics in original).

Vidyānandin’s answer should be read as meaning that if external objects are not proved because the validity of a cognition, i.e. it leading to successful purposeful action, is on account of difference of impressions (*vāsanā*), then this must apply to the cognitions of other continuances as well. Thus they are not established because their cognition is only due to impressions (*vāsanā*).

other continuances in the waking⁵¹⁶ state is intense. In the other [state]⁵¹⁷ it is regarded as invalid because it [the impression of the cognition of other continuances] is not intense”.⁵¹⁸

If one does not acknowledge that [form grasped and grasper], how can the proving of one’s own [doctrines], the destruction of moments⁵¹⁹, [other] continuances etc. be acknowledged? Therefore, having gone too far, some cognition having the tattvas desired by one’s self as its object is to be approved.⁵²⁰ Therefore, [the Vijñānādvaitin] whose view is wrong, composing a treatise for the elucidation of others, in reality obstructs the true knowledge and the preaching of the intelligent ones. Thus this [Vijñānādvaita doctrine] is nothing [to be concerned with].

Thus, the proof [in the syllogism], [that cognition] has the form of cognized and cognizer, proves that the cognition of external objects has that which is different from its own nature as its object⁵²¹. The non-existence of the defining characteristics of cognized and cognizer is not a negation [of the fact that the cognition of external objects has that which is different from its own nature as its object] because there is negation of the negation.⁵²²

SŚP §10 13, 1-10

nanv asty eva bahirarthapratyakṣasya bādhakam, nīlatajjñānāyor abhedah
sahopalambhaniyamāt⁵²³, dvicandravat, ity anumānasya tadbādhakatvād iti cet, na, hetor

⁵¹⁶ the term *anupaplava* is here curious. One would expect to find *jāgraddaśā* (waking state) also here, mirroring the first part of the sentence. This also seems to be the point, i.e. that *anupaplavadaśā* should here be read as referring to the waking state. The MMW however, has no record of *anupaplava* meaning “awake” (or *upaplava* meaning “sleep”). *Anupaplava* seems clearly to mean “unafflicted”. But this does not seem to make any sense here, as the solidity of the impressions of other continuances would then depend on whether or not one is afflicted or not. What kind of affliction this would refer to is also unclear. Reading *anupaplavadaśā* as meaning the same as *jāgraddaśā* thus seems to make the most sense, though why the term *anupaplava* is used to express this is unclear.

⁵¹⁷ i.e. the dream state

⁵¹⁸ i.e. if the intensity of the impressions of external objects in the waking state (as opposed to their lack of intensity in the dream-state etc.) does not establish the existence of external objects, then how can the felt intensity of the impressions of other continuances establish the existence of other continuances? If external objects are not proved to exist, then other continuances cannot be proved to exist either.

⁵¹⁹ The term *kṣaṇakṣaya* is also found in Vidyānandin’s commentary to ĀM verse 24 in his *Aṣṭasahasrī*, cf. Soni (2009: 451). Soni comments: “Vidyānandin’s *kṣaṇakṣaya* is certainly a synonym for the better known Buddhist view of *kṣanabhaṅga* (Soni 2009: 451, footnote 7).

⁵²⁰ i.e. As the Vijñānādvaitin rejects the reality of the forms grasped and grasper, he cannot prove momentariness, his own continuance etc.. Thus the Vijñānādvaitin has gone too far in his argumentation and ended up in the situation that he cannot prove the existence of his own accepted principles. If he wishes to maintain the reality of these at least some cognitions must be acknowledged to have these as their object. The cognition here implied is inferential cognition, and, as shown above (Cf. §6 above), acknowledging this would inevitably entail an acceptance of the form of grasped and grasper.

⁵²¹ i.e. the object of such a cognition is not cognition itself, but something else, i.e. an external object.

⁵²² i.e. the claim that the defining characteristic of cognized and cognizer does not exist does not negate the above statement, as this has been refuted.

⁵²³ ed. note: “saktṛsamvedyamānasya niyamena dhiyā saha | viṣayasya tato ‘nyatvaṃ kenākāreṇa siddhyati || pra- vā- 3|388”. “The ‘otherness’ of the object, which is necessarily and immediately [cognized] with the cognition, is proved by what form?” (My translation).

viruddhatvāt | yaugapadyārthe sahaśabde tanniyamasyābhedaviruddhe nānā(tve⁵²⁴)⁵²⁵
bhāvāt | abhede’pi candradvitaye bhāva iti cet; na; tatrāpi yathā pratibhāsam bhedabhāvāt
| tathā tattvam abhedo ‘pi iti cet; na; yathātattvam sahopalambasyāpi abhāvāt evam
dr̥ṣṭānto ‘pi sādhyasādhnavikalah syāt | tanmātrasya⁵²⁶ hetutve tasya bhedamātra eva
bhāvād viruddha eva hetuḥ syāt | tathā – asiddhaś cāyaṃ hetuḥ; yato
nartakyādyekārthasamgatadr̥ṣṭayaḥ paracittavido vā nāvaśyaṃ tadbuddhiṃ tadarthaṃ vā
samvidantīti hetor asiddhiḥ, niyamasyāsiddheḥ | nartakīrūpasyāpi bahutvān na
tanniyamāsiddhir iti cet; na; tadrūpasyaikavāt | tatra sarveṣāṃ sabhāsamavāyinām⁵²⁷
ekavākyatāpratipatteḥ | vyāmohād eva kutaścīt tatra teṣāṃ ekavākyatvaṃ vastuto nānaiva
⁵²⁸tadrūpam iti cet, ⁵²⁹kośapānād etat pratyetyaṃ na pramānataḥ kutaścīd api tadabhāvāt
|

SŚP §10 English

If it is objected: Certainly there exists negation of the sensory perception of external objects, because the inference: “Blue and its cognition are not different⁵³⁰, because (blue and its cognition) are necessarily perceived together, [they only appear to be different] like [when a person suffering from defective eye sight sees] two moons [even though there is only one]” negates that [sensory perception of external objects].⁵³¹
[It is answered] no, because the premise [in this inference] is contradictory⁵³². Because [the premise] is present in “difference” which contradicts the identity of that which is invariably that [cognized together] since the word “together” has the simultaneous presence [of two or more things] as its meaning.⁵³³

⁵²⁴ ed. note: “ekatve ‘pi |”

⁵²⁵ The editor has here amended the text. Manuscript Ka- reads: “nānātvabhāvāt”

⁵²⁶ ed. note: “sahopalambhaniyamamātrasya |”.

⁵²⁷ Ed. note: “sabhyānām ity arthaḥ |”.

⁵²⁸ ed. note: “nartakīrūpam |”.

⁵²⁹ ed. note: “kośapānam = saugandhyam |”.

⁵³⁰ i.e. the blue thing and the cognition of the blue thing are identical.

⁵³¹ This is a syllogism: 1) pratijñā (proposition): There is no difference between blue and the cognition of blue; 2) hetu (premise): because they are invariably perceived together; 3) udāharaṇa (example): like a person with defective eyesight seeing two moons.

The argument is that as an object is never cognized without its cognition, it cannot be proved that the object has an existence independent of cognition. In explaining Dharmakīrti’s inference, Shah (1968) writes: “How could the object be proved to be different from the cognition if the former were invariably cognized simultaneously with the latter? The object appears to be different from the cognition to those who are under a transcendental illusion, just as one moon appears to be different to a person having defective eyesight” (166). Cf. SŚP 4, 25-28 for the Puruṣādvaita (Advaita Vedānta) syllogism of *pratibhāsasamānādhikaraṇatva*.

⁵³² i.e. it suffers from the fault of *viruddhatva*, i.e. *hetu* proves the opposite of that which is to be proved (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119).

⁵³³ i.e. the word “together” implies difference. Thus the premise in Dharmakīrti’s syllogism is contradictory. This argument is also put forth by Akalaṅka. Shah (1968) renders Akalaṅka’s argument from his Akalaṅkagranthatrāya in the following way: “...Dharmakīrti gives the reason – ‘their being apprehended together.’ This reason is fallacious. It is contradictory (*viruddha*) because the term together always implies a difference between the things that go together; in other words, the probans ‘being apprehended together together’ has for its probandum difference (rather than ‘identity’).” (Shah 1968: 174-75).

If it is objected: “It is present in the two moons, even though there is no difference”. [It is answered] no, because there is difference even in that [example], according to the appearance [in the cognition].⁵³⁴

If it is objected: “In the same way there is also no difference in reality”. [It is answered] no, because in reality there is non-existence of simultaneous perception [of the two together]. Thus even the example is without proof of that which is to be proved.⁵³⁵ The premise is indeed contradictory, because, if merely that [seeing the two together] is the premise, that [premise] is present in difference only.

In the same way – this premise is unproved⁵³⁶ because people seeing a single object, such as a dancing woman etc., surely do not perceive the cognition of those [other people seeing the same object], and knowers of other’s minds (surely do not perceive) the object of those [other people’s thoughts]. The premise is not proved, because the necessity is not proved.⁵³⁷

If it is objected: The necessity of that [being perceived together]⁵³⁸ is not unproved, because the form of a dancing girl is manifold⁵³⁹. [It is answered] no, because

⁵³⁴ The Vijñānādvaitin may object that it is not so that the premise is only found in difference because it is found in the example of the person with defective eyesight seeing two moons where there is only one. Vidyānandin rejects this, as there is difference even in this example, only the difference is not one of objects but of appearances in the cognition.

⁵³⁵ This argument only seems to make sense if one sees it as a rather condensed version of one of Akalaṅka’s arguments against Dharmakīrti’s inference. Akalaṅka says: “bahir antaś ca nīlataddhiyor darśanāt kutaḥ sahopalambhaniyamaḥ siddhaḥ?” (Akalaṅka’s Siddhiviniścayavṛtti quoted in Shah 1968: 175). Shah (1968: 175) renders Akalaṅka’s full argument in the following way: “The thing and its cognition between which two identity is sought to be established by means of inference are never apprehended together. The thing blue is experienced *externally* in the form ‘this is the blue’, and the cognition of this cognition is experienced *internally*”.

⁵³⁶ i.e. it is not proved that blue and the cognition of blue are invariably perceived together.

⁵³⁷ Vidyānanda here attacks the *niyama* (necessity) part of the premise in Dharmakīrti’s inference. The object is the cause of the cognition, and thus the cognition is always cognized with its object. But the necessity of them *always* appearing together is here questioned. The argument is that if the cognition and that which is perceived is identical, then several people perceiving the same object would be able to see each other’s cognitions of that object (as these cognitions would be identical to the object they themselves are perceiving). But this is not found to be the case. Likewise a person able to read the minds of others should then be able to see the objects they are thinking of, yet the Buddhists maintain that people who are able to read the minds of others are only able to know their mental states and not the objects that are thought about or known. The first part of this argument is taken from Akalaṅka: “sakraḍ ekārthopanibaddhadṛṣṭīnām parajñānānupalambhe ‘pi tadarthadarśanāt kuto niyamaḥ?” (Akalaṅka’s Siddhiviniścayavṛtti quoted in Shah 1968: 175). Shah (1968) renders Akalaṅka’s argument in the following way: “Many people perceive a blue thing at one and the same time. Now here though a person cognizes *the blue* he does not cognize *the cognition of blue* occurring in another person’s mind. If the blue and the cognition of blue were identical he would have perceived even the cognition of the blue occurring in another person’s mind” (175). What these arguments intend to show is that the premise in Dharmakīrti’s inference is indeed fallacious, for, as the example of several people seeing the same object and the reader of other people’s minds shows, the cognition and the object are not **necessarily** perceived together.

⁵³⁸ i.e. the *hetu* (premise)

⁵³⁹ i.e. the object and cognition are indeed cognized together, because the cognitions of others (in the example of many people seeing a single object such as a dancer) have a different object than one’s own cognition of this object. This is because the form of any given object, in this case a dancer, is manifold, and all the people watching this object see a different form. So while one’s cognition is identical to the object one has perceived, it is not identical to the object seen by the others nor to their cognitions. Thus the rule concerning the necessity of the cognition and its object being cognized together is not negated.

the form of that [dancing girl] is unitary⁵⁴⁰. Because all those that have come together in the assembly⁵⁴¹ unanimously agree with respect to that [unitary form of the dancing girl].

If it is objected: The unanimity of those [members of the audience] with respect to that [unitary form of the dancing girl] is only because of some delusion. The form of that [dancing girl] is really manifold. [It is answered] This [a dancing girl having many forms] is agreed to on account of a fragrant intoxicating drink⁵⁴², [but] not from [the standpoint of] any valid means of knowledge, because [a dancing girl] does not have that [manifold forms].⁵⁴³

SŚP §11 13, 11-17

atha sarve pratyayāḥ nirāmbanatāḥ pratyayatvāt svapnapratyayavat [pravārtikālam- pr- 359] ity anumānam prakṛtabādhakam iti cet; na; prakṛtasādhyasādhnapratyayayoḥ svārthāmbanatvābhāvena hetor vijñānamātrasiddhiḥ hetusādhyayor abhāvāt | athārthavattve, tābhyām eva hetor vyabhicārāt | tad uktam bhagavadbhiḥ⁵⁴⁴ svāmibhiḥ –

**anarthikā sādhanasādhyadhīś ced vijñānamātrasya na hetusiddhiḥ |
athārthavattvaṃ vyabhicāradoṣo na yogigamyam paravādisiddham** || [yuktyanu- ślo-
17] iti

SŚP §11 English

If it is now objected: then the inference “all cognitions are without [external] objects because they are cognitions, like dream-cognition” negates that which is contended [by the opponents who hold that there are external objects]”⁵⁴⁵. [It is answered] no. Because

⁵⁴⁰ and so the fallacy of the premise (*hetu*) being unproved (*asiddha*) remains.

⁵⁴¹ i.e. the whole audience at a dance performance

⁵⁴² *Kośapāna* is not found in the MMW. *Pāna* means “cup”, “vessel”, “drink”, while *kośa* usually means “treasury”, “cask”, “vessel for holding liquids”, “cup” etc., but can also refer to the inner part of several fruits, among others the *Artocarpus integrifolia* or jackfruit, which is found in large parts of India and has been cultivated there for a long time. From the context, it seems that *kośapāna* refers to some kind of intoxicating drink, perhaps made from jackfruit? The editor glosses it as *saugandhya* (relating or pertaining to something which smells good. Perhaps something made from a plant etc. which smells good?), which is not very helpful with respect to understanding the argument (cf. ed. note to *kośapāna* in footnote 529). He gives no reference or reason for his gloss.

⁵⁴³ i.e. perhaps this is so from the standpoint of a drunk person (who sees many forms where there is only one), but not from the standpoint of the valid means of knowledge. This seems to be a rather rude remark from Vidyānandin insinuating that the Vijñānādvaitin must be drunk.

⁵⁴⁴ Amended. Printed ed. reads “bhagavadbhiḥ; svāmibhiḥ –”. Semicolon has been removed.

⁵⁴⁵ This is a syllogism: 1) pratijñā (proposition): All cognitions are without an external object; 2) hetu (premise): because they are cognition; 3) udāharāṇa (explanatory example with a general statement): *that which is a cognition is without an [external] object*, like dream-cognition.

The argument seems to be that in dream cognition there cannot be said to be any external object which is different from the cognition, as the objects and events of dreams only exist or take place within the mind. Thus there are at least some instances of objects not being different from the cognition. The implication seems to be that since identity between object and cognition is thus clearly possible, it cannot be proved that there is no such identity in the waking state.

that which is to be proved and the proof under discussion have no own objects, the premise [in your inference] is proved to be mere cognition because there is neither a premise nor a thing to be proved⁵⁴⁶. Now, if [if it is contended that they] have an object, then the premise [in the above syllogism] is wrong because of those two [objects of the premise and that which is to be proved]⁵⁴⁷. It is said by the Blessed master:

If the cognition of ‘proof’ and ‘that which is to be proved’ is without an object, cognition-only is not proved by the premise. Now, (if) (the cognition of ‘proof’ and ‘that which is to be proved’) does have an object, there is the fault of erroneous⁵⁴⁸ reasoning. That which is proved by the opponent is not accessible [even] for a yogi.

§12 13, 18-19

tad evaṃ sakalabādhakavaidhuryād abhrāntena pratyakṣena bahirarthasiddher
dr̥ṣṭaviruddhaṃ vijñānādvaitaśāsanam |

SŚP §12 English

Thus, the Vijñānādvaita-teaching is contradicted by perception, because external objects are proved by non-illusory perception on account of all negation having been removed.

§13 13, 20-26

tathṣṭaviruddhaṃ ca, anumānād bahirarthasiddheḥ | tac cedam anumānam – santi
bahirarthāḥ sādhanadūṣaṇaprayogāt iti katham punar ato bhāvadharmino bahirarthasya
sādhanam, katham ca na syāt, asya sadbhāvadharmatve tadvadasiddhatvāpatteḥ;
tadabhāvadharmatve cātas tad abhāvasyaiva siddher viruddhatvopaniṣāt,
tadubhayadharmatve ca vyabhicāraprasaṅgāt iti cet; na;
pratyekobhayadharmavikalpavikalasyaivāsyābhyanujñānāt | katham evaṃ tasya
bahirarthabhāvaṃ praty eva liṅgatvaṃ na tadabhāvam praty apīti cet; na; ⁵⁴⁹tatraiva
tasyāvinābhāvaniyamāt | dharmidharmasyāpi kṛtakatvāder anityatvātau tata⁵⁵⁰ eva

⁵⁴⁶ i.e. the *hetu* (premise) and the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) will both be identical, as they will both be mere *vijñāna* (cognition). There is thus no *hetu* or *sādhya* as they are identical (i.e. there is only *vijñāna*, so they are both merely *vijñāna*), and the *hetu* can thus not be used to prove the *sādhya*.

⁵⁴⁷ i.e. if they do have objects then the *hetu* (premise) in the above inference clearly cannot prove the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved, i.e. that all cognitions are without an object) as the *sādhya* is then not true (seeing as both the *hetu* and the *sādhya* have an object). The existence of these objects thus disproves the *hetu*.

⁵⁴⁸ *vyabhicāradoṣa* i.e. the fault of the presence of the *hetu* (premise) without the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved). I.e. the *hetu* (“because it is a cognition”) is found even when the *sādhya* (cognitions do not have objects) is not, as there is the clearly a cognition which has an object.

⁵⁴⁹ ed. note: “bahirarthasadbhāva eva |”

⁵⁵⁰ ed. note: “avinābhāvaniyamād eva |”

gamakatvopapatteḥ na dharmidharmatvamātreṇa, ⁵⁵¹ekaśākhāprabhavatvādāvapi
tadupanipātenātiprasaṃgāpatteḥ |

ŚŚP §13 English

In the same way it [the Vijñānādvaita-teaching] is contradicted by inference, because external objects are proved by inference. And this is that inference – “external objects exist because there is employment of [arguments that] prove [their existence] and disprove [their non-existence]”. [If it is objected:] Again, how can the proof of external objects which have existence as their characteristic be from this? [It is answered:] And how can it not? [If the Vijñānādvaitin then answers that] Because, if its [external objects’] characteristic [is said to be] ‘truly existing’, then the difficulty of being unproved, just like that [external object] [is unproved], [arises for the attribute ‘truly existing’ as well]. And because, if that [external object] has the attribute of ‘non-existence’, there arises a contradiction as only non-existence is proved for them [external objects] from this [external objects having the attribute ‘non-existence’]. Because there is adhering to erroneous reasoning⁵⁵² if their nature is said to be both [existence and non-existence]”. [It is answered:] no, because we accept this [external object] being deprived of determination with respect each one or both of the attributes [existence and non-existence]⁵⁵³.

If it is objected: How can it be thus that that [premise⁵⁵⁴] is the logical mark only with regard to the existence of external objects [but] not also with regard to the non-existence of those [external objects]?⁵⁵⁵ [It is answered:] no. Because of the invariable relation of that [premise] only with regard to that [existence of external objects]. Because, even [in the case of] a substantive and [its] attribute, when [one infers] impermanence etc. from being produced etc.⁵⁵⁶ there occurs convincingness [of the argument] only because of that [invariable relation], and not merely because they are substantive and attribute.⁵⁵⁷ Because [if it were so that this was convincing simply because they are

⁵⁵¹ ed. note: “pakvāni etāni phalāni ekaśākhāprabhavatvāt upayuktaphalavad ity atra |”, i.e. “In [the inference]: These fruits are ripe on account of being grown on the same branch as the fruit that was eaten”.

⁵⁵² The *hetu* is then not invariably related, i.e. it is found also when the *sādhyā* (that which is to be proved) is not found, with the existence of external objects, as it will be found with respect to their non-existence as well, and not only their existence (which is here the *sādhyā*). The *hetu* thus suffers from the fault of *vyabhicāra*.

⁵⁵³ i.e. the Jains would say that in reality the external object cannot be determined as solely existing, nor non-existing, nor both existing and non-existing, but that it both exists and does not exist *sui generis* (*jātyantara*). They thus avoid the faults of these three positions.

⁵⁵⁴ i.e. the *hetu* (premise) in the above inference: “because there is employment of arguments that support (the desired thesis) and refute (the opposite)”

⁵⁵⁵ i.e. why is this (that there is employment of arguments in favor of it and arguments that disprove the opposite) then not also equally true with regard to the non-existence of external objects?

⁵⁵⁶ i.e. that something is impermanent because it is produced

⁵⁵⁷ the point seems to be that even in the case of an attribute of a substantive, here exemplified by impermanent (attribute) and a thing which is produced (substantive), the reason the inference “the thing is impermanent because it is produced” is convincing is not because of the substantive-attribute relation

substantive and attribute] [there would arise] the difficulty of an unwarrantable extension because of the occurrence of that [invariable relation] even in the case of “being grown on one branch etc.”⁵⁵⁸.

§14 + §15 SŚP 14, 1-10

tatra⁵⁵⁹ sādhanam nīlādeḥ saṃvedanatvasamarthanam, dūṣaṇam bahirarthatvaniṣedhanam tayoh prayogaḥ prakāśanam | “nīlādiḥ saṃvedanād avyatiriktaḥ tadvedyatvāt; tatsvarūpavat” ity ādiḥ “na jaḍo nīlādiḥ pratibhāsamānavāt sukhādivat” ity ādiś ca | katham punar asya bahirarthābhāve ‘nupatapatir iti cet; asya⁵⁶⁰ bahirarthaviśeṣatvād eva | na hi tadabhāve tadviśeṣasya saṃbhavaḥ, vṛkṣābhāve śiṃśapābhāvasyaiva pratipatteḥ | nāsau tadviśeṣa āropitarūpatvād iti cet; na; tataḥ sarvaśaktivikalād aniṣṭavad iṣṭasyāpy asiddheḥ | anāropito ‘py ayam bodha eva na bahirartha iti cet; na; pratipādyasya tadbhāvāt | pratipādakasyeti cet; katham tataḥ⁵⁶¹ pratipādasya prakṛtārthasya pratipattiḥ anyabodhād anyasya tadanupapatteḥ | anyathā pratyātmaṃ buddhibhedakalpanāvaiphalyopanipātāt | tasmād arthaviśeṣa evāyam ity upapannam evāto bahirarthavyavasthāpanam⁵⁶² | tataḥ sādḥuktam iṣṭaviruddham vijñānādvaitam iti |

SŚP §14+§15 English

If it is objected: There⁵⁶³, “proof” is establishing the cognitive nature of blue etc.. “Refutation” is the negation of (blue etc.) having the nature of being an external object. “Employment of those two [proof and refutation]” means a statement⁵⁶⁴ [which is as follows] – “Blue etc.. is not separate from the cognition [of it], because it is cognized by that [cognition], just as cognition itself”⁵⁶⁵ and so forth, and “Blue etc. is not inanimate matter, because it is cognized, like happiness etc.”⁵⁶⁶ and so forth. Again, how [can you say that] this [premise] is not found if there is non-existence of external objects?”⁵⁶⁷

between its elements, but because there is an invariable relationship (*avinābhāvaniyama*) between the two, i.e. something which is produced is *always* impermanent.

⁵⁵⁸ i.e. inferring that a given fruit is ripe on the basis that it was grown on the same branch as a fruit known to be ripe grew (Cf. editors note in footnote 551). Here there is no invariable relationship. Just because they were grown on the same branch this does not mean that they must both be ripe. There is no invariable relation (as there is between being produced and impermanent) between growing on the same branch and being ripe.

⁵⁵⁹ ed. note: “sādhanadūṣaṇaprayogāt ity atra |”.

⁵⁶⁰ ed. note: “sādhanadūṣaṇaprayogāt ity asya hetoh |”

⁵⁶¹ ed. note: “pratipādakabodharūpāt |”

⁵⁶² Amended. Printed edition reads: “bahirarthavyavasthānam”. *Bahirarthavyavasthāpanam* is better.

⁵⁶³ i.e. in the *hetu* (premise) *sādhanadūṣaṇaprayogāt* (because there is employment [of arguments] proving it and disproving [the opposite]). This is an alternate, Buddhist commentary to the Jain inference.

⁵⁶⁴ i.e. employing the two here means making statements which makes use of them.

⁵⁶⁵ This is the example of “proof” (*sādhana*) being “employed” (*prayoga*). It affirms the cognitive nature of blue etc.. This is a syllogism: 1) pratijñā (proposition): Blue etc. is not separate from the cognition of blue etc.; 2) hetu (premise): because blue etc. is cognized by the cognition of blue etc.; 3) udāharāṇa (example): just like cognition itself.

⁵⁶⁶ This is the example of “refutation” (*dūṣaṇa*) being “employed” (*prayoga*). It refutes the external, material nature of blue etc.. This is a syllogism: 1) pratijñā (proposition): Blue etc. is not inanimate matter;

[It is answered:] [It is] indeed [not found if there are no external objects] on account of this [premise] being a specific external object. For [the existence] of a particular of those [external objects] is not possible if those [external objects] do not exist. Because there is acknowledgement of the non-existence of the Śiṃśapa-tree if trees [in general] do not exist⁵⁶⁸.

If it is objected: It is not so that that [premise] is a particular of those [external objects], because [its] form is ⁵⁶⁹superimposed. [It is answered] no; because then even that which is desired is unproved along with that which is not desired, on account of it [the premise] being destitute of all power⁵⁷⁰.

If it is objected: “this [premise], even though it is not superimposed, is not an external object. It is only cognition.” [It is answered] no; because [it] exists as that [external object] to [the person] to whom it is addressed⁵⁷¹.

If it is objected: [the premise has the nature of only cognition] to [the person] addressing [the one who is addressed]. [It is answered:] How is there cognition of the thing under consideration⁵⁷² for the one addressed from that [which has being the cognition of the person addressing as its nature]? Because that [cognition of the thing under consideration] is not found for another from another’s cognition.⁵⁷³ Because

2) *hetu* (premise): because blue etc. is cognized; 3) *udāharaṇa* (example): just like happiness etc. is cognized.

⁵⁶⁷ i.e. how can the Jains say that this premise (“on account of employment of proof and refutation”) is not found if there are no external objects, when it has been shown here that it can indeed be found if interpreted in the way presented above? The objection here raised on behalf of the Vijñānavādin is in the form of a commentary to Vidyānandin’s syllogism. It offers an alternate interpretation of the words used in the syllogism and tries to show that when interpreted in this (i.e. according to the Vijñānavādin, the correct-) way, the *hetu* is indeed valid with respect to the non-existence of external objects.

⁵⁶⁸ i.e. the *hetu* (premise) is a specific external thing. If external things do not exist, the *hetu* cannot exist. Thus the *hetu* cannot be found if external objects do not exist, just as the Śiṃśapa-tree cannot exist if trees do not exist.

⁵⁶⁹ *Āropita* is not found with this meaning in the MMW or in Edgertons Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary. Grimes (1996), in his “A concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy”, gives the meanings “appearance” and “assumed”. The MMW, however, gives the meaning “superimposition” for *āropa*. *Adhyāropa* is an important term in Advaita Vedānta which describes the superimposition of the world on brahman, which alone really exists, due to ignorance, and is usually illustrated by the well known example of the rope appearing as a serpent (Kharwandikar 2004a: 354). While discussing theories of error, Radhakrishnan (1966b) writes: “The Sautrāntikas hold that in error there is a wrong superimposition (*āropa*) of something which is a form of cognition” (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 131) *Āropita* is here used in the same way as *āropa*, the point here being that the *hetu* (premise) is wrongly conceived of as an external object, when it is in fact mere cognition. This superimposition is due to ignorance.

⁵⁷⁰ i.e. if the *hetu* (premise) is superimposed and not ultimately real, then it is powerless to prove the position of the Vijñānavādin. That which one desires to prove will be as unproved as that which one does not desire to prove.

⁵⁷¹ the gerundive *pratipādyā*, which literally means “to be propounded, treated, discussed etc.”, seems here to refer to a person to whom the *hetu* (premise) is addressed, i.e. the person to whom it is propounded or the person with whom the matter is discussed. The *hetu* in a syllogistic inference, which is *parārthānumāna* (inference for the sake of another), is an external object to the person addressed.

⁵⁷² i.e. in this case the *hetu* (premise) being discussed.

⁵⁷³ i.e. how can the one addressed then have any cognition of the *hetu* (premise), if the *hetu* only has the nature of being the cognition of the one who addresses? A person cannot cognize something from the cognition of another. If it is to be cognized by the one being addressed, it must be an external object.

otherwise the uselessness of positing a separate consciousness for each and every soul [would] occur.⁵⁷⁴

Therefore it is indeed found that this [premise] is nothing other than a particular [external] object. From this the establishing of the [existence of] external objects [is accomplished]. Therefore it is said by the saints: The Vijñānādvaita is contradicted by inference.

[iti vijñānādvaitaśāsanaparīkṣā]

Thus is the investigation of the Vijñānādvaita-teaching.

[Citrādvaitaśāsanaparīkṣā]

Investigation of the Citrādvaita-teaching.

SŚP §16 14, 13

etena citrādvaitam apī pratyuktam | tanmate 'pi bahirarthāpahnāvāt |
pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ bahirarthasya ca vyavasthāpitatvād ity alam prasamgena |
sarvathā antaraṅgārthaikāntaśāsanasya dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddhatvāt asatyatvasiddheḥ |

pramāṇābhāvataḥ sarvaṃ vijñānādvaitināṃ vacaḥ |
bhavet pralāpamātratvān nāvadheyam vipāścītām ||

jñānādvaitam na satyam syād dr̥ṣṭeṣṭābhyāṃ virodhataḥ |
na ca tena pratikṣepaḥ syādvādasyeti niścītam ||

SŚP §16 English

Also the Cittādvaita is refuted by this, because there is denial of external objects also in their doctrine. It [Citrādvaita] is not to be adhered to because external objects are established by perception and inference. Because [this] one-sided teaching of interior objects is proved to be untrue on account of being contradicted by perception and inference in every way.

All that is said by the Vijñānādvaitins
is not to be attended to by the wise
because it is only delirious speech

⁵⁷⁴ i.e. if one could cognize anything from the cognition of another it would challenge the contention that each individual has a separate consciousness, which is held to be true by the Vijñānādvaitins (cf. Dharmakīrti's inference of *santānāntarasiddhi* in footnote 503)

and [does not have any] valid means of knowledge [to back it up].

The non-dual cognition cannot be true,
because it is contradicted by perception and inference.

It is settled: “The Syādvāda is not refuted by that [Vijñānādvaita doctrine]”.

Cārvākaśāsanaparīkṣā

Investigation into the Cārvāka-teaching.

SŚP 15, 3-4

athānekārthavādiśāsanānām madhye tāvac cārvākamatam dṛṣṭeṣṭaviruddham | idaṃ hi teṣām abhimatam –⁵⁷⁵

SŚP 15, 3-4 English

Now, among the teachings of the propounders of pluralism⁵⁷⁶, first the Cārvāka-doctrine is contradicted by perception and inference. For this is their doctrine –

[pūrvapakṣa]

The opponents side

SŚP §1 15, 4-7

iha tāvan na kaścit sarvajñaḥ sugatādiṣu sambhavati |

sugato yadi sarvajñaḥ kapilo neti kā pramā |

taūbhau yadi sarvajñau matabhedah katham tayoh || [tattvasaṃ- ślo- 3129]⁵⁷⁷ iti vacanāt

SŚP §1 English

Firstly, concerning the Sugata⁵⁷⁸ etc., in this world no one is omniscient, on account of the saying:

If the Sugata is omniscient, Kapila⁵⁷⁹ is not. What is the basis [for deciding]? If they are both omniscient, why is there difference in their doctrines?

SŚP §2 15, 8-14

⁵⁷⁵ Amended. This opening part is included in the pūrvapakṣa by the editor. It is strictly speaking not part of the pūrvapakṣa (opponent's side) as it states that the Puruṣādvaita is contradicted by perception and inference. It has therefore been separated from the rest of §1 (in which it was included by the editor), which starts the pūrvapakṣa.

⁵⁷⁶ the two schools that have been discussed so far, i.e. the Advaita Vedānta and the Vijñānādvaita have been non-dualistic. Now the pluralistic schools will be discussed, starting with the Cārvāka, more specifically the materialistic school of the Cārvāka as opposed to the skeptical school of the Cārvāka which was to be dealt with in a separate chapter of this text, but which is unfortunately lost. For a discussion of the relationship between the Cārvāka and the Tattvopaplavavāda, see footnote 140.

⁵⁷⁷ Ed. note: “śloko ‘yaṃ pūrvapakṣe vidyate’”. I.e. this verse is also found in the pūrvapakṣa of the discussion on the Cārvāka in the Tattvasaṃgraha of Śantarakṣita, a Buddhist philosopher.

⁵⁷⁸ i.e. the Buddha.

⁵⁷⁹ said to be the founder of Sāṃkhya.

nāpy āgamas tarko vā pramāṇabhūto ‘sti parasparavirodhādidoṣāt; tataḥ kathaṃ dharmo vyavatiṣṭheta | tad uktam –

**tarko ‘pratiṣṭhaḥ śrutayo vibhinnāḥ,
nāsau munir yasya vacaḥ pramāṇam |
dharmasya tattvaṃ nihitaṃ guhāyām,
mahājano yena gataḥ sa panthāḥ || [mahābhārata⁵⁸⁰] iti**

SŚP §2 English

Also, neither tradition nor inference is a valid means of knowledge, because of the fault of being mutually contradictory etc.. How can the dharma⁵⁸¹ be established from those [tradition and inference]? It is said –

Logic has no solid ground and the revelations are contradictory. There is no sage whose words are a valid means of knowledge⁵⁸². The truth of the dharma is laid aside in a cave. The path [for us] is that by which great men⁵⁸³ have gone.

SŚP §3 15, 15-19

tataḥ āptas tu kaścīd devatārūpo gurur bṛhaspatir eva
pratyakṣaprasiddhapṛthivyādītattvopadeśāt | tathā hi – pṛthivyaptejovāyava iti catvāry eva
tattvāni | kāyākārapariṇatebhyas tebhyaḥ⁵⁸⁴ piṣṭodakaguḍaghātākīsaṃyogān
madaśaktivat⁵⁸⁵ snāyulābūdandaṅguṣṭhāṅguliprayatnāc chravaṇaramaṇīyakvaṇitavac ca
tadātmakaṃ caitanyaṃ jāyate | tac ca garbhādimaraṇaparyantaṃ “jīva ātmā” ity ādi
vyapadeśabhāk pravartante | garbhāt pūrvakāle maraṇād uttarakāle ca tadabhāvaḥ |

SŚP §3 English

Therefore⁵⁸⁶ only Bṛhaspati is a guru that has some divine⁵⁸⁷ nature and is an authoritative person, on account of teaching the tattvas, earth etc., that are well known by sensory

⁵⁸⁰ The reference supplied by the editor is here incomplete.

⁵⁸¹ It is hard to say how *dharmā* should here be translated. *Dharma* has many possible translations according to context. It is here used in the sense of “religion”, “truth”, “true religion”, “law” etc.. As *dharmā* as a term is quite well known and often used in English, I have chosen not to translate it here so as not to have to choose one of these terms and exclude the others.

⁵⁸² i.e. no sage is so wise and reliable that his word alone is a good enough reason to assume something to be true. This is a rejection of *āptavacana* (statement of an authoritative person) or *śabda* (verbal testimony) as a *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge).

⁵⁸³ even though *mahājano* (great person) is here in the singular, its meaning is here best rendered in the plural.

⁵⁸⁴ ed. note: ”pṛthivyādibhyaḥ |”

⁵⁸⁵ Amended. The printed edition reads “śuktivān”. This does not fit the rest of the sentence. As this is clearly meant as an example it should be read as “-vat”.

⁵⁸⁶ i.e. from such reflection

perception. [His teaching is] as follows – The elements are only four: earth, water, fire and wind”.

Just as a pleasant sound [arises] from the activity of the strings, the bottle gourd, the staff⁵⁸⁸, the thumb and the fingers, and like that which has the power of intoxication [arises through fermentation⁵⁸⁹] from the combination of flour, water, molasses and *ghātakī*⁵⁹⁰, just so the consciousness, which has those [elements] as its nature, arises from those [elements], which are transformed into the form of the body.⁵⁹¹ And that [consciousness], which has names such as “*jīva*, *ātman*” etc., begins at conception and ends at death. It does not exist in the time preceding conception, nor in the time after death.

SŚP §4 15, 20-16, 9

tataḥ parlokino ‘bhāvaḥ | paralokino ‘bhāvāt paralokasyāpy abhāvaḥ | paralokābhāve
tallokasukhānubhavanārtham aihikasukhavimukhā ḍimbhikā iva
dambhapralambhanādhināḥ śarīrārthavyayavidhānena bahudhā mudhāvata kleśam
aśnuvate | tathaiivoktam –

yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ |
bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamaṇaṃ kutaḥ ||
agnihotraṃ trayo vedāḥ⁵⁹² tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmaguṇṭhanam |
buddhipauruṣahīnānāṃ jīvikti bṛhaspatiḥ⁵⁹³ ||

strīmudrām makaradhvajasya mahatīm nirvāṇasaṃpatkarīm
ye mohād avadhīrayanti kudhiyo mithyāsukhānveṣiṇaḥ |

⁵⁸⁷ seeing as Cārvāka is a purely materialistic and atheistic philosophy the word “divine” should not be taken literally. The meaning is rather that only he is a worthy teacher.

⁵⁸⁸ the three first members of this compound describe the parts of a musical instrument.

⁵⁸⁹ Kharwandikar (2004b) gives two examples of how the consciousness is said to arise in Cārvāka philosophy (without giving any reference to where these examples are taken from): “Consciousness in the body arises just as red color which is absent from betel leaf, areca-nut, lime and catechu individually, makes its appearance when those ingredients are combined proportionately. Similarly *molasses which by itself is not intoxicating becomes so by fermentation*” (Kharwandikar 2004b: 187, my italics). The example here seems to be a variant of the second example given by Kharwandikar.

⁵⁹⁰ the only information in the MMW under *ghātakī* is “made of the Ghātaka (vadhaka) wood”. Vadhaka is explained as “a partic. sort of reed or rush”. It thus clearly refers to some kind of plant product, but I have not been able to find out anything more specific about it. I have therefore chosen not to translate it and simply render it as *ghātakī*.

⁵⁹¹ i.e. just like the parts in these examples together create something that is not found in any of them, i.e. one cannot make pleasant music by means of only the thumb or only the strings, but together, when they are combined, they can, just so the tattvas combine and thus make up the consciousness (which is not found in any one of them alone. The point here is that the consciousness is not a primary principle. It is not found among the *tattvas*, but is a product of the basic elements (earth etc.).

⁵⁹² ed. note: “*ṛkyajusāmākhyāḥ |*”

⁵⁹³ Ed. note: “*uddhṛtam idam – sarvadarśanasam- cārvā- pr- 2, 4 |*”. I.e. these two verses are also found in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha (1924: 2, 4; 1914: 2, 4), a 14th century text (Cowell 1914: vii). The source of the verses is unidentified.

**te tenaiva nihatyā nirdayataraṃ bhasmīkṛtā luṅṅhitāḥ
kecit pañcaśikhīkṛtā hi jaṭinaḥ kāpālikāś cāpare** || [sṛṅgāraśataka ślo- 79]

anyac ca

**payodharabharālasāḥ smaraviḥhūrṇitārdreksaṇāḥ
kvacin malayapañcamoccaritagītajhaṅkāriṇīḥ |
vihāya ramaṇīr amūraparamokṣasaukhyārthinām
aho jaḍimaḍiṇḍimo viphalabhaṅḍapākhaṅḍinām** ||⁵⁹⁴ [source not found] iti

SŚP §4 English

Therefore, one transmigrating to the other world⁵⁹⁵ does not exist. On account of the non-existence of [anyone] transmigrating to the other world, the other world also does not exist. Since the other world does not exist, those that turn away from the pleasures of this world for the purpose of experiencing the pleasures of that [other] world, are subject to fraud and deceit, like a new born child⁵⁹⁶. They experience much pointless anguish by expending [their] bodies⁵⁹⁷ and [their] wealth⁵⁹⁸. Thus it is said:

As long as one lives, one must live with pleasure.

One who is not within the range of death does not exist.

How can there be [any] return of a person that has been reduced to ashes?

Bṛhaspati [says]: [To perform] the sacrifice to Agni, [to recite] the three Vedas,
[to carry] the three staffs [of wandering religious ascetics]
and the smearing of [oneself] with ashes,
this is the livelihood of those who are deficient with respect to intellect and manhood.⁵⁹⁹

Those who are fools, who, on account of delusion,
search for false happiness and disregard the great joy of women,
which belongs to the god of love⁶⁰⁰ and
which causes the enjoyment of the greatest pleasure⁶⁰¹.

⁵⁹⁴ ed. note: "uddhṛtam idam – yaśastilake uttarārdhe, pr- 252 |"

⁵⁹⁵ *paralokin*. The suffix *-in* is added to nouns, forming adjectives with the sense of possession or being characterized by, such as *dhanin* (from *dhana*), "possessing wealth", and *yogin* (from *yoga*), "a devotee of yoga". Here *paralokin* (from *paraloka*) is best rendered as "one translating to the other world".

⁵⁹⁶ the meaning seems to be that a young child is very easy to trick. Thus people who give up the pleasures of worldly life for rewards in the other world are compared to children as they are gullible.

⁵⁹⁷ referring to ascetism etc..

⁵⁹⁸ offering to the gods, donating to temples etc..

⁵⁹⁹ i.e. this is a mode of life for those that cannot or do not want to work (like real men do).

⁶⁰⁰ lit. 'he whose banner is that of a sea-creature'

⁶⁰¹ Nirvāṇa usually means extinguishing, i.e. liberation, and is probably here used deliberately as there is no liberation according to the Cārvāka. There is only enjoyment of the pleasures of the senses.

Having been violently stricken by that [delusion],
some ascetics are made ashy⁶⁰², some lame⁶⁰³,
some have five tufts of hair⁶⁰⁴, and others carry a human skull⁶⁰⁵.

Moreover:

Having abandoned the beautiful women,
who are tired because of the weight of their breasts,
whose eyes are moist and roll [as a sign of] sexual love,
who sometimes hum a song that rises up in the fifth [note]
and [follows] the *malaya* [measure]⁶⁰⁶,
alas, the senselessness of [those] useless buffoons,
who long for the enjoyment of supreme liberation, [causes] great noise.

[uttarapakṣa]

The refutation

SŚP §5 16, 11-13

tad etac cārvākamataṃ tāvad dr̥ṣṭaviruddham, pratyakṣeṇa pṛthivyādīnāṃ parasparam
upādānopādeyabhāvadārśanāt, teṣāṃ sarvathā tattvāntaratvasya pakṣasya
pratyakṣavirodhasiddheḥ | teṣāṃ parasparam upādānopādeyabhāve ‘pi tattvāntaratve
bījāder aṅkurāder api tattvāntaraprasaṅgāt |

SŚP §5 English

This very Cārvāka doctrine is firstly contradicted by perception on account of seeing, by means of sensory perception, that those [earth etc.] are each other’s material cause and effect.⁶⁰⁷ Because it is proved that the view that those [earth etc.] are separate tattvas is

⁶⁰² probably refers to the practice of covering one’s self with ashes.

⁶⁰³ i.e. in some way crippled as a consequence of ascetic practice?

⁶⁰⁴ Sāṃkhya philosophers.

⁶⁰⁵ a kind of śaiva-ascetic.

⁶⁰⁶ *Malaya* is the name of a type of measure (in music), i.e. a segment of time defined as a given number of beats of a given duration, such as 4/4 etc..

⁶⁰⁷ As I understand Tatia (in his introduction), he seems to understand this differently. The point, according to him, seems to be that the material cause (here the four elements) and the effect (here consciousness) must be mutually reducible to each other. The material cause cannot produce something which is radically different from itself. One can for example make a pot out of clay. If the pot is broken, it will again become clay. In other words, just as the effect is made from the cause, just so it must be possible to get the effect from the cause. But this kind of relationship is not possible between the four elements and consciousness,

contradicted by sensory perception. Because, if those [earth etc..] are separate tattvas even though they are each other's material cause and effect, [then there would be] adhering to even the seed etc. and the sprout etc., [which are each other's cause and effect], being separate tattvas.

SŚP §6 16, 14-16

na ca teṣāṃ parasparam upādānopādeyabhāvadarśanam asiddham,
 pṛthivyātmakacandrakāntasūryakāntakāṣṭhaviśeṣebhyo⁶⁰⁸ jalānalayor utpatteh |
 pradīpajalaviśeṣābhyāṃ pṛthvirūpāñjanamuktāphalayoh, pṛthvīviśeṣatālavṛntāder vāyoh
 sākṣād vīkṣaṇāt, anyathā dṛṣṭāpalāpapasamgāt |

SŚP §6 English

And it is not so that seeing those [earth etc.] being each other's material cause and effect is not proved, on account of the arising of water and fire [respectively] from the two crystals⁶⁰⁹, the *candrakānta* and *sūryakānta*, [both of which] have the nature of earth. Because collyrium⁶¹⁰ is the fruit of a lamp⁶¹¹ and pearls are the fruit of special water⁶¹², [both of which, i.e. collyrium and pearls,] have the nature of earth, and because wind⁶¹³ is seen from [using] a palm leaf fan, which has the nature of earth.⁶¹⁴ Otherwise, there would be adhering to a denial of that which is seen.⁶¹⁵

as they are not mutually reducible to each other. Earth, fire, water and wind are insentient. How then can they produce sentience? According to the Jain, this reciprocity can be seen, by means of sensory perception, to belong to earth etc., i.e. it is seen that this is how the material world functions. Thus something else must be the cause of consciousness.

Tatia (1964:35) writes: “The nature of consciousness is radically different from matter and so it cannot be the product of material elements. The effect must be essentially homogeneous with the cause and reducible to the latter in turn. The law of causality demands that the cause and its effect must be mutually reducible”. To this he adds in a footnote: “Vidyānanda cites examples of such reducibility in the following passage: na ca teṣāṃ parasparam upādānopādeya-bhāva-darśanam asiddham, pṛthivyātmaka-candrakānta-sūryakānta-kāṣṭha-viśeṣebhyo jalānalayor utpatteh.” (1964: 35, footnote 1). He does not attempt to explain how the example here cited illustrates such reducibility, and it is difficult to see how this sentence can be interpreted in such a way. The point seems rather to be that earth etc. cannot be separate *tattvas* as they have a mutual cause-effect relationship. *Tattvas* cannot be generated (this is a point taken for granted in this argument).

⁶⁰⁸ ed. note: “maṇibhyah |”

⁶⁰⁹ Here *candrakānta* and *sūryakānta* (moon-stone and sun-stone respectively) are kinds of *kāṣṭhaviśeṣa*, lit. “special and excellent”. *Kāṣṭhaviśeṣa* is not found in the MMW, but is glossed by the editor as *maṇi* (jewel or crystal). As both *candrakānta* and *sūryakānta* are stones, this seems to be a reasonable interpretation. *Kāṣṭha* usually means “wood”, but this meaning seems to make no sense here, as *candrakānta* and *sūryakānta* are both stones. I have thus interpreted *kāṣṭhaviśeṣa* as meaning crystal.

⁶¹⁰ a black pigment which is made from soot. It is applied around the eyes as makeup.

⁶¹¹ i.e. fire

⁶¹² i.e. on entering a shell.

⁶¹³ i.e. air

⁶¹⁴ this is simply a collection of examples of the material elements being each other's material cause and effect. The point Vidyānandin is making is that they can thus not be *tattvas*.

⁶¹⁵ i.e. claiming that this mutual cause effect relationship is not proved (Cf. the starting sentence of the paragraph, *na ca teṣāṃ parasparam upādānopādeyabhāvadarśanam asiddham*) would be a denial of that which is readily perceptible to everyone.

SŚP §7 16, 17-21

tathā jīvo nāstīty abhimatam api dr̥ṣṭaviruddham |
sukhaduḥkhaharṣaviṣādādyanekapariṇāmātmakasya ātmatattvasya
svasaṃvedanapratyakṣeṇa nirbādham anubhāvāt hetubhir vinaiva astitvasya siddheḥ |

tasya hi hetur vācyo yasmin momuhyate matir nṛṇām |
na hi darpaṇādeyaḥ⁶¹⁶ karakaṅkaṇadarśanāya buddhaiḥ || [source not found] iti vacanāt

SŚP §7 English

In the same way also the accepted [position] [of the Cārvāka], [i.e.] that the soul does not exist, is contradicted by perception. Because the nature of the soul, whose nature is that of many modes such as pleasure, pain, joy, despair etc., is experienced by means of the perception [known as] self-cognition⁶¹⁷. Because [its] existence is proved even without a logical reason. Because of the saying:

That with respect to which the intellect of men is bewildered,
the logical reason of that is to be declared.

For a mirror is not to be taken up by the wise
for the purpose of seeing the bracelet on [their own] hands.⁶¹⁸

SŚP §8 16, 22-26

na ca jīvasya jñānātmano ‘svasaṃvedanam⁶¹⁹ asiddham, jñānasya asvasaṃviditatve⁶²⁰
cābhāvāpatter grāhakābhāvāt | jñānāntareṇa grahaṇe, tasyāpi tadanantareṇa
grahaṇakalpanāyām anavasthohanipātāt⁶²¹ tadkalpanāyām tathā vaktum aśakeḥ | na
cānumānena tadgrahaṇam, tadanupagamāt⁶²² pramāṇasaṃkhyāvyādhātāc ca | tataḥ
svasaṃvedanam eṣitavyam | tatra ca svasaṃvedanena jīvasya
bhokṛtvāsādhāraṇadharmabhṛtaḥ sāksātkaraṇād dr̥ṣṭaviruddham idaṃ bārhaspatyam
matam |

SŚP §8 English

⁶¹⁶ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “darpaṇa ādeyaḥ”. It is preferable to read it as a compound, as *darpaṇa* would otherwise have to be read as a vocative.

⁶¹⁷ Cf. SŚP 6, 4 and 12, 4-7 for how this term is used with respect to the Puruṣādvaita and Vijñānādvaita.

⁶¹⁸ i.e. when one has the un-obstructed experience of something, it does not require proof in the form of a logical reason, just like one does not need a mirror to see the bracelets on one’s own hands.

⁶¹⁹ Amended. The printed edition reads “jñānātmanaḥ svasaṃviditatve”. This reading does not fit the context and the following argumentation, which clearly requires a negation.

⁶²⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads “svasaṃviditatve”. The argument clearly needs this to be negated.

⁶²¹ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “tadkalpanāyām”. This does not make any sense as the point is clearly to show the consequences of the Cārvāka position, and not the consequences of rejecting it.

⁶²² ed. note: “anumānābhyupagamāt |”

And it is not so that self-cognition of the soul, which has cognition as its nature, is not proved, because, if cognition is not self-cognized, the result is the non-existence of [cognition], on account of there being no grasper⁶²³ [of the cognition itself]. Because it is found that it is not established if the grasping is performed by another cognition, since [it requires] the postulation of the grasping of that [cognition which is equally uncognized] by an adjoining [cognition], [and so on, *ad infinitum*]⁶²⁴. Because then, if that [other cognition cognizing the initial cognition] is proposed, one is not able to speak [about any object]⁶²⁵. And it is not so that the grasping of that [initial cognition] is [done] by means of inference, for acceptance of that [inference] was left out from the enumeration of *pramāṇas*.⁶²⁶ Therefore, the self-cognition [of cognition] must be accepted.⁶²⁷ And in that case the doctrine of the followers of Bṛaspati is contradicted by sensory perception, on account of there being direct perception of the soul, which has the state of being the experiencer as [its] uncommon characteristic⁶²⁸, by means of self-cognition.

SŚP §9 16, 27-17, 2

nāsiddhaṃ bhokṛtvasyāsādhāraṇatvaṃ, acetanasya śarīrādes tadanupapatteḥ | na hy acetanasya śarīrasya bhokṛtvam upapadyate, śarīrasya bhogādhiṣṭhānatvena prasiddhaḥ, anyathā mṛtakasyāpi bhokṛtvaprasaṃgāt | nāpi karaṇagrāmasya⁶²⁹; tasya bhogopabhogakaraṇatvāt | na ca śabdādiviśayasya; bhogyatvena tasya pratīteḥ | tato bhokṛtvam ātmany aveti tadapalāpino lokāyatikasya bhokṛtvam kvāpi na vyavasthām āstighnuvīta |

SŚP §9 English

And it is not so that being the experiencer is not proved to be the uncommon [characteristic of the soul], because the inanimate, the body etc., having that [state of being the experiencer] is not found.⁶³⁰ For it is not found that the inanimate body is the experiencer. It is well known because the body is the abode for [the souls] experience. Because otherwise [there would be] adherence to even a corpse being the experiencer.

⁶²³ i.e. cognizer

⁶²⁴ i.e. postulating another cognition as the grasper of the initial cognition would only lead to infinite regress, as this cognition would require yet another cognition etc. etc..

⁶²⁵ i.e. this would lead to no object ever being cognized as the cognition of the object would remain uncognized due to infinite regress. As no object could ever be cognized, one could never speak of any objects, as this presupposes the cognition of objects.

⁶²⁶ the materialistic Cārvāka only accept one *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge), namely *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception). Thus they cannot take recourse to inference (*anumāna*) to solve this problem, as they do not accept inference as a valid means of knowledge.

⁶²⁷ i.e. the Cārvāka must accept that cognition cognizes itself, as neither another cognition nor inference can account for its cognition.

⁶²⁸ i.e. this is a specific quality of the soul which is not found in other things.

⁶²⁹ ed. note: "indriyasamūhasya |"

⁶³⁰ the materialist Cārvāka cannot deny that being the experiencer is the uncommon characteristic (i.e. a characteristic not shared with other kinds of phenomena) of the soul, as it cannot be shown that any inanimate thing, such as the body and so forth, has this characteristic.

And it is also not [found that] the group of instruments⁶³¹ [is the experiencer], because it [the group of instruments] is the instrument for experiencing the experiencing. And it is also not [found that] the sense objects, sound etc., [are the experiencer], because they are seen to be that which is to be experienced [by the soul].⁶³² “Because of that, the state of being the experience is only in the soul”. The state of being the experiencer cannot ascend to establishment in any [other substance] for the Lokāyatika⁶³³ who denies that [the state of being the experiencer in the soul].

SŚP §10 17, 3-13

nanu pṛthivyādisamudayaśārīrakāryānvayini garbhādimaraṇaparyante caitanye sarvacetanāviśeṣavyāpini bhokṛtvam saṃbhavati, śārīrādivilakṣaṇatvāt tasyeti cet; tad evātmadravyam astu, janmanaḥ pūrvam maraṇād ūrdhvam api tasya sadbhāvopapatteḥ | vivādāpannam caitanyam anādy anantaṃ pṛthivyādisamudayaśārīrendriyaviṣayebhyo ‘tyantavilakṣaṇasyānyathānupapatteḥ | na hi tatkāryam tato ‘tyantavilakṣaṇam asti, rūpādisamanvayāt | caitanyasyāpi sattvādisamanvayān nātyantavilakṣaṇatvam iti cet; na; tattvabhede ‘pi tasya⁶³⁴ bhāvāt pṛthivyādīnām abhedāpatteḥ | pṛthivyāditattvabhedaṇām ekavikārisamanvayābhāvād bheda eva keṣaṃcit⁶³⁵ prāgabhāvādibhedavat; kim idānīm caitanyabhūtayor ekavikārisamanvayo ‘sti yena tattvāntaratvena bhedo na syāt, tasmād ekavikārisamanvayāsattvam vilakṣanyam, tad eva ca tattvāntaratvam ity anādyanantarām caitanasya sādhatyānī anādyanantatvena prasiddhaḥ so ‘yam ātmā harṣaviśādādyane kākāravivartaḥ pratyātmavedanīyaḥ pratiśārīram bhedaḥ bhedaḥ ātmako ‘pratyākhyānārhaḥ pratikṣipantam ātmanam pratibodhatyānī kṛtam prayāsenā | tataś cārvākamataṃ dṛṣṭaviruddham iti siddham |

SŚP §10 English

If it is objected: Certainly, the state of being the experiencer is contained in the consciousness, which is connected [to the body] as the effect of the body which [in turn] is a compound of earth etc.; which begins at conception and ends at death; and which pervades all conscious beings, on account of that [consciousness] being characteristically

⁶³¹ i.e. the senses

⁶³² pred. instr. construction. Though the Sanskrit here has *viśaya* (sense object) in the singular this is best rendered into the plural in English.

⁶³³ Lokāyata is another name for the Cārvāka. According to Kharwandikar (2004b) there are several proposed interpretations of what the word *loka* here refers to and hence several interpretations of what the name Lokāyata means: 1) *loka* means “the world”, *āyata* means “based on”. Thus Lokāyata is the view based on the affairs of the world; 2) *loka* means ‘common people’. Lokāyata is thus “the view which is conformably agreeable to common people”; 3) *loka* means “sense object”, and Lokāyata thus means “the view based on the sense objects” (185).

⁶³⁴ ed. note: “sattvādisamanvayasya |”

⁶³⁵ ed. note: “naiyāyikānām |”

different from the body.⁶³⁶ [It is answered:] [then] that [consciousness] must be the soul-substance, because the existence of that [consciousness] is found also before birth and after death. The consciousness that has entered into the dispute is without beginning and without end, because otherwise one would not find that [the consciousness] is completely different⁶³⁷ from the objects, the senses and the body, which is a compound of earth etc..⁶³⁸

For the effect of those [earth etc.] is not completely different from those [earth etc.], on account of harmony⁶³⁹ [between them] with respect to [their characteristics] [such as] color etc..⁶⁴⁰

If it is objected: Also consciousness [being the product of earth etc.] is not completely different [from earth etc.], because there is harmony [between them] with respect to [the characteristic of] existence etc..⁶⁴¹ [It is answered:] no, because [then there would] be non-difference of [the tattvas] earth etc. on account of that [harmony with respect to existence] being [present] even in the different tattvas.⁶⁴² [But the Cārvākas hold that]⁶⁴³ there is only difference [between the tattvas, earth etc.] because the different tattvas, earth etc., do not have harmony of a single variable [characteristic]⁶⁴⁴, just like the

⁶³⁶ i.e. so the fault raised against the body being the experiencer (that then even a dead body would experience) does not apply, as the consciousness and the body are not identical.

⁶³⁷ the phrasing “completely different” (*atyantavailakṣaṇa*) is curious, as the view of complete difference, in the strictest sense, would be incompatible with the *anekāntavāda*. Postulating absolute difference would be an *ekānta* (one-sided) view. It should here be noted that Vidyānandin does not use the phrase *sarvathā bhīma*, which he does when referring to *ekānta* views, to express this difference. *Vailakṣaṇa* is derived from *vilakṣaṇa* (having different characteristic marks). It thus refers to possessing different characteristics, not an absolute difference as envisioned in *ekānta* views (such as the difference accepted by the Vaiśeṣika).

⁶³⁸ This is a syllogism: 1) Pratiṅṅā (proposition): The consciousness in dispute exists before birth and after death; 2) hetu (premise): because otherwise it would not be found to be completely different from the objects, senses and the body, which is a compound of earth etc. (i.e. the material elements).

The contention seems to be that the consciousness must be eternal if it is to be different from the body etc., which is made up of the material elements.

⁶³⁹ according to the MMW *samanvaya* (from *sam + anu + i*) means “regular succession or order”, “connected sequence or consequence”. “conjunction” or “mutual or immediate connection”. None of these meanings fit the context. According to Grimes (1996) *samanvaya* means “harmony”. This meaning is adopted here.

⁶⁴⁰ i.e. the some characteristics of the cause are found in the effect, thus they are not completely different.

⁶⁴¹ i.e. the Cārvāka might argue that they are in fact not completely different, as they both share the quality “existence”.

⁶⁴² i.e. this objection is rejected because “existence” is regarded to be a too general characteristic to apply in this context. Even the *tattvas* accepted by the Cārvāka share this characteristic, and as a result the materialist Cārvāka would be advocating the non-difference between the *tattvas* (earth etc.).

⁶⁴³ The sentence *prthivyādītattvabhedaṅām ekavikārisamanvayābhāvād bheda eva keṣaṃcit prāgabdhāvādibhedavat*; is the opinion held by the Cārvāka, though it is not marked as such in any of the usual ways of doing so, i.e. as an objection (by means of *iti cet*) or by the locative. It nevertheless clearly seems to intend to express a Cārvāka opinion, as it is not a Jain opinion that earth etc. do not have single variable characteristic in common, cf. §§5-6 above where Vidyānandin shows that earth etc. are each others cause and effect. As argued above in the present paragraph (*na hi tatkāryaṃ tato 'tyantavailakṣaṇam asti, rūpādisamanvayāt*), this would entail that they do indeed have some characteristics in common as the cause and its effect cannot be completely different.

⁶⁴⁴ *ekavikārisamanvaya*. The term *ekavikārin* is curious. *Vikāra* (from *vi + kṛ*), according to the MMW, means “change of form or nature”, “transformation”, “modification”, “change” etc.. *Vikārin* thus means “liable to change”, “changeable”, “undergoing change”, “inconstant”, “variable” etc., but is also found meaning simply “change” or “alteration” (compounded with the suffix *-iva*). As the argument here revolves around characteristics, the term *ekavikārin* is here interpreted to refer to such characteristics. Thus the

different [kinds of non-existence], previous non-existence etc.⁶⁴⁵, [posited by] some [i.e. the naiyāyikas] [do not have harmony of a single variable characteristic]. [Thus it is asked] Now, do consciousness and the elements [earth etc.] have harmony of a single variable [characteristic], by which⁶⁴⁶ the difference would not be as that [which the Cārvāka accept] between different tattvas?⁶⁴⁷ Therefore⁶⁴⁸ there is absolute difference, which is the absence of having harmony of a single variable [characteristic], [between consciousness and the material elements].

Indeed, that [difference found between consciousness and the material elements] has “different-tattva-ness”⁶⁴⁹. Thus it is proved that the consciousness is beginningless and endless. Thus that very soul, which is well known as beginningless and endless, which has manifold modifications such as joy, despair etc., experienced by every living being, [specific] to each body, has a nature that is both different and non-different with respect to the body, is not deserving of refutation and awakens the self that rejects it⁶⁵⁰. Enough with [this] effort [to establish the existence of the soul by means of sensory perception]! Therefore it is proved that the Cārvāka-doctrine is contradicted by perception.

SŚP §11 17, 14-18

etena tadīṣṭaviruddhaṃ ca siddhaṃ, anādyanantasyātmanaḥ sādhitatvāt,
pratiṣedhagaṇakalpanādibhis tasya sādhaṣyamāṇatvāc ca | tad uktam –

⁶⁵¹pratiṣedhagaṇakalpanāśuddhapadānekasaṃmatījinoktaiḥ |
nirbādhalakṣaṇārthair liṅgair api bhāvyaṭe bhāvaḥ⁶⁵² || [source not found] iti

SŚP §11 English

By this it is also proven that that [Cārvāka doctrine] is contradicted by inference, because the beginningless and endless soul is proved [to exist], and because there will be proving

phrase *ekavikārisamanvaya* is here interpreted as meaning “having even one variable characteristic in common”.

⁶⁴⁵ the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika distinguish between different kinds of non-existence (*abhāva*), such as: *prāgabhāva*: the non-existence of an object before it comes into existence (i.e. such as the absence of the pot in the clay before the pot is produced); *pradhvaṃsābhāva*: non-existence in consequence of annihilation; *anyonyābhāva*: one object not being another (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 219). Various philosophers have classified them differently, the details of which are not important here (cf. Radhakrishnan 1966b: 219-221 for a concise exposition of this).

⁶⁴⁶ i.e. if they did have harmony of a single variable characteristic (*ekavikārisamanvaya*).

⁶⁴⁷ i.e. so that, having *ekavikārisamanvaya* (at least one single variable quality in common), the difference between them would not be so total as that between different tattvas. This is a rhetorical question.

⁶⁴⁸ i.e. since the answer to the preceding question is “no”.

⁶⁴⁹ i.e. it has the nature of the difference between the different tattvas, i.e. absolute difference.

⁶⁵⁰ the point here seems to be that it is because the soul exists that one is able to object against its existence, as it is the cognizer of all cognitions and the basis of all thought and reflection. Thus even the Cārvāka, who denies its existence, owes his ability to do so to its existence.

⁶⁵¹ ed. note: ”pratiṣedhaś ca gaṇakalpanaṃ ca śuddhapadaś ca anekasaṃmatīś ca jinoktiś ca taiḥ |”

⁶⁵² ed. note: “jīvaḥ |”

of that [beginningless and endless soul] by means of negation, secondary usage etc.. It is said –

The soul is shown to exist even by [these] un-negated logical marks: negation⁶⁵³, figurative usage [of words]⁶⁵⁴, uncompounded words⁶⁵⁵, the agreement of many⁶⁵⁶, the word of the Jinas⁶⁵⁷.

SŚP §12 17, 19-21

tad yathā – “nāsti jīvaḥ” iti pratiṣedhavadānam eva jīvasya mukhyavṛtṭyā astitvaṃ sūcayati, nirūpākhyeṣu⁶⁵⁸ vidhipratiṣedhānupapatteḥ | yathā – “nāstīha ghaṭaḥ” iti pratiṣedho deśāntare ghaṭāstitvaṃ prakāśayati tathā svarūpādicatuṣṭayena sata eva jīvasya pararūpādicatuṣṭayena nāstitvaṃ ghaṭate nānyathā |

SŚP §12 English

It is as follows – even the statement of negation “The soul does not exist” primarily⁶⁵⁹ reveals the existence of the soul. Because affirmation or negation with respect to [completely] non-existent⁶⁶⁰ [things] is not found. Just as the negation “there is no pot here” reveals the existence of a pot in another place⁶⁶¹, just so one reaches the existence of the soul by means of the fourfold own nature etc.⁶⁶² and the non-existence (of the soul) by means of the fourfold other-nature etc..⁶⁶³ It is not otherwise.

⁶⁵³ cf. §12 and §13 below

⁶⁵⁴ cf. §14 below

⁶⁵⁵ *Sudhhapada*. *Suddha* means “clear”, “pure”, “simple” etc.. Here it refers to uncompounded words. Cf. §15 below

⁶⁵⁶ cf. §16 below

⁶⁵⁷ cf. §16 below

⁶⁵⁸ ed. note: “nirūpeṣu tuccheṣu |”, i.e. *nirūpa* here means *tuccha* (empty).

⁶⁵⁹ *mukhyavṛtṭya* here seems best read as an adverb, in the sense that the negating statement “the soul does not exist” *presupposes* the existence of the soul, i.e. the sentence *primarily* indicates the existence of a soul as it presupposes that there is such a thing as a soul that is negated or denied. *Mukhyavṛtṭya* could also be read as an instrumental, “...reveals the existence of the soul by means of the primary meaning [of words]”. The sense is the same, though the first option seems preferable.

⁶⁶⁰ According to the MMW *nirūpākhyā* is wrong for *nirupākhyā*, which means “destitute of all qualification”, “unreal”, “false”, “non-existent” etc.. Cf. ed. note to *nirūpākhyeṣu* in footnote 658.

⁶⁶¹ i.e. when one says “there is no pot” one does not mean that there does not exist any such thing as a pot. What one means is that there is no pot in the place one is referring to.

⁶⁶² i.e. *svadravya* (own-substance), *svakṣetra* (own location), *svakāla* (own time) and *svabhāva* (own state). Cf. footnote to translation of *pararūpa* (other-nature) below and the chapter on the *anekāntavāda*.

⁶⁶³ i.e. *paradravya* (other substance), *parakṣetra* (other location), *parakāla* (other time) and *parabhāva* (other state). Cf. Chapter 2. Refers to the *syādvāda*, more specifically to four characteristics in which a thing is said to not exist, and the four ways in which a thing is said to exist. If the pot exists in a certain place x, it exists as its *svarūpa*, i.e. *svadravya* etc., there. Simultaneously it does not exist there as *pararūpa*, i.e. as *paradravya* etc.. In other words, it does not exist as a non-pot (i.e. as a bicycle etc.). When saying “ghaṭo ‘sti”, what one is really saying is “ghaṭaḥ svarūpenāsti, ghaṭaḥ pararūpena nāsti”, i.e. “ghaṭaḥ ghaṭatvena rūpenāsti, ghaṭaḥ paṭatvena rūpeṇa nāsti”. According to the *syādvāda*, everything both exists and does not exist at the same time. In some ways it exists, in others it does not. So when one says that something exists or does not exist one is really saying that something exists or does not exist in a certain form (*svarūpa*, *pararūpa* etc.).

SŚP §13 17, 22-24

nanu kharaviṣāṇādīnām atyantābhāvarūpāṇām api niṣedhaviṣayasyopapattir iti cet; na, gavādimastake sata eva viṣāṇasya kharādimastake pratiṣedhadarśanāt | tataḥ sataḥ pratītau pratiṣedhasiddhir iti sunirūpitam |

SŚP §13 English

If it is objected: Certainly, being an object of negation is found even for completely non-existent forms, such as a donkey's horn etc.. [It is answered:] no, because it is seen that the negation is of a horn, which exists on the head of a cow etc., on the head of a donkey etc..⁶⁶⁴ Therefore it is well observed: “there is establishment of negation if the existence [of the negated thing] is cognized”.

SŚP §14 17, 25-27

tathā citrapuruṣāḍau “idaṃ saḥjīvacitram” iti gaṇakalpanam mukhyavṛtṭyā jīvāstitvam kathayati, yathā – “siṃho māṇavakaḥ” iti māṇavake siṃhatvam viśiṣṭajātyādīpariṇatasimhāstitvam iti | tasmād gaṇakalpanād mukhyasiddir iti niravadyam |

SŚP §14 English

In the same way, the figurative usage “this painting has soul” with respect to a man in a painting etc. shows the existence of the soul by the primary meaning⁶⁶⁵, just as lion-ness in the student [when saying] “the lion-student”⁶⁶⁶ [shows] the existence of the lion, which is turned into [the concept of being of] “the best kind” etc..⁶⁶⁷ Therefore it is unobjectionable to say: “there is proof of the primary [meaning] from the figurative usage”.

SŚP §15 17, 28-29

tathā “jīvaḥ” iti śuddhapadam mukhyavṛtṭyā svārthavat⁶⁶⁸, śuddhapadatvāt, pramāṇapadavat | tataḥ śuddhapadatvāt “asti jīvaḥ” iti ca siddham |

⁶⁶⁴ i.e. The donkey's horn is strictly speaking not absolutely non-existent. Even such negations have their root in reality, as the negation of a donkey's horn is the negation of a horn, which exists on the heads of cows etc., on the head of a donkey, which is also a really existing thing. What is denied is the combination of two existing things.

⁶⁶⁵ i.e. such a secondary usage presupposes the primary meaning.

⁶⁶⁶ According to Dr. Srinivasan this is an expression used in India to denote the very best kind of student which grasps everything the teacher says just like a lion pounces on its prey.

⁶⁶⁷ i.e. just like the statement concerning the “lion student” presupposes the existence of the lion, which is then used figuratively to express the idea of being “of the best kind”.

⁶⁶⁸ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “mukhyavṛtṭyā, svārthavat”. The syntax seems to make much more sense if the comma is removed.

SŚP §15 English

In the same way, the un-compounded⁶⁶⁹ word “soul” denotes its own object by means of [its] primary meaning, because it is an un-compounded word, like the word *pramāṇa*. Therefore it is proved that “the soul exists” because [“soul”] is an un-compounded word.⁶⁷⁰

SŚP §16 17, 30-31

tathaiṅkaviśiṣṭajanasammatatvāt, āptapraṇītatvāc ca “asti jīvaḥ” iti suvyavasthitam |

SŚP §16 English

In the same way, it is firmly established that “the soul exists”, because it is agreed to by many distinguished people and because it is taught by those who have reached [emancipation and omniscience, i.e. the Jinas]⁶⁷¹.

SŚP §17 18, 1-5

kiṃ ca bhūtacaitanyayor bahirantarmukhāvabhāsayoḥ

⁶⁷²bālyādirāgādiviruddhadharmādhyāsitayor dravyāntarabhāvena bhinnapramāṇa

grāhyatvāt bheda eva | tayor deśabhedenādarśanād abhede

śārīrākārapariṇatāvanivana⁶⁷³pavana⁶⁷⁴sakhapavanānām apy ekatvaprasaṅgāt |

upādānakāraṇasadṛṣaṃ hi kāryaṃ bhavati [source not found] iti vacanād

⁶⁷⁵dhāraṇereṇadravoṣṇatārūpeṇa bhūtasādṛśyābhāvāt, amūrtacaitanyasya

mūrtakāryatvāyogāc ca śārīrabhinnam eva caitanyam |

SŚP §17 English

Moreover, the material elements and consciousness, which are cognized as external and internal [respectively] and reside in contradictory qualities such as infancy etc. and passion etc. [respectively], are different, because they are grasped as different substances by different valid means of knowledge. Because, if they [consciousness and the material elements] are not different on account of not being seen as different with respect to space,

⁶⁶⁹ i.e. un-compounded

⁶⁷⁰ the idea seems to be that while compounded words, such as “donkey’s horn” (*kharaviṣāna*) (which is a compound word in Sanskrit) may denote non-existing things, the simple (i.e. un-compounded) words (*śuddhapada*), such as “donkey” and “horn”, must refer to something real. Since the word “soul” is a simple, i.e. un-compounded, word, it must refer to something real, and thus it is proved that the soul exists by the fact that it is a simple, un-compounded word.

⁶⁷¹ *āpta* (ppp of *āp*, “obtained”, “reached” etc.) is often used in the sense of “reliable person” with regard to testimony etc.. Here it clearly refers to the Jinas (cf. the verse in §11 which states *jinokta* as one of the logical marks which prove the existence of the soul). I have thus chosen to translate it as “those who have reached [emancipation and omniscience]” to make this connection clearer.

⁶⁷² ed. note: “bālyādibhāvo hi bhautikaśārīragocaraḥ |”

⁶⁷³ ed. note: “jalam |”

⁶⁷⁴ ed. note: “agniḥ |”

⁶⁷⁵ ed. note: “dhāraṇam pṛthivyāḥ, irāṇam vāyvoḥ, dravo jalasya, uṣṇatā cāgneḥ |”.

[there would be] adherence to the identity of the earth, water, fire and wind that are transformed into the form of the body.⁶⁷⁶ Consciousness is indeed different from the body, on account of the statement “for the effect is similar to the material cause”, because [consciousness] is not similar to the elements which have the nature of holding [associated with earth], moving [wind], flowing [water] and heat [fire]⁶⁷⁷, and because it is unsuitable for the immaterial consciousness to be the product of material [substances].

SŚP §18 18, 6-12

tasya⁶⁷⁸ cābhilāṣo hi pratyabhiññāne sati prādurbhavati, pratyabhiññānaṃ ca smaraṇe sati, smaraṇaṃ ca pūrvānubhava eva bhavatīti pūrvānubhavaḥ siddhaḥ | anyathā tadaharjātabālakasya stanādāv abhilāṣā ‘bhāvaprasaṅgāt |⁶⁷⁹ mṛtānāṃ keṣāṃcid rakṣoyakṣādikuleṣu svayamutpannatvena kathayatām darśanāt keṣāṃcid bhavasmṛter upalambhāc ca paraloko ‘py asti | tad uktam –

**tadaharjjastanehāto rakṣodṛṣṭer⁶⁸⁰ bhavasmṛteḥ |
bhūtānanvayanāt siddhaḥ prakṛtijñāḥ sanātanaḥ ||** [source not found] iti

SŚP §18 English

Previous experience [from past lives] is proved: For desire appears for that [soul] [only] if there is recognition. And there is [only] recognition if there is remembering. And remembering exists only if there is previous experience⁶⁸¹. Otherwise [there would be] adherence to the desires of a child born on that very day towards the female breast etc. not existing.⁶⁸² Also the other-world exists, because some that are dead are seen conversing [with the living] because they have spontaneously arisen among the ranks of

⁶⁷⁶ i.e. if it should be argued that the consciousness and the body must be the same because they are always seen to occupy the same space (one never sees the consciousness not residing in a body), then one must argue the same for the elements which make up the body (as they too occupy the same space). This argument does not seem particularly convincing, as the individual elements are seen in other places without the others (water is seen by itself, i.e. not sharing the same space as fire, earth or wind, in a lake etc.), while the consciousness can hardly be said to be seen unaccompanied by a body.

⁶⁷⁷ i.e. if the consciousness was the product of the elements, these characteristics would be found in the consciousness (as the effect and the material cause must be similar). As these characteristics are not found in the consciousness, it cannot be the product of the elements.

⁶⁷⁸ ed. note: “jivasya |”

⁶⁷⁹ ed. note: “tulanā – prameyaratna- |”

⁶⁸⁰ Amended. The printed edition reads: “rakṣo dṛṣṭer”. Reading this as compounded seems preferable.

⁶⁸¹ i.e. past experience is a prerequisite for memory, memory is a prerequisite for recognition and recognition is a prerequisite for desire.

⁶⁸² i.e. since desire is based on recognition, which is again based on remembering, how else can one explain the desire of the newborn child towards the breast? It must be based on experience in a former life (as it has had no experiences in this life which could give rise to its desire for its mother’s breast), thus proving the existence of the consciousness before conception.

rakṣas, yakṣas etc.⁶⁸³, and because some [people] obtain memories of [previous] states of existence. It is said:

Because of the desire of one born on that [same] day for the breast [of his mother], because of the seeing of Rakṣas, because of remembering [previous] states of existence, because of lack of connection with the elements, the soul⁶⁸⁴ is proved.

SŚP §19 18, 13-23

jananādikāraṇāvīśeṣe ‘pi sukhaduḥkhādivaicitryadarśanāt puṇyapāpādikam apy asty eva |
evam pramāṇaprasiddhe paraloke paralokapuṇyapāpapradvēṣi bṛhaspatimatam na satām
mano manāg api prīṇayati, kiṃtu upālabham evārhati |
sa cokatḥ svāmibhiḥ –

**madyāṅgavad bhūtasamāgame jñāñ śaktyantaravyaktir adaivasṛṣṭiḥ |
ity ātmaśīṣnodarapuṣṭituṣṭair nihrībhayair hā mṛdavaḥ pralabdḥāḥ ||**

**dr̥ṣṭe ‘viśiṣṭe jananādiḥtau viśiṣṭatā kā pratisattvam eṣām |
svabhāvataḥ kim na parasya siddhir atāvakānām api hā prapātaḥ ||**

**svacchandavṛtter jagataḥ svabhāvād uccair anācārapadeṣv adoṣam |
nirghuṣya ⁶⁸⁵dīkṣāsamamuktimānās tvaddṛṣṭibādhyāḥ bata vibhramanti ||**

[yuktyanu- ślo- 35-37] iti

tato nāyaṃ bṛhaspatir āptatām ātmasātkaroti |

SŚP §19 English

Also merit and demerit etc. exist, because one sees difference with regard to the pleasure and pain [that living beings experience], even though there is no difference with respect to [their] causes [of birth], [the manner of] production⁶⁸⁶ etc..⁶⁸⁷ Thus, since the other world is well known by the valid means of knowledge, the doctrine of Bṛhaspati, which

⁶⁸³ i.e. because some beings that have died and been reborn as rakṣas, yakṣas etc. have had contact with the living

⁶⁸⁴ *prakṛtijñāḥ* literally means “knower of Nature”, here referring to the soul/consciousness.

⁶⁸⁵ Amended. Printed edition reads “dikṣā samamukti”. *Dikṣā* (undertaking religious observance), here in the feminine nominative singular, does not seem to make sense here. It does not seem to fit grammatically with any of the other elements in the sentence. Thus it seems better to read it as compounded with *samamukti*.

⁶⁸⁶ *janana* here more literally means “generating”, “producing”, “begetting”, referring to the manner in which living beings are generated, i.e. sexual intercourse etc..

⁶⁸⁷ i.e. even though all people are brought into the world by the same means, people experience different degrees and amounts of pleasure and pain throughout life. How else can this be explained but through the theory of karma?

hates⁶⁸⁸ the other world, merit and demerit, does not even in the least please the mind of the wise. On the contrary, it deserves reproach. And that is said by the Master:

If there is coming together of the elements, like the constituents of liquor,⁶⁸⁹ the knower⁶⁹⁰ is one whose nature is non-divine⁶⁹¹ and manifests a different power [then that which is made up of].⁶⁹² Alas! The weak are deceived by fearlessness and shamelessness⁶⁹³ and the satisfaction and prosperity of their own bellies and penises.

Since it is seen that the cause [of birth], [manner of] production etc., is not distinct⁶⁹⁴ [for each individual], why is there distinction [with respect to] each and every life? [If it is answered:] “because it is their nature”, why is that which is proved for [your] opponents [the soul, the other world, merit and demerit etc.] not [proved from nature]?⁶⁹⁵ Alas [o Jina]! [this is] the fall of those that are not your [followers]⁶⁹⁶!

The living beings, having declared: “There is no fault in the matters of improper behaviour on account of acting according to one’s own will and because it is the way of the world/living beings”. Considering it to be equal to liberation and religious undertaking, they, alas, disregarding⁶⁹⁷ your⁶⁹⁸ doctrine, roam around [in saṃsāra].

Therefore [it is concluded that] Bṛhaspati does not possess⁶⁹⁹ trustworthiness⁷⁰⁰.

⁶⁸⁸ *pradveṣi* must be the neuter nominative singular of *pradveṣin*. This form (derived from *pra* + *dviṣ* + *in* is not found in the MMW).

⁶⁸⁹ if the consciousness is made up of the elements, i.e. if the materialist doctrine is correct and there is no soul, merit, demerit, other world etc..

⁶⁹⁰ i.e. consciousness

⁶⁹¹ i.e. it has the nature of the elements. Non-divine should here not be taken too literally, as the Jains do not believe in a creator god, and it would thus be strange to characterize the soul as literally “divine”. “Daiva” seems here to be contrasted with the nature of the elements, i.e. used simply to imply a non-material or non-mundane nature. Taken in this way, what is expressed here is that if the consciousness is simply made up of the elements, it has their nature, i.e. its nature is “adaiva”.

⁶⁹² i.e. just like the ingredients of liquor, which do not separately have the power to intoxicate a man, come together to form a power that is different from themselves, so the consciousness is of a non-divine nature and manifests a power which is not found in its parts (i.e. sentience) if it is so that it is made up of the elements.

⁶⁹³ *ni* here seems to negate both *hrī* (shame) and *bhaya* (fear).

⁶⁹⁴ i.e. it is the same

⁶⁹⁵ the exact meaning of this sentence is unclear. The translation offered here is the only reading of this verse that seems to make sense, viewing *eṣāṃ svabhāvataḥ* as an answer to the question *viśiṣṭatā kā pratisattvam*. The question *kiṃ na parasya siddhir* is then asked as a reaction to *eṣāṃ svabhāvataḥ*. The point seems to be that if the Cārvāka, when asked to account for the diversity in various lives, answer that that is simply the way it is, i.e. it is natural, then why cannot this be said about the existence of the soul, the other world, merit and demerit etc.?

⁶⁹⁶ this last sentence seems to be addressed to the Jina.

⁶⁹⁷ *bādhya* is a gerundive from the root *bādh*, lit. meaning “is to be repelled/pressed/removed/set aside”. The sense here seems to be that they (the living beings described in this verse) consider the doctrine of the Jina (*tvaddṛṣṭi*, i.e. “your doctrine”) as something which is to be set aside.

⁶⁹⁸ seems to be directed towards the Tīrthaṅkara.

⁶⁹⁹ *āmasātkaroti* literally means “making one’s own”. Here it is best rendered as “possesses”.

SŚP §20 18, 24-28

yad uktam – “sarvajño nāsti” ity ādi, tad api pralāpamātram eva; pratyakṣataḥ sarvajñasya muneḥ, anumānasyāgamasya ca⁷⁰¹ nāstitvavyavasthāpanāsambhavāt, tasya⁷⁰² bhāvaviṣayatābhyupagamāt | yadi kiṃcit pratyakṣam tatrāpravartamānatvād eva tadabhāvaṃ vyavasthāpayet, tadā puruṣāntarādipratyakṣāntarāṇām apy abhāvaṃ tad eva gamayet, tadviṣayāṇām ca kṣmādīnām ity atiprasaṃgaḥ svayam iṣṭasya bṛhaspatyādipratyakṣasyāpi saviṣayasyābhāvasiddheḥ⁷⁰³ |

SŚP §20 English

That which is said: “An omniscient being does not exist” etc., even that is mere talk. Because it is impossible to establish the non-existence of the omniscient saint and [the invalidity of] inference and the scriptural tradition⁷⁰⁴ from sensory perception, on account of it being acknowledged that it [sensory perception] has that which exists as its object.⁷⁰⁵ If [the Cārvākas argue that] some perception could establish the non-existence of that [omniscient being] on account of not occurring with respect to that [non-existent thing]⁷⁰⁶, then [this results in] an unwarrantable extension: that same [perception] would lead to the non-existence of even other perceptions, [i.e.] [the perceptions] of other people⁷⁰⁷ etc., and the objects of that [sensory perception], [i.e.] earth etc., on account of proving the

⁷⁰⁰ *āpta* is used to describe trustworthy people in the context of verbal testimony. Verbal testimony (*āptavacana* or *śabda*) is generally considered valid or trustworthy if the person who gives it is *āpta*, i.e. trustworthy.

⁷⁰¹ The occurrence of *anumānasyāgamasya ca* (inference and scriptural tradition) here is curious. It is mainly the existence of the *sarvajñamuniḥ* (omniscient saint) which is discussed in the following paragraphs, inference and verbal testimony only appearing in a curious argument in §21 below, though this argument does not seem to be related to the argument advanced here. Regarding to the statement made here, however, i.e. that *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception) cannot prove that there is no omniscient saint, it applies to inference and the scriptural tradition as well (the point of contention regarding the latter two presumably being their validity and not whether or not they exist). It is moreover brought up again in §21 below (Cf. footnote 716). Thus, though the inclusion and formulation here is a bit peculiar, it has not been decided to amend the text and remove *anumānasyāgamasya ca*.

⁷⁰² ed. note: ”pratyakṣasya |”

⁷⁰³ Amended. Printed edition reads “abh va”. The *ā* (in *abhāva*) seems to be missing in the text as the result of a misprint.

⁷⁰⁴ cf. footnote 701.

⁷⁰⁵ i.e. sensory perception cannot negate, only affirm. Cf. the Advaitin’s argument: “tasya vidhātṛtvena niṣeddhṛtvābhāvāt” (SŚP 4, 12-18, §19 Advaita-chapter). The reason it can here be used by the Jain seems to be that inference is not accepted by the Cārvāka, and thus the arguments raised against the Advaitin’s argument by the Jain cannot be raised against the Jain by the Cārvāka. When one does not see the pot on the table, it is not the non-existence of the pot that is seen. One only sees the table, and from that one deduces the non-existence of the pot (on the table). The Jain thus argued that perception does entail negation (Cf. SŚP 4, 12-18 §19 Advaita-chapter). As the Cārvāka does not allow any other *pramānas* than perception (*pratyakṣa*), they cannot argue in this way and must consider perception as only affirming.

⁷⁰⁶ i.e. if he Cārvāka argues that perception proves the non-existence of a thing by not occurring with respect to that thing, i.e. if that thing is not perceived.

⁷⁰⁷ i.e. the perceptions belonging to other people

non-existence even of the sensory perception of Bṛhaspati etc. and its objects, which are approved [by the Cārvākas] themselves.⁷⁰⁸

SŚP §21 19, 1-6

atha pratyakṣāntaram svayam ātmānaṃ vyavasthāpayati pṛthivyādisvaviṣayaṃ ca tatra pravartanād ato na tadabhāvaprasaṅga ity matam; tarhi sarvajño ‘pi svasaṃvedanād ātmānaṃ svargāpūrvādiviṣayaṃ ca vyavasthāpayati, iti kathaṃ tadabhāvasiddheḥ, pramāṇāntarasya⁷⁰⁹ ca tadvacanasya hetuvādarūpasyāhetuvādarūpasya ca sa eva vyavasthāpakaḥ syād iti kutas tadabhāva⁷¹⁰ siddhiḥ | sarvajñaḥ svaparavyavasthāpako ‘stīty atra kiṃ pramāṇam iti cet; svapratyakṣaikapramāṇavādīnaḥ pratyakṣāntaram svaparaviṣayam astīty atra kiṃ pramāṇam, tathā prasiddhir anyatrāpi, iti na pratyakṣam tadabhāvāvedakam, atiprasaṅgasya duḥpariharatvāt |

SŚP §21 English

Now it is thought [by the Cārvāka]: “Other sensory perception⁷¹¹ establish itself and [is] objects, earth etc., on its own, because it operates with regard to that [itself and its objects]⁷¹². Therefore there [would] not be adhering to the non-existence of that [perception belonging to another]”.

[It is then objected by the Jain:] then also the omniscient being establishes himself and [his] objects, heaven, apūrva⁷¹³ etc., on account of self-cognition. How is [then] the non-existence of those [omniscient being etc.] proved? Only the [the omniscient] can be the establisher of that which has the stating of a premise as its nature, which is another valid means of knowledge⁷¹⁴, and that which does not have the stating of a premise as its nature, which is the statement of those [authoritative persons]⁷¹⁵. How then is the non-existence of those [omniscient being and the other valid means of knowledge] be established?⁷¹⁶

⁷⁰⁸ i.e. such a postulation would have undesired consequences for the Cārvākas as such perception would then disprove the perceptions of others, along with the objects of this perception. The result of this would also be the non-existence of the perceptions of Bṛhaspati and its objects (probably referring to the *tattvas*). Thus, Vidyānandin argues, the Cārvāka would have to conclude that other people do not have any perceptions.

⁷⁰⁹ ed. note: “anumānarūpasya |”

⁷¹⁰ ed. note: “sarvajñāsya pramāṇāntarasya ca |”

⁷¹¹ i.e. perceptual cognition belonging to another person

⁷¹² The use of *pravartamāna* here corresponds to the wording of the Jain argument in SŚP 18, 25-28 above (*tatrāpravartamāna*).

⁷¹³ *Apūrva* is according to Penna (2004a) used as a technical term in Mīmāṃsā philosophy, denoting the means for reaching heaven (*svarga*). According to the Mīmāṃsā, *apūrva* is generated upon the completion of vedic sacrifice. Its use here seems to be connected to this Mīmāṃsā usage, and probably refers to the means for attaining heaven (*svarga*) which is mentioned immediately before *apūrva* here.

⁷¹⁴ must here refer to inference (*anumāna*)

⁷¹⁵ *āptavacana* (statement of an authoritative person), also another *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge). Here *āpta* is substituted by *tad* in the Sanskrit.

⁷¹⁶ i.e. if the cognitions of others can establish themselves, then so can the omniscient being, and thus all that is established by the omniscient being is established as well. The final point, however, which seems to

If it is objected: [The Jains say that]: “the omniscient being is the establisher of itself and others”. What is the valid means of knowledge here?⁷¹⁷ [It is then answered:] The [Cārvākas], propounders of one’s own sensory perception as the only valid means of knowledge, say: “There is other perception⁷¹⁸ which has itself and others as its objects”. What is the valid means of knowledge here?

[If the Cārvākas answer that:] It is well known to be thus.⁷¹⁹ [It is answered by the Jain:] [it is thus] elsewhere as well.⁷²⁰ Thus sensory perception does not make known the non-existence of that [omniscient being], on account of an unwarranted extension being difficult to avoid⁷²¹.

SŚP §22 19, 7-9

kiṃ ca sarvajñātvābhāvaḥ pratyakṣeṇa kvacit kadācit kasyacid vyavasthāpyate, sarvatra sarvadā sarvasya vā? tatrādyapakṣe parasyeṣṭāpādanam |⁷²² dvitīyapakṣe sarvatra sarvadā sarvasya sarvajñātvābhāvaṃ pratyakṣataḥ samvidan svayaṃ sarvajñaḥ syāt | tathā sati vyāhatam etat sarvajñābhāvavacanāṃ cārvākasya |

SŚP §22 English

And moreover, is the non-existence of omniscience established by means of sensory perception with regard to some [specific soul] in some [specific] place at some [specific] time, or with regard to all [souls] everywhere and at all times? In the first case, [you] establish that which is accepted by the opponent [i.e. the Jains].⁷²³ In the second case, knowing the non-existence of omniscience with respect to all [souls] at all times and everywhere from sensory perception, one must be omniscient oneself. If it is thus, the Cārvāka’s statement concerning the non-existence of omniscience is [self]-contradictory.

SŚP §23 19, 10-11

nāpy anumānaṃ tadabhāvasādhakam, tadanabyupagamāt svayaṃ anumānaṃ nirākurvann anumānād eva sarvajñābhāvaṃ sādhayati iti katham anumattaḥ |

be that only an omniscient being can establish the validity of the *pramāṇas* beyond perception (i.e. inference and testimony), i.e. their validity rest upon him, seems odd. While it seems clear how the validity of reliable testimony rests upon the omniscience of the omniscient sage, it is not at all clear why or how the validity of inference depends upon the omniscient saint. It is not clear how this statement could be justified.

⁷¹⁷ i.e. what *pramāṇa* establishes that there is an omniscient being that establishes itself and its objects?

⁷¹⁸ i.e. sensory perception belonging to others

⁷¹⁹ i.e. this is well known and thus does not need to be established by proof. “There is an interesting distinction between *siddha* and *prasiddha*: *siddha* is something proved, whereas *prasiddha* is something so well known that it does not require a proof anymore.” (Franco 1994: 301).

⁷²⁰ i.e. then the Jain says that omniscience too is well known (*prasiddha*) and need not be established.

⁷²¹ i.e. if perception could prove the non-existence of omniscience, it would (as shown in SSP 19, 1-4) prove the non-existence of other perception as well.

⁷²² ed. note: “‘asmin kale atra kaścitsarvajño nāsti’ ity atra vivādābhāvāt |”

⁷²³ The contention that a specific being in a specific place at a specific time is not omniscient is not in itself objectionable to the Jains. Whether or not such a contention would be true or not is another matter, and would depend on the specific circumstances (i.e. what being it concerns, at what time and in which place).

SŚP §23 English

Not even inference is the proof of the non-existence of that [omniscience], because it [inference] is not accepted [as a valid means of knowledge by the Cārvāka]. “Oneself rejecting inference, one proves the non-existence of omniscience from inference”. How is [that] not insane?

SŚP §24 19, 12-20

tad evaṃ bādhakābhāvād asti sarvajñaḥ | sa ca syādvādī bhagavan arhann
evānyayogavyavacchedena niścīyate, tasyaiva yuktiśāstrāviroddhavākya tvāt | anyeṣāṃ
nyāyāgamaviruddhabhāṣitvāt | tatas tadukto⁷²⁴ dharmo mokṣaś ca vyavatiṣṭhate |
tannirākarāṇe cārvākānāṃ pramāṇābhāvasya pratipāditaprāyatvāt | pralāpamātrasya ca
prekṣāvatām anādarāṇīyatvād iti sthitam drṣṭeṣṭāviroddhatvāt cārvākamatam asatyam iti |

svaparāviditādhyakṣacārvākānāṃ vaco ’khilam |
bhavet pralāpamātratvān nāvadheyam vipāścītām ||
na cārvākamatam satyam drṣṭādrṣṭeṣṭabādhataḥ |
na ca tena pratikṣepaḥ syādvād(asyeti)⁷²⁵ niścitam ||

SŚP §24 English

Thus the omniscient [being] exists, on account of the non-existence of [any] negation [of its existence]. And, because the fitness of others is excluded, only the blessed Arhat⁷²⁶, propounder of the *Syādvāda*, is ascertained [to be omniscient], on account of only him teaching that which is not contradictory to logic and the scriptures.⁷²⁷ Because the speech of the others is contradicted by logic and the [scriptural] tradition⁷²⁸. Therefore the

⁷²⁴ ed. note: “syādvaditīrthamkarapranītaḥ |”

⁷²⁵ The editor has here added the genitive ending *-asya* and *iti*. Cf. SŚP 10, 8 and 14, 19 etc. for the same formulation.

⁷²⁶ a title used to denote those that have reached *kevalajñāna* (omniscience) in Jainism. This does not refer specifically to a Jina, but to any being that has obtained liberation and thus reached omniscience.

⁷²⁷ Cf. ĀM verse 6:

*sa tvam evāsi nirdoṣo yuktiśāstrāvirodhivāk |
avirodho yad iṣṭam te prasiddhena na bādhyate || 6 ||*

Shah (1999) translates as: “And such an omniscient personage you alone are whose utterance is neither in conflict with logic nor in conflict with scripture. As for the proof of such an absence of conflict, it is the circumstance that what you seek to establish is never contradicted by what is known to be the case”.

Akalaṅka, in his *Aṣṭaśatī*, commenting on this, says: *viprakarṣy api bhinnalakṣaṇasambandhitvādinā kasyacit pratyakṣam | so ‘tra bhavān arhann eva, anyeṣāṃ nyāyāgamaviruddhabhāṣitvāt |* “Direct perception of anything, even that which is in the [remote] distance, by means of connection with separate characteristics (?) (*bhinnalakṣaṇa?*), only you, the Arhat, [has that] with regard to these [things that are remote], because the speech of others is contradicted by logic and scripture” (My translation). See also Chapter 4.

⁷²⁸ i.e. the Jaina *āgama* (scriptural tradition).

dharma and liberation declared by those [omniscient beings] is established. Because it has been demonstrated that the Cārvākas do not have [any] valid means of knowledge when denying them [the dharma and liberation]. It is established: “Because that which is merely talk is not to be attended to by the wise⁷²⁹.” “The Cārvāka-doctrine is untrue, because it is contradicted by perception and inference.”

All the words of the Cārvākas,
for whom perception does not cognize his own [cognition]
nor [the cognition of] others,
is not to be attended to by the wise, because it is mere talk.

The Cārvāka-doctrine is not seen to be true,
on account of being negated by that which is seen,
the unseen⁷³⁰ and inference. It is settled:
“the Syādvāda is not refuted by that [Cārvāka doctrine]”.

[iti cārvākaśāsanaparīkṣā]
[Thus is the investigation into the Cārvāka teaching]

⁷²⁹ *prekṣāvāt*, lit. one who possesses seeing.

⁷³⁰ The meaning of *adr̥ṣṭa* is here unclear. *Adr̥ṣṭa* usually refers to such things as *puṇya* and *pāpa* etc., i.e. the workings of karma. It is difficult to see how this could be said to negate the Cārvāka doctrine. *Adr̥ṣṭa* could here be used as a synonym for *parokṣa* (“indirect”, i.e. not directly perceptible and thus *adr̥ṣṭa*, i.e. “unseen” or “not seen”), as it occurs together with *dr̥ṣṭa* and *iṣṭa*, which both refer to valid means of knowledge. The same phrase (*dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭeṣṭabādhatāḥ*) seems to be used in ŚŚP 33, 23 (Sāṃkhya-chapter), though it is printed as *dr̥ṣṭadr̥ṣṭeṣṭabādhatāḥ* (amended to *dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭeṣṭabādhatāḥ*).

Bauddhaśāsanaparīkṣā

Investigation into the Buddhist doctrine.

SŚP 20, 2-3

tathā tathāgataśāsanam api dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddham | evaṃ hi sarvabhāvānāṃ
kṣaṇabhaṅgasamgamam evāṅgaśṛgāram aṅgīkurvāṅs tathāgatāḥ saṃgirante —⁷³¹

SŚP English

In the same way also the teaching of the Tathāgata⁷³² is contradicted by perception and inference. For the followers of the Tathāgata, who assert only close association and destruction of moments for all that exists, agreeing to a love of sub-divisions⁷³³, assert it to be thus:

[pūrvapakṣa]⁷³⁴

The opponent's side.

§1 SŚP 20, 3-10

rūpādipañcaskandhā eva tattvāni | rūparasagandhasparśaparamānavah
sajātīyavijātīyavyāvrttāḥ parasparāsambaddhā rūpaskandhāḥ | sukhaduḥkhādayo
vedanāskandhāḥ | savikalpakanirvikalpakajñānāni viñjānaskandhāḥ |

jātikriyāguṇadravyasaṃjñā pañcaiva kalpanāḥ |

aśvo yāti sito ⁷³⁵ghaṇṭikas⁷³⁶ tadākhyti⁷³⁷ yathākramam || [source not found] iti

ity etat kalpanāsaḥitaṃ savikalpakam, tadrāhitam nirvikalpakam | tathā vṛkṣādināmāni
saṃjñāskandhāḥ | jñānapuṇyapāpavāsanāḥ saṃskāraskandhāḥ |
rūpavedanāvijñānasaṃjñāsaṃskārā iti pañca skandhāḥ |

⁷³¹ Amended. As this opening part is not part of the pūrvapakṣa it has been separated out from the rest of §1.

⁷³² i.e. the Buddha

⁷³³ *Aṅgaśṛṅgāram*. *Śṛṅgāra* is, in the MMW, listed as meaning “sexual passion”, “desire”, “enjoyment”, and is in narrative literature (such as the Pañcatantra) found as meaning “an elegant dress”. Here it seems to be used, compounded with *aṅga* (“limb”, here used in the sense of “division” or “sub-division”) to express, in a somewhat derogatory way, what Vidyānandin seems to view as an exaggerated preoccupation (i.e. sexual desire or love) with subdivisions, i.e. it expresses the Jain view of Buddhism as a one-sided (*ekānta*) view which focuses exclusively on the impermanent aspects of reality. In Jain ontological terms, the Buddhists are seen to only focus on the *paryāya* (mode) aspect of reality, which is impermanent, ignoring the *dravya* (substance) aspect of reality, which is permanent.

⁷³⁴ The editor has not indicated the start of the pūrvapakṣa in this chapter. It has here been added following the convention in the rest of the chapters.

⁷³⁵ ed. note: “ghaṇṭāvān |”

⁷³⁶ Amended. Printed edition reads: “ghaṇṭika tadākhyeti”, with no case ending for *ghaṇṭika*

⁷³⁷ ed. note: “tatsaṃjñakāḥ |”

SŚP §1 English

The tattvas are only the five aggregates, form etc.. The atoms of color, taste, smell and touch, which are different from [both] the similar and dissimilar [atoms], and unconnected with one another⁷³⁸, are the matter-aggregate. Pleasure, pain etc. are the feeling-aggregate. Determinate and indeterminate cognition are the cognition-aggregate.

Universal, activity, quality, substance and name are the five mental constructs.

Just as the series: “the white horse, possessing a bell, walks and has its name”⁷³⁹.

Thus, [cognition] which is connected with mental construction is determinate [cognition]. That which is free from that [mental construction] is indeterminate [cognition]. In the same way, names such as ‘tree’ etc. are the name-aggregate. The previous impressions of cognitions, good deeds and bad deeds are the impression-aggregate. Matter, feeling, cognition, name and impression are the five aggregates.⁷⁴⁰

SŚP §2 20, 11-21

⁷³⁸ i.e. all the atoms are unique. They are all different from each other and not connected to each other.

⁷³⁹ here horse is an example of class (*jāti*), goes is an example of activity (*kriyā*), white is an example of quality (*guṇa*), having a bell is an example of substance (*dravya*), i.e. the bell being the substance, and having its name is an example of name (*saṃjñā*). English syntax makes it impossible to give these examples in the same order as they appear in the Sanskrit.

⁷⁴⁰ This understanding of the five *skandhas* differs from that usually encountered. The translation of the terms for the five *skandhas* are here made on account of how they are here explained, and not according to how these are usually explained and translated. Thus *vijñānaskandha* has here been translated as “cognition-aggregate” on account of it being explained as both *vikalpa-* and *nirvikalpaprayakṣa* (determinate and indeterminate cognition), and *saṃjñāskandha* has been translated as “name-aggregate” on account of it being explained as names (*vrkṣādināmāni saṃjñāskandhāḥ*). There is also some variety with respect to how the *skandhas* are presented and translated in secondary literature. Compare for example Reat’s (1996) translation: “(1) body or materiality (*rūpa*), (2) feelings (*vedanā*), (3) conceptual identification (*saṃjñā*), (4) conditioning factors (*saṃskārā*) and (5) consciousness (*vijñāna*)” (Reat 1996: 41, italics in original), with Acharya’s (2004): “rūpaskandha [rūpakkhandha] (form), saṃjñāskandha [saññākkhandha] (perception), saṃskāraskandha [saṅkhārakkhandha] (mental formation) and vijñānaskandha [viññāṇakkhandha] (consciousness)” (Acharya 2004: 620).

In Buddhist sources, the *vedanāskandha*, *saṃjñāskandha* and *vijñānaskandha* all occur as a result of the activity of the five senses and the mind (Reat 1996: 41). Thus one has six kinds of feeling (*vedanā*) and six kinds of perception (*saṃjñā*) as a result of contact with forms, sounds, odours, sapids, tangibles and mental objects. This contact results in six kinds of consciousness, namely eye-, ear, nose, tongue-, body- and mind-consciousness respectively (Acharya 2004: 621; Reat 1996: 41). This is not mentioned in Vidyānandin’s explanation of these *skandhas*.

Vidyānandin’s explanation of *vijñānaskandha* as both *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate cognition) and *savikalpaka* (determinate cognition), while identifying *saṃjñāskandha* with names (such as “tree”), is also unusual. The translations of *saṃjñā* as “conceptual identification” (Reat) and “perception” (Acharya), as well as Chatterjee and Datta’s explanation of it as “perception including understanding and naming” (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 129) show that *savikalpakapratyakṣa* (determinate cognition) in Buddhist sources seems to be identified with the *saṃjñāskandha*, while the *vijñānaskandha*, translated by all three as “consciousness”, explained by Acharya as eye-consciousness etc. (cf above), not associated with understanding and naming which is the domain of the *saṃjñāskandha*, seems to correspond to *nirvikalpapratyakṣa* only (Shah 1968: 10-11). Seeing as these inconsistencies have no consequence for Vidyānandin’s further treatment of Buddhist philosophy in the following chapter, they are here only mentioned.

teṣu ca pūrvapūrvacittaviśeṣaprabhavā uttarottaracittakṣaṇā upādānopādeyarūpeṇa
sajātyuttarakṣaṇaṃ janayantaḥ parasparāsamprkṭā niranvayapratikṣaṇaviśārāvo
niraṃśās ca bhrāntivaśāt grāhyagrāhakaśamvedanākāratrayākṛāntā
vijātīyāvyavadhāna⁷⁴¹laghūtpattisadrśāparāparotpattivipralabdhabuddheḥ saṃtānarūpeṇa
vartamānā ātmābhidhānaṃ janayanti | tatraikatvapratyabhijñānaṃ api
lūnapunarjātanakhakeśādaḥ pūrvāparaikatvābhāve ‘pi darśanān nityatvasamarthanāya
nālam iti trikālānuvāyeyakatvarahitā eva vartante; kiṃ tu
jñānavairāgyabhāvanātiśayavasād avidyātrṣṇāvigame niḥśaktikānām
uttarottaravijñānakṣaṇaṃ ajanayatāṃ niranvayavināśena saṃtānocchittir mokṣaḥ |
“praḍīpanirvāṇakalpam ātmanirvāṇam” [] iti vacanāt | tad uktam –

kṣaṇād ūrdhvam na tiṣṭhanti śarīrendriyabuddhayaḥ |
dīpārcir iva vartante skandhāḥ kṣaṇavilambitāḥ || [source not found] iti

SŚP §2 English

Each following mind-instant, having as its source the particular previous mind[-instant], cause a following instant of the same kind to arise, by way of a material cause and effect [relationship]. They do not come into contact with each other, they are unconnected and continually perishing and they have no parts. On account of the power of confusion they [appear] to possess three forms: grasped, grasper and [the resulting] cognition. They exist and give rise to that which is named the “self” by way of “continuance” for those that are deceived by the non-interruption between the dissimilar [moments], [their] rapid arising and [their] arising, one after another, [all] resembling [each other].⁷⁴²

The recognition of oneness in that [continuance] is not sufficient for the establishing of permanence⁷⁴³, because [oneness] is seen the nail, hair etc. are cut and regenerated, even though there is absence of oneness of that which was before⁷⁴⁴ and what is after⁷⁴⁵. They are certainly free from oneness throughout the three times⁷⁴⁶. But when there is cessation of ignorance and thirst on account of intense insight, freedom from worldly desires and meditation, there is annihilation of the continuance by the destruction of the unconnected [instants] which are [then] powerless and do not generate each following consciousness-instant. [This annihilation of the continuance is] liberation,

⁷⁴¹ ed. note: “āsūtpatti |”

⁷⁴² i.e. so those who are deceived by these three characteristics take the *skandhas* (aggregates), which arise in a continuous stream, to be that which is named “soul” or “self”.

⁷⁴³ i.e. so the notion of unity which this continuous stream of moments gives rise to is not true. Having this notion is not enough to establish the existence of a permanent self/soul.

⁷⁴⁴ i.e. that which was cut

⁷⁴⁵ i.e. that which grows back

⁷⁴⁶ i.e. they do not persist throughout the three times (past, present, future), as they exist only for an instant (the shortest possible length of time) and past, present and future requires a minimum of 3 instants.

because of the saying: “The liberation of the soul resembles the blowing out of a lamp”. It is said –

The body, the senses and the intellect do not endure beyond an instant.
The aggregates, whose measure is an instant, are like the flame of a lamp.

SŚP §3 20, 22-23

tasya ca mokṣasyopāyaḥ kāṣāyacīvaraparidhānaśirastuṇḍamuṇḍanabrahmacarya-
dhāraṇādayaḥ | tathaiva duḥkhasamudaya⁷⁴⁷nirodha⁷⁴⁸mārgā⁷⁴⁹ iti catvāraḥ padārthāś
caturāryasatyābhidānā mumukṣubhir jñātavyāḥ |

SŚP §3 English

And the means for this liberation is putting on the red clothes of a monk, shaving the head and face, maintaining chastity etc.. The four principles, named The Four Noble Truths: “suffering, the cause [of suffering], cessation [of suffering] and the path [leading to the cessation of suffering]”, are to be known by those desirous of liberation.

SŚP §4 20, 24-21, 4

tatra sahaśārīramānasāgantukāni duḥkhāni | tatra sahaḥ
kṣuttrṣṇāmanobhūbhayādikam | śārīraṃ vātapittapīnasānām⁷⁵⁰ vaiśamyasambhūtam |
mānasam dhikkārāvajñicchaviḡhātādijanitam | āgantukam śītavātātapaśanipātādijanitam |
etad duḥkhaviśiṣṭāś cittakṣaṇāḥ saṃsāriṇām duḥkham ity ucyate |
tadduḥkhajanabandhahetubhūte avidyātrṣṇe samudayaśabdenocyete tatra
vastuyathātmyāpratipattir avidyā | iṣṭāniṣṭendriyaviṣayaprāptiparihāravāñchā trṣṇā |
nirodho nāma avidyātrṣṇāvināśena nirāsravacittasamṭānotpattilakṣaṇaḥ
samṭānocchittilakṣaṇo vā mokṣaḥ | tathā mokṣahetubhūtaḥ mārgaḥ⁷⁵¹ |

SŚP §4 English

Among those [four truths], sufferings⁷⁵² are [of four kinds]: natural, bodily, mental and occasional. Among those [kinds of suffering], natural [suffering] is hunger, thirst, sexual desire, fear etc.. Bodily [suffering] is produced by imbalance of air, bile and phlegm⁷⁵³.

⁷⁴⁷ ed. note: “samudeti asmād iti samudayaḥ duḥkhakāraṇam iti yāvat |”

⁷⁴⁸ ed. note: “nirvāṇam |”

⁷⁴⁹ Amended. The printed edition reads “mārgaṇā iti”, which means “desiring, searching” etc.. This does not make sense as the fourth noble truth is the eightfold path. Ed. note to *mārgaṇā* : “aṣṭāṅgikaḥ samyagdrṣṭyādih |”

⁷⁵⁰ Ed. note: “kapha |”.

⁷⁵¹ Amended. Printed edition reads “mokṣahetubhūta mārgaṇā”. Cf. footnote 749.

⁷⁵² i.e. *duḥkha*, the first Noble Truth

⁷⁵³ Editor glosses *pīnasa* (a cold, such as affects the nose) as *kapha* (phlegm). Cf. editors note in footnote 750.

Mental [suffering] is produced from reproach, contempt, prevention of desire etc.. Occasional [suffering] is produced by cold, wind, heat, decay of food etc.. It is said: “the mind-instants characterized by [these] sufferings are the suffering of those trapped in saṃsāra.”

Ignorance and thirst, which are the cause of binding and action which cause the suffering of those [trapped in saṃsāra] are explained by the name “producing cause”⁷⁵⁴. Among those [two], ignorance is the non-apprehension of the true nature of a thing and thirst is the desire to obtain objects of sense that are agreeable and avoid sense-objects that are disagreeable.

Destruction⁷⁵⁵ is liberation by means of the annihilation of ignorance and thirst, characterized by the arising of a continuance of thought that is without defilements, or by the expiration of continuance [altogether]. Thus the [eightfold] path is the cause of liberation.

SŚP §5 21, 5-16

sa ca ⁷⁵⁶samyaktvasaṃjñāsamjñīvākkāyakarmāntarvyāyāmājīvasthanisamādhi-
lakṣaṇāṣṭāṅgaḥ | tatra samyaktvaṃ padārthānāṃ yāthātmyadarśanaṃ | saṃjñā vācakaḥ
śabdaḥ saṃjñī vācayo ‘rthaḥ | vākkāyakarmanī vākkāyavyāpārau | antarvyāyāmo
vāyudhāraṇā | ājīvasthanir āyuravasānaparyantaṃ prāṇadhāraṇā | samādhir nāma sarvaṃ
duḥkham, sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam, sarvaṃ nirātmakaṃ sūnyam iti satyabhāvanā | tasyāḥ⁷⁵⁷
prakarṣād avidyātrṣṇāvigame nirāsravacittakṣaṇāḥ sakalapadārthāvabhāsakāḥ
samutpadyante | tad yogipratyakṣam | sa ca yogī yāvad āyus tāvat kālam upāsakānāṃ
dharmam upadeśya āyuravasāne pradīpanirvāṇakalpam ātmanirvāṇaṃ prāpnoti
uttaracittasyotpatter abhāvād iti |

dīpo yathā nirvṛttim abhyupeto naivāvaniṃ gacchati nāntarikṣam |
dīśam na kāṃcid vidiśam na kāṃcit snehakṣayāt kevalam eti śāntim || [28]⁷⁵⁸
jīvas tathā nirvṛttim abhyupeto naivāvaniṃ gacchati nāntarikṣam |
dīśam na kāṃcid vidiśam na kāṃcit mohakṣayāt kevalam eti śāntim || [29]⁷⁵⁹
[saundarananda- 16|28|29] iti |

⁷⁵⁴ i.e. *samudaya*, the second Noble Truth.

⁷⁵⁵ i.e. *nirodha*, the third Noble Truth

⁷⁵⁶ ed. note: “tanmate hi – samyagdrṣṭiḥ, samyaksamkalpaḥ, samyagvāk, samyagvyāyāmaḥ, samyagājīvaḥ, samyak prayatnaḥ, samyaksmṛtiḥ, samyagsamādhiś cety aṣṭau |”.

⁷⁵⁷ ed. note: “bhāvanāyāḥ |”

⁷⁵⁸ Compared to Johnston’s critical edition of Aśvaghōṣa’s Saundarananda (1928). The wording is identical.

⁷⁵⁹ Compared to Johnston’s critical edition of Aśvaghōṣa’s Saundarananda (1928). The wording is not identical. Johnston’s edition reads:

evaṃ kṛtī nirvṛttim abhyupeto naivāvaniṃ gacchati nāntarikṣam |
dīśam na kāṃcid vidiśam na kāṃcit kleśakṣayāt kevalameti śāntim || 29||

SŚP §5 English

And that [path] is eightfold, characterized by correctness, denoter, denoted, actions of speech and body, internal exercise, “lasting for life” and concentration.⁷⁶⁰ Among those [eight limbs], correctness is the seeing of the true nature of things. Denoter is the expressing word. The denoted is the object that is to be spoken of. “Actions of speech and body” is employment of the speech and the body. Internal exercise is holding [one’s] breath. “Lasting for life” is holding [one’s] breath until there is cessation of life. “Concentration” is meditation on the truths: “Everything is suffering, everything is transient, everything is void and without individual essence”.

When there is cessation of ignorance and thirst because of the excellence of that [meditation], the mind-instants that are without defilements, illuminating all things, arise. That [illumination of all things] is yogic perception. And as long as he lives, so long the yogin is to teach the dharma to the followers. When there is cessation of life, he reaches

⁷⁶⁰ This is not the Eightfold path as presented in Buddhist sources. (Cf. editors note to *samyaktva* in footnote 756). Chatterjee and Datta (2007) present the eightfold path as right views, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindedness and right concentration (118-121). They further explain right views (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*) as “defined as correct knowledge about the four Noble Truths” (ibid: 119); right resolve (*samyaksamkalpa*) as resolving to reform ones life in the light of the four Noble Truths by renouncing worldliness, giving up ill-feeling towards others and by abstaining from harming others (ibid: 119); right speech (*samyagvāk*) as speech guided by right resolve, characterized by abstention from lying, slander, unkind words and frivolous talk (ibid: 119); right conduct (*samyakkarmānta*) as conduct resulting from right resolve, including the *pañcasīla*, i.e. the five vows for abstention from killing, stealing, sensuality, lying and intoxication (ibid: 119); right livelihood (*samyagājīva*) as earning ones livelihood by honest means in consistency with good determination (ibid: 119); right effort (*samyagvyāyāma*) as the constant rooting out of evil thoughts, preventing them from arising again, filling the mind with good ideas and retaining such ideas in the mind (ibid: 120); right mindfulness (*samyaksmṛti*) as constantly remembering and contemplating the body as body, sensations as sensations, mind as mind and mental states as mental states, not thinking ‘This am I’ or ‘This is mine’ about any of these (ibid: 120); and right concentration (*samyaksamādhi*) as entering the four deeper states of concentration, i.e. the four stages of intent meditation (*dhyāna*) (ibid: 121).

It should be noted that the editor has, in his enumeration of the eight limbs of the eightfold path (cf. footnote to the Sanskrit above), listed the 6th member, *samyagvyāyāma* (right effort) as number four. He has further denotes what is usually the fourth member of the list, *samyakkarmānta* (right conduct) as *samyak prayatna*, and places this as the fourth member of the path.

It is readily apparent that Vidyānandin’s presentation of the eightfold path is quite different from that which is usually found, though there are similarities between the two as well. Vidyānandin’s first member of the path, *samyaktva* (correctness), which is explained as “the seeing of the true nature of things”, can be seen as corresponding to the first member of the usual eightfold path, *samyagdr̥ṣṭi* (right views). His fourth and fifth members, *vākkāyakarma* (actions of speech and body), explained simply as “employment of the speech and the body”, can be seen as corresponding to *samyagvāk* (right speech) and *samyakkarmānta* (right conduct), usually the third and fourth members of the eightfold path respectively. The sixth and seventh members enumerated by Vidyānandin, *antarvyāyāma* (internal effort) and *ājīvashīti* (lasting for life), are similar to the usual seventh and sixth members, *samyagvyāyāma* (right effort) and *samyagājīva* (right livelihood), only in the terms employed, while their explanations are drastically different as Vidyānandin explains them both as involving holding one’s breath. Vidyānandin’s eighth and final member, *samādhi* (concentration), explained as “meditation on the truths ‘everything is suffering, everything is transient, everything is void and without individual essence’”, too only resembles the usual eighth member of the eightfold path, *samyaksamādhi* (right concentration), in name.

The remaining two of the usual eight members, *samyaksamkalpa* (right resolve) and *samyaksmṛti*, have no parallel in Vidyānandin’s enumeration of the eight limbs of the path. Instead, Vidyānandin gives *saṃjñā* (denoter word) and *saṃjñān* (the denoted).

It is not known what Vidyānandin’s source for this list is and why he uses the word *mārganā* instead of *mārga* when referring to it. Further investigation of this is needed.

the “blowing out of the self”, resembling the blowing out of a lamp, on account of the non-existence of arising of [any] following mind-instant.

Just as a lamp that has arrived at termination does not go to the earth, nor to the sky, nor to any cardinal direction, nor to any intermediate direction. It goes to complete tranquillity on account of the wearing away of the oil.

Just so the living being that has arrived at termination does not go to the earth, nor to the sky, nor to any cardinal direction, nor to any intermediate direction. It goes to complete tranquillity on account of the wearing away of delusion.⁷⁶¹

[uttarapakṣa]

The refutation.

SŚP §6 21, 18-20

tad etat saugatamatam tāvat drṣṭaviruddham | saugatābhimatasya
niranvayavināśiparamānumātralakṣaṇasvalakṣaṇasya sthūlasthirasādhāraṇākārāvabhāsinā
pratyakṣena viruddhatvāt | na hi pratyakṣe sūkṣmakṣaṇikāsādhāraṇarūpāḥ paramāṇavaḥ
pratibhāsante, sthūlasthirasādhāraṇākārātmanām eva ghaṭādīnām pratibhāsanāt |

SŚP §6 English

Firstly, this very doctrine of the followers of Sugata is contradicted by perception. Because the bare particular, accepted by the followers of Sugata, which has the characteristic of mere atoms⁷⁶² which are destroyed [every moment] without residue, is contradicted by sensory perception which cognizes common forms that are gross and solid. For, when there is sensory perception, the atoms do not appear as unique⁷⁶³ forms that are minute and momentary, because of the appearance of jars etc. whose character is the common form that is gross and solid.⁷⁶⁴

⁷⁶¹ Johnston’s edition (1928) of the Saudarananda reads ”kṛtī” (mas. nom. sing. of *kṛtin*) instead of “jīvas”. His translation thus reads “Saint” instead of “living being”. He also translates *nivṛtīm abhyupeto* as “who has reached Nirvāṇa” in this verse, while translating the same phrase as “which has reached the stage of extinction” in the previous verse (canto 16, verse 28) (Johnston 1932: 91). Though this is clearly the meaning intended in the verse, I find it preferable to translate the phrase in the same way in both verses.

⁷⁶² *Paramāṇu* is, according to Vasubandhu, the smallest possible particle of *rūpa* (matter) (Radhakrishnan 1966a: 616-17), and is rendered as “atom” throughout this translation.

⁷⁶³ *asādhāraṇa*, lit. “uncommon”.

⁷⁶⁴ a similar critique is also raised by Akalaṅka in Akalaṅkagranthatraya: “sarvataḥ samhr̥tya cintāṃ stimitāntarātmanā sthito ‘pi cakṣuṣā rūpaṃ samsthānātmakam sthūlātmakam ekaṃ sūkṣmānekasvabhāvaṃ paśyati na punaḥ asādhāraṇaikāntam svalakṣaṇam | pratisamhāravutthitacittasya tathaiṅvāsmaṇāt | tasmād aviśadam eva avikalpakam pratyakṣābham |” (Akalaṅka’s Akalaṅkagranthatraya quoted in Shah 1968: 222 footnote 50). Shah renders Akalaṅka’s argument as: “Akalaṅka has also criticized Dharmakīrti’s view that the object of perception is only a unique particular. He observes that indeterminate cognition which is the

SŚP §7 21, 21-24

nanu paramāṇuṣv avātyāsannāsamsrṣṭeṣu dṛṣṭau pratibhāsamāneṣu kutaścid
vibhramanimittād ātmani paratra cāsantam eva sthūlādyākāraṃ darśayantī samvṛtīḥ⁷⁶⁵ tān
samvṛṇoti keśādibhrāntavad iti cet; naivam; bahir antaś ca pratyakṣasya bhrāntatvāpatteḥ,
tasya abhrāntatvakalpanāpoḍhatvābhāvaprasaṃgāt, **pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham**
abhrāntam [nyāyavi - 1|4] iti lakṣaṇasyāsaṃbhavadoṣānuṣaṃgāt |

SŚP §7 English

If it is objected: certainly, while the atoms, which are unconnected [to each other] but very close, appear in the eye, mental creation, causing one to see a non-existing form, such as the gross etc., in one's self and elsewhere⁷⁶⁶, covers up those [atoms] on account of some illusion, like being mistaken about hair⁷⁶⁷ etc..⁷⁶⁸ [It is answered:] It is not thus. Because [then there would be] adhering to that [sensory perception] not being devoid of confusion and conceptual construction, on account of [all] sensory perception, [both of] external [things] and internal [states] entering into the state of confusion. Because it would result in the definition, “sensory perception is devoid of conceptual construction and not confused⁷⁶⁹” [nyāyavi- 1|4] [suffering from] the fault of being inapplicable.⁷⁷⁰

only type of perception for Dharmakīrti has not a unique particular for its object because a man whose senses are operating never cognizes such an object. One does not experience such a unique particular either externally or internally. Externally we perceive (for example) a pot undergoing modifications and having parts; internally we experience our own consciousness having many forms. Even the person who has withdrawn his thoughts or concepts from all objects, perceives only a gross form having many parts and not an absolutely unique impartite particular. This is proved by the fact that a person awakened from such a state does not remember to have experienced such an absolutely unique particular” (Shah 1968: 222).

⁷⁶⁵ ed. note: “kalpanā |”

⁷⁶⁶ i.e. in both internal and external objects.

⁷⁶⁷ i.e. when seen from a distance the individual hairs cannot be seen and the hair looks like one unitary thing. “...the atoms can be perceived in a mass, though we cannot see them singly, even as we see a mass of hair, but not a single hair” (Radhakrishnan 1966a: 616)

⁷⁶⁸ The translation of *samvṛtī*, glossed by the editor as *kalpanā*, as mental creation here deserves some notice. Cf. Shah's (1999) comment to verses 42-50 of the *Āptamīmāṃsā*: “In this connection it is necessary to pay serious attention to the empiricist Buddhist's notion of *samvṛtī* or usage; for when he calls a phenomenon *samvṛtī* he means only to emphasize that it is not to be cognized by bare senses but by senses assisted by thought. Samantabhadra, on the other hand, will like the empiricist Buddhist to equate *samvṛtī* with illusion pure and simple, but he knows that the latter does not oblige him – at least does not do so straight away... There were no doubt Buddhists who equated *samvṛtī* with illusion, but these were the advocates of transcendentalism, not empiricism...” (Shah 1999: 50-51).

Samvṛtī thus corresponds to *kalpanā* (mental construction) or *savikalpakapratyakṣa* (determinate cognition), as it involves cognition not only with the bare senses but by the senses assisted by thought. The same tendency as described by Shah with respect to Samantabhadra towards wanting *samvṛtī* to mean “illusion pure and simple”, however, seems to be present here too when Vidyānandin has the Sautrāntika say that *samvṛtī* causes one to see non-existent forms, such as gross etc., both in external and internal objects (*ātmani paratra cāsantam eva sthūlādyākāraṃ darśayantī samvṛtīḥ*), while what is really perceived are only the unconnected atoms.

⁷⁶⁹ it is important to note that Dharmakīrti thus defines *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception) as indeterminate, i.e. free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*). This must be kept in mind throughout this chapter, as Vidyānandin often takes this for granted in his discussions of indeterminate and determinate cognition. Thus indeterminate cognition is often just referred to as cognition (*pratyakṣa, darśana, jñāna etc.*), without specifying that it is indeterminate. This is due to the fact that for the Buddhists perception *per se* is indeterminate.

SŚP §8 21, 25-28

nanu naiṣa doṣaḥ, paramāṇupratyakṣasya tallakṣaṇasambhavād iti cet; na; paramāṇūnām jātucid adhyakṣabuddhāvapratibhāsanāt | na hi kaścil laukikaḥ parīkṣako vā deśakālaviprakṛṣṭārthavat paramāṇūn sākṣāt pratyeti, anyathā pratītyapalāpapasamṅāt | ta ime paramāṇavaḥ pratyakṣabuddhāvātmānaṃ na samarpayanti pratyakṣatām ca svīkartum icchantīty amūlyadānakrayiṇaḥ⁷⁷¹ |

SŚP §8 English

If it is objected: Certainly this is no fault [of inapplicability] [with respect to our definition of sensory perception], because [our] definition of that [perception] is applicable to the sensory perception of atoms⁷⁷². [It is answered:] no; because the atoms do not appear in perceptual cognition at any time. For no ordinary [person] nor any critical examiner directly perceives the atoms, like objects that are remote in space and time [cannot be perceived]. Because otherwise [there would be] adhering to the denial of experience. These very atoms do not deliver themselves over to⁷⁷³ perceptual cognition, and [yet] they desire to claim visibility [for themselves]. Thus they are a buyer that does not want to pay the price [of that which he wants to buy].⁷⁷⁴

SŚP §9 22, 1-5

na ca paramāṇavaḥ pratyakṣā bhavitum arhanti, tatsākṣātkaṛaṇe pramāṇābhāvāt | nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam astīti cet; na; tasyāvyavasāyātmakasyāprāmāṇyāt, avisaṃvādavaikalayāt | tathā hi – yad avisaṃvādavikalaṃ na tat pramāṇam, yathā ajñasya viṣadarśanam, tad vikalaṃ ca saugataparikalpitaṃ darśanam | avisaṃvādo hītthaṃ geyam itthaṃ citram ity abhisandhikaraṇam eva | **abhiprāyanivedanād avisaṃvādanam** [pra-vā-1|3]⁷⁷⁵ iti vacanāt | na ca tannivedanam avyavasāyasya, ajñaviṣadarśanasyaṅpi tatprasamṅāt |

⁷⁷⁰ *Asambhava* is one of the three kinds of fallacies possible with respect to a definition (*avyāpti*, *ativyāpti* and *asambhava*), as defined by the Nyāya. *Asambhava*, inapplicable, is when the attribute does not exist in the phenomena one is trying to define, such as if one defines a cow as an animal with uncloven hoofs (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 47).

Vidyānandin's charge against the Sautrāntika her is that all perceptions perceive only gross, solid, common forms. If these are not real, merely the effect of mental creation caused by the illusion of the connection of the atoms (which are really discrete), then surely the conclusion is that all sensory perception is confused and not devoid of conceptions (as they all suffer from mental creations which cover the atoms). And if all sensory perception is confused and not devoid of conceptions, then the definition of sensory perception as not confused and devoid of conceptions given by Dharmakīrti cannot possibly be correct.

⁷⁷¹ ed. note: "mūlyam dātum na prabhavanti atha ca pratyakṣatām icchati |"

⁷⁷² i.e. sensory perception of atoms is covered by this definition, thus the definition is not inapplicable.

⁷⁷³ though *pratyakṣabuddhau* is here in the locative case, "to" seems to be the best English rendering.

⁷⁷⁴ i.e. "they want to have their cake and eat it too". They are not perceptible, yet want the condition of perceptibility. Cf. SŚP 36, 5 for the same expression.

⁷⁷⁵ Ed. note: "pramānam avisaṃvādijñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ | avisaṃvādanam śabde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt || [pra-vā- 1|3] |"

SŚP §9 English

And the atoms are not fit to be [called] perceptible⁷⁷⁶, because there is non-existence of a valid means of knowledge with respect to their direct perception⁷⁷⁷. If it is objected: “there is indeterminate perception [of the atoms]”⁷⁷⁸. [It is answered:] no, because that which has indeterminate nature is invalid, because it is devoid of correspondence [with the object]⁷⁷⁹. For it is as follows – That which lacks correspondance, that is not a valid means of knowledge, just as the seeing of poison by one who does not know [poisons]. And the perception postulated by the followers of the Sugata lacks that [correspondence].⁷⁸⁰ For correspondence only relates the intention [of the speaker]⁷⁸¹: “the song is such, the painting is such”. Because of the saying: “there is correspondence because of relating the intention⁷⁸²”. And the indeterminate cognition cannot make that

⁷⁷⁶ here *pratyakṣa*, usually a noun meaning “sensory perception”, is clearly used as an adjective meaning “perceptible”.

⁷⁷⁷ i.e. the atoms cannot be perceived as there is no valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) capable of perceiving them.

⁷⁷⁸ i.e. there does exist a *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge) which perceives the atoms, and that is indeterminate perception. Cf. §7 above for Dharmakīri’s definition of the *pramāṇa pratyakṣa* (sensory perception) as *kalpanāpodhatva* (devoid of conceptual construction), i.e. *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate). Cf. also SŚP 3, 26-27 for the same argument raised on behalf of the Puruṣādvaita with respect to the cognition of brahman.

⁷⁷⁹ i.e. non-discrepancy. According to the Buddhists the indeterminate cognition does have correspondence with the object. This is what makes it valid, i.e. that it has the form of the object that is perceived, without any conceptualizations and mental creations superimposed on it. But Vidyānandin here objects that indeterminate cognition is devoid of exactly such correspondence. An indeterminate cognition cannot have correspondence with the object as it is indeterminate, i.e. it cannot determine its nature. This is the point Vidyānandin is trying to make, though it gets somewhat confused by his apparent misunderstanding of the concept of *abhiprāyanivedana* (See footnote 782).

⁷⁸⁰ This is a syllogism. 1) *pratijñā (proposition): *indeterminate cognition is not a *pramāṇa*. 2) *hetu (premise): *because it lacks correspondence [with the object]. 3) udāharāṇa (explanatory example with a general statement): That which lacks correspondence, that is not *pramāṇa*, just as the seeing of poison by one who does not know [poisons] 4) upanaya (application): And the perception postulated by the followers of the Sugata (i.e. indeterminate cognition) lacks that [correspondence]. Only the *udāharāṇa* and *upanaya* are here given. The rest of the members of the syllogism are taken for granted. The point here is that indeterminate cognition cannot determine the nature of an object, just like a person who is ignorant of poisons is not able to recognize poison when he sees it. This syllogism is taken from the Siddhivinīścaya 1|24 of Akalaṅka (cf. Siddhivinīścaya 1|24 quoted in §15 below)

⁷⁸¹ Cf. footnote 782.

⁷⁸² the use of *abhiprāya* here is curious, as this concept of relating the intention (*abhiprāya*) is taken from a discussion of *śabda* (reliable testimony) with regard to its status as *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge). It might here be added that the Buddhists do not regard testimony as a separate *pramāṇa*, but as a case of inference (Shah 1968: 284). The point being made in the *Pramāṇavārtika* (Cf. editors note to verse 1|3 of the *Pramāṇavārtika* in footnote 775) is that *śabda* (testimony) does have correspondence, but with the intention the speaker wishes to convey, not the object in itself. It is thus strange to bring it up here in a discussion of perception, especially since the point clearly seems to be that indeterminate cognition cannot know the nature of the object, i.e. that it does not correspond to the object itself (which has nothing to do with the intentions of anyone). It is difficult to see how claiming that correspondence being “making known the intention”, taken from a discussion of *śabda* and referring to the intention of a speaker, fits into this. It thus seems clear that this concept has been brought into the discussion here on account of some misunderstanding by Vidyānandin.

As this term is so consistently used in this portion of the text, it has not been amended. Thus, even though it is here consistently translated as “intention”, as this is the meaning of the term used, it should be kept in mind that the point Vidyānanda clearly seems to be driving at is that **correspondence with the object itself** is only possible if there is determinate cognition, and impossible in indeterminate cognition, and not correspondence to the intention of a speaker.

[object⁷⁸³] known, because [then there would be] adherence to the perception of poison by one who does not know [poisons] [doing] that [i.e. making the object known]⁷⁸⁴.

SŚP §10 22, 6-8

avyavasāyasyāpi darśanasya vyavasāyajananāt tannivedanam iti cet; na;
vyavasāyasyaivāsaṃbhavāt, kutaścīd api tatsvarūpasyāvyavasthiteḥ | vikalpasvarūpasya
svasaṃvedanena vyavasthāpane ‘pi tasya vikalpanāntarāpekṣatvaprasaṅgāt,
nīlādisvalakṣaṇadarśanavat |

SŚP §10 English

If it is objected: Even indeterminate perception relates that [object]⁷⁸⁵ because it produces determinate [cognition]⁷⁸⁶. [It is answered:] no, because of the impossibility of [acquiring] determinate [cognition] [from indeterminate perception]. Because of the non-establishment of its essence from any means.⁷⁸⁷ If the determinate nature is established by self-cognition⁷⁸⁸, [then this is unacceptable], because [then there would be] adherence to that [self-cognition] being dependent on another determinate cognition, like seeing the bare particular, blue etc..⁷⁸⁹

SŚP §11 22, 9-13

yadi svasaṃvedanaṃ niścayasvarūpaṃ niścayanirapekṣatayā pariniṣṭhāpayet⁷⁹⁰ tadā
vastudarśanam api svalakṣaṇam, viśeṣābhāvāt, tathā ca kiṃ niścayāpekṣayā ?
vastudarśanasya niścayāpekṣāyāṃ vā niścayasvarūpasamvedanasyāpi

⁷⁸³ Syntactically, *tad* should here stand for *abhiprāya* (intention). It however seems clear that it is the object that is meant. Cf. footnote 782.

⁷⁸⁴ Here too it seems best to read “object” instead of intention. As stated in footnote 782 above, Vidyānandin seems clearly to have misunderstood the term *abhiprāya* (intention). What he is really trying to say is that indeterminate cognition cannot know the nature of the object it cognizes, as this would be like claiming that one who does not know poisons can still recognize a poison as poison when he sees it. Strictly speaking, following the same line of argumentation, one can of course say that one who is ignorant of poisons cannot relate the intention (of something being a poison) to someone else after having seen a poison, but that does not change the fact that this concept does not fit into the overall point Vidyānandin is trying to make.

⁷⁸⁵ Cf. footnote 782.

⁷⁸⁶ According to Dharmakīrti indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpapratyakṣa*) is only valid when it gives rise to determinate cognition (*savikalpapratyakṣa*) which leads to successful action (Shah 1968: 225). Thus the nature of the object (here the term *abhiprāya*, “intention”, is used in stead. Cf. footnote 782) can be known by indeterminate cognition.

⁷⁸⁷ What cognition would know this cognition as determinate? The indeterminate cognition, being indeterminate, cannot determine its determinate nature.

⁷⁸⁸ i.e. if it is able to know itself as determinate

⁷⁸⁹ *Svasamvedana*, being a kind of perception is, in Buddhist philosophy, indeterminate (Matilal 1986: 149; Shah 1968: 227). Being indeterminate, Vidyānandin here seems to argue, it would then require another determinate cognition. Just like seeing a particular, such as a blue thing, in Buddhist philosophy first occurs as an indeterminate cognition, which gives rise to a determinate cognition. Only then is the blue thing known, because an indeterminate cognition is only valid when followed by a determinate cognition which leads to successful, purposive action (Shah 1968: 225). Self-cognition can therefore not establish the determinate nature of the determinate cognition, it can only establish its perceptual nature.

⁷⁹⁰ ed. note: “vyavasthāpayet |”

nīścayāntarāpekṣaṇād anavasthā syād | vikalpasya vikalpāntareṇa vyavasthāpane ‘pi
tasyāpi tadantareṇa vyavasthī tadavasthaivānavasthā | tato vyavasāya eva na sambhavati
yatas tajjananāt pratyakṣam prāmāṇyam upadhauketa |

SŚP §11 English

If self-cognition can establish the determinate essence [of determinate cognition] without depending on [it itself being] determinate, then even [indeterminate] perception of an object⁷⁹¹ [can establish] the unique particular [without depending on determinate cognition], because there is no difference. And what is then the point of determinate cognition?⁷⁹² Or, since the [indeterminate] perception of the objectively existing thing [i.e. particular] is dependent on determination [by determinate cognition] there must be infinite regress on account of even that cognition of the determinate nature being dependent of another determination [by another determinate cognition]. If there is establishing of the determinate [cognition] by means of another determinate [cognition], there is establishing of that [other determinate cognition] by [yet] another [determinate cognition]. Only infinite regress is established from that [line of argumentation]. Therefore, determinate perception, from the production of which sensory perception presents validity, is not possible.⁷⁹³

SŚP §12 22, 14-17

⁷⁹¹ i.e. the bare particular (*svalakṣaṇa*).

⁷⁹² i.e. if it is maintained that self-cognition (which, according to the Buddhists, is indeterminate) can establish the determinate nature of the determinate cognition, then it should be maintained that the indeterminate cognition itself can establish the unique particulars directly without giving rise to a determinate cognition. There is no difference between the two cases. Why then do the Buddhists maintain that an indeterminate cognition depends on a following determinate cognition for its validity? There is thus no point in maintaining the existence of determinate cognition as its function, i.e. determining the indeterminate cognition and thus establishing the object of the indeterminate cognition, is clearly not necessary.

⁷⁹³ i.e. a determinate cognition can also not be self-cognized because a determinate cognition would be in need of another cognition to determine itself, on account of self-cognition, according to the Buddhists, being indeterminate as it is a case of valid perception. This second cognition will meet with the same problem as the first, thus requiring yet another cognition etc. etc.. The result is thus infinite regress. As a result, determinate cognition itself is impossible.

Vidyānandin here draws on one of Akalaṅka’s arguments for proving that *svasamvedana* (self-cognition) is not necessarily indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*), as the Buddhists maintain. Akalaṅka writes: “sarvavijñānām svasamvedanam pratyakṣam avikalpam yadi, niścayasyāpi kasyacit svata evāniścayāt | niścayāntaraparikalpanāyām anavasthānāt kutaḥ tatsamvyavahārasiddhiḥ |” (Akalaṅkagranthatraya quoted in Shah 1968: 228 footnote 63). Shah (1968) explains: “...Akalaṅka rightly observes that the self-cognition of a determinate knowledge at least could never be indeterminate. Dharmakīrti holds that the self-cognitions of all knowledge – including even determinate knowledge – is indeterminate. **This would mean that even a determinate knowledge is not self-determined but requires another knowledge to determine its self; this would involve an infinite regress detrimental to all purposive action.** Through all this Akalaṅka proves that though all cognitions are self cognized, a self-cognition is not necessarily indeterminate; that the self-cognition of a determinate knowledge is always determinate; and that only a determinate self-cognition deserves to be called *pramāna*.” (Shah 1968: 227-8 italics in original, my bold).

Vidyānandin is here not making the same point as Akalaṅka, but clearly draws on his argument to reach his own point. Akalaṅka has shown that the self-cognition of a determinate cognition must be determinate, otherwise it will end in infinite regress. Vidyānandin draws on Akalaṅka’s argument when he here argues that determinate cognition cannot be self-cognized and is thus not possible.

yathā kathamcid vyavasāyasya sambhava vā na tajjananam sambhavati avyavasāyād
vyavasāyasya gardabhād asvasyevānutpatteḥ | abhilāpaśūnyād apy adhyakṣād
vyavasāyakalpanāyām svalakṣaṇam kiṃ nādhyavasāyam janayet svayam abhilāpaśūnyam
api, pratyakṣam adhyavasāyasya hetur na punaḥ rūpādir iti katham sunirūpitābhidhānam |

SŚP §12 English

Or because, if determinate [cognition] [should] somehow be possible, it is not possible that it [i.e. the determinate cognition] is produced from that [indeterminate cognition]⁷⁹⁴. Because there is no arising of determinate [cognition] from indeterminate [cognition], just as there is (no arising) of a horse from a donkey.⁷⁹⁵ If determinate, conceptual [cognition] [can be produced from] an [indeterminate] perception that is free from verbal expression⁷⁹⁶, why can not the bare particular, which is itself free from verbal expression, produce the determinate cognition? How can the statement: “[indeterminate] sensory perception is the cause of the determinate cognition, but not color etc.” be well considered?⁷⁹⁷

SŚP §13 22, 18-20

yadi punar avikalpakād api pratyakṣād vikalpātmano 'dhyavasāyasyotpattiḥ pradīpādeḥ
kajjalādivat; vijātīyād api kāraṇāt kāryasyotpattidarśanād iti matam; tadā tādrśo⁷⁹⁸ 'rthād
vikalpātmanah pratyakṣasyotpattir astu tata eva |

SŚP §13 English

Moreover, if it is thought that: “cognition that has a determinate nature⁷⁹⁹ arises even from indeterminate sensory perception, like soot etc. from a lamp etc.⁸⁰⁰, because the

⁷⁹⁴ This seems to have been a common argument raised against the Buddhists, leading the Buddhist Jñānagarbha and his followers to maintain that mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*), which is both sensory and mental, is required in order to link the two heterogenous kinds of cognition, i.e. indeterminate perception and determinate cognition (Shah 1968: 211). This was later rejected by Dharmottara, maintaining that an effect can be produced from a heterogenous cause (cf. note to the translation of the Buddhist objection in §13 below).

⁷⁹⁵ even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that determinate cognition is somehow possible for the Buddhist, it cannot arise from indeterminate cognition as these are two different things. There is no way indeterminate cognition could give rise to determinate cognition, just as a donkey cannot give rise to a horse.

⁷⁹⁶ According to Buddhist philosophers, there can only be verbal expressions if there is mental construction, i.e. conceptualization, which indeterminate cognition is free from. Only a mental construction can be associated with words (Shah 1968: 202).

⁷⁹⁷ i.e. why not cut out the middle man and say that the object itself generates determinate cognition? The Sautrāntika Buddhists maintain that the indeterminate cognition is the generative cause of the determinate cognition, while the objects are not. But, since both the objects and indeterminate cognition are both free from verbal expression, Vidyānandin argues, the objects themselves could just as well be the generative cause of the determinate cognition.

⁷⁹⁸ ed. note: “śabdarahitāt |”

⁷⁹⁹ i.e. determinate cognition

⁸⁰⁰ i.e. the lamp, which has the nature of fire produces soot, which has the nature of earth. Thus determinate cognition can arise from indeterminate cognition.

arising of an effect even from a dissimilar cause is perceived”⁸⁰¹, then indeed sensory perception which has a determinate nature must arise from an object that is of such a kind [i.e. free from verbal expression]⁸⁰².

SŚP §14 22, 21-24

jātidravayaguṇakriyāparibhāṣākālpanārahitād arthāt katham jātyādikalpanātmakam
pratyakṣam syād iti cet; pratyakṣāt tadarhitād vikalpaḥ katham jātyādikalpanātmakaḥ
syād iti samānaḥ paryanuyogaḥ | vikalpasya jātyādiviṣayatvād adoṣaḥ iti cet; na;
pratyakṣavat tasya⁸⁰³ jātyādiviṣayatvavirodhāt; tata⁸⁰⁴ eva tasya vastuno ‘py
utpattiprasakteś ceti vyavasāyahetutvam anupapannam eva |

SŚP §14 English

[If it is objected]: How can [determinate] cognition, which has the nature of conceptual construction, [be generated] from the object which is free from the conceptual constructions of universal, substance, quality, activity and words? [It is answered with] the question: How can determinate [cognition] which has conceptual constructions of categories etc. as its nature [be generated] from [indeterminate] cognition which is free from those [conceptual constructions]?

[If it is objected]: There is no fault, because determinate [cognition] has categories etc. as [its] object.⁸⁰⁵ [The answer is:] no; because that [determinate cognition] having universals etc. as its object is contradictory, like [indeterminate] perception [having category etc. as its object is contradictory]⁸⁰⁶. and [if determinate cognition is said to create the its proposed objects, i.e. the universal etc., and then cognize them], [then this is rejected] because [then there would be] adhering to the objects arising even from that

⁸⁰¹ This position is taken by Dharmottara in his commentary on the Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindhu, the Nyāyabindhuṭīkāṭīppanī 29-31 as a response to and refutation of Jñānagarbha’s contention that *mānasapratyakṣa* (mental perception) is required as an intermediate step in order for indeterminate perception to generate determinate cognition (Shah 1968: 211).

⁸⁰² i.e. this would not solve the problem, as determinate cognition arising directly from the object would also be a case of an effect arising from a dissimilar cause.

⁸⁰³ ed. note: “nirvikalpakasya |”. This does not fit the argument and should be understood as referring to *vikalpakasya*.

⁸⁰⁴ ed. note: “pratyakṣāt |”

⁸⁰⁵ i.e. the determinate cognition’s determinate nature, characterized by conceptual construction, comes from its objects being categories etc.. Its determinate nature does thus not come from indeterminate cognition.

⁸⁰⁶ i.e. if indeterminate cognition does not cognize the universal etc. on account of being free from conceptual constructions, and determinate cognition is generated by indeterminate cognition, how can determinate cognition have these as its objects? This does not make sense. It is just as contradictory to hold that determinate cognition has these as its objects as it would be to say that indeterminate cognition has these as its objects. Whatever is cognized by the indeterminate cognition should be cognized by the determinate cognition as well. If the universal etc. are not cognized by the indeterminate cognition, how can they be there for the determinate cognition to cognize?

[indeterminate sensory perception]⁸⁰⁷. Thus [indeterminate cognition] being the cause of determinate [cognition] is inadequately supported.

SŚP §15 22, 25-23, 5

atha vyavasāyavāsanonmīlanena avyavasāyasyāpi vyavasāyahetutvaṃ darśanasyeti cet; na; tadvad arthasyaiva taddhetutvaprasaṅgena antargaḍuno darśanasyākalpanāpatteḥ | vyavasāyahetutvena cāvīsaṃvāditvam aupacārikam eva darśanasya syāt, mukhyataḥ saṃnipatyābhiprāyanivedanena vyavasāyasyaiva tadupapatteḥ | na ca tatas tasya prāmāṇyam; sannikarṣādāv api tatprasāṅgāt | tato yuktam avīsaṃvādavaikalyāt⁸⁰⁸ darśanam apramāṇam iti | tad uktam –

**viśadarśanavat sarvam ajñasyākalpanātmakam |
darśanam na pramāṇam syād avīsaṃvādahānitaḥ || [siddhivini- 1|24] iti**

SŚP §15 English

If it is now objected: “Indeterminate [cognition] is still the cause of the determinate [cognition] on account of the rise of impressions [of previous] determinate [cognitions]”.⁸⁰⁹ [It is answered:] no; because, in the same way [there would then be] adherence to the object alone being the cause of that [determinate cognition], on account of the occurring of the uselessness of non-conceptual [indeterminate] perception.⁸¹⁰

Let [then] the correspondence of [indeterminate] perception [to the object] be only secondary, by being the cause of determinate [cognition], because it is found that only that [correspondence] of determinate [cognition] is primary, by directly making known the⁸¹¹ intention. And therefore that [indeterminate perception] does not have validity, because [then there would be] adhering to that [validity] even in the connection of the

⁸⁰⁷ This second argument (*tata eva tasya vastuno 'py utpattiprasākteś ca*) is rather minimal. It is difficult to see how it would describe the consequences of the first argument (*pratyakṣavat tasya jātyādiviṣayatvavirodhāt*). It thus seems best to read it as further proving that the universal etc. cannot be the objects of determinate cognition by showing the consequences of another, unexpressed suggestion as to how this can be so.

As the universal are not the objects of indeterminate cognition, which gives rise to the determinate cognition, it might be contended that the determinate cognition creates the universal etc. and then cognizes them. This seems to be the unexpressed suggestion this argument is directed against. Against this Vidyānandin then argues that if this is maintained one may as well maintain that the indeterminate cognition too gives rise to its objects, i.e. blue etc., as well, because there is no difference between the two cases. This would not be acceptable to the Sautrāntikas.

⁸⁰⁸ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “vakalyāt”.

⁸⁰⁹ i.e. the Buddhist may then contend that indeterminate cognition can still give rise to determinate cognition, because universals etc. are cognized in determinate cognition, even though it is not cognized by indeterminate cognition, because of previous impressions. This is an attempt to address the problem of the indeterminate cognition and the determinate cognition having different objects discussed in the previous paragraphs.

⁸¹⁰ i.e. once again the objects themselves, by instigating the rise of the impressions, can then give rise to determinate cognition. The intermediate indeterminate cognition is then not required in order to generate the determinate cognition.

⁸¹¹ here too *abhiprāya* (intention) should be read as really referring to “the object”. Cf. footnote 782.

sense organs with the sense objects etc.. Therefore it is suitable that [indeterminate] perception is not a valid means of knowledge, on account of lacking correspondence [with the object].⁸¹² It is said –

Like the seeing of poison by one who is ignorant [of poisons]⁸¹³, all perception, which does not have conceptual construction as its nature, cannot be a valid means of knowledge, on account of not corresponding [with the object].

SŚP §16 23, 6-7

prāmāṇyābhāve ca dūrataḥ pratyakṣatvam; tasya⁸¹⁴ tadviśiṣṭatvena⁸¹⁵ tadabhāve
'nupapatteḥ | ataḥ pratyakṣābhāvān na paramāṇūnām pratibhāsane pratyakṣam prabhavati
|

SŚP §16 English

On the non-existence of validity, [indeterminate cognition having] “perception-ness” is far away.⁸¹⁶ Because that [perception-ness] is characterized by that [validity], on account of it [perception-ness] not being found if there is no validity. Therefore, on account of the non-existence of that [validity], perception does not have the power to cognize the atoms.⁸¹⁷

SŚP §17 23, 8

nāpy anumānam; tasya liṅgadarśanapūrvakasya pratyakṣābhāve 'nupapatteḥ | nāpy
āgamaḥ vācām vastuviśayatvāniṣṭeḥ | evaṃ sakalapramāṇābhāvāt katham arthapramitiḥ
syāt, tadabhāve paroditapañcaskandharūpāṣeṣaprameyānupapattiḥ | tathā ca jagac

⁸¹² i.e. as the Buddhists maintain that indeterminate is only valid if it gives rise to a determinate cognition, its correspondence with the object can only be secondary, i.e. it corresponds with the object only by being the generative cause of the determinate cognition. The determinate cognition must have the primary correspondence as it reveals the object directly. If indeterminate cognition, with its secondary correspondence with the objects, which it has by generating determinate cognition, is regarded as valid, then the contact of the senses and objects, with its third hand correspondence from generating indeterminate cognition which again generates determinate cognition, should also be considered valid. This is not acceptable to the Buddhists.

This argument does not seem to be directly linked to the objection and its answer in the beginning of this paragraph, but seems rather to sum up the discussion concerning determinate and indeterminate cognition, and the lack of the latter of correspondence with the object, so far (§9-§15). Vidyānandin now considers it proved that indeterminate cognition does not correspond to the cognized object, and can thus not be considered a *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge).

⁸¹³ Cf. SŚP 22, 2-3 and 22, 5 (§9 above) for the same expression.

⁸¹⁴ ed. note: “pratyakṣatvasya |”

⁸¹⁵ ed. note: “prāmāṇyābhāve |”

⁸¹⁶ i.e. if it is not valid, it can hardly be called perception. Cf. Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception, *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhrāntam* [nyāyavi - 1|4], quoted in §7 above.

⁸¹⁷ This concludes the refutation of the Buddhist contention that the atoms are cognized by perception, raised in §9 above.

chūnyam eveti syādvādaivdeṣinām saugatānām mahadaniṣṭam upanipatati | tad uktam
svamisamantabhadrapādaiḥ –

pratyakṣabuddhiḥ kramate na yatra talliṅgigamyam na tadarthaliṅgam |
vāco na vā tadviṣayeṇa yogaḥ kā tadgatiḥ kaṣṭam aśruṇvatām te⁸¹⁸ || [yuktyanu- ślo 22]
iti

SŚP §17 English

Not even inference [has the power to cognize the atoms], on account of there being no occurrence of that [inference], which is preceded by the seeing of the mark, if there is non-existence of perception [as it does not have validity].⁸¹⁹ Not even the [scriptural] tradition [has the power to cognize the atoms] as the words are not acknowledged to have really existing objects as their objects.⁸²⁰ Thus, on account of the non-existence of all the valid means of knowledge, how can there be valid cognition of objects? Because, if there is non-existence of those [valid means of knowledge], the objects of valid knowledge, which are declared by the opponents [i.e. Buddhists] to have the nature of the five skandhas, are not found. And thus the great calamity, “The whole world is completely void”, occurs for the followers of the Sugata, who are hostile towards the Syādvāda. It is said by the verses of Svami Samantabhadra –

That in which perceptual cognition does not operate is known through having the mark⁸²¹. [But] there is no object [that can be] the mark! Nor is testimony suitable, because [its] object is that [intention of the speaker]. Alas! What is the refuge of those who do not listen to your [words, O Arahāt!]?

SŚP §18 23, 15-17

tataḥ prāk paramāṇavaḥ pratibhāsanta iti pareṣāṃ pratijñā poplūyate, tathā paścāt
saṃvṛtyā⁸²² sthūlādyākārāḥ pratīyanta⁸²³ iti pratijñāpi | prāg api pratyakṣeṇa nīlādivat
sthūlādyākārāṇām darśanāt nīlavikalpavat sthūlādivikalpānām ca pratīteḥ |

⁸¹⁸ ed. note: “arhata iṣṭam ity adhyāhāraḥ, ten ate iṣṭasaśruṇvatām iti sambandhaḥ - ā, ṭi- |”

⁸¹⁹ as inference depends on perception, it too cannot establish the existence of the atoms if there is no perception. Such as in the inference “there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke”, the mark (*liṅga*), which is here the smoke, must be cognized by perception. If the mark cannot be cognized, there can be no inference.

⁸²⁰ i.e. the *vastu* (really existing object) is not accepted to be the object of statements, as statements relate the intention of the speaker and not the objects spoken of directly. Cf. Pramāṇavārtika 1.3. quoted by the editor in a footnote 775.

⁸²¹ i.e. it is inferred

⁸²² Amended. Printed ed. reads: “saṃvṛti”. Cf. footnote 768.

⁸²³ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “pratīyante iti”. Amended according to sandhi rules.

SŚP §18 English

Therefore, the first proposition of the others: “The atoms are cognized” is utterly demolished. In the same way [their] later proposition: “the forms, the gross etc., are cognized by mental construction” is also [utterly demolished]. Because, even at first, like blue etc., there is perception of the forms, gross etc., by means of sensory perception. And because the determinate [cognition] of gross etc., like the determinate cognition of blue etc., is cognized.

SŚP §19 23, 18-19

tasmād indriyabuddhayo ‘pi svalakṣaṇaviṣayā mā bhūvan kevalaṃ sthūlādyākārān paśyeyuḥ, adṛṣṭe vikalpāyogāt, atiprasaṃgāc ca |

SŚP §19 English

Hence, even sensory-perceptions cannot have the bare particular as their object. They [i.e. the sensory-perceptions] merely cognize the forms, such as gross etc.. Because of the unsuitability of determinate [cognition] with respect to that which is not cognized [by indeterminate cognition]⁸²⁴, and because of the unwarrantable extension⁸²⁵.

SŚP §20 23, 20-22

yathaiva hi nīle pītādīnām adrstatvān na ⁸²⁶tadvikalpotpattiḥ, nīlasya drṣṭatvān nīlavikalpasyotpatteḥ, tathaiva sthūlādīn apaśyataḥ ⁸²⁷tadvikalpotpattir mā bhūt; svalakṣaṇadarśanāt svalakṣaṇavikalpotpattir evāstu |

SŚP §20 English

For, just as there is no arising of determinate [cognition] of that [yellow] on account of yellow etc. not being cognized in blue, because there is only arising of determinate [cognition] of blue from the [indeterminate] cognition of blue. In the same way the arising of determinate [cognition] of that [gross etc.] cannot arise from gross etc. not being cognized. From cognizing the bare particular, determinate [cognition] of only the bare particular can arise.⁸²⁸

⁸²⁴ i.e. the object of the indeterminate cognition and the object of the determinate cognition must be the same. Cf. § 14 above and §20 below.

⁸²⁵ i.e. if it were so that that which is not cognized by indeterminate cognition could be cognized by determinate cognition, this would mean that one could have the determinate cognition of yellow from the indeterminate cognition of blue. Cf. §20 below.

⁸²⁶ ed. note: “sthūlādivikalpotpattiḥ |”. It seems that some printing error is responsible for the editors note to the same expression (i.e. *tadvikalpotpattiḥ*) below (in the same sentence) has been printed next to this word as well. While he has correctly glossed the following occurrence of this expression as *sthūlādivikalpotpattiḥ*, it is not correct here. Here it should be correctly glossed as *pītādivikalpotpattiḥ*.

⁸²⁷ ed. note: “sthūlādivikalpotpattiḥ |”

⁸²⁸ i.e. there can only be determinate cognition of something if that thing is cognized. But the Buddhists maintain that the forms, such as gross etc., are not really cognized. Vidyānandin argues that there can then

SŚP §21 23, 23-24, 1

na caivam, sthūlādyākāreṣv eva vikalpotpatteḥ | yadi punaḥ sthūlādyākārāṇām adarśane
'pi ⁸²⁹tadanādivāsanāvaśād eva tadvikalpotpattir uararīkriyate tadā nīlādirūpādarśane 'pi
tadvāsanāsāmarthyād eva nīlādivikalpotpattiḥ⁸³⁰ | tato⁸³¹ nīlādirūpavyavasthā mā bhūt |
tadvat sukhādivyavasthitir api kutaḥ saṃbhāvyet | svasaṃvedanavyavasthā ca
tanniścayotpatteḥ durghaṭaiva | tadanutpateḥ sutarāṃ tadavyavasthā
svargaṃrāpaṇaśaktyvad vedyākāravivekavad vā | **svarūpasya svato gatīḥ** [pra- vā- 1|5] ity
api tathā niścayānutpattau na siddhyet, brahmādvaitādivad iti sarvaṃ viplavate |

SŚP §21 English

And it is not thus, because of the arising of determinate [cognition] only with respect to the forms, such as gross etc..⁸³² Moreover, if the arising of determinate cognition of those [forms, gross etc.] even though there is no [indeterminate] cognition of the forms, gross etc., is agreed to on account of the power of beginningless [previous] impressions of those [gross etc.], then the arising of determinate [cognition] of blue etc., even though there is no seeing of the colors, blue etc., [must also be agreed to] on account of the [previous] impressions of those [blue etc.]. From that, there cannot be establishing of the colors, such as blue etc..⁸³³

Likewise the establishing of [inner states such as] happiness etc. [is not possible]. How can [their establishment] be possible?⁸³⁴ And the establishing of self-cognition is difficult from the arising of [its] determinate [cognition]⁸³⁵. That [self-cognition] is even more unestablished from the non-arising of that [determinate cognition], like the power

not be determinate cognition of them. Claiming that determinate cognition of gross forms etc. arises from cognition of the bare particulars is like claiming that the determinate cognition of yellow arises from the cognition of blue. It is absurd. If the bare particular was cognized, the result would be the arising of determinate cognition of that particular, and not the determinate cognition of gross forms etc..

⁸²⁹ ed. note: "sthūlādi |"

⁸³⁰ ed. note: "syād iti |"

⁸³¹ ed. note: "nīlādivikalpotpattyanyathānupapatteḥ |"

⁸³² And the determinate cognition of the bare particular never arises. Only determinate cognition of gross forms etc. arises. The conclusion must then be that the bare particulars are not cognized by indeterminate cognition.

⁸³³ i.e. if one tries to explain the determinate cognition of the gross form etc. by postulating that the determinate cognition of gross forms etc., which the Buddhist maintains is not perceived by indeterminate cognition, are caused by previous impressions of gross forms etc., then one must also, by the same logic, acknowledge that the determinate cognitions of blue etc. (i.e. all external objects) are caused by previous impressions. And thus one cannot establish the existence of those external things, since they are not really cognized. The determinate cognition is then not generated by the external objects, not even indirectly by being produced from the indeterminate cognition of the external object. They simply appear from previous impressions.

⁸³⁴ i.e. mental states would also not be established as their cognition too would be on account of previous impressions (*vāsanā*).

⁸³⁵ i.e. as self-cognition is considered to be indeterminate by the Buddhists, there is a problem of how it is determined. Since an indeterminate cognition depends on a subsequent determinate cognition to be valid, self cognition cannot be validated. Cf. §11 above and footnote 793.

that leads to attaining heaven⁸³⁶ or like the distinction of the form that is to be known⁸³⁷. In the same way, since there is no arising of [its] determinate [cognition], it cannot be proved that "self-cognition cognizes itself from itself", like with respect to the Brahmādvaita etc.. Thus everything is lost.⁸³⁸

SŚP §22 24, 2-3

tataḥ kutaścīn niścayāt nīlādisvabhāvavyavasthāyāṃ sthūlādiniścayāt vastuni
paramārthataḥ sthūlādyākāravavyavasthitir āstheyā anyathā kvacid api vyavasthānāsiddheḥ |

SŚP §22 English

Hence, if there is somehow establishing of the nature of blue etc. from determinate [cognition] [of blue etc.], it is to be acknowledged that there is establishing of the really existing forms, gross etc., in the [external] object on account of a determinate [cognition] of gross [form] etc.. Because otherwise it is not proved that there is establishing [of the nature of a thing] in anything.⁸³⁹

SŚP §23 24, 4-5

tato na teṣāṃ sāmvr̥tatvam, samvr̥te vikalpātmikāyāḥ prāg eva pratyādiṣṭatvāc⁸⁴⁰ ceti prāg
uktaṃ śākyaavākyaṃ aśeṣataḥ pratijñārūpaṃ prajñair avajñāyate |

SŚP §23 English

Therefore, they [gross form etc.] are not mental creations. Because that which has a determinate nature has already been refuted with respect to being mental creation. Thus the entire statement of the Buddhists⁸⁴¹, in the form of [their] proposition⁸⁴², is despised by the wise.

⁸³⁶ The point seems to be that though there is self-cognition of "the power that leads to heaven", it cannot have determinate cognition. Phenomena such as this are then even more impossible to ascertain, as they can only have self-cognition, which (as shown above) cannot establish them as it is indeterminate and thus depends on a subsequent determinate cognition for validity.

⁸³⁷ It is utterly obscure what the meaning of this should be. It is apparently something which cannot have determinate cognition, but I have not been able to understand what it refers to.

⁸³⁸ Since self-cognition is indeterminate and its determination has been shown to be impossible, it cannot be established that self-cognition cognizes itself, just like the Brahmādvaita cannot be established to cognize itself. Thus, since cognition as imagined by the Buddhists is impossible, everything is lost. Since cognition is not valid, the objects of cognition cannot be established. Thus one cannot prove that anything exists.

⁸³⁹ i.e. either both the blue nature of the blue thing and the gross nature of the gross thing must be admitted as real, as they are both established on account of a determinate cognition, or both must be seen as unreal. If a bare particular such as blue etc. is established on account of a determinate cognition, so must the gross forms etc..

⁸⁴⁰ ed. note: "pratyākhyānaṃ niraśanaṃ pratyādeśo nirākṛtiḥ ā-ṭi- |"

⁸⁴¹ Śākya (descended from the śakas) can refer to either the Buddha or to Buddhists. The reason for this ambivalence in meaning is that śākya is already a strengthened form of śaka (with the -ya ending added). Buddha was from the śaka clan, thus he may be described as śākya, i.e. descended from the śaka. One can moreover further strengthen śākya to denote a follower of the Buddha. (Just as Bauddha is a strengthened form of Buddha, denoting the followers of the Buddha, and Jaina is a strengthened form of Jina, denoting the followers of the Jinas). But as ā does not change under further strengthening, the two forms cannot be

SŚP §24+§25 24, 6-17

nanu [na]⁸⁴³ paramārthāḥ sthūlādyākārāḥ bādhakasadbhāvāt | tathā hi – sthūlākāro
'vayavī, sādharmaṅkārah sāmānyam | tatra caikasyāvayavino 'nekeṣv avayaveṣu
sāmānyasyaikasya anekavyaktiṣu vṛttiḥ parair iṣṭā, pratyāśrayam kim ekadeśena,
sarvātmanā vā syāt prakārāntarābhāvāt | samavāyaḥ prakārāntaram iti cet; na;
ayutasiddheṣu vartate samavaiṭīty anayor arthabhedābhāvāt | tatraikam anekatra
vartamānaṃ pratyadhikaranaṃ na tāvad ekadeśena, niḥpradeśatvāt | nāpi sarvātmanā,
avayavyādibahutvaprasaṅgāt⁸⁴⁴; yāvanto 'vayavādayas tāvanto 'vayavyādayaḥ syuḥ,
teṣāṃ pratyekaṃ sarvātmanā vṛttatvāt | atha pradeśavattvaṃ⁸⁴⁵ manyetāvayavyādīnāṃ
tatrāpi vṛttivikalpo 'navasthā ca | tathā vāvayavyādi sarvaṃ tad ekam eva na syād iti⁸⁴⁶
vṛtter doṣasya bādhakasya bhāvād iti cet; tad asat; bhedaikāntavādināṃ
pratipāditadoṣopanipātāt | syādvādibhir api

ekasyānekavṛttir na bhāgābhāvād bahūni vā |

bhāgitvād vāsya naikatvaṃ doṣo vṛtter anārhatē || [āptamī- ślo- 62] iti

tān⁸⁴⁷ prati taddoṣapratipādanāt |

SŚP §24+§25 English

If [the Buddhist] objects:⁸⁴⁸ Certainly, the forms, gross etc., are not real, because of the existence of negations⁸⁴⁹. [They] are as follows – The gross form is a composite whole⁸⁵⁰. The common form is a universal. There, it is maintained by the opponents⁸⁵¹ that the one

separated from one another. It is however reasonable to assume that Vidyānandin here means the Buddhists.

⁸⁴² i.e. *saṃvṛtīyā sthūlādyākārāḥ praīyanta iti pratijñāpi*, “the proposition: “the forms, gross etc., are cognized by mental creation”. Cf. §18 above.

⁸⁴³ The editor seems here to have added *na*. Manuscript Ka- reads “nanu paramā-“.

⁸⁴⁴ This portion, “tatraikam anekatra vartamānaṃ pratyadhikaranaṃ na tāvad ekadeśena, niḥpradeśatvāt | nāpi sarvātmanā, avayavyādibahutvaprasaṅgāt” is taken from Akalaṅka’s commentary to verse 62 of the ĀM in his Aṣṭaśatī. Cf. footnote 863, and Chapter 4.

⁸⁴⁵ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “manyeta avayavyādīnāṃ”. Amended according to sandhi rules.

⁸⁴⁶ The section: “atha pradeśavattvaṃ manyeta avayavyādīnāṃ tatrāpi vṛttivikalpo 'navasthā ca | tathā vāvayavyādi sarvaṃ tad ekam eva na syād iti” seems to have taken several parts from Akalaṅka’s Aṣṭaśatī in his commentary to verse 62 of the ĀM. Cf. footnote 863. Vidyānandin has added to the argument, but the main sentences and argument are clearly the same.

⁸⁴⁷ ed note: “naiyāyikān prati vṛttivikalpadoṣasya |”

⁸⁴⁸ Paragraph 24 and the beginning of paragraph 25 are written as a Buddhist attempt to disprove the reality of the gross forms etc.. Thus the main portion of the text presents the Buddhist arguments, while the objections are the hypothetical objections against the arguments the Buddhist raises. The answers in this portion are thus the Buddhist’s answers to these objection. It is first in the end of paragraph 25, indicated in the translation by [The Jain answers:], that Vidyānandin answers the Buddhist objection as a whole.

⁸⁴⁹ i.e. there are arguments that disprove their reality.

⁸⁵⁰ *avayavin* literally means “having parts”.

⁸⁵¹ the opponents here referred to are actually the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The point Vidyānandin is trying to make is that the faults the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are met with with respect to the maintaining of universals and wholes do not apply to the Jains. To show this he here has the Buddhist raise these objections, taken from

whole resides in [its] many parts [and] the one universal (resides) in many individuals. Is [its]⁸⁵² seat partly [with each part], or wholly [with each part]? Because there is no other way.⁸⁵³ If it is objected: inherence is another way.⁸⁵⁴ [It is answered:] no, “it inheres” [means that] it resides in inseparable [things]⁸⁵⁵. Because thus the two adversaries do not have the status of separate objects⁸⁵⁶. In that case, the unitary [whole], existing in many places and in each substratum, firstly, does not [reside] [in its parts] partly, on account of having no parts. Neither does it [reside] [in its parts or individuals] wholly, because [then there would be] adherence to a multitude of wholes. There would be as many wholes as there are parts. Because each [whole] [would] reside wholly [in each part].⁸⁵⁷

Now, one may think that the whole etc. have parts.⁸⁵⁸ In that case, there is determination of [the whole of these parts] residing [in all of its parts partly or wholly] [remains], and [the result is] infinite regress.⁸⁵⁹ And thus the whole etc. cannot be completely one⁸⁶⁰, because of the existence of the fault of residing negates [it].

[The Jain answers]: That is untrue, because of the occurring of the fault that is set forth only for those who propound the doctrine of absolute difference [between the whole and its parts]⁸⁶¹. [For this fault is pointed out] by the Syādvādin as well:

The “fault of residing” in a [certain] Non-Jain⁸⁶² [doctrines] is: The one [whole or universal] cannot reside in the many, on account of not having parts. [In order to do so] it

the arguments of the Āptamīmāṃsā and Aṣṭaśatī against the Vaiśeṣika (cf. footnote 863), against the Anekāntavāda.

⁸⁵² everything said or argued concerning the whole in this paragraph is regarded as true concerning the universal as well.

⁸⁵³ i.e. does a part of the whole reside in each of its part, or does the whole whole reside in each part? There is no third alternative. The whole must reside either in the totality of its parts or just one. The universal must reside in all individuals or just one.

⁸⁵⁴ i.e. the whole and the universal reside in their parts or individuals by means of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Inherence is one of the Vaiśeṣika categories. The concept of *samavāya* is discussed at length by Vidyānandin in the Vaiśeṣika chapter.

⁸⁵⁵ Cf. footnote 1116.

⁸⁵⁶ The exact meaning of this is unclear. The implication seems to be that the close relation required between two things for inherence renders them essentially one?

⁸⁵⁷ i.e. according to the Vaiśeṣikas the whole (*avayavin*) and the universal (*sāmānya*) are unitary. Thus they cannot possibly reside partly in each part/individual, as they do not have parts. Neither can they reside wholly in each part or individual, as there would then have to be many wholes and universals, as many as there are parts and individuals. And then the whole/universal would not be one, but many.

⁸⁵⁸ i.e. if the opponents concede that they have parts

⁸⁵⁹ i.e. the parts of the whole (which is different from its parts) would again make up a whole, which would again have to have parts (again held to be different from this whole) to escape the previously declared faults. These parts would again be parts of a whole (different from the parts) etc. etc.. The result is infinite regress.

⁸⁶⁰ This section: “*atha pradeśavattvaṃ manyeta avayavyādīnām tatrāpi vṛttivikalpo ‘navasthā ca | tathā vāyavyādī sarvaṃ tad ekam eva na syād iti’*” is taken from Akalaṅka’s commentary to verse 62 of the ĀM in his Aṣṭaśatī. Cf. footnote 863 and Chapter 4. Vidyānandin has added to the argument, but the main sentences and argument are the same.

⁸⁶¹ i.e. this fault does not apply to the Jains, only the Vaiśeṣikas who uphold absolute difference between the whole and the parts. As the Jains do not hold that the wholes and the parts and the universal and particular are absolutely different, nor that the universal or whole is unitary, these faults do not apply.

⁸⁶² here referring to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of absolute difference between the whole and its parts.

[must be] many. [Then] it [the whole or universal] is not one because of consisting of parts.⁸⁶³

Because the fault of that [residing] is set forth [by the Jains] with regard to those [Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas]⁸⁶⁴

SŚP §26 24, 19-24

nanv evaṃ vṛtter doṣaḥ syādvādināṃ ca prasajyate iti cet; tarhi nāyaṃ prasaṅgo 'nekānte kathaṃcit tādātmyāt vedyavedakākārajñānavat |⁸⁶⁵ yathaiva hi jñānasya vedyavedakākārābhyāṃ tādātmyam, aśakyavivedanatvāt “kim ekadeśena sarvātmanā vā” iti vikalpayor na vijñānasya sāvayavatvaṃ bahutvaṃ vā prasajyeta, anavasthā vā, tathā avayavyāder apy avayavādibhyas tādātmyam aśakyavivecanatvād eva naikadeśena pratyekaṃ sarvātmanā vā; yatas tāthāgataḥ sarvathā bheda iva avayavāvayavyādīnāṃ kathaṃcit tādātmye ‘pi vṛttiṃ dūṣayet |

SŚP §26 English

If it is objected: Certainly, there must be adhering to the fault of residing for the Syādvādins. Then [it is answered]: there is no adherence [to that] in [the doctrine of] non-absolutism, on account of [it positing] some identity [between the whole and its parts], like cognition and the forms of cognized and cognized.⁸⁶⁶ For, just as the cognition has [some] identity with the forms of known and knower on account of it being impossible to distinguish [one of] the two alternatives: “Does it [reside in them] partly or wholly?”, and there is no adherence to cognition having parts or being manifold, nor infinite regress, just so there is [some] identity of the whole etc. with [its] parts etc. because it is impossible to distinguish [one of the two alternatives]. Neither does it [reside in its parts] partly nor wholly, from which⁸⁶⁷ the followers of the Tathāgata could ascribe the fault of

⁸⁶³ Cf. Akalaṅka's commentary to this verse in his Aṣṭaśatī:

tatra ekam anekatra vartamānaṃ pratyadhikaraṇaṃ na tāvad ekadeśena, niṣpradeśatvāt | nāpi sarvātmanā avayavyādibahutva prasaṅgāt | athāpi kathaṃcit pradeśavattvam, tatrāpi vṛttikalpano 'navasthā ca | tad ekam eva na syād iti | nāyam prasaṅgo 'nekānte, kathaṃcit tādātmyāt, vedyavedakākārajñānavat ||62||

“There, the one firstly does not reside in the many partly in each substratum, because it does not have parts. It can also not [reside in its parts wholly], because [then there would be] adhering to the whole etc. being many. Now [if it is conceded that] it somehow possesses parts, then the determination of [the whole of these parts] residing [in its parts partly or wholly] [remains] and there is infinite regress. It cannot be only one. There is no adhering to this in the Anekānta[vāda], because [according to the Anekāntavāda] there is some identity [between the parts and the whole etc.], like [when] cognizing the form of cognized and cognizer [they are seen as in some ways identical]” (My translation). See also Chapter 4.

⁸⁶⁴ i.e. the fault applies to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, not the Syādvādins.

⁸⁶⁵ The last half of this sentence is taken from Akalaṅka's Aṣṭaśatī which reads: *nāyam prasaṅgo 'nekānte, kathaṃcit tādātmyāt, vedyavedakākārajñānavat*. Cf. footnote 863.

⁸⁶⁶ i.e. according to the *anekāntavāda* the relation is one of both identity and difference *sui generis*.

⁸⁶⁷ i.e. had it been so that the Jains had held the whole and the part etc. to be absolutely different

residing even [in the doctrine that posits] some identity of the parts and the whole etc.⁸⁶⁸, like [they do] in the [doctrine that holds them to be] completely different⁸⁶⁹.

SŚP §27 24, 25-25, 10

yad atrānyad apy uktam – na paramārthaḥ sthūlākāraḥ paramāṇūnām saṃbandhāsiddheḥ teṣāṃ ekadeśena saṃbandhe digbhāgabhedād⁸⁷⁰ aṇuṣaṭkena yugapad yoge ṣaḍaṃśatāpatteḥ; sarvātmanā saṃbandhe pracayasyaikaparamāṇumātratvāpatter iti, tad api dūṣaṇaṃ paramāṇūnām ananyathānekāntavādinām⁸⁷¹ syān na punaḥ syādvādinām | yathaiva hi naiyāyikādayaḥ “paramāṇavo viviktāvasthāvāt pracayāvasthāyām api paramāṇutvaṃ na tyajanti” iti manyante na tathā syādvādinō yena taddoṣas teṣāṃ anuṣajyeta; taiḥ paramāṇūnām snigdharūkṣaṇām ajaghanyaguṇānām dvyadhikādiguṇānām vijātīyānām sajātīyānām ca saktutoyavat samtaptajatukhaṇḍavat kathamcit skandhākārapariṇāmātmakasya saṃbandhasyābhyupagamāt |

⁸⁷²**lukkhasa lukkheṇa duvāhieṇa ṇiddhasa ṇiddheṇa duvāhieṇa | ṇiddhasa lukkheṇa havei bandho jahaṇṇavajje visame same vā** || [source not found] iti vacanāt |

SŚP §27 English

Another [argument] is also declared with respect to this⁸⁷³ [by the Buddhists]: “The gross form is not real, because the relation of the atoms is not proved. Because, if [the atoms] relate partly, [i.e.] if they have simultaneous contact with six atoms from different directions⁸⁷⁴, it results in [the atom] having six parts.⁸⁷⁵ If [the atoms] relate wholly⁸⁷⁶, it results in a [composite atomic] aggregate having [the dimension] of only a single atom.⁸⁷⁷” [To this it is answered:] That fault is there for the absolutists who posit the non-difference of the atoms⁸⁷⁸, but not for the Syādvādins.

⁸⁶⁸ i.e. the Anekānavāda

⁸⁶⁹ i.e. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

⁸⁷⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “anuṣaṭkena”.

⁸⁷¹ ed. note: “paramāṇavaḥ paramāṇava eva na tu anyarūpā avayavirūpā vā bhavanti ity ekāntavādinām |”

⁸⁷² editors note: “rūkṣasya rūkṣeṇa dvayādhikena snigdheyasya snigdheṇa dvayādhikena | snigdhasya rūkṣeṇa bhavati bandhaḥ jaghanyavarjye viṣame same vā || uddhṛtam sarvā- pr- 307 |”. The Prakrit verse quoted by Vidyānandin has here been given in Sanskrit by the editor. According to Pischel §475, the form *havei* only seems to be found in Jain Śauraseni (1981: 396).

⁸⁷³ i.e. the unreality of the gross forms etc..

⁸⁷⁴ atoms are here imagined as having six sides (like a die) which they can combine with other atoms

⁸⁷⁵ i.e. and if atoms have parts they are not atoms but themselves composite entities.

⁸⁷⁶ i.e. if one atom combines wholly with another atom, and not a part of the atom with a part of another atom.

⁸⁷⁷ i.e. no matter how many atoms would combine the resulting aggregate of atoms would never exceed the spatial dimension of one single atom. Thus the gross forms cannot possible be made out of atoms as they do not have the dimension of only one single atom.

⁸⁷⁸ i.e. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who hold that the atoms do not change when entering into an aggregate.

For the Naiyāyikas etc. think: “The atoms do not abandon [their] atomic nature when abiding in an aggregate, like when abiding alone”. It is not so for the Syādvādin, by which⁸⁷⁹ that fault would result for them [the Syādvādins] as well. Because they [Syādvādins] agree to a relation whose nature is somehow a transformation into the form of an aggregate for the atoms⁸⁸⁰ that do not have the minimum degree [of difference], [i.e.] which have degrees [that differ by] two or more, dissimilar or similar. [The combination of dissimilar atoms is] like [the combination of] barley meal and water, [the combination of similar atoms is] like [the combination of] pieces of gum that are heated together. Because of the statement:

A cohesive [atom] [can combine with another] cohesive [atom] which [differs in its] degree [of cohesiveness] by two [or more]. A dry [atom] [can combine with another] dry [atom] which [differs in its] degree [of dryness] by two [or more]. A cohesive [atom] combines with a dry [atom] [which differs in its degree of dryness by two or more], similar or dissimilar [atoms] [can combine], except when [the difference of degree is the] minimum.⁸⁸¹

SŚP §28 25, 11-15

⁸⁸²parair apy evam abhyupagamaḥ kartavyaḥ, anyathā arthakriyāvirodhāt, aṅūnām anyonyam asaṃbandhato jaladhāraṇāharaṇādyarthakriyākāritvānupapatteḥ | rajjuvaṃśadaṇḍādīnām ekadeśāpakaṛṣaṇe tadanyākaraṣaṇe cāsaṃbandhavādino na syāt | asti caitat sarvam, vikalpapatibhāsināḥ pratyakṣadrṣṭatvasiddheḥ adrṣṭe vikalpāyogāt, anyathātiprasaṃgasyoktaprāyatvāt | asaṃbaddhaparamāṇumātragrāhipratyakṣādipramāṇābhāvasya pratipāditatvāc ca | tato jalāharaṇādyarthakriyānyathānupapatteḥ saṃbandhaḥ siddhaḥ⁸⁸³ |

⁸⁷⁹ i.e. if this was held by the Syādvādin as well.

⁸⁸⁰ i.e. the Syādvādins do not hold that the atoms are static (like the Naiyāyikas hold them to be). The atoms somehow transform into the form of an aggregate.

⁸⁸¹ Cf. TS 5, 32-35: “snigdharukṣatvād bandhaḥ, na jaghanyaguṇānām, guṇasāmye sadṛśānām, dvyadhiguṇānām tu”. Tatia (1994) translates as: “The integration of atoms is due to their tactile qualities of viscosity and dryness. There cannot be integration of atoms that possess the minimum one degree of viscosity or dryness. Atoms which have the same degree of viscosity or same degree of dryness cannot integrate. Two viscous or two dry atoms can integrate if the viscosity or dryness of one is two or more degrees higher than the other.” Put simply, atoms have one of the two qualities of “dryness” or “cohesiveness” (called “viscosity” by Tatia), which they have in varying degrees (1, 2, 3 etc. up to innumerable). Whether or not atoms can combine depends upon these qualities and their degrees. Exactly what rules apply is not uniform in the commentaries to the TS. The detailed workings of this are also not very significant in this context. Those interested in further details may confer with Tatia’s comments and explanation to his translation of this section in Tatia 1994: 141-42. The general rule however seems to be that both similar and dissimilar atoms (i.e. dry and cohesive) can combine as long as their degree of dryness or cohesiveness differs by two or more. They cannot combine if their degree differs only by the minimum amount (i.e. 1) (Tatia 1994: 140-142).

⁸⁸² ed. note: “baudhair api |”

⁸⁸³ Amended according to variant reading supplied by editor. The printed edition reads: ”saṃbandhāsiddhaḥ”. “saṃbandhaḥ siddhaḥ” is given as an alternate reading in a footnote, but without

SŚP §28 English

Even the opponents [Buddhists] should assent to it being thus⁸⁸⁴, because otherwise [they are] contradicted by causal efficacy⁸⁸⁵. Because causal efficacy, [like the pot] carrying and holding water etc., is not found if⁸⁸⁶ the atoms are not mutually connected.⁸⁸⁷ One who holds that there is no combination [of atoms] cannot pull a rope, bamboo cane, staff etc. in one direction while pulling [the same rope, bamboo cane, staff etc.] in the other [direction].⁸⁸⁸

And all this happens⁸⁸⁹. Because that which is cognized by determinate cognition is proved to be cognized by [indeterminate] cognition, because determination is unsuitable if it is not cognized [by indeterminate cognition]. Because otherwise [there will result] the aforementioned arising of an unwarranted extension. Because the non-existence of [any] valid means of knowledge, sensory perception etc., that grasp the mere unconnected atoms has [already] been set forth [by us]. Hence, combination [of atoms] is proved, because otherwise causal efficacy, such as holding water etc., is not found.

SŚP §29 25, 16-22

kiṃ ca, evaṃ vedataḥ citrajñānanirbhāsalavaviśeṣāñāṃ ekadeśena sarvātmanāpi
saṃbandhāsiddheḥ sakalanīlādinirbhāsāvayavavyāpy ekatvaṃ tatra na siddhyet |
tadavayavaprthaktvakalpanāyāṃ citraikajñānavyavahāro mā bhūt;
prthagvarṇāntaraviśayānekaśaṃtānā⁸⁹⁰ ekaikakṣaṇavat | tatra pratyāsattiviśeṣaḥ kathamcid
aikyāt ko 'paraḥ syāt; deśapratyāsatteḥ śītavātādibhiḥ vyabhicārāt; kālapratyāsatter
ekasamayavartibhir aśeṣārthair anekāntāt bhāvapratyāsatter
ekārthodbhūtānekapuruṣajñānair anaikāntikatvāt, dravyapratyāsattir eva pāriśeṣyāt
saṃbhāvyaṭe | sā caikadravyatādātmyalakṣaṇatvāt pratyāsattiviśeṣa itī kathamcid aikyam
evaikatvavyavahāranibandhanam citrajñānasya |

reference to any of the manuscripts. It is thus uncertain if any of the manuscripts have this reading. However, it is still a preferable reading.

⁸⁸⁴ i.e. the combination of atoms making up aggregates

⁸⁸⁵ according to Dharmakīrti objects are real mainly because they have causal efficacy

(*arthakriyāsāmarthya*) (Matilal 1986: 320).

⁸⁸⁶ *asambandhato* has an ablative ending. Though the English translation “if” usually represents the Sanskrit locative case, the ablative is here best rendered to English as “if”.

⁸⁸⁷ and since these activities are found to take place, i.e. as pots hold water etc., the position that atoms do not combine into aggregates is contradicted. Thus the Buddhists must accept it, or they will be adhering to a position that is shown to be untrue.

⁸⁸⁸ The point seems to be that one cannot deny the one but maintain the other, i.e. one cannot deny the combining of atoms, yet still maintain that the objects, such as pots etc., are still able to carry out their activities. This is like pulling a rope in two different directions.

⁸⁸⁹ i.e. the objects do carry out their activities

⁸⁹⁰ Amended. Printed edition reads: “prthagvarṇāntaraviśayānekaśaṃtānaikaikakṣaṇavat”. It does not seem to make sense to have this as one long comparison, as there then does not seem to be anything in the sentence which it is the comparison to.

SŚP §29 English

Moreover, on account of speaking thus the oneness [of a variegated cognition⁸⁹¹] pervading all [its] parts, [in the form of] reflections, such as blue etc., partly or wholly cannot be proved, because the relation of the particular pieces of reflections of a variegated cognition are not proved⁸⁹². If the parts of that [variegated cognition] are conceived of as separate [from one another], one cannot speak of one single cognition of variegated [color], [as the different parts would make up] many [separate] continuances whose objects are different, separate colors, just like several [spatially separate] moments [make up different continuances]⁸⁹³. What other relation⁸⁹⁴ than “some identity” can there be with respect to this⁸⁹⁵?

By elimination, only the relation [of occupying the same] substance is possible. Because the relation [of occupying the same] space is incorrect, on account of coldness and wind etc. [not being one though they occupy the same space], [because] the relation [of occupying the same] time [is incorrect] because it has the manifoldness of all objects on account of abiding in the same moment [not being one but many], [and because] relation [with the same] state [is incorrect] because there is manifoldness on account of the cognitions of many people cognizing the same object [not being one but many]. And that [relation of occupying the same substance] is the particular relation [that is possible in this case], because [its] nature is [some] identity [of the parts] with one substance. Thus only some identity is the basis for calling the variegated cognition one.⁸⁹⁶

⁸⁹¹ i.e. a cognition of variegated color

⁸⁹² i.e. if the combination of atoms is denied, how can a unified variegated cognition can be perceived? It cannot be proved that the one, variegated cognition resides partly in all the reflections (i.e. colors) of which it is made up, not wholly in each of them. In the first case the variegated cognition would have parts, in the second case it would not be one, but many. Both alternatives would result in there not being one variegated cognition. The variegated cognition is only possible if the different atoms combine, in the way that was previously described, into one whole.

⁸⁹³ i.e. if the different parts of the variegated cognition are not connected, they would make up separate continuums of moments, just like spatially different moments make up separate continuums (it must be added that this concerns spatially separate moments, as temporally different moments can be part of the same continuum of moments, as a continuum of moments consists of temporally separate moments successively following each other). The syntax of this sentence, even after amending the text (cf. footnote 890), is slightly unusual. The absence of an ablative, which which one would expect to appear at the end of this sentence, is noteworthy.

⁸⁹⁴ MMW gives this as “immediate proximity (in time, space etc.), close contact”. In this context, relation seems to be the best English rendering.

⁸⁹⁵ i.e. what other relation could account for the oneness of the variegated cognition?

⁸⁹⁶ i.e. occupying the same space cannot make the separate reflections a single variegated cognition, because coldness and wind occupy the same space, yet they are not one. Occupying the same time can also not make the separate reflections a single variegated cognition, as all the things existing in a given moment would then make up a whole. Likewise relation with the same state cannot make the separate reflections a single variegated cognition, as different people’s cognitions of a single object, which are cognitions of the same state, i.e. whichever state the given object possesses at the time of cognition, (the condition of these cognitions occurring at the same time thus seems to be presupposed and taken for granted), are not one cognition but many cognitions. Thus it is established that only the relation of occupying the same substance, which is characterized by having the nature of “some identity”, as, according to the *anekāntavāda* the parts and the whole are not absolutely different, can make the separate reflections a single variegated cognition.

SŚP §30 25, 23-26, 3

tad evaṃ pramāṇaprasiddhacitrajñānavat sūkṣmsthūlātmani jātyantare⁸⁹⁷
syādvādīṣṭavastunivṛttidoṣādyakhiladoṣo nāvakāśaṃ labhate | atrānyatra ca sarvatra
virodhādidūṣaṇaṃ citrajñānam evāpahastayatīti kiṃ niścintayā | tataḥ syādvādīnāṃ
saṃmataḥ sthūlākāraḥ paramārtha eva siddhaḥ | etena tadabhimataḥ sādharmaṇākāro ‘pi
paramārthatayā siddhaḥ syādvādisaṃmatasya sadṛśapariṇāmalakṣaṇasya
sāmānyasyāpratīkṣepārhatvāt, anyathā śuktikāde rajatādyapekṣayā
sādharmyadarśanasyābhāvāt, kathaṃ tannibandhanas tatra⁸⁹⁸ rūpyādhyāropaḥ, yata idaṃ
sūktaṃ bhavet | **śuktau vā rajatākāro rūpasādharmyadarśanāt** || [pra- vā- 1 | 45] iti

SŚP §30 English

Thus indeed, just like variegated cognition is well known through the valid means of knowledge, all faults, such as the fault of residing⁸⁹⁹ etc., do not find a footing in the object, which has a nature that is *sui generis* both minute and gross, accepted by the Syādvādins. With respect to this and other things, [indeed] with respect to everything, variegated cognition itself removes the refutation, such as contradiction etc., in every case. Thus, why should [the Syādvādins]⁹⁰⁰ worry?⁹⁰¹

Hence the gross form, approved by the Syādvādins, is indeed proved to be real [and not illusory]. By that [same logic] the common form as well, accepted by those [Syādvādins] is proved to be real, because the universal, defined as similar modification⁹⁰², does not deserve objection. Because otherwise [there would be] non-existence of perception of similarity in a shell etc. with regard to silver etc.. [And then] how [can] the wrong attribution of silver there [in the shell] be dependent on that [similarity]?⁹⁰³ From which [it follows that] this must be well said⁹⁰⁴: Or the silver form [is perceived] in the shell, on account of the perception of similarity of form.

SŚP §31 26, 4-11

na ca sādharmaṇyād aparaṃ asti, tasya nityavyāpīsvabhāvāsya kvacid api aprativedanāt |
tathā syādvādisaṃmataḥ sthīrākāraḥ paramārtha eva, citrajñānasyaikaṃ yugapad

⁸⁹⁷ editors note: “kathaṃcid nityānityātmani |”

⁸⁹⁸ ed. note: “rūpyam – rajatam |”

⁸⁹⁹ i.e. the question of whether the whole etc. resides partly or wholly in its parts etc..

⁹⁰⁰ *Nis-*, here prefixed to *cintā* (“thought”, “care”, “worry”) has a strengthening function.

⁹⁰¹ i.e. since the unitary variegated cognition (which is accepted by the Buddhists as one even though it consists of many reflections) itself proves that there is no fault in the Jain position, why should the Jains be worried?

⁹⁰² i.e. the Jain concept of *sāmānya* (universal) thus differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *sāmānya*. *Sāmānya* is not viewed as one and permanent, but defined as similar modification, or having similar qualities or form (Shah 1968: 144). Cf. also §31 below and SŚP 45, 10 (§6 Mīmāṃsā chapter) and SŚP 46, 24 (§11 Mīmāṃsā chapter).

⁹⁰³ i.e. how can one then mistake a shell for silver because they have a similar appearance if similarity is not accepted?

⁹⁰⁴ This formulation is interesting as the following quote is from Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārtika*.

anekākāravayāpitvavat krameṇāpy ekasyātmāder anekākāravayāpitvasiddheḥ | tathaivoktaṃ
bhaṭṭākalaṅkadevaiḥ –

yathaikaṃ bhinnadeśārthān kuryād vyāpnoti vā sakṛt |
tathaikaṃ bhinnakālārthān kuryād vyāpnoti vā kramāt || [laghī- ślo- 37] iti

pūrvottarakṣāṇānāṃ sarvathāniranvayatve⁹⁰⁵ arthakriyāvirodhāc ca | na hi
kṣaṇakṣayaikāntapakṣe arthakriyopapannā; bahirantararthānāṃ niravayavināśe kāryasya
nirhetukatvāpatter janmavirodhasiddheḥ |

SŚP §31 English

And there is no [universal] other than ‘similarity’, on account of there not being [any] perception of [anything] whose nature is eternal and [all]-pervading, anywhere.⁹⁰⁶ In the same way the solid form, accepted by the Syādvādins, is indeed real [and not illusory], on account of proving that the self etc.⁹⁰⁷, which is one, pervades manifold modes⁹⁰⁸ successively, just like variegated cognition, which is one, pervades manifold forms simultaneously. Indeed thus it is said by the master, Bhaṭṭākalaṅka:

Just as one [thing] may simultaneously produce or pervade [many] objects in different places. Just so one [thing] may successively produce or pervade [many] modes⁹⁰⁹ at different times.

Because, if [it is maintained that] the previous and following moments are completely unconnected, it is contradicted by causal efficacy. For, causal efficacy is not found in the absolutist doctrine of the destruction of moments. Because it is seen that [the theory of momentariness] contradicts the production [of effects], on account of resulting in the effect not having a cause if the external and internal objects are absolutely destroyed.⁹¹⁰

SŚP §32 26, 12-13

⁹⁰⁵ ed. note: “ekadravyānvayābhāve |”

⁹⁰⁶ i.e. the universal is nothing other than similarity, not something whose nature is eternal and (all)pervading (*nityavyāpīsvabhāva*), which is posited by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

⁹⁰⁷ i.e. substances such as the soul etc..

⁹⁰⁸ *ākāra* is here best rendered as “mode” (normally *pariyāya* or *bhāva*).

⁹⁰⁹ *artha* is here best rendered as “mode” (usually *pariyāya* or *bhāva*).

⁹¹⁰ i.e. the absolutely momentary object cannot be causally productive. According to Shah (1968), Bhadanta Yogasena, a Buddhist who did not hold reality to be momentary, was the first Indian philosopher to raise this objection against the momentary thing. Akalaṅka seems to be the first Jaina philosopher to use this argument against momentarism (60 footnote 33).

nanu pūrvakṣaṇād uttarakṣaṇasya prādur bhāvāt kuto niṣkāraṇatvaṃ kāryasyeti cet; na;
⁹¹¹kāryakālam aprāpnuvataḥ kāraṇatvānupapatteḥ, ciratarātītavat |

SŚP §32 English

If it is objected: Certainly, since the following instant manifests from the preceding instant, how is the effect without a cause? [It is answered:] no, because the [moment] which is not synchronous with the effect⁹¹² is not found to be [its] cause, like that [moment] which has become past a long time ago.⁹¹³

SŚP §33 26, 14-17

nanu kāryakālam prāpnuvato ‘pi na kāraṇatvaṃ, anyathā sarvasya samānakṣaṇavartinas
tatkāraṇatvaprasaṅgāt | tato yad anvayavyatirekānuvidhāyī kāryaṃ tad eva tasya kāraṇam
nānanukṛtvānvayavyatirekaṃ kāraṇam | [source not found] iti cet; na;
kṣaṇakṣayaikānte anvayavyatirekasyaivāghaṭanāt |

SŚP §33 English

If it is objected: Certainly, even the [moment] which is synchronous with the effect is not [its] cause. Because otherwise [there would be] adhering to everything that abides in the same instant being the cause of that [effect].⁹¹⁴ Therefore, that which accords with respect

⁹¹¹ Editors note: “tulanā – aṣṭaśa- aṣṭaśa- pr- 87 |”

⁹¹² lit. “that which does not obtain the time of the effect”

⁹¹³ i.e. since the momentary cause ceases to exist before the effect comes into existence, it cannot be its cause. An effect can only be generated in the presence of the cause. If the cause is not present, the effect cannot be generated. It does not matter if the supposed cause was destroyed a mere moment before the effect was to be produced or a long time before. The size of the time gap between them is irrelevant as long as they do not exist at the same time. Cf. Akalaṅka’s Siddhiviniścaya: “pūrvam naśvarāc chaktāt kāryaṃ kinnāvinaśvarāt | kāryotpattir virudhyeta na vai kāraṇasattayā ||” (quoted in Shah 1968: 61 footnote 35). Mookerjee (1944) writes: “...the absence of synchronism between the cause and the effect at the moment of the latter’s emergence would make the effect independent of the cause. The effect was not in existence when the cause was in existence and it comes into existence when the cause has ceased to exist. So if the effect is independent of the cause when it comes into existence and is not found to be dependent upon the cause either before or after, the bearing of the cause upon the effect becomes a fiction” (p28-29). Shah (1968), in summarizing Akalaṅka’s critique of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, adds: “Dharmakīrti should not consider what immediately precedes the effect to be the cause of it just as he does not consider that which is separated from the effect by a gap of time to be the cause of it; for both are similar as far as their utter non-existence at the time of the effect is concerned” (1968: 63).

A similar argument is also found in the Aṣṭasahasrī: “*na vinaṣṭaṃ kāraṇam asattvāc ciratarātītavat | samanantarātītaṃ kāraṇam iti ced na, samanantaratve ‘py abhāvāviśeṣāt | na ca pūrvasyottaraṃ kāryaṃ, tadasaty eva hi bhāvād vastvataravad atikrāntatamavad vā, yataḥ pūrvasya kāraṇatvanirṇayaḥ syāt*” (Aṣṭasahasrī 182/10 quoted in Soni 2009: 452; italics and bold in original). Soni (2009) translates: “...**what has been destroyed cannot be a cause because of its non-existence, as with what has passed by a long time ago.** If you [Buddhists now] say: “what immediately follows what has [just] passed by is the cause,” then [we Jains say] no, **because even what immediately follows it is not different from what does not exist. And neither is the effect what follows from what is previous, because it [the effect] would exist in the very absence of what was previous, as another thing, or as what has long since passed by;** therefore, it would be an explanation of the cause of what was previous [and not what came afterwards].” (Soni 2009: 452-3; bold in original).

⁹¹⁴ i.e. synchronicity with the effect, i.e. existing at the same time, cannot be the defining characteristic of its cause, as then everything synchronous with the effect would have to be regarded as its cause, which is absurd. In other words such a definition is too wide (*ativyāpti*).

to agreement and contrariety⁹¹⁵, that is its cause, on account of the saying: “that which does not follow⁹¹⁶ agreement and contrariety [with respect to the effect], is not the cause”.⁹¹⁷ [It is answered:] no, because agreement and contrariety is not brought about in the absolutist [doctrine] of the destruction of moments.⁹¹⁸

SŚP §34 26, 18-21

na khalu samarthe kāraṇe saty abhāvataḥ svayam eva paścād abhavatas
tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhānaṃ nāma nityavat | “svadeśavat svakāla sati samarthe kāraṇe
kāryaṃ jāyate nāsati” ity etāvataḥ kṣaṇikapakṣe anvayavyatirekānuvidhāne nitye ’pi⁹¹⁹ tat
syāt; svakāle ’nādyante sati samarthe nitye svasamaye kāryasyotpatter⁹²⁰
pratīyamānatvāt |

SŚP §34 English

Just like the permanent [cause] (cannot be said to accord with respect to agreement and contrariety), [the momentary cause] [can] certainly not be named “according with respect to agreement and contrariety”. [Because, in the case of the momentary cause,] [the effect] is later [generated] by itself alone, on account of the non-existence [of the cause at the time of the effect], because [the effect] does not exist when the [causally] efficient cause exists.⁹²¹

⁹¹⁵ *anvayavyatireka* is a Buddhist technical term, especially used by Dharmakīrti to describe the relation between a cause and its effect (Soni 2009: 453 footnote 9). Bartley (2005) explains it as: “a mode of reasoning (*yukti*) stating that when A is present, B is present, and when A is absent, B is absent. This is used to establish a relation of cause and effect. For example: given that we see our own actions happen after our intentions and that they do not happen in the absence of our intentions, there is a causal connection between intention and the occurrence of action. The causal relation is established by perception and non-perception and consists in positive and negative agreement.” (25, italics in original). In other words, if B invariably follows A, then A is the cause of B.

⁹¹⁶ *ananukṛtva*, from *anukṛtvan* is not found in the MMW. *Kṛtvan* (making, causing) and *anu+kr* (to follow) are found. *Anukṛtvan* is thus rendered as “that which follows”, making *ananukṛtvan* “that which does not follow”.

⁹¹⁷ i.e. “that which accords with respect to agreement and contrariety to the effect is its cause”.

⁹¹⁸ i.e. because, according to the theory of momentariness, the effect never takes place while the cause is present. It only takes place when the cause is absent, i.e. has been destroyed, as the moments, lasting only one moment, are continuously destroyed. Thus the cause according with respect to agreement and contrariety to the effect is impossible in the theory of momentariness.

⁹¹⁹ ed. note: “anvayavyatirekānuvidhānaṃ |”

⁹²⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “kāryasyotpatter asaty anutpatteś ca pratīyamānatvāt |”, so that it mirrors the argument of the Buddhists. But it makes no sense for the eternalists to argue that the effect will not be generated at its own time if the cause is not present, as they regard the cause as eternal, i.e. always present. It has therefore here been removed.

⁹²¹ i.e. it is not possible for the Buddhists to conclude that the cause accords with respect to agreement and contrariety because the cause and effect do not exist at the same time. The Buddhists must then hold that the effect generates itself as it does not exist at the same time as its cause. But then the effect would no longer be dependent on a cause, which is the defining characteristic of an effect.

This argument seems to be a condensed version of an argument raised by Akalaṅka in his *Siddhiviniścaya* against Dharmakīrti. Having established that the momentary cause and effect cannot exist at the same time, Shah summarizes Akalaṅka's further argument as follows: “If the effect is held to come into existence as the result of the absence of something (say X) that immediately precedes the effect, then the effect should be existent at all moments save the moment of X's existence because at all those moments there is the ‘absence of X’. If the momentarist wants to avoid this contingency, he will have to accept that

If [it is held that] the doctrine of momentariness accords with respect to agreement and contrariety [by arguing in such a way]: “In the presence of the [causally] efficient cause the effect is produced only in its own time, [and] in the absence (of the causally efficient cause) (the effect) is not (generated in its own time), just like (in the presence of the causally efficient cause the effect is produced only in) its own place⁹²², (and in the absence of the causally efficient cause the effect is not generated in its own place)”⁹²³, [then] that [accordance with respect to agreement and contrariety] [is found] even in the case of the permanent [cause]. [For the eternalist could argue that the permanent cause accords with respect to agreement and contrariety] because it is known that there is arising of the effect at its own time in the presence of the eternal [cause], which is [causally] efficient in its own time, which is beginningless and ⁹²⁴endless.⁹²⁵

SŚP §35+§36 26, 22-30

sarvadā nitye samarthe sati svakāla eva kāryaṃ bhavat kathaṃ
tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhāyīti cet; tarhi kāranakṣaṇāt pūrvaṃ paścāt cānādyanante
tadabhāvaviśiṣṭe⁹²⁶ kvacid eva tadabhāvasamaye bhavat kāryaṃ kathaṃ tadanuvidhāyīti
samānam | ⁹²⁷nityasya pratikṣaṇam anekakāryakāritve kramaśo ‘nekasvabhāvatvasiddheḥ

the effect comes into being by itself, that is, without any cause whatsoever; there is no other alternative for him.” (Shah 1968: 63-64).

The comparison with the permanent cause seems to need some qualification, as the permanent cause would not have the exact same problem as the momentary cause. The comparison must be understood as referring only to the conclusion, i.e. that it cannot accord with respect to agreement and contrariety, as the permanent cause will also not be able to meet these criteria as it would be eternally present. Its problem is thus in a certain sense the opposite of that of the momentary cause. For while the momentary cause cannot be shown to accord with respect to presence (as it cannot exist at the same time as its effect), the permanent cause cannot be shown to accord with respect to absence (as it is eternal and thus always exists). The comparison here, given simply as *nityavat*, is thus a bit unclear as the wording could imply that the permanent cause would have the exact same problem as the momentary cause, though their problems are really like two sides of a coin. While the eternal cause is eternally present and thus cannot be absent when the effect is absent, the logical conclusion being that if there is such a thing as an eternal cause it would continuously produce all its effects at once, just so the momentary cause is never present when the effect is present, and thus it can never produce its effects.

⁹²² i.e. the effect is not produced in the place of the cause, but in its own place, like the effects of the magnet occur in a different place than the magnet itself (i.e. a magnet can effect things which are one the other side of the table etc.). The Buddhists hold that the effect need not be produced (spatially) next to the cause (Shah 1968: 63).

⁹²³ i.e. if the Buddhist should argue that the effect does not need to be generated at the time of the cause, just like it does not need to be generated in the place of the cause.

⁹²⁴ i.e. the permanent cause is causally efficient in its own time, its own time being beginningless and endless. Thus, the permanent cause is always causally efficient.

⁹²⁵ i.e. the eternalist could then argue that, even though it is permanent and thus eternally causally efficient, the permanent cause will not produce all its effects at once or continuously, because it is the nature of the effect to only be produced at its own time. Thus the same logic used by the Buddhist to defend his doctrine of the momentary cause can just as well be used to establish the permanent cause.

⁹²⁶ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “tadabhāve ‘viśiṣṭe”. It makes no sense to claim that the Buddhists would say that all the moments prior to and following the causal moment are *not* characterized by the non-existence of the causal moment. The negation has thus been removed.

⁹²⁷ The remainder of §35 (from *nityasya* and onward) and the whole of §36 are almost identical to Aṣṭasahasrī 183/6-8: “*nityasya pratikṣaṇam anekakāryakāritve kramaśo ‘nekasvabhāvatvasiddheḥ katham ekatvaṃ syād iti cet kṣaṇikasya katham iti samaḥ saryanuyogaḥ | sa hi kṣaṇasthitir eko ‘pi bhāvo ‘nekasvabhāvas citrakāryatvān nānārthavat | na hi kāraṇaśaktibhedam antareṇa kāryanāntavaṃ yuktaṃ rūpādijñānavat | yathaiva hi karkaṭikādau rūpādijñānāni rūpādisvabhāvabhedanibandhanāni tatha*

katham ekatvaṃ syād iti cet; kṣaṇikasya katham iti samaḥ paryanuyogaḥ | sa hi
kṣaṇasthitiḥ eko 'pi bhāvo 'nekasvabhāvo vicitrakāryatvāt nānārthakṣaṇavat | na hi
kāraṇaśaktibhedam antareṇa kāryanānātvaṃ yuktam rūpādijñānavat | yathaiva
karkaṭikādau rūpādijñānāni rūpādisvabhāvabhedanibandhanāni tathā kṣaṇisthiter ekasmāt
pradīpādikṣaṇāt vartikādāhatailaśoṣādivicitrakāryāṇi śaktibhedanimittakāni
vyavatiṣṭhante, anyathā rūpāder api nānātvaṃ na syāt |

SŚP §35+§36 English

If it is objected: How can that [permanent cause] accord with respect to agreement and contrariety [with the effect] when the permanent [cause] is always [causally] efficient, [yet] the effect comes into existence at its own time [and not always]? Then a similar [question is asked of the Buddhists]: when [all] the beginningless [moments] prior [to the causal moment] and [all] the endless [moments] posterior to the causal moment are characterized by the non-existence of that [causal moment], how can the effect, which only takes place at some time [characterized by] the non-existence of that [causal moment] be said to have that [accordance with respect to agreement and contrariety]?⁹²⁸

If it is objected: Because, if the permanent [cause] in every moment successively produces various effects, it is proved that it has many natures⁹²⁹. How can it then be unitary? [Then] the same is asked [of the Buddhist]: How can the momentary [cause] be unitary? For that [momentary cause] which lasts [only one] moment, even though it is one, has a manifold nature, like many momentary objects, on account of [producing] various effects.⁹³⁰

kṣaṇasthiter ekasmād api bhāvāt pradīpāder vartikāmukhadāhatailaśoṣādivicitrakāryāṇi śaktibhedanimittakāni vyavatiṣṭhante | anyathā rūpāder nānātvaṃ na sidhyet, cakṣurādisāmagribhedāt tajjñānirbhāśabhedo 'vakalpyeta," (Aṣṭasahasrī 183/6-8 quoted in Soni 2009: 455-56; italics and bold in original).

Soni translates: "If you [Buddhists now] ask: 'if what is permanent produces manifold effects in every moment, and is therefore demonstrably of manifold nature [which arises] gradually, why would this [permanent entity] be one [having a single nature],' then [we Jainas ask]: 'how could the momentary [entity] have it?'" The objection would be the same as [as your inquiry]. For, **this momentary existence, although only a single entity, would be of a multiple nature because of its various effects** [and would be] **like many things** [at the same time]. For, **without the differentiation through the powers of the cause a multitude of effects, as in the knowledge of form, and so on, would be unreasonable.** Just as in a cucumber, etc., the knowledge of its form, etc., **depend on the differences of the intrinsic natures of form, etc.,** so too, because of a single entity that exists for [just] a single moment, like a flame, there are various effects as the burning of the tip of the wick [and] the absorption of oil, caused by its different powers. **Otherwise** [if the abilities were not different] **the variety of form, etc., would not be established; since there is a difference in the apparatus of eyes, etc., a difference in the appearance of their** [respective] **knowledge should be considered possible;**" (Soni 2009: 455-56; bold in original).

⁹²⁸ i.e. since the cause is momentary it only exists during one, single moment. Thus all its preceding moments and the moments posterior to it are characterized by its non-existence (i.e. it does not exist during these moments). How can one then say that the effect, which must appear in a moment posterior to the causal moment, has accordance with respect to agreement and contrariety with the cause, i.e. how can one say that the effect then only takes place in the presence of the cause and not in its absence?

⁹²⁹ i.e. which would entail it not being absolutely permanent as it would have to be different when producing different effects.

⁹³⁰ This argument is also raised by Akalaṅka. The Buddhists hold that a momentary cause, such as a *rūpa-kṣaṇa*, can produce various effects according to circumstance, i.e. whether it acts as the material cause or

For it is not so that the variety of effects is logical by [any] other [explanation] than the cause possessing multiplicity of capacities, just like cognition of color etc.⁹³¹ [is not possible unless the object of the cognition possesses multiplicity of capacities]. Just as cognitions of color etc. in a cucumber etc. depend on [the cucumber etc.] having various natures of color⁹³² etc., just so the variegated effects, the burning of the wick, the drying up of the oil etc., from the momentary lamp etc. which is one and lasts [only one] moment, are established to have multiplicity of capacity as their cause.⁹³³ Otherwise there would not be manifoldness even of color etc..⁹³⁴

SŚP §37 27, 1-3

nanu ca śaktimato ‘rthāntarānarthāntarapakṣayoḥ⁹³⁵ śaktīnām aghaṭanāt tāsām paramārthasattvābhāvaḥ, tarhi rūpādīnām api pratītisiddhadravayād arthāntarānarthāntaravikalpayor asaṃbhavāt paramārthasattvābhāvaḥ syāt | syādvādiḥ citrajñānavat jātyantarasya śaktimato ‘rthasyopagamāc ca noktadoṣānuṣaṅgaḥ |

SŚP §37 English

[If it is objected:] certainly, those [capacities] do not have real existence, because both the alternative views, [i.e.] the capacities being a separate entity from that which possesses the capacities [i.e. the object] and the capacities not being a separate entity (from that which possesses the capacities) are impossible. [It is answered that:], in that case even color etc. cannot have real existence, because determination of [them] being a separate entity [from the object they are cognized in] or not being a separate entity [from the object they are cognized in] is impossible on account of substance being proved by experience.⁹³⁶ The aforementioned fault does not result [for the Syādvādins], because the

auxiliary cause. Thus a *rūpa-kṣaṇa*, acting as the material cause, can produce a following *rūpa-kṣaṇa*. But, acting as an auxiliary cause, it can also produce *rasa-*, *gandha-* and *sparśa-kṣaṇas*, depending on the circumstances, i.e. depending on which kind of *kṣaṇa* is the material cause. Thus when the *rasa-kṣaṇa* is the material cause and the other *kṣaṇas* are auxiliary causes, a *rasa-kṣaṇa* is produced etc.. Since the Buddhists maintain that there is no change in the nature of the cause even though it, with the help of assisting causes, produces various effects, then there should be no objection to the permanent cause producing various effects, with the help of assisting causes, without changing its nature (1968: 64-65).

⁹³¹ i.e. *rasa*, *gandha* and *sparśa* (smell, taste and touch).

⁹³² i.e. *rasa*, *gandha* and *sparśa* (smell, taste and touch).

⁹³³ like the momentary object such as a lamp produces various effects, such as the burning of the wick, the drying up of oil etc., which are different from one another, yet, according to Dharmakīrti, retains its unitary nature (Shah 1968: 62).

⁹³⁴ i.e. just as the experience of a cucumber, i.e. its color, feel, smell and texture, shows it to have a variegated nature (i.e. a color-nature, smell-nature, taste-nature and touch-nature), just so the lamp-moment (i.e. momentary object, a lamp) has manifold capacities as it produces various effects simultaneously, such as the burning of the wick, the drying up of the oil etc.. Otherwise (if they did not have manifold nature) cucumbers would only have color but not smell, taste or texture etc..

⁹³⁵ ed. note: “bhedābhedapakṣayoḥ |”

⁹³⁶ i.e. if the impossibility of determining the capacities as either absolutely different or identical with that which possesses them results in them not being real, then surely the same will result for color etc. (which the Buddhists do believe to have real existence as it is a *svalakṣaṇa*), as these too cannot be determined as

Syādvādins accept that the object that possesses the capacities is *sui generis* [both identical and different from the capacities], like variegated cognition.⁹³⁷

SŚP §38 27, 4-7

atha pratyakṣabuddhau pratibhāsamānatvād rūpādayaḥ paramārthasanto⁹³⁸ na punas
tacchaktayas tāsām anumānabuddhau pratibhāsamānatvāt; ity apy ayuktam;
kṣaṇakṣayasvargaprāpaṇaśaktyādīnām aparamārthasattvaprasaṅgāt | tato yathā
kṣaṇikasya yugapad anekakāryakāritve ‘py ekatvāvirodhas tathā akṣaṇikasya kramaśo
‘nekaśaktyakāritve ‘pīty anavadyaṃ sthirākāro ‘pi paramārtha iti |

SŚP §38 English

Now, it is not suitable to say: “color etc. really exist because [they] are perceived in perceptual cognition, but their capacities are not [real] because they are perceived in inferential cognition [and not perceptual cognition]”. Because then there would be adherence to the destruction of moments, the capacity to lead one to heaven etc. being unreal⁹³⁹. Therefore it is unobjectionable to say: “just as there is no contradiction with respect to [its] oneness even though the momentary [cause] produces various effects at the same time, just so [there is no contradiction with respect to its oneness] even though the non-momentary [cause] produces many effects successively”, and even the solid form is real.

SŚP §39 27, 8-9

tad evaṃ sakalabādhakābhāvād apratikṣepārhanām ārthatābhimatānām
sthirasthūlasādhāraṇākārāṇām paramārthatvasiddheḥ abhrentena tadgrāhipratyakṣeṇa
svalakṣaṇalakṣaṇatattvasya viruddhatvaṃ siddhyati eva |

SŚP §39 English

Thus, the real, defined as the bare particular, is proved to be contradicted by non-illusory sensory perception, because the solid, gross and common forms that are acknowledged by the followers of the Arhats [i.e. the Jainas] and deserve no objections are proved to be real on account of the non-existence of all negation.

SŚP §40 27, 10-11

absolutely different or identical with the objects in which they reside because (the Jain view of) substance, which is both different and non-different from its modes, is proved to be true.

⁹³⁷ Like the variegated cognition is both different and non-different *sui generis* from the colors that make up the variegated cognition. Cf. §29 above

⁹³⁸ *Paramārthasanto* as been underlined by the editor, marking it as a name. This seems to be incorrect.

Paramārthasanto should rather be read as an adjective qualifying *rūpādayaḥ*.

⁹³⁹ i.e. as these are inferred and not perceived in perceptual cognition.

nanu naiṣa doṣaḥ, saugatābhimatasvalakṣaṇatattvasya avācyatvād iti cet; tadasaṃgatam; avācyāśabdena svalakṣaṇatattvasya vācyatvāt svavacanenaiva svapratijñāhāner darśanāt |

SŚP §40 English

If it is objected: Certainly this fault does not [occur], because the real bare particular which is acknowledged by the followers of the Sugata is inexpressible. [It is answered:] that is self-contradictory, because [according to your own statement] the real bare particular is expressible by means of the word “inexpressible”. [The fault remains] because it is seen that [your] position is given up by your own statement.⁹⁴⁰

SŚP §41 27, 12-17

nanv avācyāśabdenāpi na svalakṣaṇasvarūpam ucyate

⁹⁴¹tenāropitasāmānyākārasyaivābhidhānād iti cet; vyāhatam etat |

sāmānyākhyapararūpavācinā avācyāśabdena svalakṣaṇasvarūpābhidhānasya viruddhatvāt nīlaśabdena pītābhidhānavat | tad uktaṃ yuktyanuśāsane svāmibhiḥ –

avācyam ity atra ca vācyabhāvād avācyam evety anyathāpratijñām |

svarūpataś cet pararūpavācī svarūpavācīti vaco viruddham || [yuktyanu- ślo- 29] iti

SŚP §41 English

If it is objected: “Certainly, the nature of the bare particular is not expressed by the word “inexpressible”, on account of only the superimposed, common form being expressed by that [word]”. [It is answered:] This is contradicted. Because expressing the nature of the bare particular by means of the word “inexpressible”, which expresses a nature which is alien [to the bare particular], namely the common form, [and not the nature of the bare particular], is contradictory, like expressing yellow by means of the word “blue”.⁹⁴² It is said by the Master in the Yuktyanuśāsana:

[It is said that]: “[the bare particular is] inexpressible”. Here it is certainly [said to be] inexpressible because it is expressible⁹⁴³. Thus the proposition is contradicted. If the word [“inexpressible”] by its own nature expresses a nature alien [to the bare particular], it is contradictory [to say that it] expresses the nature [of the bare particular].

⁹⁴⁰ i.e. saying that something is inexpressible is an expression (i.e. description) of that thing. As the objection, being self-contradictory, is thus not valid, the fault remains.

⁹⁴¹ ed. note: “śabdena |”

⁹⁴² i.e. if the word “inexpressible” really expresses the nature of the common form, which is merely superimposed upon the bare particular, why then would the Buddhist use it to refer to the bare particular?

⁹⁴³ i.e. the only reason one can say that it is inexpressible is that it must be expressible, otherwise one could not describe it as inexpressible. Thus saying that it is inexpressible contradicts one’s own position.

SŚP §42 27, 18-19

tato nāvācyataikāntaḥ śreyān iti katham api pratyakṣavirodho duḥśakaḥ parihartum |
tasmāt suvyavasthityaṃ pratijñā⁹⁴⁴ dṛṣṭāviruddhaṃ śākyaśāsanam iti |

SŚP §42 English

Hence absolutist inexpressibility is not beneficial. Thus it is impossible to avoid [its] contradiction by sensory perception in any way. On account of that, this proposition stands firmly: “The teaching of the followers of Śākya is contradicted by perception”.

SŚP §43 27, 20-30

tathā tāthāgataśāsanam iṣṭāviruddham | tadabhimataḥkṣaṇakṣayaikāntāviruddhasya
ātmādīnāṃ kathamcin nityatvasyānumānena sādhanāt | tathā hi – yat sat tat sarvaṃ
kathamcin nityatvam, sarvathā kṣaṇike kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt
sattvānupapatteḥ iti | atra na tāvad dhetor anaikāntikatvam; sarvathā nityatve
sattvasyābhāvāt, sarvathā kṣaṇikatvavat | tadabhāvaś ca kramākramānupapatteḥ |
tadanupapattiś ca pūrvāparasvabhāvatyāgopādānānvitarūpābhāvāt; sakṛd
anekāśaktyātmakatvābhāvāc ca | na hi kūṭasthe pūrvottarasvabhāvatyāgopādāne staḥ⁹⁴⁵,
kṣaṇike cānviṭam rūpam asti yataḥ kramaḥ kālakṛto deśakṛto vā syāt | nāpi yugapad
anekasvabhāvāt yato yaugapadyam, kauṭasthyavirodhāt, sarvathaikarūpatvāt
kūṭasthasya | **ekarūpatayā tu yas trikālavyāpī saḥ kūṭasthaḥ** [source not found] ity
abhidhānāt, niranvayakṣaṇikatvavyāghātāc ca, tathā kramākramānekāntātmakasyaiva
siddheḥ | sahakārikramākramāpekṣayā tatra⁹⁴⁶ kramayaugapadyakalpanāpi na sādhyasī;
svayaṃ⁹⁴⁷ tadapekṣākrametarasvabhāvāt vābhāve tadanupapatteḥ |

SŚP §43 English

In the same way the doctrine of the followers of the Tathāgata is contradicted by inference. Because some permanence of the self etc., which is contradicted by the one-sided destruction of moments which is acknowledged by those [Buddhists], is proved by inference. [That inference] is as follows – All that which exists must have some permanence. Because if [a thing is] completely momentary it is not found that it exist on account of being contradicted by causal efficacy [both] successively and simultaneously.⁹⁴⁸

⁹⁴⁴ Ed. note: “bauddhena kṛtā yat śākyaśāsanam dṛṣṭāviruddham iti |”

⁹⁴⁵ the print is unclear, but *staḥ* is the most likely reading.

⁹⁴⁶ ed. note: “nitye |”. As this point is valid with respect to both the absolutely permanent (*nitya*) and absolutely momentary (*kṣaṇika*) cause, as it has been shown that none of them can have manifold natures, it seems better to read *tatra* as referring to both the permanent and impermanent cause.

⁹⁴⁷ ed. note: “sahakāryāpekṣā svathaṃ tatsvabhāvasyaiva saṃbhāvayatam |”

⁹⁴⁸ i.e. the absolutely momentary thing cannot be real, as the absolutely momentary thing cannot be causally efficient, i.e. it cannot produce effects simultaneously or successively. According to Dharmakīrti that which

Firstly, the premise in this [syllogism] is not inconclusive⁹⁴⁹, because if [a thing is] completely permanent it does not exist, just like the completely momentary [thing] (does not exist). And that [completely permanent or completely momentary cause] does not exist because it is not found [that it can produce effects] successively or simultaneously. And that [production of effects successively or simultaneously] is not found [in the completely permanent or completely momentary cause] on account of not having a nature [characterized by] abandoning a previous nature, appropriating a following nature and continuous nature⁹⁵⁰, and on account of not having manifold capacity simultaneously. For, if it is uniform⁹⁵¹, there is no abandoning of [its] previous nature and appropriating of [its] following nature, and, if it is momentary⁹⁵², there is [no] constant form from which [there could be] succession in time or in space. It does also not have manifold natures at the same time, on account of which simultaneous [production of many effects] [would be possible], because it is contradicted by being uniform. Because the completely uniform has a single nature. Because of the statement: “That which pervades the three [divisions of] time⁹⁵³ by its one nature, that is uniform”. And because it is contradicted by being absolutely momentary [as the absolutely momentary thing exists for a mere moment]. Because thus it is proved that only that which has a manifold nature [can produce effects] successively or simultaneously.⁹⁵⁴

Even the postulation of [the cause producing many effects] successively or simultaneously by depending on successive or simultaneous [assistance] by an assisting cause is, in the case of the [absolutely permanent or absolutely momentary cause], not any better. Because that [producing many effects successively or simultaneously] is not found if there is absence of [the dual] nature of successive and simultaneous expectancy of that [assisting cause] [in the absolutely permanent or absolutely momentary cause] itself.⁹⁵⁵

is real must be causally efficient (Shah 1968: 43). Dharmakīrti has argued against the permanent cause by showing that it cannot be causally efficient, and thus cannot exist. Vidyānandin here attempts to show that the momentary cause does not fare any better. The first Jain philosopher to argue in this way against momentarism seems to have been Akalaṅka (Shah 1968: 60 footnote 33).

⁹⁴⁹ *anaikāntikatva* is a technical term for a kind of fallacy of the *hetu*. *Anaikāntika-hetu* is the fallacy of the concomitance of the premise (*hetu*) and that which is to be established (*sādhya*) is not absolute, i.e. the *hetu* is found outside the *sādhya* as well.

⁹⁵⁰ cf. the three characteristics of substances according to Jainism. Origination (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*) and continued existence (*sthiti*).

⁹⁵¹ i.e. absolutely permanent

⁹⁵² i.e. absolutely momentary.

⁹⁵³ past, present and future

⁹⁵⁴ i.e. since both the absolutely momentary and the absolutely permanent cannot have a manifold nature, they cannot be causally efficient, i.e. they cannot produce their effects either simultaneously or successively. Thus they cannot be real, for being real is defined by Dharmakīrti as being causally efficient (*arthakriyākāritva*) (Shah 1968: 43). Thus only the *sui generis* permanent and impermanent cause proposed by the Jains can be real, as only such an object can be causally efficient.

⁹⁵⁵ i.e. both the permanent and impermanent cause would have to have the dual nature of expecting the assistance of the assisting causes both successively and simultaneously, i.e. they would have to have a manifold (non-singular) nature. As this has been shown to be impossible, this possibility must be rejected as well.

SŚP §44 28, 1-2

tatkāryāṇām tadapekṣā na punar nityasya kṣaṇikasya cety api na śreyah; teṣām
tadakāryatvapasamgāt |

SŚP §44 English

Even [saying that]: “it is the effects of [the absolutely permanent or momentary cause] which expects the assistance [of the assisting causes], and not that the [absolutely permanent or momentary cause [itself]”, is not any better. Because [then there would be] adherence to those [effects] not being the effects of those [absolutely permanent or absolutely momentary causes].⁹⁵⁶

SŚP §45 28, 3-8

tatsahitebhyaḥ sahakāribhyaḥ kāryāṇām utpatteḥ anyathā ‘nutpattes tatkāryatvanirṇayaḥ
iti cet; tarhi yena svabhāvenaikena sahakāriṇā sahabhāvaḥ tenaiva sarvasahakāriṇā yadi
tasya syāt tadaikakāryakaraṇe sarvakāryakaraṇāt kramakāryānutpattiḥ |
sahakāryantarābhāve ‘pi ca tatsahabhāvāt sakṛd eva sakalakāryotpattiḥ prasajyeta |
svabhāvāntaraiḥ sahakāryantarasaḥabhāve tasya
kramākramavṛtṭyanekasvabhāvatvasiddheḥ kuto nityam ekatvasvabhāvaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ vā
vastu kramayaugapadyayor vyāpakaṃ syāt, kathamcin nityasyaiva
kramākramānekasvabhāvasya tadvyāpakatvapratīteḥ |

SŚP §45 English

If it is objected: [They are to be regarded as effects of the cause proper], because the effects arise from the assisting causes, which are accompanied by that [permanent or momentary cause proper], because [the effects] do not arise otherwise.⁹⁵⁷ [It is answered:] then the nature by which [the cause proper] is associated with one assisting cause is the [nature] by which [the cause proper] (is associated) with all [its] assisting causes. And if it is [thus] for that [cause proper], then there can be no arising of effects successively on account of it producing all [its] effects when producing one effect.⁹⁵⁸

⁹⁵⁶ i.e. such argumentation will only result in the effects having to be considered to be effects of the assisting causes, and not the permanent or momentary cause proper.

⁹⁵⁷ i.e. they are to be regarded as the effects of the cause proper as they cannot come into being without it.

⁹⁵⁸ i.e. seeing as the absolutely permanent or momentary cause cannot have a manifold nature, the nature by which it is associated with the assisting causes must be the same (otherwise its nature would be manifold). The association being identical, all the effects would be created simultaneously. A thing producing manifold successive effects would then be impossible.

Even if there is absence of the other assisting causes, the arising of all effects simultaneously must be adhered to from [its] connection to that [one assisting cause]⁹⁵⁹. Because, if [the momentary or permanent cause proper] is connected to the different assisting causes by means of different natures, it is proved that that [cause proper] has manifold natures while producing [effects] successively and simultaneously. So how can the [absolutely] permanent or momentary object [i.e. cause] be the pervader of successive and simultaneous [production of effects]? Because only the somewhat permanent [cause]⁹⁶⁰, which has a manifold nature [required to produce effects] both successively and simultaneously, is seen to be the pervader of that [production of effects simultaneously and successively].⁹⁶¹

SŚP §46 28, 9-11

etena vipakṣe hetor bādhakasya vyāpakānupalambhasya⁹⁶² vyatirekaniścayaḥ kathamcin nitye pratyakṣapravṛtteḥ pradarśitaḥ pratyeyaḥ | tataḥ satyaḥ kathamcin nityam eva sādhyatīti siddhaḥ śauddhodaniśāsanam iṣṭaviruddham iti |

SŚP §46 English

By this [above argumentation] the determination of the opposite of the non-perception of the pervader [i.e. that which is found in all existing things and in existing things only, namely the production of effects successively and simultaneously], which⁹⁶³ negates the premise [i.e. existence], is to be understood as having been shown in the counter-statement [i.e. the somehow permanent thing] on account of the operation of sensory perception in the somehow permanent [thing]. Hence, [the premise] establishes that only the thing which is in some ways permanent is true. It is proved that the teaching of Śauddhodani⁹⁶⁴ is contradicted by inference.⁹⁶⁵

⁹⁵⁹ i.e. since its connections with the various assisting causes would have to be identical, the cause proper would not even have to come into contact with all of them in order to produce all its effects simultaneously. Coming into contact with one of them would suffice.

⁹⁶⁰ i.e. both permanent and impermanent *sui generis*.

⁹⁶¹ i.e. in a syllogism the *sādhyā* (that which is to be proved) must be the pervader (*vyāpaka*) and the *hetu* (premise) the pervaded (*vyāpya*). The point Vidyānandin is making is that simultaneous and successive production of effects cannot be proof of the absolutely permanent or momentary cause, as both have a uniform nature. In other words, one cannot set up a syllogism consisting of either the absolutely permanent or the absolutely impermanent cause as the *sādhyā* and “simultaneous and simultaneous production of effects” as the *hetu* (i.e. “the cause is absolutely permanent/impermanent, because it produces effects simultaneously and successively”). Such a syllogism would not be valid. It is however possible to set up such a syllogism using the somewhat permanent cause, as it possesses the manifold nature required to produce effects both simultaneously and successively.

⁹⁶² ed. note: “kramākramayor vyāpakayor anupalambhaḥ |”

⁹⁶³ i.e. the non-perception of the *vyāpaka* (pervader) in the *vyāpya* (pervaded).

⁹⁶⁴ According to the MMW a name for Gautama Buddha.

⁹⁶⁵ i.e. the non-perception of the pervader in the counter-statement, i.e. the condition of the production of effects successively and simultaneously not being seen in the somehow permanent thing, is not determined (i.e. found). *The opposite* is found, i.e. the perception of the pervader in the counter-statement. While the non-perception of the production of effects successively and simultaneously would negate the premise (existence), i.e. the *hetu* (premise) would then not be pervaded by the *sādhyā* (that which is to be proved)

SŚP §47 28, 12-15

tathā ca śubhāśubhānuṣṭhānapuṇyapāpaśvabhraśvargādi
paralokabadhabandhakāraṇamokṣamokṣakāraṇabandhamokṣaphalabaddhamuktādi-
parokṣatatkāraṇasvarūpapratipādako ‘pi bauddhāgame na pramāṇam;
dṛṣṭeṣṭaviruddhāgamasaṃkārṭkasya tasyātīndriyeṣv atitarām aprāmāṇyāpatter iti na
bauddhānāṃ dharmānuṣṭhānaṃ pratiṣṭhām iyarti | kiṃ bahunā, bauddhair yad yad
abhidhīyate tad sarvam asad eva, tadabhimatasarvatattvasya śūnyatvāt |

SŚP §47 English

And in the same way the Buddhist scriptural tradition, even though it teaches about performance of auspicious and inauspicious [practice], merit and demerit, the other worlds, i.e. hell, heaven etc., bondage and the cause of bondage, liberation and the causes of liberation, the fruits of bondage and liberation, the bound [soul] and the liberated [soul] etc., and the imperceptible⁹⁶⁶ nature of [their] causes⁹⁶⁷, is not a valid means of knowledge. Because the author of those [the Buddhist scriptures], who is like the authors of the scriptural traditions that are contradicted by perception and inference, [suffers from] the fault of invalidity, even more so with respect to those things that are beyond sensory [perception]⁹⁶⁸. Thus the religious practice of the Buddhists does not reach an exalted position. In short, whatever is set forth by the Buddhists, all that is indeed untrue, because all the tattvas that are acknowledged by them are void.

SŚP §48 28, 16-22

tathā hi ⁹⁶⁹vikalpo ‘bhilāpasambandhārthagrahaṇarūpaḥ parair iṣṭaḥ | sa ca nāsty eva | na
hi tāvad viṣayasyābhilāpena tadgatenaiva sambandhaḥ, tatra tadabhāvāt |
smaṇopaniṭena samketakālapratipanneneti cet; na; smaṇasya nirvikalpakatve
tadviṣayasya svalakṣaṇatve na kvacid upanayanānupapatteḥ | vyavasāyarūpatve ca tenāpi

and would thus be negated, it is the opposite of this, namely the perception of the production of effects successively and simultaneously, that is determined. It is however not determined in the *pakṣa* (subject), i.e. the absolutely permanent or impermanent cause, but in the *vipakṣa* (counter-statement), i.e. the somehow permanent cause.

In other words, Vidyānandin seems to here consider a possible syllogism raised on behalf of those who hold the cause to be absolutely permanent or impermanent. This syllogism would be: 1) *pratiṣṭhā (proposition): the absolutely permanent/impermanent cause produces effects both successively and simultaneously; 2) *hetu (premise): because it exists; 3) *vipakṣa (counter-statement): unlike the somehow permanent cause. Vidyānandin’s point here is that the *vyāpaka* (pervader), i.e. the *sādhya* (that which is to be shown), namely “producing effects both simultaneously and successively” is, by the above argumentation shown to be found in the somehow permanent cause, which is the *vipakṣa* in the syllogism of the opponents. Thus the syllogism is invalid and the somehow permanent cause is established while the absolutely permanent and the absolutely impermanent cause are contradicted by inference.

⁹⁶⁶ i.e. indirect as they cannot be cognized directly. Here it seems best rendered as “imperceptible”.

⁹⁶⁷ i.e. the causes of merit, demerit, heaven, hell etc..

⁹⁶⁸ i.e. what is written in the Buddhist scriptures is not valid, especially that which refers to imperceptible things.

⁹⁶⁹ ed. note: ”vikalpo nāma saṃśrayaḥ [pra- vā- 2|123] ity abhidhānāt |”

svaviṣayo ‘bhilāpasambandha eva smarttavyaḥ | tadabhilāpo ‘pi tathāvidhā eva
tatsmaraṇenety anavasthitiprasaṅgāt | smaraṇasya tadanabhisambandhavastuveditve ‘pi
vyavasāyasvabhāvatve pratyakṣasyāpi tat kiṃ na syāt,
⁹⁷⁰svābhīdhānaviśeṣāpekṣayaivārthā niścair vyavasīyante” ity ekāntatyāgāt | nāmnah
svalakṣaṇasyāpi svābhīdhānaviśeṣānapekṣasyaiva vyavasāyavacanāt |

SŚP §48 English

For it is thus: determinate cognition is accepted by the opponents [i.e. Buddhists] to have the nature of grasping the object as associated with the word [denoting it]. And that [determinate cognition which has such a nature] does indeed not exist. For, firstly, there is no association of the object with the word which resides in it, on account of the absence of that [word] in that [object].

If it is objected: [the object is associated with the word] because that which is learned at the time of convention is brought near [to the object] by recollection.⁹⁷¹ [It is answered:] no, because, if recollection is indeterminate and its object is the bare particular, [recollection] bringing [the word] near [the object] is not found at any time. And if [recollection] has a determinate nature, its own object must be recollected as associated with the word also by that [recollection]. And the word of that [object] too is of such a kind [i.e. not in the object] and [must be recollected] by another recollection. Thus [this is unacceptable] because there [would be] adhering to an infinite regress.⁹⁷²

If recollection cognizes the object as not associated with that [word] and [yet] has a determinate nature, why can it not be [thus] even for sensory perception? Because there is giving up of one’s absolutist [position]: “The objects are determinately cognized only with regard to their own particular words”.⁹⁷³ Because even a name, which is a bare particular, is said to be determinately cognized without regard to its own particular name.⁹⁷⁴

⁹⁷⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads: svābhīdhānaviśeṣāpekṣayā eva”. Amended according to sandhi rules.

⁹⁷¹ i.e. the word associated with the object is at some point learned through convention. On future cognitions of such objects this convention is remembered, and the object is thus associated with the word that denotes it. Matilal (1986) explains: “For after the particular has been visually grasped, there arises the remembering of the word/concept. Constructive awareness in this way is intervened by at least two moments through the arising of memory, etc..” (328).

⁹⁷² i.e. if memory is indeterminate and thus free from mental constructions as it has for its object the bare particular, it cannot associate the object with the word denoting it as this would involve mental construction. If memory is determinate, then it too must be associated with the word by another memory etc., which ends in infinite regress.

⁹⁷³ i.e. if memory is held to be determinate even though it does not cognize the object as associated with its word, then this must surely also apply to perception itself. Thus there is no need to hold the position that perception which is determinate is so on account of cognizing the object as associated with its word (viz. “determinate cognition always cognizes the object as associated with its word”), as the Buddhists would have given up this absolutist position. Thus one will end up having to accept that memory cannot be determinate.

⁹⁷⁴ i.e. a name, which is a bare particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) does not have a particular name of its own. From this it follows that the bare particular is not always the object of indeterminate cognition but can also be the

SŚP §49 28, 23-27

evam anavasthādidoṣopanipātān nāmasmaraṇobhāvena kvacid vikalpā na siddhyet |
smaraṇopanītanāmasambaddhārthagrahaṇasyaiva vikalpatvāt | vikalpābhāvena na kvacit
pratyakṣam | akṛtavikalpena pratyakṣeṇa bahir antar vā grhītasyāpy agrhītakalpatvāt
kṣaṇakṣayādīsamvedanavat | pratyakṣābhāve na kvacid anumānam pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt
tasyeti sakalapramāṇābhāvaḥ | ⁹⁷⁵tadabhāve sakalaprameyābhāvaḥ, pramāṇāpāye
prameyavyavasthānupapatter iti saugatābhimatam sarvaṃ tattvaṃ śūnyam eva syāt |

SŚP §49 English

Thus, on account of the occurring of faults, such as infinite regress etc., determinate [cognitions] [as defined by the Buddhists, i.e. as always connected to the word] can never be established as arising through the recollection of names. Because [according to the Buddhists] only the grasping of objects as related to [their] names, brought near by recollection, is determinate [cognition].

There is no sensory perception at any time because of the non-existence of determinate [cognition].⁹⁷⁶ Because even the grasping, whether external or internal, by means of sensory perception by which determination is not performed, is as good as non-grasping, like cognition of the destruction of moments etc..⁹⁷⁷ If there is non-existence of perception, there is no inference at any time. Because that [inference] is preceded by perception.⁹⁷⁸ Thus all the valid means of knowledge are non-existent.⁹⁷⁹ If those [valid means of knowledge] do not exist, the objects of valid knowledge do not exist. Because, if there is destruction of the means of valid knowledge, the establishing of the objects of valid knowledge is not found. Thus all the tattvas that are acknowledged by the followers of the Sugata must [thus] be void.

SŚP §50 29, 1-2

object of determinate cognition, as the bare particular name can be the object of determinate cognition without association to its word (as it does not have one).

⁹⁷⁵ ed. note: “pramāṇābhāve |”

⁹⁷⁶ i.e. since it has been shown that it is not possible for memory to associate the object and the word, there can thus be no determinate cognition such as it is defined by the Buddhists. Thus there cannot be any sensory perception, as the Buddhists regard sensory perception (which is indeterminate) as valid only when it generates an appropriate determinate cognition. Since determinate cognition is impossible, no sensory perception can be valid.

⁹⁷⁷ i.e. if determinate cognition is impossible, that which is cognized by indeterminate cognition, such as the momentary nature of things, is as good as uncognized as its indeterminate cognition cannot be validated (i.e. as indeterminate cognition depends on determinate cognition for its validity).

⁹⁷⁸ inference must always in some way rest on sensory perception. One can infer the presence of fire only by *seeing* the smoke etc..

⁹⁷⁹ i.e. as the Buddhists only acknowledge perception and inference as valid means of knowledge (testimony only being regarded as a case of inference), this results in the eradication of all their accepted valid means of knowledge.

tathā ca saugato heyopādeyopāyarahito ‘yam ahrīkaḥ kevalaṃ vikrośatīti upekṣārha eveti
kṛtamativistareṇa, dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddhatvāt tanmatasyāsatyatvasiddheḥ |

dr̥ṣṭeṣṭeṣu dr̥ṣṭeṣṭavirodhāt sugatoditaḥ |
parokṣeṣu tadekatvād āgamo na pramāṇatām ||

vikalpābhāvataḥ sarvahāner bauddhavaco ‘khilam |
bhavet pralāpamātratvān nāvadheyam vipaścītām ||

dr̥ṣṭeṣṭābhyām viruddhatvān na satyam śākyaśāsanam |
na ca tena pratikṣepaḥ syādvādasyeti niścītām ||

SŚP §50 English

And thus the follower of the Sugata, the shameless beggar, deprived of the means for that which is to be avoided and that which is to be accepted, merely cries out. Hence he only deserves to be disregarded because of the extensive opinion [i.e. investigation] performed [in this treatise], because their doctrine is proved to be false on account of being contradicted by perception and inference.

That which is proclaimed by the Sugata is not valid with respect to the perceptible and inferable⁹⁸⁰, on account of being contradicted by perception and inference.

The [Buddhist] scriptural tradition (is also not valid) with respect to the imperceptible⁹⁸¹ on account of being one with that [part which is contradicted by perception and inference].

Because there is abandoning of everything on account of the non-existence of determinate cognition, [and hence] all that which is said by the Buddhists is not to be attended to by the wise, on account of it being mere talk.

The teaching of the followers of Śākya is not true,
on account of being contradicted by perception and inference.

Thus it is ascertained: the Syādvāda is not refuted by that [Buddhist teaching].

[iti bauddhaśāsanaparīkṣā]

Thus is the investigation into the teaching of the Bauddha.

⁹⁸⁰ i.e. that which is seen (*dr̥ṣṭa*) and inferred (*iṣṭa*).

⁹⁸¹ i.e. that which can only be known indirectly.

Sāṃkhyaśāsanaparīkṣā

Investigation into the Sāṃkhya teaching.

SŚP 30, 3

tathā sām̐khyāśāsanam api dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddham | evaṃ hi tāvad ākhyānti sām̐khyāḥ –⁹⁸²

SŚP 30, 3 English

In the same way also the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya is contradicted by perception and inference. For, firstly, the Sāṃkhya declare it to be thus:

[pūrvapakṣa]

The opponent's side.

SŚP §1 30, 3-8

sarvam idaṃ jagat pradhānaṃ ayam⁹⁸³; pradhānaṃ ca sattvarajastamasāṃ
sāmyāvasthāsvarūpam | tathā ca tadgranthāḥ |

sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam avaṣṭambhakaṃ⁹⁸⁴ calaṃ ca rajaḥ |
guruvaraṇakam eva tamaḥ sāmyāvasthā bhavet prakṛtiḥ || [Sām̐khyakā- 13]⁹⁸⁵

SŚP §1 English

This whole world is Pradhāna⁹⁸⁶, and Pradhāna is that which has as its nature the equipoise of sattva, rajas and tamas⁹⁸⁷.

And thus their texts [say]:

Sattva is accepted to be light⁹⁸⁸ and illuminating, rajas is that which applies and moving,

⁹⁸² Amended. This opening part is included in the pūrvapakṣa by the editor. It is strictly speaking not part of the pūrvapakṣa (opponent's side) as it states that the Puruṣādvaita is contradicted by perception and inference. It has therefore been separated from the rest of §5 (in which it was included by the editor), which starts the pūrvapakṣa.

⁹⁸³ ed. note: “pradhānaṃ iti prakṛtir nāmāntaram |”

⁹⁸⁴ All consulted versions read *upastambhakaṃ* (cf. footnote 985). As the term is used again in the commentary to this verse (§2 below), it has not been amended.

⁹⁸⁵ This version of verse 13 of the Sām̐khyakārikā does not match the version given in Larson (1969) and Sastri (1948), which read: *sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam upaṣṭambhakaṃ calaṃ ca rajaḥ | guruvaraṇakam eva tamaḥ pradīpavac cārthato vṛttiḥ || 13 ||*. This discrepancy is not noted by the editor of the text.

⁹⁸⁶ From *pra + dhā*, “chief”, “the foremost”. Technical term in Sāṃkhya philosophy, synonymous with *Prakṛti*, the eternal cause of the creation of the world. As this is a well known technical term it is here left untranslated. Cf. editors note in footnote 983.

⁹⁸⁷ following Larson (1987: 23), these can be translated as intelligibility, activity and inertia respectively. They are left untranslated throughout this chapter as they are well known technical terms.

tamas is heavy and concealing. Prakṛti is the state of equipoise [of the three].

SŚP §2 30, 9-15

tatra yad iṣṭaṃ prakāśakaṃ laghu tat sattvam ity ucyate | sattvodayāt praśastā eva
pariṇāmā jāyante | yac ca calam avaṣṭambhakaṃ dārakaṃ grāhakaṃ vā tad raja ity ucyate
| rajasa udayād rāgapariṇāmā eva jāyante | yad guru āvaraṇakaṃ ajñānahetubhūtaṃ tat
tama iti nirūpyate | tamasa udayāt dveṣād ajñānapariṇāmā eva jāyante |
sattvarajastamasāṃ sām्यāvasthā prakṛtiḥ |

**prakṛter mahāms tato 'haṃkāras tasmād gaṇaś ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ |
tasmād api ṣoḍaśakāt pañcabhyaḥ pañcabhūtāni || [śāṃkhyakā- 22]**

SŚP §2 English

There⁹⁸⁹, that which is accepted to be illuminating and light, that is said to be sattva. From the arising of sattva⁹⁹⁰, only auspicious evolutions are produced. And that which is moving and applying, breaking or seizing⁹⁹¹, that is said to be rajas. From the arising of rajas⁹⁹², only evolutions of passion are produced. That which is heavy, concealing, and the cause of ignorance, that is defined to be tamas. Only evolutions of ignorance are produced from aversion, [which in turn arises] from the arising of tamas⁹⁹³. Prakṛti is the state of equipoise of sattva, rajas and tamas.

[When the equipoise of sattva, rajas and tamas is disturbed] the Great one⁹⁹⁴ [arises] from Prakṛti, from that [Great one] individuality [arises], and from that [individuality] a group consisting of 16 [arises]. Also, the five gross elements [arise] from five⁹⁹⁵ of the group of 16.⁹⁹⁶

SŚP §3 30, 16-21

⁹⁸⁸ as opposed to heavy

⁹⁸⁹ *tatra* here indicates that the following paragraph is a commentary to the preceding verse (SK verse 13) quoted above.

⁹⁹⁰ i.e. when the equipoise between the three (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) has been disturbed and *sattva* predominates.

⁹⁹¹ This is a bit unclear. Is “dārakaṃ grāhakaṃ vā” a gloss of “calam avaṣṭambhakaṃ”? So that *cala* (moving) is explained as *dāraka* (braking, bursting), and *upastambhaka* (supporting) as *grāhaka* (seizing, grasping)? Or are *dāraka* and *grāhaka* simply additional characteristics added to describe *rajas*?

⁹⁹² i.e. when the equipoise between the three (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) has been disturbed and *rajas* predominates.

⁹⁹³ i.e. when the equipoise between the three (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) has been disturbed and *tamas* predominates.

⁹⁹⁴ In Sāṃkhya *mahat* = *buddhi* (intellect)

⁹⁹⁵ the five *tanmātras*, i.e. subtle elements

⁹⁹⁶ This verse is commented upon in the following paragraph (§3 below), where the terms and categories used here are explained.

jagadutpādikā prakṛtiḥ, “pradhānaṃ bahudhānakam” iti prakṛter abhidhānāni | tataḥ prakṛter mahān utpadyate | āsargapralayasthāyinī buddhir mahān | tato mahataḥ sakāśād ahaṃkāra utpadyate | “ahaṃ jñātā, ahaṃ sukhī, ahaṃ duḥkhī” ityādi pratyayaviśayaḥ | tato ‘haṃkārad gandharasarūpasparśāśabdāḥ, pañcatanmātrāḥ, sparśanarasanaghrāṇacakṣuśrotrāni pañcabuddhīndriyāni, vākpāṇipāda⁹⁹⁷pāyūpasthāni⁹⁹⁸ pañcakarmendriyāni, manaś ceti ṣoḍaśagaṇāḥ samutpadyante | teṣu ṣoḍaśagaṇeṣu pañcatanmātrebhyaḥ pañcabhūtāni samutpadyante |

SŚP §3 English

Prakṛti is the generator of the world. The names of Prakṛti are “The foremost”⁹⁹⁹ and “That which holds the many “. From that¹⁰⁰⁰ Prakṛti, The Great one arises. The Great one is the faculty of mental perception, which remains from creation until dissolution. From the Great one, the individuality arises. [It is] the object of the cognitions: “I am the knower, I am happy, I am suffering” etc.. Thus the group of 16 arise from the individuality: The five subtle elements: smell, taste, form, touch and sound; the five organs of consciousness: the organs of touch, taste, smell, the eye and the ear; the five organs of action: speech, the hand, the foot, the anus and the organ of generation; and the mind. Within the group of 16, the five great elements arise from the five subtle elements.¹⁰⁰¹

SŚP §4 30, 22-25

tad yathā - gandharūparasasparśebhyaḥ pṛthivī, rasarūpasparśebhyo jalam, rūpasparśābhyāṃ tejaḥ, sparśād vāyuḥ, śabdād ākāśaḥ samutpadyate iti sṛṣṭikramaḥ | etāni caturviṃśatitattvāni | pañcaviṃśatko jīvaḥ | ṣaḍviṃśatikaḥ parama iti nirīśvarasāṃkhyāḥ | ṣaḍviṃśako maheśvaraḥ, saptaviṃśatiḥ parama¹⁰⁰² iti seśvarasāṃkhyāḥ | teṣu tattveṣu –

mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtir mahādādyāḥ prakṛtīvikṛtayaḥ sapta |
ṣoḍaśakaś ca vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ || [Sāṃkhyakā- 3]

SŚP §4 English

⁹⁹⁷ ed. note: “malavisarjanadvāram |”

⁹⁹⁸ ed. note: “mūtravisarjanendriyam |”

⁹⁹⁹ i.e. *pradhāna*. As these names of *prakṛti* seem here partly to be given as explanations of *prakṛti* as “the foremost” and “that which holds the many”, it has here been translated. In the rest of the chapter it is left untranslated.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *tataḥ* is probably used here to avoid using the feminine ablative singular of the pronoun *tad* (*tasyāḥ*), as the feminine genitive singular and ablative singular endings are identical. Using *tataḥ* thus makes it absolutely clear that *prakṛter* is to be read as an ablative.

¹⁰⁰¹ How the great elements are derived from the subtle elements is explained in the following paragraph (§4 below).

¹⁰⁰² ed. note: “muktaḥ |”

It is as follows: earth (arises) from smell, form, taste and touch. Water (arises) from taste, form and touch. Fire (arises) from form and touch. Wind (arises) from touch. Ether arises from sound.”¹⁰⁰³ Thus is the series of creation. These are the 24 tattvas. The soul is the 25th. “The liberated soul¹⁰⁰⁴ is the 26th” the non-theistic Sāṃkhya say. “The Supreme God is the 26th, the liberated soul is the 27th” the theistic Sāṃkhya say. Among the tattvas:

Mūlaprakṛti¹⁰⁰⁵ is uncreated, the seven, the Great etc., are both creative and created, the group of 16 is created, the puruṣa¹⁰⁰⁶ is neither creative nor created¹⁰⁰⁷.

SŚP §5 31, 1-5

ity evaṃ prakṛtipuruṣayor bhedavijñānāt prakṛtiniṣṛtau puruṣasya suṣuptapuruṣavad
avyaktacaitanyopayogena svarūpamātrāvasthālakṣaṇo mokṣaḥ | tasya copāyaḥ
pañcaviṃśatitattvaparijñānam eva |

**pañcaviṃśatitattvajño yatra kutrāśrame sthitaḥ |
jaṭī muṇḍī śikhī keśī mucyate nātra saṃśayaḥ**¹⁰⁰⁸ || [source not found] iti vacanāt

SŚP §5 English

Thus, when there is cessation of prakṛti as a consequence of discerning the difference of prakṛti and puruṣa, [then] there is liberation, which has as its characteristic the establishing [of puruṣa] in its own nature only, because the consciousness [of the puruṣa] is un-manifest, like that of a man in deep sleep.¹⁰⁰⁹ And the means for that [liberation] is only thorough knowledge of the 25 tattvas. Because it is said:

¹⁰⁰³ How the gross elements are derived from the subtle elements is not explained in the SK. According to Larson (1987: 51), some commentaries put forth what they call the “accumulation theory”, in which *śabda* generates *ākāśa*, *śabda* and *sparsa* generate *vāyu* etc., following an ‘a -> 1, a+b -> 2, a+b+c -> c etc.’ form. The explanation given in the SŚP closely resembles this, except for a discrepancy in the beginning, thus following an ‘a -> 1, b -> 2, b+c -> 3, b+c+d -> 4 etc.’ form. Whether this is simply a mistake on the authors part, or if this is another way of explaining this process which can be found in other texts remains to be properly investigated.

¹⁰⁰⁴ *parama* (superlative of *para*, meaning “most distant”, “most remote” and thus “supreme”, “best” etc.) seems here to be used to denote the liberated soul. This meaning is perhaps derived from *parama* (supreme) being used to designate the supreme goal, i.e. liberation (*mokṣa*). Here this meaning seems to be extended to describe one who has reached this goal, i.e. the liberated soul.

¹⁰⁰⁵ *Mūlaprakṛti* (*mūla* meaning “root”) is synonymous with *prakṛti/pradhāna*.

¹⁰⁰⁶ i.e. the soul

¹⁰⁰⁷ The translation of this verse is based on Larson’s (1969: 258) translation. It should be noted that the term *ṣoḍaśaka* (group of 16) in this verse does not refer to the same 16 tattvas as in SK verse 22 (quoted in SŚP 30, 13-14). If it did, the Sāṃkhyakārikā would contradict itself as SK 22 states that *ṣoḍaśakāt pañcabhyaḥ pañcabhūtāni* (the five gross elements [arise] from five of the group of 16). The group of 16 tattvas referred to in SK 22 is thus clearly not only created, as five of those 16 are also creative.

¹⁰⁰⁸ ed. note: “śloko ‘yam sāmkyakā- māṭharavṛttau ‘yad uktam’ iti kṛtvā uddhṛtaḥ |”.

¹⁰⁰⁹ i.e. from realizing the difference between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, *prakṛti* ceases. From the ceasing of *prakṛti* the consciousness of the *puruṣa* remains dormant, just like the consciousness of someone in deep sleep. The soul is then liberated as a result of this. Liberation is characterized by the soul establishing itself in its own nature only.

“The knower of the 25 tattvas stays in whatever hermitage, [whether he is] an ascetic with twisted locks of hair, bald, with a tuft of hair or with long hair, he is liberated. With respect to this there is no doubt.”

[uttarapakṣa]

The refutation.

SŚP §6 31, 7-11

tad etat kapilamatam dṛṣṭaviruddham | tathā hi – tāvat puruṣavyatiriktasarvārthāḥ
pradhānamayāḥ kāpilair iṣṭāḥ | tac ca pradhānam sarvadā vartate nityatvāt, sarvatra ca
vartate tasya vyāpakatvenābhyupagamāt, sarvatra ca saṃpūrṇatayā vartate tasya
sarvathāniravayavatveneṣṭatvāt | tathā ca ”sarvaṃ sarvatra vartate” ity āyātam |
“sarvamayaṃ pradhānam sarvatra sākalyena vartate” ity abhyupagame “sarvaṃ sarvatra
vartate” ity asyāvaśyam abhyupagantavyatvāt.

SŚP §6 English

This very doctrine of Kapila¹⁰¹⁰ is contradicted by perception. For it is as follows – firstly, all objects, except the puruṣa, are accepted by the followers of Kapila to be identical with¹⁰¹¹ pradhāna. And that pradhāna exists at all times, because it is eternal. And it exists everywhere, because it is accepted that it is [all]-pervading. And it exists everywhere wholly because it is accepted to be absolutely partless. And thus it is arrived at that ”everything exists everywhere”. Because, if it is agreed that pradhāna, which is identical with all [objects], exists everywhere wholly, one must necessarily agree that “everything exists everywhere”.

SŚP §7 31, 12-14

nanv iṣṭāpādanam idam sarvaṃ sarvatra cāsta¹⁰¹² iti kāpilair ururīkaraṇād iti cet; tad idaṃ
hi spaṣṭam dṛṣṭaviruddham; pratyakṣena pratiniyatadeśakālasyaivārthasya darśanāt | na hi
pratyakṣena sarvaṃ sarvatra dṛśyate | aṅgulyagre hastiyūthaśatāder api darśanaprasaṅgāt
|

SŚP §7 English

If it is answered: Certainly, this is conducive to that which is agreed to [by us], because it is admitted by the followers of Kapila that “everything is everywhere”. [It answered:]

¹⁰¹⁰ Kapila is said to be the founder of the Sāṃkhya system

¹⁰¹¹ *Māya* may also mean “made up of”, “consisting of” etc.. In this context it seems best translated as “identical with”. This meaning is found in the MMW under *tanmaya*.

¹⁰¹² 3rd. sg. pres. ind. ātmanepada of the root *as*.

then that is clearly contradicted by perception, because an object is seen, by means of sensory perception, only in a specific place and time. For everything is not seen [to be] everywhere by means of sensory perception. Because [then there would be] adhering to seeing a hundred elephant-herds on the tip of a finger as well.

SŚP §8 31, 15-21

nanu naiṣa doṣaḥ sarvasya sarvatra sadbhāva ‘pi yatra yasyāvīrbhāvaḥ sa eva tatra dṛśyate na punar anyas tirohitaḥ, ity arthānāṃ darśanayogyāyogyatvavyavasthiter iti cet; ko ‘yam āvirbhāvo nāma – prāg anupalabdhasya vyañjakavyāpārād upalambha iti cet; sa ca nityo vā ‘nityo vā; yady anityaḥ, tadā sa prāg asan kāraṇaiḥ kriyeta, anyathā nityatvapasamṅgāt, tathā ca ghaṭādir api tadvat prāg asan kāraṇaiḥ kriyatām, na caivam, satkāryavādavirodhāt | āvirbhāvaḥ prāg asan kāraṇaiḥ kriyeta na punar ghaṭādir iti svarucivacanamātram | nirupapattikatvāt | yadi nityaḥ, tadā tad eva sarvatra sarvasya darśanaṃ syāt, āvirbhāvasya sadā sattvāt |

SŚP §8 English

If it is objected: “Certainly this fault does not [occur] even though everything exists everywhere. Where there is manifestation of something, there that alone is seen.

However, the other, [which is] concealed, is not [seen in that place], because objects are established as being either ¹⁰¹³cognizable or uncognizable¹⁰¹⁴; [It is asked:] What is this which is called “manifestation”? If [it is answered]: “It is the cognizing of that which was previously not cognized on account of the operation of manifestation¹⁰¹⁵.” [It is asked:] Is that [manifestation] eternal or non-eternal?¹⁰¹⁶ If it is non-eternal, then that previously non-existent [manifestation] must be produced by causes, because otherwise [there would be] adhering to [it being] eternal¹⁰¹⁷. In the same way a jar etc.. which previously did not exist, must likewise be produced by causes. But it is not thus, because it is in opposition to the doctrine of the effect being latently pre-existent in the cause. [To say that] “A manifestation that was previously non-existent must be made by causes, however, the jar

¹⁰¹³ *darśanayogyāyatva*, lit. “the state of being suitable and unsuitable with respect to seeing”, i.e. cognizable or uncognizable.

¹⁰¹⁴ The concept of manifestation (*āvirbhāva*, *prādurbhāva*) and concealment (*tirohita*, *tirobhāva*) are important concepts in the *satkāryavāda* (theory that the effect is latently pre-existent in the material cause) of the Sāṃkhya (Paradkar 2004: 14). The effect (*kārya*) is the manifestation (*vyakta*) of the unmanifest (*avyakta*) potentiality in the cause. The 23 evolutes (i.e. the *tattvas*) are considered the effects (*kārya*) of *prakṛti*, which is considered to be their material cause (*kāraṇa*). These evolutes pre-exist in *prakṛti* in the sense that they are specifications of its inherent generativity (Larson 1987: 68), their production thus being a manifestation of the potentiality in *prakṛti*.

¹⁰¹⁵ this being an explanation of *āvirbhāva* (manifestation), the term *vāñjaka* is here used for manifestation to make clear the meaning of *āvirbhāva*.

¹⁰¹⁶ though no interrogative pronouns are used here this is best rendered into English as a question on account of the context and the use of *vā* (or).

¹⁰¹⁷ i.e. if something were to exist but not be created by a cause, then it would have to be eternal. Thus, for a thing to be non-eternal, it must have previously not existed and been brought into existence by a cause.

etc.. is not” are mere words of ones own fancy, because it is illogical.¹⁰¹⁸ If it is eternal, then there must be seeing of everything everywhere, because of the constant existence of the manifestation.

SŚP §9 31, 22-23

athāvirbhāvasya prāk tirohitasya sata eva kāraṇair āvirbhāvāntaram iṣyate, tarhi tasyāpy anyat tasyāpy anyad āvirbhāvanam ity anavasthānān na kadācit ghaṭāder āvirbhāvaḥ syāt |

SŚP §9 English

Now, another manifestation is accepted as a cause for the manifestation that exists but was previously concealed. In that case another (manifestation) for that [manifestation], and yet another manifestation for that [manifestation] [etc.. etc.. has to be posited]. Thus the manifestation of a jar etc.. can never exist, because of infinite regress.¹⁰¹⁹

SŚP §10 31, 24-26

athāvirbhāvasyopalambharūpasya tadrūpāvirbhāvāntarānapekṣatvāt prakāśasya prakāśāntarānapekṣatvavan nānavasthiti matam; tarhi tasya kāraṇasya kāraṇād ātmalābho ‘bhyupagantavyaḥ,¹⁰²⁰ utpattiyabhivyaktibhyām prakārāntarābhavāt tatra coktadoṣa iti nāvirbhāvaḥ siddhyet |

SŚP §10 English

Now, it is thought: “There is no infinite regress because a manifestation, which has the nature of cognition¹⁰²¹, does not need another manifestation which has the [same] nature, like a light does not need another light [to be seen]”.¹⁰²² [To that it is answered:] In that case it must be accepted that the cause of that [manifestation] comes into existence from a cause, on account of the non-existence of any other alternative than production and

¹⁰¹⁸ The *satkāryavāda* is the theory of the relation between cause and effect advocated by Sāṃkhya philosophy, which claims that the effect is pre-existent in its material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*). The point Vidyānandin is here trying to make is that from this point of view it cannot be correct to say that the pot which is made did not previously exist and that it was brought into existence by some causes. The pot always existed within its cause. The same must then apply to manifestation (*āvirbhāva*). It cannot have previously not existed and then be created by its cause. Saying that the *satkāryavāda* applies to the pot but not manifestation is illogical as there is not difference between the two cases. Thus manifestation cannot be non-eternal as this is contradictory to the doctrines of the Sāṃkhya themselves.

¹⁰¹⁹ i.e. if one admits that the manifestation must be eternal, but tries to solve the problem of everything existing everywhere by positing another manifestation that reveals the manifestation, one ends up in an infinite regress of manifestations as each new manifestation will require another manifestation in order to not be manifest all the time. The pot will thus never manifest on account of the infinite number of manifestations that have to precede the actual manifestation of the pot.

¹⁰²⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “utpatti-abhivyaktibhyām”. Amended according to sandhi rules.

¹⁰²¹ *upalambha* (from *upa* + *labh*) literally means “to seize”, and is used similarly to the English “to grasp”, i.e. cognition.

¹⁰²² i.e. light allows one to see the objects surrounding it as well as itself. One need not postulate another light to see the light, as the light does this by itself. It is just so with manifestation as well. The argument is thus that manifestation manifests itself.

manifestation. And in that case the declared fault [applies]. Thus manifestation is not proved.¹⁰²³

SŚP §11 31, 27-29

yat tena tirobhāve ‘pi pratyādiṣṭaprāyaḥ tasya nityānityapakṣayor uktadoṣānuṣaṅgāt | āvirbhāvasya nirastatvena tṛtīyapakṣena cāsambhavāt | evam āvirbhāvatirobhāvayor asiddhau tadvaśāt kvacit kasyacit pratīter anupapatteḥ sarvam sarvatra dṛśyatām | na caivam; iti pratyakṣavirodhas tadavastha eva |

SŚP §11 English

Even in the case of concealment it is very much overcome by that [i.e. the same arguments], because of the extension of the declared faults to that [concealment] having [one of] the two alternatives of [being] eternal or non-eternal, because manifestation is refuted and because of the impossibility of a third alternative¹⁰²⁴. Thus, because, since manifestation and concealment is not proved, the cognition of some things somewhere on account of that [manifestation] is not found, everything must be seen everywhere. But it is not so. Thus the contradiction with sensory perception remains the same.¹⁰²⁵

SŚP §12 32, 1-13

tathā saty upalabdhiyogyatve saty anupalabdheḥ nāsti pradhānam | tadabhāve tannimittakā mahadādayo ‘pi na siddheyur iti sarvābhāvaḥ | tathāpi vaiyyātyāt¹⁰²⁶ mahadādisṛṣṭiprakriyocyate tadāyaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ - kim idaṃ mahadādikam pradhānasya kāryaṃ vā pariṇāmo vti, prathamampakṣe na tāvat satas tasya kāryatvam; sarvathā sataḥ kāraṇavaiyyarthāt puruṣavat | **yadi sat sarvathā kāryaṃ puṃvan notpattum arhati** | [āptamī- ślo- 39] iti vacanāt | nāpy asataḥ |

asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvāsambhavābhāvāt |

¹⁰²³ Vidyānandin’s argument here is not entirely clear. It seems to be that even if manifestation manifests itself like a lamp illuminates itself, it still requires a cause, i.e. the fact that it manifests (both itself and the effect) at a certain time must be caused by something. To continue the comparison with the lamp, even though a lamp illuminates both itself and the things around it, it does not light itself. This something must be a cause, as there is no third alternative, i.e. it must be either a cause or another manifestation. It cannot be another manifestation as this has already been shown to end in infinite regress. From this it follows that it must be a cause. This cause will also have to face the question of being eternal or not, i.e. produced or not, and will thus run into the same faults as the manifestation. Thus manifestation is not established.

¹⁰²⁴ i.e. the same faults apply to the notion of concealment. The point here is simply to make clear that expressing the same argument (regarding manifestation) negatively, i.e. “when something is perceived it is ‘un-concealed’, at all other times it is concealed”, would not help, as the same faults would apply.

¹⁰²⁵ i.e. since one has been unable to establish manifestation and concealment one cannot show how it is that things are seen at a specific time and place as a result of manifestation. Thus, since one desires to uphold the theory of *prakṛti*, everything must be seen everywhere. Since perception shows this not to be the case, the Sāṃkhya doctrine is contradicted by perception.

¹⁰²⁶ ed. note: “viparītāgrāhāt |”

śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca satkāryam || [sāṃkhyakā. 9]

iti svasiddhāntavirodhāt | sarvathāpy asataḥ utpattivirodhāc ca | **yady asat sarvathā kārya tan mā jani khapuṣpakavat** | [āptamī- ślo- 42] iti vacanāt |

SŚP §12 English

This being so, pradhāna does not exist, because there is no cognition [of pradhāna] even though [pradhāna] is fit to be cognized.¹⁰²⁷ Since that [pradhāna] does not exist, [then] also the Great etc.. which are caused by that [pradhāna] cannot be proved. Thus there is non-existence of everything.¹⁰²⁸

If it, even though it is thus, is said, on account of shamelessness, that the process of creation, the Great etc., [arises from pradhāna], then it is to be asked: “Is this, the Great etc., an effect or a transformation of Pradhāna?” In the first case, that [the Great etc.], which exists, [can] not be an effect, because of the uselessness of [positing] a cause for that which exists completely, like the Puruṣa. Because it is said: “If the effect exists completely it is not able to be an effect, like the soul”.¹⁰²⁹ And that which is [completely] non-existent [can] also not [be an effect], on account of it contradicting your own established conclusion:

“The effect must be pre-existent in the cause because there is no cause for the non-existent, because there is an apprehension of the material [not being different], because

¹⁰²⁷ i.e. if *pradhāna* existed there is no reason why it should not be cognized. Since it is “fit to be perceived”, the fact that it is not perceived proves that it does not exist.

¹⁰²⁸ i.e. thus the whole evolution of the world, as seen by the Sāṃkhya, breaks down.

¹⁰²⁹ Cf. Akalaṅka’s commentary to this verse in his Aṣṭaśatī:

na tāvat sataḥ kāryatvaṃ caitanyavat | nāpy asataḥ siddhāntavirodhāt, gaganakusumādivat | nāparam ekāntaprakāraṅtaram asit, vivartādeḥ pūrvottarasvabhāvapradhvamsitpattilakṣaṇatvāt | tad etat trailokyam vyakter apiti nityatvapratishedhāt | apetaṃ apy asti vināśapratishedhāt, iti anekāntoktiḥ andhasarpabilapraveśanyāyam anusarati || 39 ||

“Firstly, that which exists [completely] is not an effect, like the soul [is held by the Sāṃkhya not to be an effect]. The [completely] non-existent is also not [an effect], because it contradicts the established conclusion [of the Sāṃkhya themselves], like the sky flower [cannot be an effect as it is completely non-existent]. Moreover, there is no other one-sided way [except for the effect to completely exist or not exist], because transformation being characterized by the destruction and arising of prior and posterior modes [of the thing that transforms] [is the non-one-sided view] [because transformation is not compatible with the one-sided permanence which is held by the Sāṃkhya]. This very triple world vanishes on account of manifestation, because permanence is denied. It also vanishes because destruction is denied. Thus the speech of the Anekānta[vādin] follows the analogy of the blind snake entering a hole.” (My translation). See also Chapter 4.

Vidyānandin’s argument, taken from Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka, here seems to be that, as the *satkāryavāda* entails the pre-existence of the effect in the cause and the Sāṃkhya hold a one-sided (*ekānta*) view of permanence (*nitya*), the evolutes must be held to already exist completely. Thus it is not suitable that they have a cause, as they are completely existent. Likewise it is unsuitable to posit a cause for something that is completely non-existent. The underlying premise here is that only the *sui generis* both existent and non-existent thing can be produced. As the Sāṃkhya do not hold the evolutes to be *sui generis* both pre-existent and non-existent, they cannot be effects of *pradhāna*.

the possibility of everything does not exist, because the potent is the cause of that which is to have potency and because [the effect] has the nature of the cause”¹⁰³⁰

And because the arising of that which is completely non-existent [in the cause] is contradictory. Because it is said: “If the effect is completely non-existent, it cannot be produced, just like the sky-flower [can never be produced].”¹⁰³¹

SŚP §13 32, 14-16

dviṭīyapakṣe pariṇāmino bahudhānakasya pariṇāmā mahadādayo ‘tyantaṃ bhinnā vā syuḥ abhinnā vā, tatra pariṇāmānām tadabhinnānām kramaśo vṛttir mā bhūt pariṇāmino ‘kramatvāt | tato bhinnānām vyapadeśo na syāt saṃbandhāsiddher anupakāratvāt |

SŚP §13 English

In the second case¹⁰³², the transformations, The Great etc., of “That which holds the many”¹⁰³³, which is that which transforms, must either be absolutely different [from *pradhāna*], or identical [to it]. In the [first case]¹⁰³⁴, the transformations that are identical to that [which is transformed, i.e. *pradhāna*] cannot have successive order, on account of that which transforms having no successive order.¹⁰³⁵ [Concerning the second alternative], there cannot be an appeal to the [transformations] being different from that [*pradhāna*], because, [if they are different from *pradhāna*], there is no established relation [between that which transforms and the transformations] and [*pradhāna* cannot render any] assistance [to the transformations].¹⁰³⁶

SŚP §14 32, 17-23

¹⁰³⁰ This verse from the SK gives five reasons for the *satkāryavāda*. They are 1) *asadkaraṇa* – the non-existent cannot be the object of any activity. The sky flower cannot be produced. Blue cannot be made yellow even by a thousand artists (na hi nīlaṃ śilpisahasreṇāpi pītaṃ kartuṃ śakyate | Tattvakaumudī) (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 256); 2) *upādānagrahaṇa* – The effect is not different from the material from which it is produced. Only milk can produce curds as milk alone is materially related to curds. (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 257; Paradkar 2004: 13); 3) *sarvasaṃbhavābhāva* – If the effect does not exist in the material from which it is created, any cause might give rise to any effect. (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 257); 4) *śaktasya śakyakaraṇa* – Causal efficiency belongs to that which has the necessary potency (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 257), otherwise oil could be produced from sand (Paradkar 2004: 14); and 5) *kāraṇabhāva* – the effect has the same nature as the cause. A causal relation cannot subsist between two things that are essentially different (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 257).

¹⁰³¹ Akalaṅka’s commentary to this verse in his *Aṣṭaśatī* is quoted in Chapter 4.

¹⁰³² i.e. if the evolutes are transformations of *Pradhāna*.

¹⁰³³ i.e. *pradhāna/prakṛti*. Cf. §3 above.

¹⁰³⁴ i.e. if they are identical to *Pradhāna*.

¹⁰³⁵ i.e. being identical to *pradhāna* the evolutes could not have sequential order as *pradhāna* has no sequential order.

¹⁰³⁶ i.e. if the evolutes are held to be absolutely different from *pradhāna* they cannot be said to be transformations of *pradhāna*, as there can be no relation between them (as they are absolutely different). Moreover, *pradhāna* cannot render assistance to the transformations. This final point is explored in greater detail in §14 below.

na tāvat pradhānaṃ pariṇāmānām upakāraḥ; tatkr̥topakārāntarasya kāryatve
sadasatpakṣoktadoṣānuṣaṅgāt | pariṇāmatvetarabhinnānām kramotpattir mā bhūt |
bhinnānām vyapadeśo na syāt sambandhāsiddher anupakārāt | upakārāntarakalpanāyām
anavasthāprasamgāt | pariṇāmaiḥ pradhānasyopakāre yāvanto hi pariṇāmās tāvantas
tasyopakārās tatkr̥tās tato yadi bhinnāḥ, tadā tasyeti vyapadeśo ‘pi mā bhūt
saṃbandhāsiddher anupakāratvāt | tadvatat tair upakārāntare ‘pi sa eva paryanuyogaḥ
ity anavasthā | tatas te yady abhinnās tadā tāvad dhā pradhānaṃ bhidyeta | te vā
pradhānaikarūpatām pratipaderann iti pradhānasyopakārānām cāvasthānāsambhavaḥ |

SŚP §14 English

First of all, Pradhāna does not assist the transformations. Because, if the other assistance rendered by that [pradhāna] is an effect [produced by pradhāna], the declared faults concerning the [two] alternatives of existence and non-existence will result. [The assistances], being different from the other, which has the state of transformation, cannot have sequential arising. There cannot be appeal to the [assistances] being different [from the transformations], because there is no established relation. [The problem can also not be solved by positing another assistance for the assistance] because [there would be] adhering to infinite regress if [yet] another assistance is postulated [in order to relate the assistance to the transformations].¹⁰³⁷

¹⁰³⁷ Vidyānandin’s arguments in the first part of this paragraph are somewhat unclear. The arguments seem to revolve around the potential relationship between the assistances rendered by *pradhāna* (to the transformations) and the transformations, while the potential relationship between assistances rendered by the transformations (to *pradhāna*) and *pradhāna* is discussed in the latter half of the paragraph.

The first argument (*tatkr̥topakārāntarasya kāryatve sadasatpakṣoktadoṣānuṣaṅgāt*) seems to be that if the assistance is an effect of *Pradhāna*, the previously declared faults (cf. SŚP 31, 17-21) will then apply. If this is the meaning, it is however not at all clear why the assistance is referred to by the compound *tatkr̥topakārāntarasya*. *Tat* would then be *pradhāna*. *Tatkr̥topakāra* would then mean “the assistance performed by *pradhāna*”. The role of *antara* is however unclear. *Antara* means “other” or “another”. It is however not clear why the argument reads “if another/the other assistance performed by *pradhāna* is an effect”. While it is clear that Vidyānandin’s argument is that if the assistance rendered by *Pradhāna* to the transformations is an effect of *Pradhāna*, it will simply run into the same problems with regard to existence and non-existence etc., it is not clear why *antara* is included.

The second argument (*pariṇāmatvetarabhinnānām kramotpattir mā bhūt*) is even more unclear. The phrase *pariṇāmatvetarabhinnānām* is curious. It seems clear that *bhinna* must refer to the assistances. *Itara* sometimes forms tatpuruṣa compounds to express the opposite of that which it is compounded with. If this is the meaning here, then the phrase *pariṇāmatvetarabhinnānām* would refer to the assistances being different from the opposite of that which has transformation-ness, which could be taken to refer to *pradhāna*. It is not at all clear why sequential arising (*kramotpattir*) would be impossible if the assistances were different from *pradhāna*, as the opposite has been argued in §13 above, where the transformations were said to be unable to have successive order if they were held to be identical to *pradhāna*.

A second interpretation would be that *bhinna* refers to the assistances, qualified by *pariṇāmatvetara* in the sense of “either they are transformations or the other”. The argument would thus be that the assistances being different (from the transformations?), whether they are conceived of as transformations of *pradhāna* or effects of *pradhāna*, could not have sequential arising. It is then not at all clear why the result of this would be that they could not have sequential arising.

Alternately, *pariṇāmatvetara* may be a karmadhāraya compound referring to the transformations. If so the phrase *pariṇāmatvetarabhinnānām* could refer to the assistances being different from the other (*itara*), i.e. the transformations, which have the nature of transformation (*paraṇamatva*). It is however not entirely clear why the assistances being different from the transformations would prevent their sequential arising. The argument that as the transformations have sequential arising, the assistances, being different

Because, if assistance [is rendered] to *pradhāna* by the transformations, there are as many assistances [rendered] to that [*pradhāna*] as there are transformations. If [these assistances] are different from that [*pradhāna*], then there cannot be [any] appeal to that [assistance] [assisting *pradhāna*], because there is [then] no established relation [between the assistance and *pradhāna*] and [thus] no assistance [to relate the assistance and *pradhāna*]. And if another assistance [is rendered] by those [transformations] [to solve this problem], for [*pradhāna*] possessing that [relation to the assistance], [then] the same question [i.e. is this latter assistance identical to *pradhāna* or different from *pradhāna*?] [is asked], and thus there is infinite regress. If those [assistances rendered to *pradhāna* by the transformations] are identical to that [*pradhāna*], they must, alas, either¹⁰³⁸ destroy *pradhāna*, or they must attain to the state of having the same nature as *pradhāna*, and thus establishing the assistances for *pradhāna* is impossible.¹⁰³⁹

SŚP §15 32, 24-26

atha na bhinno nāpy abhinnaḥ pariṇāmaḥ kevalaṃ mahadādirūpena *pradhāna*ṃ
pariṇamate daṇḍakuṇḍalādyākāraiḥ sarpavad iti cet; tad etat sveṣṭānityaikāntabādhakam;
pūrvottarākāraparihārāvāptisthitilakṣaṇapariṇāmābhyupagame
nityānityātmakatvasyāvāṣyam bhāvāt |

SŚP §15 English

Now, if it is objected: the transformation is neither different [from *pradhāna*] nor identical [to *pradhāna*]. *Pradhāna* merely transforms itself into the form of Mahat etc., like a snake [transforms itself] into the forms of a stick, a coil of rope etc..¹⁰⁴⁰ [It is answered:] Then that opposes the one-sided [position] of permanence that is accepted by [the Sāṃkhya]

from the transformations, would not have sequential arising, does not seem very convincing. The only reason for sequential arising being impossible which seems to make sense is being identical to *pradhāna* (as argued in §13 above), as *pradhāna* does not have sequential arising. But it is difficult to see how *pariṇāmatvetarabhinna* would express identity with *pradhāna*. The meaning of this argument is thus not entirely clear.

The third and fourth arguments however seem clear, stating that if the assistances and transformations are different then there cannot be any relation between them and that if another assistance is posited to solve this problem it will only result in infinite regress. It thus seems that only the faults of the assistances being different from the transformations are stated here. This may be because Vidyānandin takes for granted that they cannot be identical, because then they would simply end up suffering from the same faults as the transformations as discussed in §13 above.

¹⁰³⁸ *tāvāt* here strictly speaking means "firstly", signifying that this is the first of two options, the second option (found in the following sentence) being connected to this first one by "vā" (or). It is here best rendered into English by the word "either".

¹⁰³⁹ Cf. SŚP 32, 19-21 above: there must be as many assistances as there are transformations. If they are identical (*abhinna*) to *pradhāna*, then *pradhāna* must have such a nature as well. The result is the refutation of *pradhāna* as postulated by the followers of Sāṃkhya, as its unitary character is lost. Alternatively, the *upakāras* (assistances) must have the same nature as *pradhāna*, i.e. non-partite, i.e. non-sequential, in which case they cannot possibly assist *pradhāna* in manifesting sequentially.

¹⁰⁴⁰ i.e. just as it makes no sense to ask if the different shapes of a snake, i.e. stretched out (like a stick), coiled (like a rope) etc., are different from the snake or identical to the snake, as they are merely the snake in two different shapes. In the same way it does not make sense to ask this question with respect to *pradhāna* and its transformations. *Pradhāna* merely transforms into these forms.

itself. Because, if [one] acknowledges transformation, defined as abandoning of previous modes, taking up of succeeding modes and continuity¹⁰⁴¹, [this] inevitably [leads to] the existence of that which has a permanent and impermanent nature [*sui generis*].¹⁰⁴²

SŚP §16 32, 27-33, 2

tad evam anekabādhakopanipātāt pradhānādicaturviṃśatitattvāni na vyavatiṣṭhante |
tadavyavasthitau bhogyābhāve puṃso bhokṛtvābhāvād abhāvaḥ syāt tasya¹⁰⁴³
tallakṣaṇatvāt | tataḥ prakṛtipuruṣatattvayor avasthānābhāvāt sāmkyābhimataṃ sarvaṃ
tattvaṃ punar api śūnyaṃ jāyata iti tat kathaṃ pratyakṣasiddhaṃ syāt; syāt;
urvīparvatatarvādipadārthānāṃ brahmamayavat pradhānamayatvasyāpi
pratyakṣeṇānupalakṣaṇāt siddham sāmkyāśāsanam dṛṣṭaviruddham |

SŚP §16 English

Thus, on account of the many negations, the 24 tattvas, Pradhāna etc., do not stand. If [the objects] which are to be experienced do not exist since that [Pradhāna etc.] is not established, then the soul cannot exist, on account of the non-existence of the state of being “the experiencer”, because it [he soul] has that [being the experiencer] as its defining characteristic¹⁰⁴⁴. Therefore, all the tattvas which are accepted by the Sāmkyā become completely void because there is no establishment of the two tattvas prakṛti and puruṣa. So how can that [which is accepted by the Sāmkyā] be proved by means of sensory-perception?

[If it is objected that:] it can [be proved by sensory perception], [then this is rejected:]¹⁰⁴⁵. That which is supposed by the Sāmkyā is proved to be contradicted by perception, because, just like (there is no observing, by means of sensory perception, of the categories of earth, mountains, trees etc.) being identical with brahman, there is also no observing by means of sensory perception of the categories of earth, mountains, trees etc. being identical with pradhāna.

SŚP §17 33, 3-6

tathā tadiṣṭaviruddhaṃ ca | kāpilābhimatasya kūṭasthanityapuruṣasya kathaṃcit
tadanityatvasādhakānumānena viruddhatvāt | tac cedam – vivādāpannaḥ puruṣaḥ
syādanityaḥ; anityabhogābhinnatvāt | yad itthaṃ tad itthaṃ dṛṣṭam; yathā bhogasvarūpaṃ

¹⁰⁴¹ i.e. in Jain terms: that the dravya (substance) remains the same but that the paryayas (modes) change

¹⁰⁴² i.e. this would be abandoning the *ekānta* (one-sided) Sāmkyā view of permanence and an acceptance of the Jain *anekānta* view of both permanence and impermanence *sui generis*.

¹⁰⁴³ ed. note: “puruṣasya |”

¹⁰⁴⁴ i.e. since *puruṣa* is defined as the experiencer (*bhokṛ*), it cannot exist as that which is experienced does not exist. Cf. ĀM 68: *kāryaliṅgaṃ hi kāraṇam* |, “the cause is that which has the effect as its mark”.

¹⁰⁴⁵ The structure here is puzzling. Either the second *syāt* should be removed, or the *syāt* following the question *tat kathaṃ pratyakṣasiddhaṃ syāt* represents a hypothetical Sāmkyā answer to this question (in an extremely minimalistic form). The rest of the sentence is then the refutation of this answer.

iti | nāsiddhaṃ bhogasyānityatvam, “anitya bhogaḥ utpattimattvāt, jñānavat” ity anumānāt tatsiddheḥ |

SŚP §17 English

In the same way that [Sāṃkhya teaching] is also contradicted by inference. Because the soul, which is accepted by the followers of Kapila to be unchanging and permanent, is contradicted by an inference which proves that that [soul] is in some ways impermanent. And this is that [inference] – the soul, which has entered into the dispute, is impermanent because it is identical¹⁰⁴⁶ to experience, which is impermanent. And that which is thus [identical to experience, which is impermanent] is seen [to be] thus [impermanent], such as experience itself.¹⁰⁴⁷ The impermanence of experience is not unproved, because it is proved from the inference: “Experience is impermanent because it has origination, just like knowledge”.¹⁰⁴⁸

SŚP §18 33, 7-12

katham utpattimān bhoga iti cet; parāpekṣatvāt tadvad eva parāpekṣo ‘sau buddhyadhyavasāyāpekṣatvāt | **buddhyavasitam artham puruṣaś cetayate** [source not found] iti vacanāt | bhogasya buddhyadhyavasāyāpekṣatve puṃsaḥ sarvatra sarvadā sarvabhogaprasaṅgāt | bhogyasaṃnidhisavyapekṣatayā kādācitkatvāc cānityaḥ siddho bhogaḥ | tasya ca puruṣād bhede tena tasya gaganāder iva puruṣāntarasyeva¹⁰⁴⁹ vā bhoktrtvānupapatteḥ | tato¹⁰⁵⁰ bhogasyābhede tadrūpatayā puruṣasya kathamcid anityatvaṃ siddhyatīti samyag idam sādhanam ātmānityatvaṃ sādhayati | tataḥ sūktam – sāmṅkhyamatam iṣṭaviruddham iti |

SŚP §18 English

If it is objected: How [can one say that] experience has origination? [It is answered:] Because [experience] depends on something else just like that [knowledge]. It [experience] depends on something else on account of depending on determinate cognition in the intellect. For it is said: “The soul is conscious of the object that is

¹⁰⁴⁶ i.e. in some ways identical (*kathamcid abhinnaḥ*)

¹⁰⁴⁷ This is the syllogism. 1) pratijñā (proposition): the soul is impermanent. 2) hetu (premise): because it is identical to experience, which is impermanent. 3) udāharaṇa (explanatory example with a general statement): that which is identical to experience is impermanent, such as experience itself. *4) upanaya (application): *and the soul is identical to experience. *5) nigamana (conclusion): *thus the soul is impermanent.

¹⁰⁴⁸ i.e. the followers of Sāṃkhya cannot object that the *hetu* (premise) in the preceding syllogism is not proved to be true (and that the syllogism is thus not valid), for the impermanent nature of experience is proved by inference: 1) pratijñā (proposition): experience is impermanent. 2) hetu (premise): because it has origination. 3) drṣṭānta (example): just like knowledge.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Amended. Printed edition reads: ”puruṣāntarasyaiva”. The *vā* and the context indicate that this too should be read as a comparison.

¹⁰⁵⁰ ed. note: “puruṣāt |”

determinately cognized by the intellect.” Because, if experience was not dependent on determinate cognition in the intellect, there [would be adhering to] the soul always having all experiences. Experience is proved to be impermanent because it happens occasionally, because it is dependent on the presence of that which is to be experienced.

Because, if that [experience] is different from the soul, it is not found that that [soul] is the experiencer, like another soul or like space etc. [is not the experiencer].¹⁰⁵¹ If experience is identical to that [soul], it is proved that the soul is in some ways impermanent because it has the nature of that [experience]. Thus this correct proof proves that the soul is impermanent. Thus it is rightly said that the Sāṃkhya doctrine is contradicted by inference.

SŚP §19 33, 13-25

tathā caturvidhavarṇāśramatattadvidheyavividhācārapuṇyapaparalokabandhamokṣa-
tatkāraṇataphalabaddhamuktādisvarūpapratipādakaḥ sām̐khyāgamo na pramāṇaṃ
dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddhāgamābhinnasya tasya parokṣatatkaraṇeṣu
prāmāṇyasambhāvanānupapatter iti na teṣāṃ dharmānuṣṭhānaṃ pratiṣṭhām iyarti | kim
atra bahunoktena yat kiṃcit seśvaranirīśvarasām̐khyair asaṃkhyāvadbhir¹⁰⁵² ākhyāyate
tatsarvaṃ mṛṣaiva, tadabhimatasakalatattvānām āvirbhāvādyapākaraṇadvāreṇa
śūnyatvasyāpāditatvād ity alaṃ prasam̐gena, dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddhatvāt
sām̐khyāśāsanasyāsatyatvasiddheḥ |

dr̥ṣṭeṣṭeṣu dr̥ṣṭeṣṭavirodhāt sām̐khyasam̐mataḥ |
parokṣeṣu tadekatvādāgamo na pramāṇatām ||

āvirbhāvacyutau sarvacyuteḥ sām̐khyavaco ‘khilam |
bhavet pralāpamātratvāt nāvadheyam vipaśicatām ||

na sām̐khyāśāsanam̐ satyam̐¹⁰⁵³ dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭeṣṭabādhatāḥ |
na ca tena pratikṣepaḥ syādvādasyeti niścitam̐ ||

SŚP §19 English

In the same way the scriptural tradition of the Sāṃkhya, which explains the fourfold caste system, the (fourfold) stages of life, the manifold practices which are to be performed

¹⁰⁵¹ The argument seems to be that the soul cannot be the experiencer of its experience if the experience is completely different from it, just like another soul cannot be the experiencer of its experience. The comparison with the sky (*gagana*) is however not clear.

¹⁰⁵² Pun: The Sāṃkhya is *asaṃkhyavat*.

¹⁰⁵³ Amended. The printed edition reads: ”dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭeṣṭabādhatāḥ”. Cf. SŚP 19, 18 (Cārvāka-chapter) for the same phrase (*dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭeṣṭabādhatāḥ*).

[according to] these [i.e. the fourfold castes and stages of life], merit, demerit, the other world, bondage, liberation, the causes of that [bondage], the fruits of that [liberation], the nature of the bound and liberated [souls] etc.. is not a valid means of knowledge because the possibility of validity with regard to their imperceptible¹⁰⁵⁴ causes, is not found for this [tradition]. Thus their religious practice does not reach an exalted position.

In short¹⁰⁵⁵, that which is declared by the unintelligent¹⁰⁵⁶ theistic and non-theistic Sāṃkhya, is completely wrong on account of the establishing of the voidness of all the tattvas that are accepted by the [Sāṃkhya] means of the refutation of manifestation etc.. Enough with contingencies, because the Sāṃkhya teaching is proved to be false on account of being contradicted by perception and inference.

That which is accepted by the Sāṃkhya is not valid with regard to that which is perceived and inferred because it is contradicted by perception and inference.

The [Sāṃkhya scriptural] tradition, on account of being one with that [which is contradicted by perception and inference], is not valid with regard to the imperceptible¹⁰⁵⁷.

Because, when manifestation falls, all [the tattvas] fall,
all the words of the Sāṃkhya are not to be attended to by the wise
because they are mere talk.

The Sāṃkhya-teaching is not true,
because it is negated by perception, the unseen¹⁰⁵⁸ and inference.
It is ascertained: The Syādvāda is not refuted by that [Sāṃkhya teaching].

[iti sāṃkhyaśāsanaparīkṣā]

Thus is the investigation into the Sāṃkhya-teaching.

¹⁰⁵⁴ i.e. they are beyond the grasp of perception. They cannot be known directly

¹⁰⁵⁵ lit. "what is the point of much speech?"

¹⁰⁵⁶ This is a pun: Sāṃkhya is *asāṃkhyāvat*.

¹⁰⁵⁷ i.e. that which can only be indirectly known, i.e. cannot be verified directly.

¹⁰⁵⁸ The meaning of *adrṣṭa* is here unclear. *Adrṣṭa* usually refers to such things as *punya* and *pāpa* etc., i.e. the workings of karma, but it is difficult to see how such a reading would make sense in this context. *Adrṣṭa* could here be used as a synonym for *parokṣa* ("indirect", i.e. not directly perceptible and thus *adrṣṭa*, i.e. "unseen" or "not seen"), as it is given together with *dṛṣṭa* and *iṣṭa*, which both refer to valid means of knowledge (perception and inference respectively).

Vaiśeṣikaśāsanaparīkṣā

Investigation into the Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

SŚP 34, 3

atha vaiśeṣikamatam api dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddham | tāvad idaṃ hi teṣāṃ ākūtam –¹⁰⁵⁹

SŚP 34, 3 English

Next, also the Vaiśeṣika doctrine is contradicted by perception and inference. Firstly, this is what they intend [to propound] –

[pūrvapakṣa]

The opponent's side.

SŚP §1 34, 3-7

buddhisukha¹⁰⁶⁰ duḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārāṇāṃ navānāṃ
ātmaviśeṣaguṇānāṃ atyantocchittāv ātmanaḥ svātmany avasthānaṃ¹⁰⁶¹ mokṣaḥ, anyathā
ātmano 'tyantaviśuddhyabhāvād iti | **dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ**
padārthānāṃ¹⁰⁶² **sādharmyavaidharmyatattvajñānaṃ**¹⁰⁶³ **niḥśreyasahetuḥ** | [praśa- bhā-
pr- 3¹⁰⁶⁴] śaivapāśupatādīkṣāgrahaṇajātādihāraṇātrikālabhasmoddhūlanāditapo
'nuṣṭhānaviśeṣāś ca |

SŚP §1 English

When there is absolute dissociation¹⁰⁶⁵ of the nine specific qualities of the soul, [namely] knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit and predispositions, the soul is established in its own self, which is liberation. Because otherwise¹⁰⁶⁶ the absolute purity of the soul is absent.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Amended. This opening part is included in the pūrvapakṣa by the editor. It is strictly speaking not part of the pūrvapakṣa (opponent's side) as it states that the Puruṣādvaita is contradicted by perception and inference. It has therefore been separated from the rest of §1 (in which it was included by the editor), which starts the pūrvapakṣa.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads: "sukhadukhecchā".

¹⁰⁶¹ Editors note: "navānāṃ ātmaviśeṣaguṇānāṃ atyantocchittir mokṣaḥ | " praśa- vyo- pr- 368 |

¹⁰⁶² The "Word index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya" (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) reads "saṅgāṃ padārthānāṃ", recording the reading found in the SŚP as an alternate reading. As the reading of the SŚP does not change the meaning, it has not been amended.

¹⁰⁶³ editors note: "dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām tattvajñānaniḥśreyasah | vaiśe- sū- 1|1|4|".

¹⁰⁶⁴ The "Word index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya" (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) has this as §2.

¹⁰⁶⁵ *ucchitti* is derived from *ut + ched*, literally meaning "to cut off". Dissociation is thus a good way of rendering it into English.

¹⁰⁶⁶ i.e. if there is no such dissociation

Thorough knowledge of the similarity and dissimilarity¹⁰⁶⁷ of the [six] categories, i.e. substance¹⁰⁶⁸, quality¹⁰⁶⁹, activity¹⁰⁷⁰, the universal, the particular and inherence, is the cause of the supreme [goal]¹⁰⁷¹. And the specific religious practices [which characterize them] are austerities such as sprinkling ashes at the three times¹⁰⁷² etc., having twisted locks of hair and undertaking the initiation of the Śaiva pāsupatas¹⁰⁷³ etc..

SŚP §2+§3+§4¹⁰⁷⁴ 34, 8-24

**tatra dravyāni pṛthivyaptejovāyvakāśakāladigātmamanāmsi
sāmānyaviśeṣasaṃjñoktāni¹⁰⁷⁵ navaiva | tadvyatirekeṇa saṃjñāntarānabhidhānāt¹⁰⁷⁶ |
guṇāḥ rūparasagandhasparśasaṃkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāga-
paratvāparatvabuddhisukhaduḥkhaicchādveṣapratyatnāś ca kaṅṭhoktāḥ saptadaśa,
caśabdasaṃmuccitāś ca gurutvadratvasnehasaṃskārādṛṣṭaśabdāḥ saptaiveti evaṃ
caturviṃśatiguṇāḥ | [praśa- bhā- pṛ- 10¹⁰⁷⁷]**

**utkṣepaṇāpakṣepaṇākuñcanaprasāraṇagamanānīti pañcaiva karmāṇi |
gamanagrahaṇād bhramaṇarecanaspandanordhvajvalanatiryagpatanana-
manonnamanādayo gamanaviśeṣā na jātyantarāni¹⁰⁷⁸ | [praśa- bhā- pṛ- 11¹⁰⁷⁹]**

**sāmānyam dvividham, param aparam cānuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam | tatra param sattā
mahaviśayatvāt, sā cānuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva | dravyatvādy aparam
alpaviśayatvāt | tac ca vyāvṛtter api hetutvāt sāmānyam sad viśeṣākhyām api labhate**

¹⁰⁶⁷ the interpretation and translation of this compound follows the Vaiśeṣikasūtra quoted by the editor in his note to *sādharṃyavāidharṃyatattvajñāna* in the Sanskrit text.

¹⁰⁶⁸ substance is, according to the Vaiśeṣika, the substratum of qualities, and exists independently from them. It can however not be seen apart from its qualities, and can thus be defined as “that which has qualities” (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 188)

¹⁰⁶⁹ quality is defined by Kaṇada as “that which has substance for its substratum, has no further qualities, and is not a cause of, nor has any concern with, conjunction or disjunction” (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 204)

¹⁰⁷⁰ *karman* is here activity in the sense of movement, and belongs to substances. But while *guṇas* (qualities) are constant features of substances, *karman* is temporary.

¹⁰⁷¹ i.e. liberation.

¹⁰⁷² i.e. morning, noon and evening

¹⁰⁷³ i.e. of the devotees of Śiva as Paśupati (Lord of the beasts). According to Radhakrishnan (1966b: 170 footnote 3) this is a common assertion which is also made by Guṇaratna in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayavṛtti*, Rājaśekhara in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* and Haribhadra in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*. Haribhadra writes: “akṣapādamate devaḥ sṛṣṭisamhāraḥc chivaḥ vibhur nityaikaḥ sarvajño nityabuddhisamāśrayaḥ” (quoted in Radhakrishnan 1966b: 170 footnote 3).

¹⁰⁷⁴ Paragraphs 2-4 are here given together as the quote from the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* which starts in §2 ends in §4.

¹⁰⁷⁵ The “Word index to the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*” (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) reads “sāmānyaviśeṣasaṃjñayoktāni”, recording the reading found in the SŚP as an alternate reading.

¹⁰⁷⁶ The “Word index to the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*” (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) reads “tadvyatirekeṇānyasya saṃjñānabhidhānāt |”, recording the reading found in the SŚP as an alternate reading. As the meaning is still clear, it has not been amended, though the reading recorded by Bronkhorst and Ramseier seems preferable.

¹⁰⁷⁷ The “Word index to the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*” (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) has this as §4-5.

¹⁰⁷⁸ ed. note: “kim tu gamana evāntarabhūtāni |”

¹⁰⁷⁹ The “Word index to the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*” (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) has this as §6

| nityadravyavṛttayo 'ntyā viśeṣāḥ | te khalv atyantavyāvṛttibuddhihetutvāt¹⁰⁸⁰ viśeṣā
eva | ayutasiddhānām ādhryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ saṃbandha iha pratyayahetuḥ sa
samavāyaḥ | evaṃ dharmair vinā dharminām uddeśaḥ kṛtaḥ | saṅgām api
padārthānām sādharmyam astitvam abhidheyatvam jñeyatvam¹⁰⁸¹ | āśritatvam
cānyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ¹⁰⁸² | dravyādīnām pañcānām api¹⁰⁸³ samavāyitvam
anekatvam ca | guṇādīnām pañcānām api¹⁰⁸⁴ nirguṇatvaniṣkriyatve | [praśa- bhā, pṛ-
11-16¹⁰⁸⁵] ity ādi anekavidhaṃ sādharmyaṃ vaidharmyaṃ ceti tattvajñānaṃ mokṣahetuḥ |
tad yathā duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye
tadanantarābhāvād apavargaḥ | [nyāyasū- 1|1|2]

SŚP §2+§3+4 English

There are only nine substances: earth, water, fire, wind¹⁰⁸⁶, ākāśa¹⁰⁸⁷, time, space¹⁰⁸⁸, soul
and mind, which are expressed by the names “universal” and “particular”¹⁰⁸⁹. Because
[the Vaiśeṣikasūtra] does not name any other [substances] except for those¹⁰⁹⁰.

Seventeen qualities are explicitly mentioned¹⁰⁹¹: color, taste, smell, touch¹⁰⁹², number¹⁰⁹³,
size¹⁰⁹⁴, individuality¹⁰⁹⁵, conjunction, disjunction¹⁰⁹⁶, priority, posteriority¹⁰⁹⁷, knowledge,

¹⁰⁸⁰ The “Word index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya” (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) reads
”atyantavyāvṛttihetutvāt”, recording the reading found in the SŚP as an alternate reading.

¹⁰⁸¹ The “Word index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya” (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) reads “saṅgām api
padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni”, recording the reading found in the SŚP as an alternate reading.

¹⁰⁸² ed. note: “nityadravyāni na kāryadravyavat svakāraṇāśritāni bhavanti |”
¹⁰⁸³ The “Word index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya” (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) omits “api”, recording the
reading found in the SŚP as an alternate reading.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Amended. Printed ed. reads “nigurnatva”.

¹⁰⁸⁵ The “Word index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya” (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) has this as §7-13.

¹⁰⁸⁶ These four elemental substances are said to consist of indivisible atoms (*paramāṇu*). *Ākāśa*, time and
space are on the other hand non-atomic but all-pervasive (Halbfass 1992: 71).

¹⁰⁸⁷ I here leave *ākāśa* untranslated. According to Radhakrishnan (1966b) *ākāśa* fills all space. It is,
however, not space itself. It does however signify space in the meaning of “room” or “place”, as
distinguished from *dik* which, although it also is not space itself, is that which sustains positional relations
and the order of discrete things. While *ākāśa* is regarded as the material cause of sound, *dik* is regarded as
the general cause of all effects (Radhakrishnan 1966b:193).

¹⁰⁸⁸ Cf. footnote 1087. Though Radhakrishnan points out that *dik* is not space itself, it does sustain
positional relations and the order of discrete things (Radhakrishnan 1966b:193). I have therefore here
chosen to translate it as space in the sense of “that which sustains positional relations”.

¹⁰⁸⁹ So, these nine are either universal, particular or both. *Ākāśa*, time and space are particular only, the rest
are both universal and particular, i.e. there is both a universal category of “soul” and particular souls that
belong to it. (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 187-194)

¹⁰⁹⁰ i.e. there are nine substances because only nine substances are mentioned in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra.

¹⁰⁹¹ *kanthokta*, lit. “uttered by means of the throat”, i.e. explicitly mentioned. These are the seventeen
qualities explicitly mentioned in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra.

¹⁰⁹² *sparśa* is the quality which can only be apprehended by the skin. It is said to be of three kinds: hot, cold
and neither hot nor cold. It thus seems to rather refer to temperature, but is sometimes also said to cover
qualities such as roughness, smoothness, hardness and softness (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 205)

¹⁰⁹³ it is because of this quality that things can be counted (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 205)

¹⁰⁹⁴ it is because of this quality that things can be measured and apprehended as big or small etc.. It is also
referred to as *parimiti* (dimension). (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 206)

¹⁰⁹⁵ this quality is the basis for distinctions with respect to quantity, *viśeṣa* (particularity) being the basis for
qualitative distinctions (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 206)

¹⁰⁹⁶ *saṃyoga* and *vibhāga* (conjunction and disjunction) refer to the combination of separate substances and
the separation of combined substances. These qualities account for changes of things (Radhakrishnan
1966b: 206-7).

pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort¹⁰⁹⁸. And seven categories are added [to those explicitly mentioned] because of the word “ca”¹⁰⁹⁹: heaviness, fluidity¹¹⁰⁰, viscosity¹¹⁰¹, predisposition¹¹⁰², the unseen¹¹⁰³ and sound¹¹⁰⁴. Thus there are 24 qualities. The activities are only five: upward, downward, contracting, expanding and moving [in general]. The particular movements, such as roaming, evacuation, quivering, flaming upwards, horizontal [movements], falling, bowing down, bending upwards etc., are not separate kinds [of movement]¹¹⁰⁵, because “movement” [in general] is mentioned. The universal, which is the cause of the cognition of similarity¹¹⁰⁶, is twofold: higher and lower¹¹⁰⁷.

Among those¹¹⁰⁸, existence-ness¹¹⁰⁹ is a higher [universal], because of [residing] in the great[est] [amount of] objects. That [existence-ness] is only a universal, on account of

¹⁰⁹⁷ *paratva* and *aparatva* (priority and posteriority) are relations of things, forming the basis of the notions of nearness and remoteness in time and space (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 207).

¹⁰⁹⁸ *buddhi* (knowledge), *sukha* (pleasure), *duhkha* (pain), *icchā* (desire), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *prayatna* (effort) are qualities of the soul. Cf. SŚP 34, 1-3.

¹⁰⁹⁹ i.e. since the list in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra ends with *ca* (and). This *ca* is interpreted as meaning that the list of 17 qualities given in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra is not exhaustive. Thus the Preśastapādabhāṣya adds the following seven qualities. The fact that several qualities of the soul (i.e. *saṃskāra*, *dharma*, *adharmā*. Cf. SŚP 34, 1-3) are not mentioned in the list of 17 qualities lends credibility to the interpretation of the list in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra not being exhaustive.

¹¹⁰⁰ this quality abides naturally in water. It is the reason for the action of “flowing” (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 207).

¹¹⁰¹ this quality belongs to water and is the cause of cohesion, smoothness etc. (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 207)

¹¹⁰² a quality of the soul. Cf. SŚP 34, 2-3 §1 above.

¹¹⁰³ *adr̥ṣṭa* (unseen) is said to be the unseen power that souls and things produce. According to Radhakrishnan (1966b) it tends to function as a sort of *deus ex machina*, explaining things that can not otherwise be accounted for, like a needle being drawn to a magnet, the upward motion of fire, the beginning of the universe etc.. When god was later accepted into the Vaiśeṣika reality, *adr̥ṣṭa* also became the vehicle for his operations in the world (207-8). It is interesting to note that Radhakrishnan (1966: 204) lists the seven qualities added by Praśastapādabhāṣya as *gurutva*, *dravatva*, *sneha*, *dharma*, *adharmā*, *śabda* and *saṃskāra*. This seems to make much more sense as *dharma* (merit) and *adharmā* (demerit) have already been mentioned as qualities of the soul (See SŚP 34, 1-3). It would then be strange if they were not given in the list of qualities. Bronkhorst and Ramsaier’s (1994) edition of the Praśastapādabhāṣya however agrees with the list of qualities given here in the SŚP. It should also be noted that the list given by Radhakrishnan omits *adr̥ṣṭa*, but in his following explanation of the qualities he still explains *adr̥ṣṭa* as a quality. Halbfass (1992: 71) gives the same list as Radhakrishnan, also omitting *adr̥ṣṭa*. He does however later say that *dharma* and *adharmā* are included in the list of 24 *guṇas* (qualities) under the common heading *adr̥ṣṭa* (ibid: 123). It thus seems clear the *adr̥ṣṭa* here refers to *dharma* and *adharmā*. Thus the list does list 24 *guṇas* as *adr̥ṣṭa* represents two *guṇas*.

¹¹⁰⁴ *śabda* is the quality belonging to *ākāśa* (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 205).

¹¹⁰⁵ i.e. these specific movements are sub-types of movement falling in under movement in general.

¹¹⁰⁶ i.e. it is the cause of different cognitions of individual cows etc. being experienced as cognitions of the same type of thing, i.e. as cows. *Anuvṛtti*, from *anu* + *vṛt* (“to go after”, “to follow”, and thus also “to resemble”), here means “resembling” or “similarity”.

¹¹⁰⁷ it should be noted that these two kinds of universal are relative, i.e. universality has different degrees which are relative to one another. Whether a type of universal is *para* (higher) or *apara* (lower) depends on what universal it is compared with. So while *dravyatva* (substanceness) is *apara* compared to *sattā* (existence-ness), it is *para* with respect to *pṛthvitva* (earthiness) etc. (Shah 1968: 78). In other words: “the class of substances is called ‘higher’ because it includes the classes of pots and chairs and so on, and it is called ‘lower’ because it is included in the general class of existents” (Matilal 1986: 380).

¹¹⁰⁸ *tatra* here indicates that the following is a commentary to the last sentence of the preceding paragraph (*sāmānyam dvividham, param aparam cānuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam*).

¹¹⁰⁹ Following Matilal (1986), I here translate *sattā*, which here refers to *sattāsāmānya*, as “existence-ness”, to distinguish it from “existence” (*svarūpasattā*) (380). While the former is a universal, the latter is not. Thus, while particular substances etc. are existents in the sense that the universal “existence-ness” resides in them, there are also attributes, including “existence-ness”, which can be said to have “existence” in the sense that they exist. But in such cases the possession of “existence” does not designate any further real property, but only serves to distinguish existent things from non-existent things such as hare’s horn etc..

being the cause of only similarity¹¹¹⁰. Substanceness etc.¹¹¹¹ is the lower, because [it resides in] a small [amount of] objects. And the existing¹¹¹² universals obtains the appellation “particular” as well, on account of also being the cause of exclusion¹¹¹³. The particulars, which appear in the eternal substances¹¹¹⁴, are [called] “the limit”¹¹¹⁵. And those are indeed only particular, on account of being the cause of cognitions of absolute exclusion. That which is the relation of those [things] that are inseparable¹¹¹⁶ and consist of the support and that which is to be supported, and which is the cause of the cognition “here”¹¹¹⁷, that is inherence.¹¹¹⁸

Thus enumeration of the possessors of attributes is performed without [mentioning their] attributes.¹¹¹⁹ The 6 categories¹¹²⁰ have [the attributes:] similarity, existence, being namable and being knowable. Those [six categories] reside [in substance], except the eternal substances.¹¹²¹ Five [categories], substance etc.¹¹²², are manifold and related by inherence. Five [categories], quality etc.¹¹²³, are without qualities and inactive¹¹²⁴.

(ibid: 380-81) In other words, while the universal “existence-ness” exists, and thus has “existence”, the universal “existence-ness” does not reside in it. If it was held that it does it would lead to an infinite regress.
¹¹¹⁰ *sattā* (existence-ness) is only *para* (higher), as it is the most general category, contained in *dravyatva* (substanceness), *guṇatva* (qualityness) and *karmatva* (activityness).

¹¹¹¹ i.e. substanceness, qualityness and activityness.

¹¹¹² The function of *sat* (existing) here is unclear. It could either belong to *sāmānyam* (universal) or be compounded with *viśeṣākhyām*. In any case its function and meaning is not clear. I have here chosen to read it as referring to *sāmānyam*.

¹¹¹³ *Dravyatva* (substanceness) causes cognitions of similarity (with respect to objects of the same class) and cognitions of exclusion (i.e. causes the differentiation of objects that belong to different classes). Cf. the Vaiśeṣikasūtra: “*dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ karmatvañ ca sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca || 1|2| 5||*”, “Substanceness, qualityness and activityness are universals and particulars”, i.e. they are the cause of both inclusion and exclusion.

¹¹¹⁴ i.e. atoms (*paramāṇu*), time (*kāla*), space (*dik*), *ākāśa*, the soul (*ātman*) and the mind (*manas*).

According to the Vaiśeṣika these six eternal substances have unique features which distinguish them from each other. But since they are partless they cannot, like complex entities, be distinguished from other individuals of the same class by the arrangements of their parts. They are thus differentiated by having *viśeṣa* (particularity), i.e. the *viśeṣa* of a soul is what differentiates it from other souls. Likewise, *viśeṣa* allows for the differentiation of the individual earth atoms from one another etc.. According to the Praśastapāda only yogis are able to cognize this particularity (Bartley 2005: 178; Radhakrishnan 1966b: 215-16). It should be noted that the *padārtha* (category) particular (*viśeṣa*) explained here is not the individual, often referred to as the particular (*viśeṣa*), as opposed to the universal (*sāmānya*).

¹¹¹⁵ “these distinctive particularities are the final facts beyond which we cannot go” (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 215).

¹¹¹⁶ i.e. inseparable yet not identical, like the relation between a substance and a quality. A quality cannot exist outside a substance, and a substance cannot exist without qualities. Their relation is thus said to be inseparable (*ayutasiddha*), yet they are not held to be identical.

¹¹¹⁷ i.e. “this is in that”, i.e. the cognition of something being the support and something else the supported, such as the cloth being in the thread, red colour in the rose etc..

¹¹¹⁸ There are thus two criteria that must be fulfilled in order to say that there is inherence. 1) the relation must be inseparable, and 2) the relation between the things must be that of support and supported (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 216).

¹¹¹⁹ i.e. the above presentation has presented the *padārthas* (categories, which are possessors of attributes) without mentioning these attributes, following the traditional sequence of *uddeśa* (enunciation), *lakṣaṇa* (definition or characterization) and *parīkṣā* (investigation) (Halbfass 1992: 145). Now the *uddeśa* part is concluded, and the *lakṣaṇa* part will be undertaken.

¹¹²⁰ i.e. *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), *karman* (activity), *sāmānya* (universal), *viśeṣa* (particular), *samavāya* (inherence).

¹¹²¹ Cf. ed. note to *nityadravyebhyaḥ* in footnote 1082. Effect-substances reside in cause-substances (i.e. their cause), like cloth (effect-substance) resides in thread (cause-substance). But eternal substances (which do not have a cause) do not. Qualities, activity, universal, particular and inherence all reside in *dravya* (substance).

Thorough knowledge of the manifold similarities and dissimilarities, such as is [described in] the statements [above] etc., is the cause of liberation. [Liberation is attained] in the following way: “when each following one of incorrect knowledge, fault¹¹²⁵, activity, birth and pain is destroyed on account of the non-existence¹¹²⁶ of the immediately preceding one¹¹²⁷, there is liberation”.

SŚP §5 34, 25-35, 2

tatra tattvajñānān mithyājñānaṃ nivartate; mithyājñānanivṛttau¹¹²⁸

tajjanyarāgadveṣanivṛttiḥ; taddoṣanivṛttau

tajjanyakāyavānmanovyāpārarūpapravṛttinivṛttiḥ; tatpravṛttinivṛttau

tajjanyapuṇyapāpabandhalakṣaṇajanmanivṛttir ity āgāmikarmabandhanivṛttis tattvajñānād eva bhavati | prāgupārjitaśeṣakarmaparikṣayas tu bhogād eva nānyathā |

SŚP §5 English

There¹¹²⁹, incorrect knowledge ceases because of thorough knowledge. When there is cessation of incorrect knowledge, there is cessation of passion and hatred which arise from that [incorrect knowledge]. When there is cessation of those faults, there is cessation of action in the form of the employment of body, speech and mind which arises from those [faults]. When there is cessation of those actions there is cessation of birth, which has the characteristics of merit, demerit and bondage and which arises from those [actions]. There is cessation of bondage and future karma only from thorough knowledge. But the complete destruction of the previously acquired karma is only from experience [of its fruits], there is no other way.

§6 SŚP 35, 2-17

tathā cōktam –

nābhuktaṃ kṣīyate karma kalpakoṭīśatair api |

avaśyam anubhoktavyaṃ kṛtaṃ karma śubhāśubha || [source not found] iti¹¹³⁰

¹¹²² i.e. *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), *karman* (activity), *sāmānya* (universal) and *viśeṣa* (particular).

¹¹²³ i.e. *guṇa* (quality), *karman* (activity), *sāmānya* (universal), *viśeṣa* (particular) and *samavāya* (inherence).

¹¹²⁴ i.e. *guṇa* (quality) and *karman* (activity) cannot reside in quality (*guṇa*) etc., only in substances (*dravya*).

¹¹²⁵ i.e. *rāga* (passion) and *dveṣa* (hatred). Cf. SŚP 34, 23- 35, 1 §5 below.

¹¹²⁶ i.e. destruction

¹¹²⁷ *anantara* means “immediately adjoining”, in this case “immediately preceding”.

¹¹²⁸ Amended. The printed ed. reads “mithyājñānanivṛttau”. This does not fit the overall pattern of the sentence.

¹¹²⁹ *tatra* here indicates that the following is a commentary to Nyāyasūtra 1|1|2 quoted at the end of §4 above.

¹¹³⁰ This verse, quoted in SŚP 35, 3-5 and the phrase *tathā cōktam* (SŚP 35, 2) was placed in §5 by the editor. It has here been moved to §6 as they clearly belong with the verses quoted there. There seems to be

tatrāpi

kurvann ātmasvarūpajñāḥ bhogāt karmaparikṣayam |

yugakoṭisahasrāṇi kṛtvā tena vimucyate || [source not found] ity ekaḥ pakṣaḥ |

ātmano vai śārīrāṇi bahūni manujeśvaraḥ |

prāpya yogabalaṃ kuryāt taiś ca sarvāṃ mahīm¹¹³¹ caret¹¹³² ||

bhujīta viṣayān kaiścit kaiścid ugraṃ tapaś caret |

saṃharec ca punas tāni sūryas tejogaṇān iva || [source not found] iti

ekasminn eva bhava bahubhiḥ śārīraiḥ prāgupārjitāśeṣaphalabhoga ity aparāḥ pakṣaḥ |
tataś ca bhogāt prāgupārjitāśeṣakarmaparikṣaye ekaviṃśatibhedabhinnaduḥkhanivṛttir iti |

SŚP §6 English

And thus it is said –

“Unexpended karma is not diminished, even after a hundred kalpakotiś¹¹³³.

One must necessarily suffer the consequences of actions that have been performed,
whether pleasant or unpleasant.”¹¹³⁴

On this matter it is also [said]:

“The knower of the nature of the soul,
undertaking destruction of karma through experiencing [its fruits],
is liberated by that, having spent thousands of yugakoṭiś¹¹³⁵.”

This is one view.¹¹³⁶

May a “Lord of men”¹¹³⁷, having obtained the power of yoga,
create many bodies for [his] soul [by means of his yogic powers]

no good reason to split up the four verses illustrating the two opinions on the wearing away of karma among the Vaiśeṣika into two paragraphs.

¹¹³¹ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “mahīm varet”. *Varet*, meaning to “conceal”, “hide”, “cover” (in the sense of hiding) etc., does not seem to fit the context. It is more likely that *caret* should here be read, especially since *caret* is used in the next verse.

¹¹³² ed. note: “idaṃ padyaṃ ka-, kha- pratau nāsti |”.

¹¹³³ *koṭi*=10 million. A *kalpa* is said to be 1000 *yugas* or 4 320 000 000 years. The point here is not to give any exact number, but that the amount of time it conveys is great.

¹¹³⁴ i.e. in order for ones karma to decrease, it must be expended by experiencing its results. Even if one waits a hundred *kalpakotiś*, it will not decrease unless its fruits have been felt.

¹¹³⁵ Like in SŚP 35, 2-5 above, the point here is not to give any exact number of years (this would anyway be subject to individual variations according to the karma one has accumulated), but that the length of time is great. Having spent all that time experiencing the fruits of ones karma, he who knows the nature of the self is liberated.

¹¹³⁶ The two verses quoted here represent one opinion among the Vaiśeṣika, i.e. the opinion that accumulated karma can only be worn away by experiencing its consequences as they naturally occur.

¹¹³⁷ i.e. a yogin.

and spread across the whole earth by means of those [bodies].

May he experience the objects of sense¹¹³⁸ by means of some [of those bodies],
may he practice powerful ascetism by means of others,
and may he [then] withdraw them, like the sun [draws back] [its] multitude of rays¹¹³⁹.

There is fruition of all the fruits that have previously been acquired in only one existence by means of many [yogic] bodies. [This is] another view¹¹⁴⁰. And thus, when there is destruction of all the previously accumulated karma because of experience [of its fruits], there is cessation of pain, which is divided into 21 divisions.

SŚP §7 35, 18-23

tāni duḥkhāni kānīti cet,

samsargaḥ sukhaduḥkhe ca¹¹⁴¹tathārthendriyabuddhayaḥ |
pratyekaṃ ṣaḍvidhāś ceti duḥkhasamkhyāikaviṃśatiḥ || [source not found] iti

sakalapuṇyapāparikṣayāt tatpūrvakabuddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatna-
saṃskārāṇām api parikṣaye ātmanaḥ kaivalyam mokṣa iti |

SŚP §7 English

If it is asked: what are those pains? [It is answered:]

Contact, pleasure, pain, objects, senses and cognition.

Each one [of the last three] is six-fold. Thus the enumeration of pains is 21.¹¹⁴²

¹¹³⁸ i.e. fruits of past karmas. The idea seems to be that he will experience objects of sense (appropriate to his past karma) by means of some of these bodies.

¹¹³⁹ i.e. like the sun withdraws its rays when it sets.

¹¹⁴⁰ The two verses quoted above illustrate that some Vaiśeṣikas are of a different opinion, believing that karma can be destroyed more quickly. While some are of the opinion that this is only possible through experiencing its effects over millions of years, others maintain that all its effects can be experienced during just one lifetime if one practices powerful asceticism. It is interesting to note that both options seem to imply an experiencing of the fruits of the karma. In the second opinion, it is the *experiencing of the fruits* that can be done within one lifetime. This is seen in the following sentence as well (35, 16-17), where it is clearly stated that the destruction of all previously accumulated karma is because of experience [of its fruits].

¹¹⁴¹ Amended. Printed ed. reads “tapā[thā]rthendriya-“. The editor does not comment his use of brackets, so it is not clear what the manuscripts read. Normally, it seems that bracketed parts of the Sanskrit text in G. Jain’s edition of the SŚP have been added by the editor (cf. SŚP 24, 6 §24 of the Bauddha chapter). It thus seems that the manuscripts read “tapārtha-“, and the editor has added “thā” in brackets to suggest the reading “tathārtha-“.

¹¹⁴² It seems that *samsarga* (otherwise used in the sense of “relation” in the SŚP, cf. SŚP 39, 10 and 43, 5) here refers to the body (*śarīra*). Cf. the Nyāyavārttika: “ekaviṃśatiprabhedabhinnam punar duḥkham: śarīram ṣaḍindriyāṇi ṣaḍviśayāḥ ṣaḍbuddhayaḥ sukham duḥkham ceti. śarīram duḥkhāyatanatvād duḥkham, indriyāṇi viśayā buddhayaś ca tatsādhanabhāvāt, sukham duḥkhānuṣāṅgāt, duḥkham svarūpata iti” (NV 6,3-5 quoted in Trikha 2009). The Nyāyavārtika also makes clear that *pratyekaṃ ṣaḍvidhāś* refers to

When, because of the ceasing of all merit and demerit, there is ceasing of knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort and the predispositions¹¹⁴³, which are [all] connected to those [merit and demerit]¹¹⁴⁴, the soul is completely isolated. [This is] liberation.

[uttarapakṣa]

The refutation.

SŚP §8 35, 25-26

tad etad aulūkyasāsanam tāvāt dr̥ṣṭaviruddham | tadabhymatasyāvayavāvayavinor
guṇaguṇinoḥ kriyākriyāvator jātivyaktyor bhedaikāntasya tadabhedagrāhiṇā pratyakṣeṇa
viruddhatvāt |

SŚP §8 English

Firstly, this very doctrine of the Aulūkyas¹¹⁴⁵ is contradicted by perception. Because the one-sided difference which is desired by them of the part and the whole, quality and that which has qualities¹¹⁴⁶, activity and that which possesses activity¹¹⁴⁷ and universal and individual is contradicted by sensory experience, which grasps the non-difference of those.

SŚP §9 35, 27-31

na hy avayavyādir avayavādibhyaḥ sarvathā bhinna eva pratyakṣe pratibhāsate, api tu
kathamcid abhinna eva | tantubhyaḥ tadātānavitānāvasthāviśeṣarūpasya paṭasya
karpatyādeś citrajñāne nīlādinirbhāsavat¹¹⁴⁸ tatraikalolībhāvanam upagatānām rūpādīnām
gacchataḥ¹¹⁴⁹ puruṣād bālyādivat, sthityādivat vā¹¹⁵⁰ tadavasthāviśeṣabhūtakriyāyāḥ

arthendriyabuddhaya. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hold that there are six organs of knowledge (i.e. senses, *indriya*), namely *grāhaṇa* (organ of smell), *rasanā* (organ of taste), *caḥṣuḥ* (organ of sight), *tvak* (organ of touch), *śrotra* (organ of hearing) and *manas* (the mind, the internal organ). They perceive smell, taste, colour, touch, sound and the qualities of the soul (cf. §1 above) and cognition respectively. This perception gives rise to the six kinds of perception, i.e. *ghrāṇaja* (olfactory), *rāsana* (gustatory), *caḥṣuṣa* (visual), *spārsana* (tactual), *śrautra* (auditory) and *mānasa* (mental), respectively (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 160-161). The three fold pain of objects, senses and cognitions seems to refer to there being pain associated with each of these 18.

¹¹⁴³ i.e. the six specific qualities (*viśeṣaguna*) of the soul. Cf. §1 above.

¹¹⁴⁴ i.e. they are caused by merit and demerit.

¹¹⁴⁵ litt. followers of Ulūka, which is another name for Kaṇāda (author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*).

¹¹⁴⁶ i.e. *dravya* (substance)

¹¹⁴⁷ i.e. *dravya* (substance)

¹¹⁴⁸ Amended. Printed edition reads: “nīlādinirbhāsavat;”. The semicolon has been removed as what precedes it does not seem to form a phrase on its own.

¹¹⁴⁹ Amended. Printed edition reads: “rūpādīnām gacchataḥ, puruṣād”. The comma has been removed as *gacchataḥ* seems to qualify *puruṣād*.

sāmānyavato ‘rthād vaisādrśyavat taddharmabhūtasādrśyalakṣaṇasāmānyasya
anarthāntaratayā sakalalokasākṣikam ¹¹⁵¹adhyakṣeṇādhyavasāyāt |

SŚP §9 English

For, when there is sensory perception, it is not so that the whole etc. appears only as completely different from [its] parts etc.¹¹⁵², but it does indeed [appear] as non-different in some ways. [This is so] because; there is determinate cognition, by means of perception, of a garment, which has the particular state of a mass of string as its form, as not being a different entity than the thread, just like the cognition of blue etc. [is identical with] [the cognition of other colours] in the variegated cognition¹¹⁵³ of a patched garment, the colors etc. experienced in that [variegated cognition] having the state of being a unitary mass¹¹⁵⁴; (because there is determinate cognition) of activity, [activity being] a particular state of a [man], (as not being a different entity) than the walking man [i.e. that which possesses activity], just like childhood etc. or standing etc. (which are particular states of a man), (are not different entities than the walking man); [and] (because there is determinate cognition) of the universal, defined as similarity¹¹⁵⁵, [this similarity] being an attribute of that [object which possesses the universal], as (not being a different entity) from the object which possesses the universal, just like dissimilarity [which is an attribute of the object] (is not a different entity than the object). [This is] testified to by all people.¹¹⁵⁶

SŚP §10 36, 1-3

¹¹⁵⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “tadavasthā viśeṣabhūtakriyāyāḥ”. Having *tadavasthā* as a separate feminine nominative phrase does not fit in with the rest of the sentence.

¹¹⁵¹ Amended. The printed ed. reads “...adhyakṣeṇādhyavasāyāt |” It seems that *adhyakṣa* has been printed with both an instrumental ending and an ablative ending.

¹¹⁵² *ādi* (etc.) here indicates that this is true with respect to the universal and particular, substance and qualities etc. as well.

¹¹⁵³ the Naiyāyika accept *citra* (variegated), as a separate colour, not as a mixture of other colours. As the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika treat the whole as a single entity with one color, a whole such as a zebra, which is both black and white, would end up creating the problem of being both completely black and completely white all over. To avoid this problem Uddyotakara (550-610) seems to have introduced this as a solution. Such an object also has only one color, a variegated color (*citra-rūpa*) (Potter 1977: 118). Just like blue is not completely different from the other colors in this *citrarūpa*, so the cloth and the thread that makes up the cloth are not completely different.

¹¹⁵⁴ *Ekaloṭī* is not found in the MMW. *Loṭī*, as a feminine variant of *lola* (from the root *lul*, and meaning “shaking”, “unsteady”, “desirous”, “transient” etc.), is found, but said to be a kind of composition in music. The editor gives “tatraikalovibhā...” as an alternative reading, which is not preferable. According to Trikha (2009), *lolībhāva* is found in the Nyāyakaumudicandra, meaning “being a mass”. Thus *ekalolībhāva* would mean “being one mass” (Trikha 2009: 182). This translation is adopted here.

¹¹⁵⁵ Cf. SŚP 26, 4-11 §31 of the Bauddha chapter.

¹¹⁵⁶ Vidyānandin’s argument here contains three main points: it is perceived that the parts are not different from the whole, than an activity is not different from that which is active and that the universal (defined as similarity) is not different from the object that possesses it (i.e. the particular). What Vidyānandin is arguing is that the Vaiśeṣika view of these (part-whole, activity-active and universal-particular) being absolutely different is not tenable, as it is perceived by everyone that they are not.

nanu samavāyāt tebhyo ^{1157*} ‘vayavyādir ¹¹⁵⁸ anarthāntaram iva pratibhāsata iti cet; na; *
 avayavyādi pratyakṣasya sarvatra bhrāntatvaprasaṅgāt,
 timirāsubhramaṇanauyānasamkṣokbhādyāhitavibhramasya ¹¹⁵⁹ dvitvādidarśanavad ¹¹⁶⁰
 asadākāra viśiṣṭārthagrahaṇāt | tathā cāvyabhicāritvaṃ ¹¹⁶¹ pratyakṣalakṣaṇam asaṃbhavi
 syāt |

SŚP §10 English

If it is objected: Certainly the whole etc. ¹¹⁶² appears as if not being a separate entity from those [parts] on account of inherence. ¹¹⁶³ [It is answered:] no, because [then there would be] adherence to sensory perception of the whole etc. everywhere being illusory on account of grasping an object as characterized by an untrue form, just like the illusion instilled by timira ¹¹⁶⁴ [gives rise to] seeing double, spinning [a firebrand] around quickly [gives rise to the illusion of a circle of fire], moving in a ship [gives rise to the illusion that the trees on land are moving], agitation [of the balance of the three humours of the body] etc. ¹¹⁶⁵ And thus the definition of sensory perception, [i.e.] that it is non-erroneous, must be inapplicable. ¹¹⁶⁶

SŚP §11 36, 4-6

¹¹⁵⁷ ed. note: “*etadantargataḥ pāṭhaḥ ka-, kha- pratau nāsti |” i.e. that which is between the two *s is not found in manuscripts Ka- and Kha-.

¹¹⁵⁸ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “arthāntaram iva”.

¹¹⁵⁹ ed. note: “gaccadvṛkṣādīdarśana |”, i.e. “like seeing a moving tree etc.”

¹¹⁶⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “dhāvadhvādidarśanavad”. *Dhāvadhva* does not make any sense. The likely role of this phrase is to refer to the effects of the various conditions listed. The first of these, *timira*, causes one to see double (Grimes 1996: 320). As this is the first condition mentioned, this would be the first of the effects listed up. The effects of the other reasons for illusory perception are skipped and replaced by *ādi*.

¹¹⁶¹ ed. note: “indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam avyapadeśyavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam nyāyasū- 1|1|4”. Radhakrishnan translates: “That which arises from the ‘contact’ of a sense-organ with its object, inexpressible by words, *unerring* and well defined” (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 49; my italics).

¹¹⁶² *ādi* (beginning with..., etc.) here signifies that this argument is also valid with respect to the relationship between the universal and particular, quality and substance and activity and substance.

¹¹⁶³ i.e. the parts and the whole are indeed cognized as if they were one, even though they are not. The reason for this is the relation of *samavāya* (inherence).

¹¹⁶⁴ an eye disease which causes double vision (Grimes 1996: 320).

¹¹⁶⁵ the *ādi* (etc.) refers to the effects of the other causes of illusory cognition. In the Sanskrit sentence structure it seems to follow the effect of the first cause (i.e. *timira*). When translating into English, however, the sentence becomes much clearer when each cause is paired with its respective effect. That *samkṣobha* (agitation) refers to the agitation of the three humours of the body was suggested by Prof. Shah. It is unclear what the effect of agitation is thought to be, and thus etc. (*ādi*) is kept after the last cause (agitation [of the three humours of the body]). The three preceding examples and effects (*timira*, spinning a firebrand and standing on a moving ship) appear to be found in Buddhist sources. Stcherbatsky (1958: 157-8) mentions them, but only in passing when discussing why Dignāga might have chosen to exclude *abhrānta* (non-illusoriness) from his definition of *pratyakṣa* (sensory perception).

¹¹⁶⁶ Cf. the Nyāyasūtra’s definition of perception (1|1|4) in ed. note in footnote 1161. Radhakrishnan translates: “that which arises from the ‘contact’ of a sense-organ with its object, inexpressible by words, *unerring* and well defined” (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 49; my italics). The point Vidyānandin is here making is that if it is argued that the whole etc. only appears to be the same as its parts because the parts and the whole are related by *samavāya* (inherence), then the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika definition of perception must be given up as it is inapplicable. Inapplicability (*asaṃbhava*) is the fault of the attribute does not exist in the phenomena one is trying to define, such as if one defines a cow as an animal with uncloven hoofs (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 47)

na caite avayavādayaḥ, ime avayavyādayaḥ samavāyaś ca teṣāṃ ayam iti
 pratyakṣabuddhau ¹¹⁶⁷visrasā bhinnā sakrd api pratīyante pratyakṣatām ca svīkartum
 icchantīti te ‘mī amūlyadānakrayiṇaḥ; pratyakṣabuddhāv ātmānarpaṇena
 pratyakṣatāsvīkaraṇāt |

SŚP §11 English

And it is not so that, when there is perceptual cognition, those [parts and wholes] are even once cognized as naturally different, i.e. “those are the parts etc., these are the wholes etc. and this is the inherence of those [parts and wholes]”.¹¹⁶⁸ [Yet] those [Vaiśeṣikas] desire to claim perceptibility [for the difference of the parts and the whole etc.] [even though the parts, the whole and their inherence are never perceived to be different]. Thus they are a buyer that does not want to pay the price [of that which he wants to buy]¹¹⁶⁹. Because [they] claim perceptibility by not offering themselves when there is perceptual cognition.¹¹⁷⁰

SŚP §12 36, 7-17

na ca paropavarṇitasvarūpaḥ samavāya eva vyavatiṣṭhate | yato bhinnānām
 abhedapratibhāsa iṣyate | tathā hi nityavyāpakaikaikarūpatayā parair abhimataḥ sa
 samavāyaḥ samavāyyāśrito anāśrito vā, yadāśritas¹¹⁷¹ tadā paramārthataḥ, upacārād vā,
 tatra na paramārthataḥ samavāyaḥ samavāyyāśritaḥ ¹¹⁷²tayoḥ saṁbandhābhāvāt | na hi
 tāvat tayoh samavāyaḥ saṁbandhaḥ samavāyasyaikatvāt | samavāyasya samavāyāntarena
 vṛttau yasyāpi tadantareṇaiva vṛtti ity anavasthohanipātāt | nāpi saṁyogaḥ, tasya¹¹⁷³
 guṇatveṇa dravyāśritatvāt, ¹¹⁷⁴adravyatvāc ca samavāyasya | nāpi viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvah,
 saṁbandhāntarābhisambaddhārtheṣv evāsya¹¹⁷⁵ pravṛttipratīteḥ daṇḍapurusaḍivat, anyathā
 sarvaṁ sarvasya viśeṣaṇaṁ viśeṣyaṁ ca syāt | na ca samavāyasamavāyinām
 saṁbandhāntarābhisambaddhatvam; saṁyogasamavāyayor anabhyupagamāt
 viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvanāntareṇa sambaddhatve tasyāpi tadantareṇa sambaddheṣv eva

¹¹⁶⁷ ed. note: “svabhāvena |”

¹¹⁶⁸ i.e. one never sees the parts, the wholes and their inherence separately.

¹¹⁶⁹ cf. SŚP 21, 28 for the same expression.

¹¹⁷⁰ i.e. and the Vaiśeṣika cannot argue that the absolute difference they posit to exist between the parts and the whole etc. can be seen by sensory perception, for it is not. Thus they are like a customer unwilling to pay the price for that which he is buying, as they desire perceptibility for this difference even though this difference does not offer itself up to perceptual cognition.

¹¹⁷¹ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “yadāśritaḥ tadā-”. Amended according to sandhi rules.

¹¹⁷² ed. note: “samavāya-samavāyinoḥ |”

¹¹⁷³ ed. note: “saṁyogasya |”

¹¹⁷⁴ Amended. The printed edition reads “dravyatvāc ca samavāyasya”. Alternate amendments could be “padārthatvāc ca samavāyasya” (i.e. because inherence is a category [and not a substance]) or “dravyatvābhāvāc ca samavāyasya”.

¹¹⁷⁵ ed. note: “viśeṣa-viśeṣyabhāvāsya |”

pravṛttir ity anavasthānāt | nāpy adṛṣṭam, ¹¹⁷⁶ṣoḍhāsambandhavāditvavyāghātāt | yadi cādrṣṭena samavāyaḥ sambaddhyeta¹¹⁷⁷; tarhi guṇaguṇyādayo ‘py ata¹¹⁷⁸ eva sambaddhā bhaviṣyantīti alaṃ samavāyādikalpanayti na sambandhāntareṇa samavāyasya sambandhaḥ siddhyati |

SŚP §12 English

And it is not so that inherence, which has a nature [such as that which] is described by the opponents and on account of which the cognition of non-difference is accepted [by the Vaiśeṣika] for those [things] that are [posited to be] [absolutely] different¹¹⁷⁹, is established.¹¹⁸⁰ For it is as follows: that inherence, which is accepted by the opponents to have a nature that is permanent, [all]-pervasive and one, either resides in the [its] substrate¹¹⁸¹ or does not reside in [its substrate]. If it resides [in its substrate], then it either really or figuratively¹¹⁸² [resides in its substrate]. With regard to this [first alternative]¹¹⁸³ inherence does not really reside the substrate, because there does not exist a relation between the two [the inherence and its substrate]. For, firstly, the relation of the two [inherence and the substrate] is not inherence, because of the oneness of inherence.¹¹⁸⁴ Because there occurs an infinite regress if inherence [could] reside [in anything] by means of another inherence, [as] also that [inherence would have to] reside [in the inherence] by means of [yet] another inherence [and so on].¹¹⁸⁵

And [the relation between inherence and its substrate can] also not [be made by means of] conjunction, on account of conjunction being a quality, because [qualities] reside [only] in substances and because inherence is not¹¹⁸⁶ a substance.

¹¹⁷⁶ ed. note: “samyogaḥ, samyuktasamavāyaḥ, samyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ, samavāyaḥ, samavetasamavāyaḥ, viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvaś cety |”.

¹¹⁷⁷ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “sambaddhyet”. The passive form cannot have a parasmaipāda ending. It has therefore been amended to *sambaddhyeta*. It could alternately be amended to *sambaddhyate*, as Trikha (2009: 211) does, but it seems preferable not to amend so as to remove the optative. It seems less intrusive to add an “a” than to change the ending from “yet” to “yate”, especially since the construction *yadi* + optative is found in several places in the SŚP, cf. for example SŚP 12, 9 and SŚP 18, 25-26.

¹¹⁷⁸ ed. note: “adṛṣṭād eva |”

¹¹⁷⁹ i.e. the whole and the parts etc.

¹¹⁸⁰ i.e. *samavāya* (inherence), on which the Vaiśeṣikas base their belief that the parts and the whole are seen as not being different even though they are different, is not established. If they want to use this as proof for the absolute difference of the parts and the whole etc., then they must prove that it exists first. The following discussion centers around this.

¹¹⁸¹ i.e. that which it relates.

¹¹⁸² This option is discussed further in §19 and §20 below.

¹¹⁸³ Three alternatives are suggested in this sentence: 1) it really resides in the *samavāyin*; 2) it figuratively resides in the *samavāyin*; 3) it does not reside in the *samavāyin*. Here option 1 is investigated first.

¹¹⁸⁴ since inherence, which is only one, has already been used to relate a substance and its quality etc. one cannot use it to be the relation between inherence and that which the inherence is said to reside in (which in the case of a substance and its quality the seat of the inherence is said to be the substance).

¹¹⁸⁵ i.e. even if the oneness of *samavāya* (inherence) was overlooked and the Vaiśeṣikas were allowed to posit another *samavāya* to relate the first *samavāya* to the substrate, this would merely end up in infinite regress.

¹¹⁸⁶ The printed edition does not have this negation, which does not make any sense. *Samavāya* (inherence) is, according to the Vaiśeṣika, **not** a substance. The intended argument must be that inherence is **not** a substance and that *samyoga* (conjunction) can thus consequently not abide in it, as *samyoga* is a quality

And [the relation] [between inherence and its substrate] can also not [be made by having] the definer and defined¹¹⁸⁷ relation, because it is clear that the application of that [definer-defined relation] is only when objects are [already] connected by another relation, like the stick and the man¹¹⁸⁸. Otherwise everything could be the definer and the defined of everything.¹¹⁸⁹ And inherence and the substratum are not connected by means of another relation, because conjunction and inherence are not accepted [as the relation between inherence and its substrate], [and] because there is infinite regress if the [prior] relation [between inherence and its substrate required for the definer-defined relation] is by means of another definer-defined relation Its application is only with respect to those [things] that are [already] related by another [relation].¹¹⁹⁰

And [the relation] is also not [by means of] the unseen¹¹⁹¹, because it is inconsistent with the teaching of the sixfold relation.¹¹⁹² And if inherence is connected by the unseen, then the qualities and those that possess qualities [i.e. substances] etc. will be connected only by that as well¹¹⁹³. Enough with postulating inherence etc.! Thus the relation of inherence [to its substrate] by means of another relation is not proved.

SŚP §13 36, 18-25

(*guṇa*) and qualities can only abide in substances (*dravya*). The text has therefore been amended. Cf. footnote 1174.

¹¹⁸⁷ these are grammatical expressions. *Viśeṣaṇa* (qualifying) describes a word that particularizes or defines (i.e. an adjective, adverb, predicate etc.) another word (which is called the *viśeṣya*, i.e. the qualified).

¹¹⁸⁸ Tatia (1966) explains this as: "For instance, the stick can function as an adjective if the relation of conjunction between the person and the stick held by him is known beforehand" (45). The point seems to be that the adjective-substantive relation depends on there already being a relation between two things. It does not in itself establish the relation between them. So, in order to describe the man (*puruṣa*) as a *dandīn* (one who has a stick), there must already be a *saṃyoga* (conjunction) relationship between the man and the stick (*danda*). Likewise, in order for a substance etc. to be defined as "that which possesses inherence" (*samavāyin*), the two must be known to already be related by another relation. Simply describing *samavāya* (inherence) and a substance (*dravya*) etc. as *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya* (i.e. *samavāya-samavāyin*) does not in itself establish a relation between them.

¹¹⁸⁹ i.e. if the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya* relation could establish a relation between two things that were not already related, one could establish such a relationship between anything.

¹¹⁹⁰ i.e. the possibility of the *samavāya* (inherence) and the *samavāyin* (substrate) being related by *saṃyoga* (conjunction) or another *samavāya* has already been refuted, and positing another *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya* (definer-defined) relation to relate them so that they can be related by the first *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya* relation (which requires its members to already be related by another relation) would only end up in infinite regress as the second *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya* relation would depend on yet another relation etc. etc.. Thus there is no other relation that can relate the *samavāya* and *samavāyin*.

¹¹⁹¹ refers to the *adrṣṭa* quality listed in SŚP 34, 6-10 §2 above in the sense of an unseen cause. Cf. footnote 1103.

¹¹⁹² Cf. Nyāyavārttika I, 1, 4: "*saṃnikarṣaḥ punaḥ śodhā bhidyate. saṃyogaḥ, saṃyuktasamavāyah, saṃyuktasamavetasamavāyah, samavāyah, samavetasamavāyah, viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaś ceti*" (NV I, 1, 4 quoted in Halbfass 1992: 111 footnote 65) The sixfold relation referred to by Vidyānandin seems to refer to the six kinds of contact (*saṃnikarṣa*) accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Thus the argument is that *adrṣṭa* (unseen) cannot account for the relation between the inherence and its substrate as the Vaiśeṣikas themselves admit that there is no such relation by not listing it as one of the possible relations. Cf. editors note in footnote 1176.

¹¹⁹³ i.e. if inherence is related to its substrate by means of *adrṣṭa* (unseen), why not just say that the qualities and the substances etc. are also connected by *adrṣṭa*? What is then the point of positing the relation of *samavāya* (inherence)?

nanu na samavāyasya sambandhāntareṇa sambandho 'smābhir iṣṭaḥ yenānavasthādidoṣāḥ syuḥ, api tu agner uṣṇatāvāt svata evāsyā sambandho yuktaḥ svata eva sambandharūpatvāt, na saṃyogādīnām ¹¹⁹⁴tadabhāvāt | na hy ekasya svabhāvo 'nyasyāpi, anyathā svato 'gner uṣṇatvadarśanāt jalādīnām api ¹¹⁹⁵tat syād iti cet; tad api pralāpamātram; yataḥ pratyakṣaprasiddhe padārthasvabhāve svabhāvair uttaram vaktum yuktam |

pratyakṣeṇa pratīte 'rthe yadi paryanuyujyate |
svabhāvair uttaram vākyam dṛṣṭe kā 'nupapannatā || [source not found] iti vacanāt |

anyathā tathottareṇa ¹¹⁹⁶sarvasya sveṣṭasiddhiprasaṃgāt |

SŚP §13 English

[If it is objected:] Certainly a relation by means of another relation, by which there would be the faults of infinite regress etc., is not accepted by us for inherence. Like fire has heat, the suitable relation of that [inherence] is only from itself, on account of [inference] having the relating of itself as its nature. It is not [thus] for conjunction etc., because [conjunction etc.] do not have that [nature of relating itself]. For it is not so that the nature of the one is also the nature of the other, otherwise there would be that [hotness] of water etc. as well on account of seeing that fire has hotness. ¹¹⁹⁷ [It is answered:] also that is mere prattle, because it is suitable to answer by [referring to] natures [only] if the nature of the category [in question] ¹¹⁹⁸ is established by sensory perception. ¹¹⁹⁹ Because of the saying:

If the object that is inquired about is cognized by sensory perception, [then] answer by [referring to] natures. What inexplicability is there with regard to that which is perceived? ¹²⁰⁰

¹¹⁹⁴ ed. note: "svataḥ sambandharūpatvābhāvāt |"

¹¹⁹⁵ Amended. Printed ed. reads: "jalādīnāpi".

¹¹⁹⁶ ed. note: "'svabhāvāt' ity uttareṇa |"

¹¹⁹⁷ i.e. it is simply the nature of inherence to relate. The point here can also be exemplified by comparing inherence with glue. Just as it makes no sense to ask what it is that connects glue to the two pieces of paper one has glued together (such as another glue etc.), so it makes no sense to ask what it is that relates inherence to the substance and its quality etc.. It is simply its nature to relate things. But this is not the case for *saṃyoga* (conjunction), which must be related by inherence. Just because it is the nature of *samavāya* (inherence) to relate itself, it does not mean that *saṃyoga* (conjunction) also shares this nature. If the nature of one thing is automatically also the nature of other things, one would have to say that water is hot because fire is hot.

¹¹⁹⁸ in this case *samavāya* (inherence).

¹¹⁹⁹ thus it is not like saying that water is hot because fire is hot, because sensory perception tells us that water is cool and fire is hot. But one does not have any sensory perception of inherence, and thus one cannot argue by referring to its nature.

¹²⁰⁰ i.e. if it is seen there is no problem in accounting for it.

Because otherwise [there would be] adherence to everyone proving that which they themselves desire by answering thus¹²⁰¹.

SŚP §14 36, 26-37, 2

na ca samavāyasya svataḥ saṃbandhatvaṃ saṃyogādīnām tu tasmāt ity
adhyakṣaprasiddham; tatsvarūpasyādhyakṣāgocarativapratipādanāt | **ata evātīndriyaḥ
sattādīnām iva pratyakṣeṣu vṛttyabhāvāt, svātmagatasamvedanābhāvāc ca** | [praśa-
bhā- pṛ- 697¹²⁰²] iti¹²⁰³ praśastapādabhāṣye ‘bhīdhānāt | “samavāyaḥ padārthāntareṇa
saṃbaddhyamāno na svataḥ saṃbaddhyate saṃbaddhyamānatvāt rūpādivat” ity
anumānavirodhāc ca |

SŚP §14 English

It is not so that it is established by perception: “Inherence relates itself [to its substrate] while conjunction etc. [is related to its substrate] by that [inherence]”, because it is taught that the nature of that [inherence] is not within the range of perception. Because it is said in the Praśastapādabhāṣya:

Therefore [inherence] is beyond the senses: because, like the [universal] existence-ness, it does not reside in perceptible [things], and because there is no cognition which reaches its nature.¹²⁰⁴

And because it is contradicted by the inference: “Inherence, being related with other categories, does not relate itself, because it is related, like colour etc.”¹²⁰⁵

SŚP §15 37, 3-5

yadi cāgniḥpradīpaśvamāmsādīnām¹²⁰⁶ uṣṇaprakāśāsucitvavat samavāyaḥ svaparayoḥ
saṃbandhahetuḥ, tarhi taddṛṣṭāntāvaṣṭambhenaiva jñānaṃ svaparayoḥ prakāśahetuḥ kim

¹²⁰¹ i.e. referring to “nature”.

¹²⁰² The “Word index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya” (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) has this as §385.

¹²⁰³ ed. note: “tasmād iha buddhyanumeyaḥ samavāyaḥ” – praśa- bhā-. This follows directly after the quote given here, and shows that the conclusion is that inherence is an object of inference.

¹²⁰⁴ The Praśastapādabhāṣya itself admits that inherence and its nature are beyond the senses, and thus cannot be proved by means of sensory perception. Cf. also Praśastapādabhāṣya: “ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādihārābhūtānām yaḥ sambandha iha pratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ |”, (quoted in SŚP 34, 20 §3 above). Thus the argument basing itself upon the nature of inherence is void, as inherence is not perceptible.

The translations of Trikha: “Eben darum [d.h. aus dem folgenden Grund] ist (die Inhärenz) jenseits der Sinne, weil sie nicht (in der gleichen Weise) wie die Existenz etc.. in den sinnlich wahrnehmbaren (Dingen) auftritt und weil ein zu ihrem eigenen Wesen gehöriges Bewusstsein fehlt” (Trikha 2009: 221) and Patti: “Die Inhärenz ist allein ausser dem Bereich der Sinnesorgane, weil sie wie das Universale ‚Sein‘ [d.h. ‚Existenz‘ (*sattā*), HT] in den Wahrnehmungen nicht anwesend ist, und weil es eine Wahrnehmung ihrer Substrate nicht gibt” (quoted in Trikha 2009: 221) have been consulted in the translation of this verse.

¹²⁰⁵ This is a syllogism: 1) pratijñā (proposition): inherence, being related to the other categories, does not relate itself 2) hetu (premise): because it is related. 3) udāharaṇa (explanatory example) like *rūpa* (color) etc.. Here only the pratijñā, hetu and part of the udāharaṇa are stated.

na syāt; tathā ca **jñānaṃ jñānāntaravedyaṃ prameyatvāt** [source not found]¹²⁰⁷ iti
viplavate |

SŚP §15 English

And if inherence is the cause of relation for itself and for others¹²⁰⁸, just like fire, a lamp and dog-meat [are the cause of] heat, light and impurity [respectively] [for themselves and for others], then, by resting on the example of that [inherence], must not cognition be the cause of the illumination of itself and others?¹²⁰⁹ And thus [the Vaiśeṣika thesis that]: “cognition is to be cognized by another cognition, because of being an object of valid knowledge” is destroyed.¹²¹⁰

SŚP §16 37, 6-11

kiṃ ca, yathārthānāṃ¹²¹¹ sadātmakasya bhāvasya nānyaḥ sattāyogo ‘sti evaṃ
dravyādīnāṃ vṛtṭyātmakasya samavāyasya nānyā vṛttir asti, tasmāt svātmavṛttir iti
manvānaḥ padārthānāṃ saṃvedanātmakasya jñānasya nānyataḥ saṃvedanam, tasmāt
svataḥ saṃvedanam iti kiṃ na manyet, bhāvavat tādātmyāviśeṣāt | tadaviśeṣe ‘pi
sattādr̥ṣṭāntena samavāyasyaiva svato vṛtṭiḥ syān na punar jñānasya svasaṃvedanam iti
svaruciviracitadarśanapradarśanamātram | svataḥ saṃbandha iva svataḥ saṃvedane ‘pi
svātmani kriyāvirodhābhāvāt, anyathā tatpī tatprasamgāt | tasyaikasyaiva
saṃghaṭanīyasamghaṭakatvabhāvāt |

SŚP §16 English

Moreover, thinking: “Just as the existence of the categories¹²¹², which is of the nature of existence, does not [require] any further relation¹²¹³ with [the universal] existence-ness,

¹²⁰⁶ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “yadi cāgnipradīpaś ca māṃsādīnāṃ uṣṇaparakāśāsucitvavat”. This does not make sense as the grammar would then suggest that it is the fat etc. (*māṃsādīnāṃ*) that is *uṣṇaparakāśāsucitva*, i.e. “has the state of [causing] warm light and impurity” while the compound *agnipradīpa*, being in the nominative, would not fit into this. The amendment made here follows that of Trikha (2009: 221).

¹²⁰⁷ ed. note: “tasmāt jñānāntarasamvedyaṃ saṃvedanaṃ vedyatvāt | ghaṭādivat – praśa- vyo- pṛ- 429 |”

¹²⁰⁸ i.e. that it relates itself to its substrate (*samavāyin*) as well as relating two other things (such as a quality and a substance).

¹²⁰⁹ then cognition should cognize both its object and itself.

¹²¹⁰ i.e. if one follows this reasoning, cognition should be the cause of its own illumination, just like inherence is the cause of its own relation to the substrate. But this is denied by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who do not hold that cognition illuminates itself (*svaparakāśa*). This other cognition that enables one to grasp the initial knowledge is called *anuvyavasāya* (Potter 1977: 160). Thus Vidyānandin argues that claiming that inherence relates itself and others will force the Vaiśeṣika to abandon their thesis that cognition does not cognize itself (the implication being that this will be unacceptable to the Vaiśeṣika and that the thesis that inherence relates both itself and others must consequently be abandoned).

¹²¹¹ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “yathā arthānāṃ”. Amended according to sandhi rules.

¹²¹² *artha* is here used in the sense of *padārtha* (category, cf. §1 for the six categories accepted by the Vaiśeṣika). The word “some” (*keṣāñcit*) must here be supplied, for only three of the categories, namely *sāmānya* (universal); *viśeṣa* (particular); and *samavāya* (inherence), do not require the universal existence-ness in order to exist as they exist by their very nature. This is so because inherence cannot require a relation to a universal (such as *sattā*) as this relation would have to be related by inherence. Likewise the

just so inherence, which has residence as its nature, does not [require] another relation for [residing in] the substances etc.. Therefore [inherence is endowed with] self-occurrence”¹²¹⁴, why does one not think: “The cognition of objects¹²¹⁵, which has cognition as its nature, does not [require] another cognition. Therefore cognition [is cognized] by itself, because, just like [in the case of] existence, there is no difference with respect to identity”?

[Saying]: “only inherence can relate itself by means of the example of existence, but cognition (can) not cognize itself”, even though there is no difference in the two cases, merely shows that [the Vaiśeṣika] philosophy is constructed according to [their] own fancy. Because there is no incompatibility in [cognition] acting upon itself when cognition [cognizes] itself, just like (there is no incompatibility in inherence acting upon itself) when [inherence] relates itself.¹²¹⁶ Because otherwise [there would be] adherence to that [incompatibility in inherence acting upon itself] in the case of that [inherence relating itself] as well. Because [in the Vaiśeṣika contention that inherence relates itself] that [inherence] alone has the state of that which is to be related and that which relates.¹²¹⁷

SŚP §17 37, 12-17

yac cocyate – samavāyaḥ sambandhāntaraṃ nāpekṣate svataḥ sambandhatvāt; ye tu sambandhāntaram apekṣante na te svataḥ sambandhāḥ, yathā ghaṭādayaḥ, na cāyaṃ na svataḥ sambandhaḥ, tasmāt sambandhāntaraṃ nāpekṣata iti; tad api manorathamātram; saṃyogenānekāntāt | sa hi svataḥ sambandhaḥ sambandhāntaraṃ cāpekṣate | na hi svato ‘sambandhasvabhāvatve saṃyogādeḥ paratas¹²¹⁸ tadyuktam; atiprasaṅgāt | samavāyaḥ padārthāntareṇa saṃśleṣe sambandhāntaram apekṣate, padārthāntaratvāt, yaditthaṃ

universal cannot require the universal existence-ness, and the particular cannot require a universal as it cannot have universal qualities. All three cases would create logical problems, and thus these three are said to exist by their very nature, i.e. existence does not require the universal existence-ness to reside in them. This is not the case for the remaining three categories, namely *dravya* (substance); *guṇa* (quality); and *karmaṇ* (activity), which require the universal existence-ness in order to exist (Matilal 1986: 380-381).¹²¹³ *yoga* (“union”, “yoking”) is here used in the sense of “relation”.

¹²¹⁴ Cf. Halbfass (1992): “According to Praśastapāda, *samavāya* itself is ‘of the nature of residence’ (*vr̥t̥tyātmaka*) and endowed with ‘self-occurrence’ or ‘residence per se’ (*svātmavṛtti*), allowing other entities to ‘occur in’ their substrates and thus be actually and contingently present.” (1992: 148; italics in original).

¹²¹⁵ *Padārtha* seems here to be used in the sense of *artha* (object) and not as the technical Vaiśeṣika term referring to the six *padārthas* (categories, cf. §1 above)

¹²¹⁶ *svātmani kriyāvirodhābhāvāt* here corresponds to the objection of *karmakarṭṛvirodha* (incompatibility of the subject and object of an action being the same) raised by the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas against the concept of self-consciousness (*ahamvitti*). They argue that the self cannot be both subject and object in the same act of knowledge, just like food cannot be both the cook (subject) and the cooked (object) (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 310).

¹²¹⁷ i.e. if there is no incompatibility of the subject and object of an action being the same in the case of *samavāya* (inherence) relating itself, then there cannot be any incompatibility of the subject and object of an action being the same in the case of cognition cognizing itself. If it however is maintained that there is such an incompatibility in the case of cognition cognizing itself, then one must also maintain that there is such an incompatibility in the case of inherence relating itself. Thus, since there is no difference in the two cases of inherence and cognition, the Vaiśeṣika must acknowledge that cognition cognizes itself if they are to hold that inherence relates itself.

¹²¹⁸ ed. note: “sambandhasvabhāvatvam |”.

[*tadittham*]¹²¹⁹, *yathā saṃyogaḥ, tathā cāyam, tasmāt tathaiva, ity anumānabādhitaviṣayatvāc ca* |

SŚP §17 English

And that which is said [by the Vaiśeṣika]: “Inherence does not require another relation, because it is a relation itself. But those [things] which require another relation, those [things] are not themselves a relation, such as jars etc.. And it is not so that this [inherence] is not itself a relation. Therefore it does not require another relation”.¹²²⁰ That is mere wishing, because [the premise in this syllogism] is inconclusive on account of conjunction. For that [conjunction], which is itself a relation, requires another relation.¹²²¹ For it is not suitable that conjunction etc. has that [nature of relation] from something else since [it] does not have the nature of relation from itself, on account of [resulting in the] extension [of inherence also depending on its nature of relation on something else], because [it] is the object of negation in the inference: “When [it] is related with a different category, inherence requires another relation, on account of being a different category. That which is thus [another category], that is thus [requires another relation when related with another category], just as conjunction [requires another relation when related to another category]. And this [inherence] is thus [i.e. another category]. Therefore it is indeed thus [requires another relation when related with another category].”¹²²²

SŚP §18 37, 18-24

¹²¹⁹ *tadittham* has here been added by the editor to correlate with *yadittham*.

¹²²⁰ This is a syllogism: 1) *pratijñā* (proposition): inherence does not require another relation; 2) *hetu* (premise): because it is itself a relation; 3) *udāharaṇa* (explanatory example): those that require another relation are not themselves relations, such as jars etc.; 4) *upanaya* (application): It is not so that inherence is not itself a relation (i.e. inherence is a relation); 5) *niḡamana* (conclusion): therefore inherence does not require another relation.

¹²²¹ i.e. *saṃyoga* (conjunction) requires another relation (i.e. inherence), as, according to the Vaiśeṣika *saṃyoga* is a *guṇa* (quality), and thus resides in *dravya* (substance) by means of *samavāya* (inherence). But *saṃyoga* is itself a relation, and thus the syllogism suffers from the fault of *anaikāntika* (inconclusiveness, also called *savyabhicāra*), here called *anekānta*, because the *hetu* (premise) is not uniformly concomitant with either one of two alternatives (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119), i.e. the state of being a relation (which is here the *hetu*) is also found in *saṃyoga* (conjunction), which is not held to relate itself. Thus the *hetu* is too wide.

¹²²² This is a syllogism: 1) *pratijñā* (proposition): inherence requires another relation when it is related with a different category; 2) *hetu* (premise): because it is a different category; 3) *udāharaṇa* (explanatory example): that which is a different category, that requires another relation when it is related with a different category, like conjunction (which belongs to the *guṇa* category) requires another relation when related to a different category (i.e. *dravya*); 4) *upanaya* (application): And inherence is a different category; 5) *niḡamana* (conclusion): therefore inherence does require another relation when related with a different category.

I.e. just as the other categories (*padārtha*) require a relation in order to be related to another category, inherence requires another relation in order to be related to another category. This is exemplified by *saṃyoga* (conjunction), which, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, needs another relation to be related to another category.

kiṃ ca, yathā samavāyaḥ svarūpāpekṣayā ‘bhedāt tadavyatiriktaghaṭānīya-ghaṭākākārāpekṣayā bhedaṭ bhedaḥbhedaṭmakāḥ¹²²³ siddhyati, tathāvayavyādyapekṣayā ‘bhedāt tadaprthagbhūtāvayavāpekṣayā bhedaṭ¹²²⁴ sarvaṃ vastu bhedaḥbhedaṭmakam jātyantaram siddhyet, virodhādidūṣāṇām samavāyadrṣṭāntenāpasāraṇāt ity arhanmatasiddhiḥ tasya tadiṣṭatvāt | **abhedabhedātmakam arthatattvaṃ tava** [yuktyanu-ślo- 7] iti vacanāt | tanmatasiddhau parābhimatābhedaikāntarūpaṃ vastu khapuṣpavad asad eva syāt | **svatatrānyatarat khapuṣpam** [yuktyanu- ślo- 7] iti vacanāt |

SŚP §18 English

Moreover, just as [since it is maintained that inherence relates itself] inherence is proved to have a nature characterized by difference and non-difference because it is non-different with regard to its own nature and different with regard to the form of relator and related, which are [both] inseparable from that [inherence],¹²²⁵ just so let all existing objects be proved to have a nature characterized by difference and non-difference *sui generis* on account of being different with regard to the parts which are inseparable from that [whole] and on account of being non-different with regard to [being] [a composite] whole etc., because the faults of contradiction etc. are removed by means of the example of inherence.¹²²⁶ Thus the doctrine of the Arhats [i.e. jainism] is proved because it accepts that [all objects having a nature characterized by difference and non-difference *sui generis*].¹²²⁷ Because of the saying: “The nature of the objects of your [doctrine] [O Arhat] is a nature that is [both] different and non-different [*sui generis*]”. Since their [the Arhats’] doctrine is proved, the object which has a nature of one-sided difference desired by the opponents [Vaiśeṣikas] must be non-existent like the sky flower. Because of the saying: “that which is independent of one of the two [i.e. difference or non-difference] [is non-existent] [just like] the sky-flower.”¹²²⁸

SŚP §19 37, 25-27

¹²²³ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “bhedaḥbhedaḥ bhedaṭmakāḥ”. This does not fit the point being made or the rest of the sentence.

¹²²⁴ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “tadaprthagbhūtāvayavāpekṣayābhedaṭ”.

¹²²⁵ i.e. since it is maintained that inherence relates itself, it is both the relator and the related. As inherence as relator is different from inherence as related, and as inherence, from the standpoint of its own nature, is non-different, it is proved that inherence has a nature that is both different and non-different *sui generis*.

¹²²⁶ i.e. thus, all objects are established to have a nature characterized by both difference and non-difference *sui generis* because objection of contradiction etc. against the doctrine of difference and non-difference are removed by the example of inherence, which must clearly have a nature characterized by both difference and non-difference *sui generis* as it is both the relator and the related.

¹²²⁷ i.e. arguing that inherence relates itself (and is thus both the relator and related) ends up proving the Jain doctrine of *anekāntavāda*.

¹²²⁸ The two quotes from the Yuktyanuśāsana together form the first line of Yuktyanuśāsana verse 7. The second half (*svatatrānyatarat khapuṣpam*) must thus be read in relation to the first half (*abhedabhedātmakam arthatattvaṃ tava*). Cf. §25 below where Vidyānandin quotes the whole verse.

tad evaṃ svataḥ parataś ca samavāyasya samavāyiṣu vṛttir na syāt, ¹²²⁹avṛttimattvāt samavāyavṛtter na paramārthataḥ samavāyaḥ samavāyyāśritaḥ parais tasya svātantryābhyupagamāc ca | nāpy upacārāt, upacāranimittābhāvāt |

SŚP §19 English

Therefore inherence cannot reside in the substrates by itself or by another [relation]. Inherence does not really reside in [its] substrate because it does not reside [in its substrate by means of another relation] and because it is acknowledged by the opponents that it [inherence] is independent.¹²³⁰ And [the relation of inherence to its substrate] is also not figurative,¹²³¹ because of the non-existence of [any] reason for figurative [usage].¹²³²

SŚP §20 38, 1-6

nanu nimittam upacārasya samavāyiṣu satsu samavāyajñānam, samavāyiṣūnyadeśe samavāyajñānāsaṃbhavād iti cet; tad asat; digādīnām apy evaṃ āśritatvaprasaṃgāt; mūrtadravyeṣu satsu upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpteṣu diglīngasya “idam ataḥ pūrveṇa” ity ādi pratyayasya kālaliṅgasya ca paratvāparatvādīpratyayasya sadbhāvāt mūrtadravyāśritatvaprasaṃgāt | tathā ca **anyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ** [praśa- bhā- pr. 16]¹²³³ iti vacanavyāghātaḥ, nityadravyasyāpi digāder upacārād āśritvasiddheḥ | tato nopacārād apy āśritatvam samavāyasya |

SŚP §20 English

If it is objected: Certainly, the reason for [employing] a figurative [interpretation] is that knowledge of inherence¹²³⁴ [only takes place] when [its] substrates are present, because it is impossible to have knowledge of inherence in a place that is devoid of [its] substrates. [It is answered:] That is not true. Because [then there would be] adhering to also space etc.¹²³⁵ [figuratively] residing [in a substrate] in the same way. Because the cognition that “this is to the east of that” etc. and the cognition of something posterior and prior etc.,

¹²²⁹ ed. note: ”anyena saṃbandhena saṃbaddhatvābhāvāt |”. i.e. it is not related by another relation.

¹²³⁰ This concludes the argumentation against the first alternative with respect to how *samavāya* (inherence) resides in its substrate (*paramārthataḥ samavāyaḥ samavāyyāśritaḥ*).

¹²³¹ Here the second option, listed in §12 above, with respect to how inherence resides in its substrate is taken up again.

¹²³² i.e. there must be some reason for a figurative interpretation to be resorted to. According to Indian grammarians three conditions are considered necessary in order to resort to interpreting a statement figuratively: 1) inconsistency in the words taken in a literal sense, such as in the sentence “The house is in the river” which cannot be taken literally as a house cannot actually exist in a river; 2) the figurative meaning and the primary meaning must in some way be related, i.e. on the basis of similarity, sharing a common quality, proximity etc.. Thus, in the statement “the house is in the river”, “river” may be interpreted as “the bank of the river” on account of proximity; 3) either sanction by popular usage (in the case of faded metaphors) or a special purpose for which the metaphor is resorted to (in the case of intentional metaphors) (Coward & Raja 1990: 8). Vidyānandin here argues that these conditions are not met by the statement “inherence resides in its substrate”, and it can thus not be interpreted figuratively.

¹²³³ Word index to the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994) has this as paragraph 11.

¹²³⁴ i.e. the experience of things inhering

¹²³⁵ i.e. the eternal substances.

which is the mark of space and the mark of time [respectively], exist [only] when material substances are present [and] when there is occurrence of the characteristics [i.e. circumstances] [that allow for] [their] perception.¹²³⁶ Because [then there would be] adhering to [space] figuratively residing in material substances. And thus there is a contradiction of the words [of one’s own tradition], [which says] “[all the categories reside in a substance] except the eternal substances”¹²³⁷, because there is proof that the eternal substances, space etc., figuratively reside [in material substances]. Therefore, inherence does not even figuratively reside [in its substrate].¹²³⁸

SŚP §21 38, 7-11

athānāśritaḥ samavāyaḥ iti matam, tadā na sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ sambandhibhyām bhinnasyobhayāśritasyaiva samyogavat sambandhatvavyavasthiteḥ | tathā ca prayogaḥ – samavāyo na sambandhaḥ sarvathā ‘nāśritatvāt, yo yaḥ sarvathā ‘nāśritaḥ sa sa na sambandhaḥ, yathā digādi, sarvathā ‘nāśritaś ca samavāyaḥ, tasmān na sambandha iti | na cātrāsiddho hetuḥ, samavāyasya paramārthata upacārāc cāśritatvasya nirākṛtatvāt |

SŚP §21 English

Now it is thought: “inherence does not reside [in its substrate]”.¹²³⁹ [If that is true], then inherence is not a relation, because it is established that only that which is different from the two [things that are] related and resides in both [the things that are related] is a relation, like conjunction [is a relation because it is different from the two related things and resides in them both]. And this is the inference [to prove this]: Inherence is not a relation because it does not at all reside [in a substrate]. Whatever does not at all reside [in a substrate], that is not a relation, such as space etc.. And inherence does not at all

¹²³⁶ *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpteṣu*, i.e. whatever conditions (such as light etc.) that are required in order for perceiving material substances are found. So it is not enough that the material substances are present, but the conditions that allow for them to be perceived must also be there.

¹²³⁷ Cf. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* §11: “*ṣaṅṅām api padārthānām astityābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni. Aśritatvaṃ cānyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ.*” (Bronkhorst & Ramseier 1994), “The six categories exist, are namable and knowable, and they reside [in a substance], except for the eternal substances.” (my translation). Cf. aslo ed. note to *nityadravyebhyaḥ* footnote 1082: “*nityadravyāni na kāryadravyavat svakāraṇāśritāni bhavanti |*”, “The eternal substances do not reside in their cause [as they have no cause] as the substances which are effects do” (My translation). Effect-substances reside in cause-substances (i.e. their cause), like cloth (effect-substance) resides in thread (cause-substance). But eternal substances (which do not have a cause) do not. Qualities, activity, universal, particular and inherence all reside in *dravya* (substance). The eternal substances do not reside in anything.

¹²³⁸ i.e. if inherence figuratively resides in the substrates because one can only know it when its substrates are present, then space must likewise figuratively reside in material substances because it is only known when there are material substances present, and space residing in anything is explicitly denied by the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, which says that eternal substances (space etc.) do not reside in anything. This doctrine will thus be contradicted as inherence figuratively residing in its substrate would prove that space etc. also figuratively reside in the material substances. Thus it cannot be held that inherence figuratively resides in its substrate.

¹²³⁹ now the third alternative with respect to the relationship of inherence to its substrate (cf. SŚP 36, 8 §12 above) is taken up.

reside [in a substrate]. Because of that [inherence] is not a relation¹²⁴⁰. And it is not so that the premise in this [inference] is not proved. Because inherence both really and figuratively residing [in that which it is to relate] is refuted.¹²⁴¹

SŚP §22 38, 12-22

syād ākūtam – samavāyasya dharmino ‘pratipattau hetor āśrayāsiddhatvam, pratipattau dharmigrāhakapramāṇabādhitāḥ pakṣo hetuś ca kālātyayāpadiṣṭāḥ prasajyate | samavāyo hi yataḥ pramāṇāt pratipannas tata evāyutasiddhasaṃbandhatvaṃ pratipannam ayutasiddhānām eva saṃbandhasya samavāyavyapadeśasiddher iti tad api na sādhyāḥ; samavāyagrāhinā pramāṇenāśritasyaiva samavāyasya aṣṭāvagbhāvalakṣaṇasya pratipatteḥ, tasyānāśritatvābhyupagame¹²⁴² cāsaṃbandhatvasya prasamgena sādhanasya sādhanāt | sādhyasādhanayor vyāpyavyāpakabhāvasiddhau parasya vyāpyābhyupagame¹²⁴³ tannāntarīyakasya vyāpakābhyupagamasya pratipādanāt | na hy anāśritatvam¹²⁴⁴ asaṃbandhatvena vyāptam digādiṣv asiddham | nāpy anaikāntikam; anāśritasya kasyacit saṃbandhatvāprasiddheḥ vipakṣe vṛtṭyabhāvāt | tata eva na viruddham nāpy satpratipakṣam; tasyānāśritasyāpi saṃbandhatvavyavasthāpakānumāṇābhāvād iti na pareṣāṃ samavāyasābandho ‘sti, yatas tadvaśād¹²⁴⁵ bhinnānām apy avayavyādīnām abhedena pratipattir upadyeta | tatas te bhedenaiva pratiyeran na caivam ataḥ pratyakṣavirodho duḥśakaḥ parihartuṃ pareṣāṃ |

SŚP §22 English

The intention [of the Vaiśeṣika] may be¹²⁴⁶: The premise [suffers from the fault of] not being proved [to reside in its] abode¹²⁴⁷ since inherence, which is the subject, is not

¹²⁴⁰ this is a syllogism. 1) pratijñā (proposition): inherence is not a relation. The proposition consists of the subject (*pakṣa*), which is *samavāya* (inherence) and the *sādhyā* (the property which is to be proved to belong to the subject), which is “not being a relation”. 2) hetu (premise): because it does not at all reside in a substrate. 3) udāharaṇa (explanatory example): whatever does not at all reside in a substrate, is not a relation, like space etc.. 4) upanaya (application): inherence not at all reside in a substrate. 5) nigamana (conclusion): thus inherence is not a relation.

¹²⁴¹ i.e. the Vaiśeṣikas cannot object that statement in the *hetu* (premise), “because it does not at all reside in a substrate”, is false as it has already been shown that inherence does not in any way reside in that which it is to relate.

¹²⁴² Amended according to sandhi rules. Printed ed. reads: “ca asaṃbandhatvasya”.

¹²⁴³ ed. note: “tadavinābhāvinaḥ |”.

¹²⁴⁴ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “āśritatvam”, which makes no sense. When read as *anāśritatvam* it fits the point being made and corresponds with the *udāharaṇa* in Vidyānandin’s inference above.

¹²⁴⁵ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “abhinnānām”.

¹²⁴⁶ this paragraph takes up different kinds of objections the Vaiśeṣikas might raise against the *hetu* (premise) in the syllogism in SŚP 38, 8-10 §21 above, i.e. these are suggestions to what the Vaiśeṣika might mean when saying that the *hetu* is not proved. 5 potential fallacies are investigated and subsequently refuted.

¹²⁴⁷ i.e. *āśrayāsiddha* (the fault of not being proved to reside in its abode) is a variety of *asiddha* (unproved), and is the fallacy occurring because the *pakṣa* (the subject of the inference) does not exist (Ghokale 1992: 53). Here it clearly refers to the subject not being perceptible.

perceived.¹²⁴⁸ And if [the subject were to be] perceived, the thesis¹²⁴⁹ and the premise are contradicted by the valid means of knowledge which grasp the subject, and [the fallacy of] mistimed premise¹²⁵⁰ is clung to¹²⁵¹. [And it is perceived], for the valid means of knowledge by means of which inference is perceived is the very [valid means of knowledge] by means of which the inseparable relation is perceived, because it is established that the term “inherence” [refers to] the relation of only those things that are inseparable.¹²⁵²

[To this it is answered:] Even that is not any better. Because only an inherence which resides [in that which it relates], having the characteristic of not being all-pervading, is perceived by the valid means of knowledge that grasps inherence,¹²⁵³ and because, if it is accepted that that [inherence] does not reside [in that which it is to be related] the proof¹²⁵⁴ is proved by there then being adherence to [inherence] not being a relation. Because, since it is proved that that which is to be proved and the proof have the pervaded-pervader¹²⁵⁵ relation, if the opponent [Vaiśeṣika] accepts the pervaded [i.e. the hetu, premise], it leads to the acknowledgement of the pervader which is not available

¹²⁴⁸ i.e. since one cannot cognize *samavāya* (inherence, which is the subject of the inference), it is not proved that the *hetu* (premise) is found in it, i.e. one cannot prove that *samavāya* does not at all reside in that which it is to relate because *samavāya* cannot be cognized. Like in the inference “there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke on the mountain”, the *hetu* must reside in the *dharmin/pakṣa* (subject, in this case the mountain), i.e. there must actually be smoke on the mountain. The Vaiśeṣika argument is here that if one cannot see the mountain it is not established that there is smoke on it, and thus it cannot be proved that the mountain has fire.

¹²⁴⁹ *pakṣa* cannot here mean “subject” (i.e. the subject in the inference) as it often does, but refers to the thesis (i.e. inference). It would make no sense for it to mean “subject” as cognizing *samavāya* (inherence) would not negate the subject (which is *samavāya*). The word *dharmin* has in this paragraph been used to refer to the subject of the inference.

¹²⁵⁰ *kālātyāyāpadiṣṭa* is also known as *bādhita* (negated), and denotes a *hetu* (premise) that states the opposite of that which is shown to be true by means of other evidence (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 120). In this case the *hetu* would state something (i.e. that inherence does not at all reside in that which it is to relate) which is the opposite of that which is shown by sensory perception (which, if inherence could be cognized, would cognize inherence in its substrate).

¹²⁵¹ i.e. if one can cognize the *pakṣa* (subject), i.e. *samavāya* (inherence) in that which it is to relate, then that would prove the Jain inference wrong, as it must clearly reside in its substrate if it is perceived to be there.

¹²⁵² i.e. the perception of *ayutasiddhasambandha* (inseparable relation) between two things (such as a substance and its quality) is the perception of *samavāya* (inherence), as *samavāya* is the relation between things that are inseparably related. While the Nyāya consider *samavāya* to be perceptible, this is not accepted by the Vaiśeṣika (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 226).

¹²⁵³ i.e. inherence, if perceived, is only perceived as residing in its substrate (where it is perceived), i.e. not as all-pervading etc.. In other words, inherence is then only perceived in specific instances in these inseparable relations. Thus perception cannot prove the *samavāya* (inherence) posited by the Vaiśeṣika, i.e. inference which is all pervasive, one etc..

¹²⁵⁴ i.e. the *hetu* (premise) in the Jain inference, that *samavāya* (inherence) does not reside in that which it is to relate.

¹²⁵⁵ i.e. that the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) is the *vyāpaka* (pervader) and the *sādhana* (proof) is the *vyāpya* (pervaded). This is a necessary criterion for an inference to be valid. The *hetu* (premise) must be pervaded by the *sādhya*, i.e. fire (the *vyāpaka*) must pervade smoke (the *vyāpya*) for the inference “there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke on the mountain” to be valid, i.e. wherever there is smoke there must be fire.

without the pervaded.¹²⁵⁶ For it is not so that it is not proved, in the case of space etc., that not residing [in something] is pervaded by not being a ¹²⁵⁷relation.¹²⁵⁸

And the [fallacy of] inconclusiveness also does not [apply here], on account something that does not reside in anything not being known to be a relation, because it does not abide in the ¹²⁵⁹counterinstance¹²⁶⁰. Therefore¹²⁶¹ [the fallacy of] contradiction¹²⁶² [does not apply], and [the fallacy of] an equally strong counter inference¹²⁶³ also [does not apply] because there is no inference that establishes that that which does not reside [in anything] is a relation. Thus the inherence-relation of the opponents does not exist, from which¹²⁶⁴ perception of the different, the whole etc., as non-different would be found on account of the power of that [inherence].¹²⁶⁵ On account of that [inherence not existing] those [parts and whole etc.], would have to be cognized as only different. But it is not thus [i.e. they are not cognized as only different]. Therefore the contradiction with sensory perception is impossible for the opponents to avert.¹²⁶⁶

¹²⁵⁶ i.e. thus it would follow that wherever the *vyāpya* (pervaded), i.e. the *sādhana* (proof), is found, so must the *vyāpaka* (pervader), i.e. the *sādhya*. So, by accepting the *hetu* (premise) the Vaiśeṣika automatically accepts the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved), i.e. by accepting that *samavāya* (inherence) does not reside in that which is to relate they also accept that it is not a relation.

¹²⁵⁷ i.e. it is proved that whatever does not reside in anything is not a relation, such as space, which does not reside in anything and is not a relation. This is the *udāharaṇa* in Vidyānandin's syllogism above.

¹²⁵⁸ i.e. arguing that *samavāya* (inherence) is perceived by perceiving the relation of inseparable things (such as a substance and its quality) does not save the Vaiśeṣika, as this perception can only perceive specific cases of *samavāya* as residing in that which it relates, i.e. it will not be seen to be all-pervasive etc., such as is posited by the Vaiśeṣika. Granted, one can observe that there is an inseparable relationship between a substance and its quality, and one may very well call this relation *samavāya*, but this should not be mistaken for having actually perceived the *samavāya* posited by the Vaiśeṣika which is described as a separate existing thing that is eternal, all-pervasive and one. If one on the other hand posits that *samavāya* does not reside in its substrate (that which it relates), then one ends up having to acknowledge that *samavāya* is not a relation on account of there being invariable concomitance between not being a relation and not residing in anything.

¹²⁵⁹ *Vipakṣa*. In the inference of fire on the mountain, the proposition is “the mountain has fire”, the *hetu* is “because it has smoke”. The positive example is the kitchen, where fire and smoke are seen to always go together, while the *vipakṣa* (counterinstance) is the lake, where there is never fire and thus never smoke. The point is that for the inference to be true, there can be no known instances of the *hetu* being found while there is absence of the property that is to be proved (Bartley 2005: 177). In this case the *vipakṣa* is any relation

¹²⁶⁰ the fault of *anaikāntika* (inconclusiveness, cf. footnote 1221) because the *hetu* (premise) is not uniformly concomitant with either one of two alternatives, i.e. that the *hetu* (here that it does not reside in anything) would be found both in things that are a relation and things that are not a relation. As the *hetu* is only found in that which is not a relation, i.e. no relations are characterized by not residing in that which they are to relate, this fault does not apply here. So the premise is not too general, i.e. it is not found outside the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved).

¹²⁶¹ i.e. since the *hetu* (premise) is absent in the *vipakṣa* (counterinstance).

¹²⁶² i.e. the fallacy of the *hetu* (premise) contradicting the proposition (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119).

¹²⁶³ *satpratipakṣa* (lit. “that the opposite is true”), also called *viruddhāvyaahicāri*, is the fault of there existing an equally strong counter-inference. In other words, there exists another *hetu* which negates the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) (Gokhale 1992: 50, 107).

¹²⁶⁴ i.e. if it did exist

¹²⁶⁵ i.e. the Vaiśeṣikas have argued (cf. §10 above) that the parts and the whole etc. are absolutely different, and that they only appear to be somewhat non-different because of the relation of inherence. Now that the inherence-relation has been proved not to exist, this argument is no longer valid.

¹²⁶⁶ i.e. if the Vaiśeṣikas still maintain the absolute difference between the parts and the whole etc., they would have to be seen as absolutely different (since the reason for them to appear to be non-different, i.e. inherence, is invalid as inherence does not exist) But it is not so, and thus the Vaiśeṣika doctrine is contradicted by perception.

SŚP §23 38, 23-24

kiṃ ca, pratipāditaparakāreṇa samavāyasyāsambhāve saṃyogasyāpy asambhavaḥ tasya kāryasya kāraṇasamavāyābhāve ‘nupapatteḥ |

SŚP §23 English

Moreover, since inherence, by way of that which has been set forth [above], is impossible, conjunction, which is its effect, is impossible as well. Because [conjunction] is not found if inherence, which is [its] cause, does not exist.¹²⁶⁷

SŚP §24 38, 25-39, 7

evaṃ saṃbandhābhāve na kiṃcit vastu bhedaikāntavādimite vyavatiṣṭhate | tathā hi – tāvat paramāṇūnām saṃyogābhāve dvyaṇukādīprakrameṇāvayavino ‘nutpatteḥ kāryarūpabhūtacatuṣṭayābhāvaḥ, tadabhāve ¹²⁶⁸tatkāraṇacaturvidhaparamāṇavo ‘pi na saṃbhāvante; kāryaliṅgatvāt kāraṇasya | **kāryabhrānter aṇubhrāntiḥ kāryaliṅgaṃ hi kāraṇam** | [āptamī- ślo- 68] iti vacanāt | tathā bhūtacatuṣṭayāsattve ¹²⁶⁹parāparādipratyayāpāyāt | “īdam ataḥ pūrveṇa” ¹²⁷⁰ity ādi pratyayāpāyāc ca [na¹²⁷¹] kālo dik ca vyavatiṣṭhate | tathā ¹²⁷²bherīdaṇḍādyākāśasaṃyogābhāvāt saṃyogajaśabdasyānutpattiḥ, sarvatrāvayavasamāyogābhāve ¹²⁷³tadvibhāgasyāpy ayogād vibhāgajaśabdasyāpy anutpattiḥ; ¹²⁷⁴tayor anudaye śabdajaśabdasyāsambhavaḥ; iti sakalaśabdānutpatter ākāśavyavasthāpakopāyāpāyād¹²⁷⁵ ākāśahāniḥ | tathā buddhyanutpattau manaso ‘siddhiḥ kramato jñāṇotpatter manoliṅgatvāt | **yugapajjñānānutpattiḥ manaso liṅgam** [nyāyasū- 1|1|16] iti vacanāt |

SŚP §24 English

¹²⁶⁷ Conjunction (*saṃyoga*) is a quality (*guṇa*), and as such it, according to the Vaiśeṣika, needs inherence in order to relate to the substances. If there is no inherence there can thus be no conjunction that relates substances. Inherence is thus also regarded to be the cause of conjunction (as it is regarded to be the cause of qualities in general as it is necessary in order for the substances to be able to produce the qualities). If the cause does not exist, neither can the effect.

¹²⁶⁸ ed. note: “kāryabhūtapṛthivyādīkāraṇa |”, i.e. the atoms are the causes of the elements, earth etc., which are their effects.

¹²⁶⁹ ed. note: “deśapekṣayā aparasmīn param yugapacciraṃ kṣipramiti kāryaliṅgāni |”

¹²⁷⁰ ed. note: “īdam ato dakṣiṇenetyādi |”

¹²⁷¹ The editor seems here to have amended the text, adding *na*. No note is given as to the reading of the manuscripts.

¹²⁷² ed. note: “bheryākāśasaṃyogo nimittakāraṇam |”

¹²⁷³ ed. note: “avayavavibhāgasya |”

¹²⁷⁴ ed. note: “saṃyogajavibhāgajaśabdāy abhāve |”

¹²⁷⁵ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “ākāśavyavasthāpakopāyād”. This does not make sense. The adding of *apāyād* (destruction, loss) follows Trikha (2009), who adds *apāyād* on account of finding the phrase “-vyavasthāpakopāyāpāyād” in Vidyānandin’s *Āptaparīkṣāṭīkā* 118, 10 (Trikha 2009: 271). *Apāya* is also used twice in the same way above in the same paragraph (cf. SŚP 39, 1-2). An alternative amendment would thus be to substitute *apāyād* for *upāyād*. As Trikha has found the reading –*vyavasthāpakopāyāpāyād* in the *Āptaparīkṣāṭīkā*, adding *apāyād* to *upāya* is preferable.

Thus, since no relations exist,¹²⁷⁶ it is established that there is no really existing object in the doctrine of those who propound one-sided difference. It is as follows – firstly, the fourfold elements¹²⁷⁷, which have being the effect [of the atoms] as [their] nature, do not exist on account of the whole not being found by way of combination of two atoms etc. since conjunction of the atoms does not exist. The fourfold atoms, which are the cause of those [elements], are not [thought] possible if the [elements] do not exist¹²⁷⁸, on account of the cause being that which has the effect as its mark. Because of the statement: “The atoms are illusory on account of [their] effects being illusory. For the cause is that which has the effect as its mark”¹²⁷⁹

[There are no existing objects according to the Vaiśeṣika] because, in the same way, if the fourfold elements do not exist, the cognition of remote and proximate etc.¹²⁸⁰ is lost. And space and time is not established on account of the loss of cognitions such as “this is to the east of that” etc..

In the same way, sound that arises from conjunction is not found on account of the non-existence of conjunction of the drum, the stick etc. and ākāśa. And sound arising from disjunction is also not found, because it is logically unsound that there be disjunction of those [drum, stick etc. and ākāśa] if there is complete non-existence of conjunction. Sound arising from sound is impossible since there is non-arising of those two [sound from conjunction and sound from disjunction]¹²⁸¹. Thus there is abandonment of ākāśa because the means that establish ākāśa are lost on account of no sound being found.¹²⁸²

In the same way, the qualities [of the soul], knowledge etc.¹²⁸³ do not arise, because there is no proof of conjunction of the mind¹²⁸⁴ and the soul.¹²⁸⁵ The essence of

¹²⁷⁶ i.e. since both *samavāya* and *saṃyoga* are shown not to exist.

¹²⁷⁷ i.e. the four great classes of material objects: earth, water, light and air (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 196).

¹²⁷⁸ i.e. since there is no conjunction of atoms, the effects (of this conjunction) cannot exist. And if the effects do not exist, the atoms cannot exist.

¹²⁷⁹ i.e. the logical mark of the cause is its effect. If the effect does not exist, then the postulated cause cannot exist. Thus, as the effects of the atoms do not exist, the atoms cannot exist either. Akalaṅka’s commentary to this verse in his *Aṣṭaśatī* is given in full in Chapter 4. It is not given here as the verse is not taken from a discussion of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, and Akalaṅka’s commentary does not contribute to a deeper understanding of this paragraph.

¹²⁸⁰ *paratva* and *aparatva* (priority and posteriority) are relations of things, forming the basis of the notions of nearness and remoteness in time and space (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 207). Cf. §2 above where these are listed among the 17 qualities (*guṇa*).

¹²⁸¹ i.e. as there is no conjunction, there can be no sound which arises from it. And as disjunction presupposes a prior conjunction, there cannot be any disjunction if there is no conjunction, and thus there also cannot be any sound produced by disjunction. And since none of these kinds of sound exist, there can be no sound that arises from sound. Thus there is no sound at all.

¹²⁸² Ākāśa is defined as the material cause of sound (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 193). And as the cause is that which has the effect as its mark (*kāryalingatvāt kāraṇasya*, cf. SŚP 38, 25-27 and Āptamīmāṃsa verse 68), ākāśa cannot exist if sound does not exist.

¹²⁸³ Cf. SŚP 34, 1-3 §1 above. The full list of the soul’s specific qualities is given there.

¹²⁸⁴ *antahkāraṇa*, “the inner instrument”.

¹²⁸⁵ the soul and the mind, being two substances, are related by conjunction.

the soul is abandoned because the means that establish the soul [i.e. its qualities] do not exist if those [qualities, i.e. knowledge etc.] do not exist.¹²⁸⁶

In the same way the mind is not proved since there is no arising of knowledge, because the successive arising of [the five kinds of] [sensory] cognition is the mark of the mind.¹²⁸⁷ On account of the saying: “the [five kinds of] [sensory] cognition not arising simultaneously¹²⁸⁸ is the mark of the mind”.

SŚP §25 39, 8-14

*evaṃ saṃyogābhāve sarvadravyābhāvaḥ | athavā samavāyābhāve
sattāsamavāyāsaṃbhavāt sarvadravyaḥ pracutaḥ | sarvadravyahānau
tadāśritaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣānām asiddhiḥ āśrayābhāve saty āśrayiṇā[m¹²⁸⁹ a]bhāvāt,
*¹²⁹⁰tantvabhāve paṭābhāvavad iti | saṃsargahāneḥ sakalārthahānir durnivārā
vaiśeṣikāṇām upanipatati | tad uktaṃ svāmisamantabhadrapādaiḥ –

**abhedabhedātmakam arthatattvaṃ tava svatantrānyatarat khapuṣpam |
avṛttimattvāt samavāyavṛtteḥ saṃsargahāneḥ sakalārthahāniḥ || [yuktyanu- ślo- 7] iti**

SŚP §25 English

Thus no substances exist since there is no conjunction. Or rather, all substances are banished on account of the impossibility of the inherence of [the universal] existence-ness since inherence does not exist.¹²⁹¹ Since there is abandoning of all substances, there is no proof of the qualities, activity, the universal and the particular, which reside in those [substances], because those which reside do not exist if the substrate does not exist,¹²⁹²

¹²⁸⁶ i.e. as the soul is defined as that which has the specific qualities of buddhi etc., the essence, and thus the existence, of the soul has to be abandoned as these do not exist.

¹²⁸⁷ i.e. the mind can only come into contact with one of the five sense organs at the time. The fact that only one cognition can arise at the time is used by Vāṭṣyāyana to infer that it is the mind which is the cause of cognitions, in the sense that it is on the proximity of the mind that cognitions appear and on account of the non-proximity of the mind that cognitions do not appear (Jhā 1984: 269).

¹²⁸⁸ i.e. the successive arising of cognition/knowledge.

¹²⁸⁹ Printed edition reads: “satyāśrayiṇā[ma]bhāvāt”, recording the alternate reading “satyāśrayiṇābhāvāt” in a footnote. The editor’s emendation seems clearly preferable to the reading found in the manuscript, as following the reading in the manuscripts one would have to read *āśrayiṇā* (instrumental), which does not make any sense.

¹²⁹⁰ ed. note: “– etad antargataḥ pāṭhaḥ ga- pratau nāsti |”, i.e. the whole of §25 up until this mark is not found in manuscript Ga-.

¹²⁹¹ i.e. since the substances cannot be related to the universal existence-ness, since the relation between substance (*dravya*) and universal (*sāmānya*) is by means of inherence which is proved not to exist, the objects cannot exist.

¹²⁹² The role of *saty* here is a bit curious. It most likely belongs with the condition, “if the substrate does not exist”, which is then here rather peculiarly expressed as *āśrayābhāve saty*, lit. as “if the non-existence of the substrate is true/exists”. Such an inclusion of *sati* is unnecessary and is not found in any of the other conditions in this paragraph (cf. *sāmānyābhāve* and *sarvadravyahānau*). Alternately, *saty* could be read together with *āśrayiṇām abhāvāt*, thus making the translation “because that which resides in the existing thing does not exist if...”, but this seems even more strange and unnecessary.

just like there is no cloth if there are no threads.¹²⁹³ On account of the abandoning of relation¹²⁹⁴ the unavoidable abandoning of all objects also takes place for the Vaiśeṣikas. It is said in the verses of Svāmi Samantabhadra:

The nature of the objects of your [doctrine] [O Arhat] is a nature that is [both] different and non-different [*sui generis*]. That which is independent of one of the two [i.e. difference or non-difference] [is non-existent] [just like] the sky-flower. All objects are abandoned because relation is abandoned on account of the inherence-relation not possessing [another] relation [by which it can reside in that which it is to relate].

SŚP §26 39, 15-17

evaṃ vicāryamānāḥ sarvathābhinnāvayavāvayavyādayaḥ svayam eva na santi yataḥ
pratyakṣeṇa pratibhāseran | tatpratyanīkāś ca kathaṃcidbhinnās te¹²⁹⁵ pratyakṣataḥ
pratibhāsanta iti sthitaṃ dṛṣṭaviruddhaṃ¹²⁹⁶ vaiśeṣikamatam iti |

SŚP §26 English

Thus, on being examined, the completely different parts and wholes etc. themselves do not exist,¹²⁹⁷ on account of which¹²⁹⁸ they would be cognized [as such] by sensory perception. But those [parts and wholes etc.] that are in some ways different¹²⁹⁹, whose [nature] is opposed to that [completely different nature] are cognized by sensory perception. Thus it is established that the Vaiśeṣika doctrine is contradicted by perception.¹³⁰⁰

¹²⁹³ i.e. if the substratum does not exist that which is said to reside in that substratum cannot exist.

¹²⁹⁴ *samsarga* here refers to relation in general, i.e. including both inherence and conjunction.

¹²⁹⁵ ed. note: "āvayavyādayaḥ |".

¹²⁹⁶ Amended. Printed ed. reads "śeṣikamatam"

¹²⁹⁷ i.e. since the objects etc. do not, on account of there being no relation if absolute difference is postulated, the absolutely different parts and wholes etc.. do not exist.

¹²⁹⁸ i.e. had they existed

¹²⁹⁹ i.e. both different and non-different *sui generis*.

¹³⁰⁰ Trikha (2009) makes two amendments in this paragraph, adding a *na* before *pratibhāseran* and amending *kathaṃcidbhinnās* to *kathaṃcidabhinnās*. He thus translates this paragraph as: "Wenn (sie) auf diese Weise untersucht werden, sind die in jeder Hinsicht unterschiedenen (Entitäten), wie Teile und Ganzes etc., eben selbst nicht vorhanden, weil sie (als solche) vermittle der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung nicht zur Erscheinung kämen. Aber als ihnen entgegengesetzte, in gewisser Hinsicht nicht unterschiedene, kommen diese aufgrund von sinnlicher Wahrnehmung zur Erscheinung. Somit steht fest, dass die Lehre der Vaiśeṣikas im Widerspruch zu sinnlich Wahrgenommenem steht." (Trikha 2009: 284). Both of Trikha's amendments seem unnecessary.

Firstly, there seems to be no reason to read *yataḥ* as meaning "because". *Yataḥ* is rather here used, together with the optative (*pratibhāseran*), to qualify *sarvathābhinnāvayavāvayavyādayaḥ* (the completely different parts and wholes etc.) **which, had they existed, would be cognized** by sensory perception. This construction with the relative pronoun is found throughout the SŚP, for example in SŚP 37, 20-21 §22 above: "iti na pareṣāṃ samavāyasambandho 'sti, yatas tadvaśād bhinnānām apy avayavyādīnām abhedena pratipattir upadyeta |"ⁱ, translated as: "Thus the inherence-relation of the opponents does not exist, from which perception of the different, the whole etc., as non-different would be found on account of the power of that [inherence].", and which Tatia translates as: "(Somit) ist es nicht der Fall, dass es die von anderen [d.h. von den Vaiśeṣikas] (angenommene) Verbindung Inhärenz gibt, sodass kraft dieser die Erkenntnis von (Dingen) wie dem Ganzen (und seinen Teilen) etc., obwohl diese verschieden sind, auf ungeschiedene

SŚP §27 39, 18-27

tathā tadiṣṭaviruddham ca | tathā hi vivādāpannam “tanukaraṇabhuvanādikaṃ buddhimaddhetukaṃ kāryatvāt ghaṭādivat” iti jagato maheśvarakṛtatvaṃ yaugaiḥ vyavasthāpyate, tac cānumānaviruddham, tadbādhakānumānasadbhāvāt | tac ca idam – neśvaras tanvādīnām kartā, aśarīratvāt, ya evaṃ sa evam, yathātmā, tathā cāyam, tasmāt tathāiveti | na cātrāsiddho hetuḥ, tasya¹³⁰¹ śarīratvāyogāt | taccharīrasya sāvayavasya nityatvānupapatteḥ | nityasyāpi taccharīrasya buddhimatkāraṇāpūrvakatve tenaiva kāryatvādihetūnām vyabhicārāt | tasya buddhimatkāraṇasapūrvatve vā parāparaśarīrakalpanāyām anavasthāprasamgāt | pūrvapūrvasya śarīreṇottarottarasvaśarīrotpattau¹³⁰² bhavasya nimittakāraṇatve sarvasamsāriṇām¹³⁰³ tathā prasiddher īśvarakalpanāvaiyarthāt | svopabhogyabhuvanādyutpattāv api teṣām eva nimittakāraṇatvopapatter iti; ¹³⁰⁴tatkāryatvācetanopadānatvasanniveśaviśiṣṭahetavo gamakāḥ syuḥ | **aśarīram vā vasantaṃ na priyāpriye spṛśataḥ** | [chāndo. 8|12|1] iti āgamavirodhāc ca |

SŚP §27 English

And, in the same way, that [Vaiśeṣika doctrine] is contradicted by inference. It is as follows: That the world is created by God¹³⁰⁵, which is [here] in dispute, is established by the Yaugas¹³⁰⁶ [in the following way]: “The body, the senses, the world etc. have an intelligent creator because they are effects, like a pot¹³⁰⁷ etc.”¹³⁰⁸. But that [inference] is

Weise möglich wäre.”. The construction with *yataḥ* is in these two instances the same, and there thus seems to be no reason to amend *pratibhāseran* to *na pratibhāseran*.

Secondly, Trikha’s amendment of *kathaṃcidabhinnās* to *kathaṃcidabhinnās* seems unnecessary. The use of *kathaṃcid* distinguishes the parts and wholes that are *kathaṃcidbhinna* from those posited by the Vaiśeṣika, which they hold to be *sarvathābhinna*. The use of *kathaṃcid* (somehow) and *sarvathā* (completely) is here sufficient to distinguish the two, the point being that the parts and the whole etc. are not **completely** different but **in some ways** different (and, thus implied, in some ways non-different as well). This is not the only place in the SŚP where this point is expressed in such a manner, cf. SŚP 46, 29-30 §13 Mīmāṃsā chapter: *nityam sadādi sāmānyam pratyabhijñāyamānatvāt, śabdavat iti cet, na; heto viruddhatvāt | kathaṃcin nityasya iṣṭaviruddhasya sādhanāt* | (If it is objected: The universal, existence-ness etc., is permanent, because it is recognized, like words. [It is answered:] no, because the premise [in this syllogism] is contradictory as [it] proves [that the universal] is **in some ways permanent**, which contradicts [your] desired [position] [of the universal being completely permanent]). Amending *bhinna* to *abhinna* is thus not necessary.

¹³⁰¹ ed. note: “īśvarasya |”.

¹³⁰² ed. note: “īśvarasya |”.

¹³⁰³ Amended The syllable “ri” is missing in the printed ed. What is visible after the “ā” seems to be part of an “i”.

¹³⁰⁴ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “tat kāryatvā-“. This *tat* seems to refer to the body etc., and should therefore either be in the genitive or compounded with *kāryatvā-*.

¹³⁰⁵ *Maheśvara* more literally translates as “Great Lord” and usually refers to Śiva. Since it here refers to one Supreme Being that is posited as the creator of the world I have here rendered it as “God”.

¹³⁰⁶ i.e. the Naiyāyikas.

¹³⁰⁷ i.e. just as a pot is created by a potter, so the world etc. is created by God.

¹³⁰⁸ This is a syllogism which aims to prove that the world and everything in it must have an intelligent creator, i.e. is made by God: 1) Pratijñā (proposition): The body, senses, the world etc. have an intelligent creator 2) Hetu (premise): because they are effects. 3) Udāharāṇa (Explanatory example with a general statement): *That which is an effect has an intelligent creator*. Like a pot etc. has an intelligent creator 4)

contradicted by [another] inference, because there exists an inference that negates that [inference of the Naiyāyikas]. And that [inference that negates the Naiyāyika inference] is this: God is not the creator of the body etc., because [God] does not have a body. That which is thus [i.e. has no body] is thus [i.e. not a creator], such as the [emancipated]¹³⁰⁹ soul. And he [God] is thus [i.e. he does not have a body], therefore [God] is thus [i.e. not a creator].¹³¹⁰

And it is not so that the premise [in this syllogism that negates the Naiyāyika syllogism] is not proved [to be present] in that [subject of the inference], because him [God] having a body is unsuitable on account of it not being found that his [i.e. God's] body, which [would] have parts, [would be] eternal.¹³¹¹

[Moreover, the inference of the Vaiśeṣika is wrong] because, even if his [God's] body [is said to be] eternal, if it is not preceded by an intelligent creator, the premise [in the Naiyāyika syllogism], [that the body etc. is an] effect etc., are erroneous¹³¹² on account of that [God's body not having an intelligent creator].¹³¹³ [And] because, if it [God's body] has a preceding intelligent creator, [there would be] adhering to an infinite regress with respect to postulating preceding and following bodies.¹³¹⁴ Because, if God is

*Upanaya (application): And the body, senses, the world etc. are effects 5) *Nigamana (conclusion): therefore they have an intelligent creator. Here only the *pratiñā*, *hetu* and the *dr̥ṣṭānta* (example) part of the *udāharana* are stated. The general statement, application and conclusion are skipped.

¹³⁰⁹ it is here presupposed that it is the emancipated soul that is referred to, as it is the emancipated soul that does not have a body.

¹³¹⁰ This is a syllogism: 1) *Pratiñā* (proposition): God is not the creator of the body etc.. 2) *Hetu* (premise): because God does not have a body. 3) *Udāharana* (Explanatory example with a general statement): That which does not have a body cannot be the creator of anything, such as the emancipated soul cannot be the creator of anything. 4) *Upanaya* (application): And God does not have a body. 5) *Nigamana* (conclusion): therefore God cannot be the creator of anything.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika do not consider God to be the creator of matter. Thus God makes the world etc. of the already existing atoms (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 172). In summarizing the various arguments raised against the Nyāya conception of God, Radhakrishnan writes: "If in some way God is able to fashion the world out of atoms without a body, we may as well say that he can create the world without any pre-existing material" (1966b: 172). It thus seems that the question of whether or not God has a body, and the various consequences of this were a common part of the critique of the Naiyāyikas doctrine of God.

¹³¹¹ i.e. the Vaiśeṣikas cannot object that the *hetu* (premise) is not found in the *pakṣa* (subject), i.e. that it is not true that God (the subject of the inference) does not have a body (the premise), as it would be illogical for God to have a physical body. In summarizing the criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of God, Radhakrishnan writes: "It is asked, whether God, the maker of the world, has a body or not. If he has a body, then it is subject to *adr̥ṣṭa* [i.e. *punya* and *pāpa*], since bodies are all determined by it. *Embodied beings are created*, and are not capable of exercising control over subtle atoms and merit and demerit (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 171; my italics). Embodied beings are created, and that which is created is not eternal. Vidyānandin also adds that God's body would have parts, which also points to it being created, i.e. put together, and thus not being eternal. The point is that God's body would have to be eternal, because him creating a body for himself without already having a body is just as problematic as him creating any other material thing without a body. Cf. footnote to Vidyānandin's inference above where criticism on this point is mentioned.

¹³¹² i.e. the fault of *vyabhicāra*, i.e. the *hetu* (premise) being found where the *sādhyā* (that which is to be proved) is not (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119).

¹³¹³ i.e. even if it is admitted that God has a body and that this body is eternal, if this body was not created by an intelligent creator (which it could not be as it is posited to be eternal), then the premise in the Naiyāyika's own syllogism (i.e. that the body etc. is an effect) is too wide, and thus the syllogism is not valid.

¹³¹⁴ i.e. if the Vaiśeṣika says that God's body is created by an intelligent creator so that the premise in their inference is not contradicted, then the body of the intelligent creator of that body would also have to have

the efficient cause¹³¹⁵, i.e. if the arising of each following of his own bodies is by means of each [of his] previous bodies, it is well known to be thus for all transmigrating beings. Because then postulating God is useless. Because those [transmigrating souls] are found to be the efficient cause even in the creation of the world etc., which is fit for their own enjoyment.¹³¹⁶ The convincing logical reasons [for proving that the efficient cause of the body etc. are the transmigrating souls, through their karma, are that] they [the body etc.] are effects, [their] material cause is insentient and [they] have a special arrangement.¹³¹⁷ And because [the view that God has a body] it is contradicted by the scriptural tradition: “He exists without a body. He is not touched by happiness or misery”.

SŚP §28 40, 1-5

evam tasyāśārīratve¹³¹⁸ siddhe neśvaras tanvādīnām kartā syāt, vitanukaraṇasya¹³¹⁹ tasya tatkr̥ter ayogāt | tādṛṣo ‘pi nimittabhāve karmaṇām acetanatve ‘pi tannimittatvam avipratīṣiddham,¹³²⁰ dṛṣṭāntavyatikramāt | yathaiiva hi kulālādisatanukaraṇaḥ kumbhādeḥ prayojako dṛṣṭāntaḥ tanukaraṇabhuvanādīnām aśārīrendriyeśvaraprayojakatvakalpanayā¹³²¹ vyatikramyate tathā karmaṇām acetanānām api tannimittatvam kalpanayā buddhimān api dṛṣṭānto vyatikramyatām viśeṣābhāvāt |

SŚP §28 English

an intelligent creator. This would result in an infinite regress as each body that is posited must have a body preceding it in order to have been created.

¹³¹⁵ The Naiyāyikas divide causal factors into three varieties: 1) *samavāyikāraṇa* (inherence-cause), i.e. the cause in which the effect inheres; 2) *asamavāyikāraṇa* (non-inherence cause), i.e. not the cause in which the effect inheres, but to which it is closely related; and 3) *niṣkāraṇa* (instrumental cause), all remaining causal factors, such as, for instance in the production of a pot, the potter, the right circumstances etc..

¹³¹⁶ i.e. God is then no different from other transmigrating beings, as all transmigrating beings are the instrumental cause of their bodies which are created according to their karma. What is then the point of postulating the existence of God? Thus the transmigrating beings themselves are fit to be the efficient cause of the body, the world etc.. in accordance with their karma.

¹³¹⁷ The reasons given here are unclear, and are not elaborated on. In §31 (below), however, karma is said to be able to undertake operations because it is an effect, causally efficient and durable

(*kāryatvārthakriyākāritvashityā*). This too is not elaborated on. *Viśiṣṭa* could also here be translated as “characterized by” and read as compounded with the dvandva compound

kāryatvācetanopadānatvasanniveśa, but it seems more likely that *lakṣaṇa* would then be used.

¹³¹⁸ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “evam aśārīratve siddhe neśvaras tasya tanvādīnām kartā syāt”. Placing the *tasya* (clearly referring to *īśvara*) after *neśvaras* is confusing, as *tasya* clearly refers to God (*īśvarasya*) and belongs together with *aśārīratve*, while *neśvaras tanvādīnām kartā syāt* is a simple statement (in the nominative) where the subject is *īśvaras*. *Tasya* has no place here. It has therefore been moved to make the sentence clearer.

¹³¹⁹ ed. note. ”tanukaraṇarahitasya |”

¹³²⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “sarvathā dṛṣṭāntavyatikramāt”. *Sarvathā* (completely, absolutely, in every way) does not fit in here as the point is not that both an incorporeal God and insentient karma are completely off with respect to the example. The point is rather that they are both equally (but not completely) off because they both do not fulfill one of the two requirements the example, in Vidyānandin’s opinion, calls for. The fact that the incorporeal God is intelligent and that the insentient karma is corporeal shows that they do not completely (*sarvathā*) overstep the example.

¹³²¹ Amended. Printed edition reads ”-kalpanāvyatikramyate”. There is no reason for these two words to be placed together like this. They cannot be a compound (as *vyatikramyate* is a verb form, the 3rd. sg. pssv. of *vi+ati+kram*), and there is no sandhi rule to justify it. They should thus be separated even in devanāgarī script.

Thus, since it is proved that [God] does not have a body, God cannot be the maker of those [the body etc.]. Because it is unsuitable that he [God], not having a body and senses¹³²², created those [the body etc.]. If [God can be] the efficient cause [of the body etc.] even though he is of such a kind¹³²³, it is not contradicted that the karmas, even though [they are] insentient, are the efficient cause of those [body etc.], because [both a bodiless God and insentient karma] overstep the example [equally much]. For, just as the example, the potter etc. who has a body and sense-organs and is the maker of a pot etc., is overstepped by postulating a God that has no body or sense-organs as the maker of the body, sense-organs, the world etc., just so the example, [i.e.] [the potter] possessing intelligence, may be overstepped by postulating the insentient karmas as the efficient cause of those [body, sense-organs, the world etc.], because there is no difference.¹³²⁴

SŚP §29 40, 6-20

syān matam – saśārīrasyāpi buddhīcchāprayatanavata eva kulālādeḥ kārakaprayokṛtvam
 dr̥ṣṭam, kuṭādikāryam kartum abuddhyamānasya tadadarśanāt buddhimato ‘pīcchāpāye
 tadanupalabdheḥ; tadicchāvato ‘pi prayatnābhāve¹³²⁵ tadanupalambhāt; vitanukaraṇasyāpi
 buddhimataḥ sraṣṭum icchataḥ prayatnavataḥ śaśvad īśvarasya
 samastakārakaprayokṛtvopapatter na dr̥ṣṭāntavyatikramaḥ, saśārīratvetarayoh
 kārakaprayuktiṃ pratyanaṅgatvāt | na hi dr̥ṣṭāntadar̥ṣṭāntikayoh sāmyam asti,
 tadviśeṣavirodhād iti; tadayuktam, buddhyādīnām api¹³²⁶ tasyāsambhavāt | īśvaro
 jñānacikīrṣāprayatnatrayavān na bhavati; aśārīratvāt; muktātmavad iti tadabhāvasiddheḥ |
 aśārīratvāviśeṣe ‘pi sādīmuktānām eva buddhyādirahitavm na tv
 anādimuktasyeśvarasyeti cet; na, anādimuktāsiddheḥ¹³²⁷ | “īśvarasyāśārīratvam sādī
 aśārīratvāt muktātmāśārīratvavat” iti tadbādhakasadbhāvāt | atrāpy aśārīratvāviśeṣe ‘pi
 muktātmāśārīratvam eva sādī na tv īśvarāśārīratvam iti cet; na, anupapattikatvāt;
 jagatkarṣṭvasarvajñatvādīnām īśvaraviśeṣaṅgānām vivādagocaratve na tato
 vailakṣaṇyābhīdhanānupapatteḥ | tathāpi yadi tathṣyate tarhi kāryatvāviśeṣe
 ghaṭapaṭakāṭakāṭakāśaṭakamukuṭādīnām buddhimaddhetukatvam na tu
 mahīmahīdharamahīruhādīnām iti kiṃ neṣyate |¹³²⁸ akṛtasamayasyāpi

¹³²² *vitanukaraṇa*. Here the prefix *vi* negates both *tanu* (body) and *karaṇa* (senses). Thus *vitanukaraṇa* is “one who has no body nor senses”

¹³²³ i.e. without a body

¹³²⁴ i.e. positing the insentient karmas as the cause of the world etc. does not violate the example of the pot any more than positing a God that has no body as its cause. The potter has both a body and sentience. Thus both the incorporeal God and the insentient karmas violate one of these criteria each. If one can overstep the example by positing an incorporeal God as the creator, then one can overstep the example by positing insentient karma as the creator, as the two cases are on par with respect to overstepping the example.

¹³²⁵ ed. note: “kāryakarṣṭvābhāvāt |”.

¹³²⁶ ed. note: “īśvarasya |”.

¹³²⁷ Amended. Printed edition reads: “anādimuktāsiddheḥ |”. This does not make any sense as a reason for rejecting the objection of the Vaiśeṣikas and must be negated.

¹³²⁸ ed. note: “agrahītasamketasyāpi |”.

kr̥tabuddhyutpāḍakebhyo ghaṭādibhyaḥ ¹³²⁹tadanutpāḍakabhuvanādīnām vailakṣanyasyāpi
saṃbhavāt | evaṃ aśārīratve buddhīcchāprayatnavattvāsiddheḥ tadasiddhau
sakalakāraprayokṛtvānupapatteḥ sūktam īśvaras tanvādīnām na kartti |

SŚP §29 English

[The Vaiśeṣikas] may think – “Even though he possesses a body, only the potter etc. that possesses knowledge, desire [to make something] and active effort, is seen to be the employer of the ¹³³⁰factors pertaining to actions. ¹³³¹ Because it is not seen that one who does not have knowledge [about how to] to make the effect, the pot etc., to be that [employer of the factors pertaining to action] ¹³³², [and] because it is not perceived that even one possessing the [required] knowledge is that [employer of the factors pertaining to action] if the desire [to make the effect] is lost ¹³³³, [and] because it is not perceived that even one possessing that [knowledge] and desire is that [employer of the factors pertaining to action] if there is absence of active effort. ¹³³⁴ Likewise, there is no transgressing of the example, because, even though he does not have a body or senses, the eternal God, possessing knowledge, the desire to create and active effort, is found to be the employer of the factors pertaining to action. The example is not overstepped; because it is not found that possessing a body or the opposite [i.e. not possessing a body] is an essential [condition] with respect to being the employer of the factors pertaining to

¹³²⁹ ed. note: ”kr̥tabuddhyanutpāḍaka |”.

¹³³⁰ Cf. footnote 200 for explanation of the *kāra*kas. It should be noted that it seems the editor of the text has interpreted *kāra*ka as meaning “maker”, as he glosses the *tad* in *tadanupalambhāt* as *kāryakartṛtvābhāvāt*. Cf. editors note in footnote 1325. In practice the distinction is not of major importance, as the heart of the matter being discussed is whether or not God can create effects. *Kāra*ka may here very well also be taken to mean “maker” or “creator”. The reason for why this interpretation has not been chosen is that the word *kāra*ka, when used in the Puruṣādvaita chapter, clearly seems to refer to the factors pertaining to action (Cf. SŚP 3, 5; 3, 8; 3, 10; 3, 12; 3, 13; 3, 18; 6, 21; 7, 5; 7, 6; and 7, 10 in §§13, 14, 15, 29 and 30 of the Puruṣādvaita chapter). The use of *kāra*ka in SŚP 7, 10 is in a verse quoted from the Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra. In his translation of this verse, Shah (1999) translates *kāra*ka as “factors-of-action”. It is for these reasons translated as meaning “factors pertaining to actions” here as well.

¹³³¹ i.e. it is not possessing a body but the possession of knowledge, desire and effort that is the essential condition for being able to employ the factors pertaining to action, i.e. being able to perform actions, which in this case refers to having the ability to create. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas maintain that God has *jñāna* (knowledge), *icchā* (desire) and *prayatna* (active effort) (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 170). Cf. §1 (pūrvapakṣa) where these are listed as three of the nine specific qualities of the soul.

¹³³² i.e. to make the effect, such as a pot etc., one must have some notion of what a pot is and the knowledge of how to make it. It is not seen that someone not possessing such a notion and knowledge can make a pot etc..

¹³³³ i.e. knowledge is not enough. One must also want to make the effect. *Āpaya* (destruction, loss etc.) is here translated as “lost”. This does not necessarily imply that the potential creator here described must at some point have had the desire to make the thing in question, but then lost this desire. The point is one of simply not having the desired quality (i.e. desire to create). “Lost” should here be seen as signifying something like “dropped from the list of his qualities”, i.e. if he has knowledge but not desire.

¹³³⁴ i.e. it is not the fact that he possesses a body that is important in the example of the potter, but that he possesses all three of the characteristics mentioned above (knowledge, desire and effort).

action.¹³³⁵ For the example and the exemplified are not completely identical, because [such a complete identity] is contradicted by the difference between them.”¹³³⁶

[To that it is answered:] That [argument] is not suitable because even knowledge etc. is impossible for him [God]. Because [the following inference] proves their [knowledge etc.] non-existence: “God is not the possessor of the three: knowledge, desire to create and active effort, on account of not having a body, just like the liberated soul”.¹³³⁷

If it is objected: Even though there is no difference with respect to not having a body¹³³⁸, only those whose liberation has a beginning are devoid of knowledge etc., but not God, whose liberation is without beginning.¹³³⁹ [It is answered:] no, because one whose liberation is without beginning is not proved. Because there exists [an inference that] negates that: “The bodylessness of God has a beginning, on account of [God] not having a body, like the bodylessness of the liberated soul”.¹³⁴⁰

If it is objected: Even here, though there is no difference with respect to not having a body, only the bodylessness of the liberated soul has a beginning, but not the bodylessness of God. [Then it is answered:] no. Because it is unsuitable. Because, since the distinguishing marks of God, being the creator of the world, omniscience etc., are within the field of dispute¹³⁴¹, it is not found that [they can be] set forth to differentiate [God] from that [liberated soul].¹³⁴² If it is nevertheless accepted to be thus¹³⁴³, then, even

¹³³⁵ i.e. so the example is not transgressed, because God has knowledge, desire to create and active effort, just like the potter etc.. The body is not relevant.

¹³³⁶ i.e. the example and the exemplified cannot be required to be completely identical. There must be some difference. Otherwise the example could not be used as it would be identical to that which is to be proved. Thus some differences, which are not important with respect to the point being proven, must be allowed. The fact that the potter has a body is such a difference.

¹³³⁷ This is a syllogism. 1) Pratiñā (proposition): God does not possess knowledge, desire to create and effort. 2) Hetu (premise): because God does not have a body. 3) Udāharaṇa (Explanatory example with a general statement): *That which does not have a body cannot have knowledge, desire to create and effort*, just like the emancipated soul does not have knowledge, desire to create and effort.

Buddhi (knowledge), *icchā* (desire) and *prayatna* (effort) are three of the nine specific qualities of the soul. Liberation is dissociation from these (Cf. ŚŚP 34, 1-3 §1 above). Thus God, like the liberated soul, cannot have these, because, not having a body, God is mere soul, just like the liberated soul. And, according to the Vaiśeṣika, the liberated soul is per definition devoid of knowledge, desire and effort. Now, God being liberated (that God is liberated is merely taken for granted) and a mere soul (i.e. with no body) must also be devoid of knowledge, desire and effort.

¹³³⁸ i.e. even though both the liberated soul and God do not have a body.

¹³³⁹ i.e. God has knowledge etc. because he has always been liberated.

¹³⁴⁰ This is a syllogism: 1) Pratiñā (proposition): God’s bodylessness has a beginning. 2) Hetu (premise): because God does not have a body. 3) Udāharaṇa (Explanatory example with a general statement): *That which does not have a body, that has a bodylessness that has a beginning*, just like the bodylessness of the emancipated soul has a beginning.

¹³⁴¹ i.e. they are in dispute.

¹³⁴² i.e. the special qualities of God are here in dispute. It is then not suitable to use these as proof (as it has not been established that they or even God himself exists). Just like being the creator of the world and omniscient are special qualities posited for God, so is him being eternally liberated. In discussing whether or not God exists, one cannot use his special qualities, which are also in dispute, to differentiate God from the liberated soul.

¹³⁴³ If it is granted for the sake of argument that even though there is no difference with respect to God and the liberated soul being devoid of a body, God’s bodylessness is eternal while the bodylessness of the soul has a beginning.

though there is no difference with respect to being an effect¹³⁴⁴, why is it not desired that the jar, cloth, straw mat, string, cart, tiara etc. have an intelligent cause, but not the earth, mountains, trees etc.? Because it is even possible to distinguish the earth etc., which do not give rise to that [cognition that they are created], from pots etc. which, even for one who has no conventions¹³⁴⁵, do give rise to the cognition that [they are] created.¹³⁴⁶

Thus, on account of it not being proved that [God] possesses knowledge, desire and active effort since he has no body, [and] because it is not found that [God] [can be] the undertaker of the creation of any [effects] since that [God having knowledge, desire and effort] is not proved, it is well said that: “God is not the creator of the body etc.”.

SŚP §30 40, 21-27

tathāpi yadi vaiyyātyād īśvaraḥ kartty abhidhīyate tadā prāṇinām
vicitraghoraduḥkhaśātānīśvaraḥ karoti vā, na vā, yadi na karoti tadā taiḥ
kāryatvādihetūnām vyabhicāraḥ | atha karotīti matam, tadasambhāvyam; iha hi kaścid
asarvajño prañāṣṭarāgadveṣo munir anyo vā sādhuḥ parapīḍāṃ na karoti kila, sa eva
mahārṣīṇām apy ārādhyāḥ sarvajño vītarāgadveṣamoho bhagavān maheśvaraḥ prāṇinām
animittam asahyavidhograduḥkhaparamparām utpādya jagattrayaṃ paripīḍayatīti
katham idam prakṣāvadbhiḥ sambhāvyate | tatkarāṇe vā tasya atyugrāpūrvarākṣasatvam
eva, na tu mahabhiḥ stutyam maheśvaratvam iti tasya tatkarāṇam asamhāvyam |

SŚP §30 English

If, on account of shamelessness, it is nevertheless said that God is the creator [of the body etc.], then he either creates hundreds of manifold dreadful pains for living beings, or he does not. If he does not, then the the premise [in the Naiyāyika syllogism], [that the body etc. is an] effect etc., is erroneous¹³⁴⁷ on account of those [hundreds of manifold dreadful

¹³⁴⁴ modeled after *aśarīratvāviśeṣe* ‘pi (SŚP 40, 12-13) and *aśarīrāviśeṣe* ‘pi (SŚP 40, 14-16) above.

¹³⁴⁵ *akṛtasamayasyāpi*. The editor glosses this as *agrāhitasamayasyāpi*, i.e. “even for one by whom conventions are not grasped”. The point seems to be that all people, even those that have not learned the conventions, on seeing a pot etc., see that it has an intelligent creator, while this is not so with respect to the earth etc.. It is not quite clear what conventions are here referred to. It seems that what is meant is the various names and definitions of different kinds of things, such as pot etc., i.e. that it is called a pot, is made of clay, created by a potter etc.. The point would then be that, when seeing a pot etc., even people who do not know what a given thing is can tell that it is created by an intelligent creator, while this is not so with respect to the earth etc..

¹³⁴⁶ i.e. if the Vaiśeṣika can say that even though both God and the liberated soul both do not have a body, Gods bodylessness is eternal while the liberated souls bodylessness has a beginning, there is no reason why one should not say that even though pots etc. and the body etc. are both effects, pots etc. have an intelligent creator while the body etc. does not. Moreover, we cognize pots etc. as created while earth, mountains etc. are not cognized as created. Thus it is more appropriate to differentiate between pots etc. and mountains etc. even though they are both effects, than it is to differentiate between God and the liberated soul.

¹³⁴⁷ i.e. the fault of the *hetu* (premise) being *savyabhicāra*. In this case the *hetu* would be too wide (*sādhāraṇa savyabhicāra*), as there would then be instances where the *hetu* is present without the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119).

pains].¹³⁴⁸ Now it is thought: “he creates [those pains]”. That is impossible. For “here, in this world, no non-omniscient saint, be he a muni or other, whose passion and rage are completely destroyed¹³⁴⁹, causes suffering to others, but the omniscient Blessed One, the Great God who is to be worshipped even by the great seers and who is free from passion, hatred and delusion, having given rise to a succession of manifold unbearable and violent pains for the living beings without a reason, torments the three worlds”, how can this be [thought to be] possible by the wise? If [he] indeed [does] cause those [pains], [then] only the nature of a very fierce and unprecedented demon, and not the nature of a Supreme God who is to be praised by great men, [is to be ascribed] to him. Thus it is not possible that [he] causes those [pains].

SŚP §31 40, 28-41, 3

nanu [na]¹³⁵⁰ prāṇinām īśvaro duḥkham utpādayatīti cet; na; duḥkhahetūnām api pāpakarmaṇām īśvarakṛtatve tasyaiva¹³⁵¹ duḥkhahetutvasiddheḥ, tatpakṣopakṣiptadoṣānuṣaṅgāt | teṣāṃ¹³⁵² tadakṛtatve tanukaraṇāder api tatkr̥tatvaṃ mā bhūt; viśeṣābhāvāt | karmabhir īśvarasādhakahetūnām anaikāntikatvāc ca; karmaṇām abuddhimannimittatve ‘pi kāryatvārthakriyākāritvasthityā¹³⁵³ pravartanānām sambhavāt | yadi kalpayitvāpīśvaram avaśyaṃ karmānumanyate; tadā kevalaṃ karmaiva tanukaraṇādinimittam iṣyatām; kim aneśvareṇa pramāṇabādhitena, tathā ca pareṣāṃ pāramparyapariśramaparihāraḥ syāt |

SŚP §31 English

If it is objected: God does certainly not give rise to pain for living beings¹³⁵⁴. [It is answered:] no. Because, if also the inauspicious karmas that cause pain are made by God,

¹³⁴⁸ this is a kind of “problem of evil”. The point is that the many terrible pains must, in order for the Naiyāyika syllogism to be correct (or more precisely for the premise in the syllogism not to be contradicted), have an intelligent creator. If God has not created them, then the syllogism is wrong on account of the *hetu* (premise) being too wide and occurring where the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) is not found, i.e. being an effect is not universally concomitant with having an intelligent creator as there would then be examples of effects that do not have an intelligent creator.

¹³⁴⁹ *praṇaṣṭa* is not found in the MMW. *Naṣṭa* (destroyed, lost etc.) is found. Here the prefix *pra* (here meaning “excessively”, “very”, “much” etc.) is added, making the meaning “completely destroyed”.

¹³⁵⁰ This negation seems to have been inserted by the editor. No note is given about the reading of the manuscripts.

¹³⁵¹ ed. note: “īśvarasyaiva |”.

¹³⁵² ed. note: “karmaṇām |”.

¹³⁵³ Amended following the suggestion of the editor. Printed ed. reads: “arthakriyākārikatvasthityā [tyā]”. Reading *sthitvā* does not fit as *kārikatva* would require a case ending.

¹³⁵⁴ i.e. the intended argument seems to be that it is not God who creates the pains, but that the living beings themselves experience the effects of their own sinful acts. I.e. the past actions (*karman*) of the beings themselves creates the pain, while God only dispenses the appropriate consequences to the appropriate being. This is actually the view expressed by the Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika: “The individual soul cannot be the controller of adṛṣṭa [puṇya and pāpa, merit and demerit, i.e. the operation of karma], since then it would be able to avert unwished-for miseries, which it is not. So the unintelligent principle of adṛṣṭa, which governs the fate of beings, acts under the direction of God, *who does not create it or alter its inevitable course, but*

it is proved that he alone is the cause of the pains. Because it results in the thesis of those [karmas] [suffering from] the [same] faults that were [previously] described [with respect to God creating the pain directly].¹³⁵⁵ If those [inauspicious karmas] are not made by him [God], even the body, sense organs etc. can also not be made by him. Because there is no difference.¹³⁵⁶ [Thus the Vaiśeṣika inference proving God to be the creator is wrong] because the premises that prove God¹³⁵⁷ [suffer from the fault of] inconclusiveness on account of [being found in] karmas [as well],¹³⁵⁸ and because it is possible for the karma, even though they are not an intelligent cause, to undertake [operations] because they are effects, causally efficient and durable.¹³⁵⁹ If, though having postulated God, one inevitably accepts karma, then let only karma alone be accepted as the cause of the body, organs of sense etc.. In doing so let the opponents abandon [their] continuous burden, [for] what is the point of this God that is negated by valid means of knowledge?

ŚŚP §32 41, 4-9

nanu katham acetanānām karmaṇām vicitropabhogyayogyatanukaraṇādyutpādakatvam iti cet; katham unmattamadirāmadanakodravādīnām unmādādivicitrakāryotpādakatvam | katham vā ayaskāntaviśeṣāṇām lohākaraṇabhramaṇādikāryakāritvam ity abhidhīyatām | tathādr̥ṣṭatvād iti cet; tata eva prakṛtaḥ svabhāvavyālabho¹³⁶⁰ ‘pi nivartyatām | tathā

renders possible its operation. God is thus the giver of the fruits of our deeds (*karmaphalapradaḥ*)” (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 167, my italics).

¹³⁵⁵ i.e. the same faults as described above apply. Cf. 40, 26-27 §30 above.

¹³⁵⁶ If the karma does not have an intelligent creator (which is in fact the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, cf. footnote to the Vaiśeṣika objection above), then the body etc. also does not need to have an intelligent creator, as there is no difference with respect to the two cases. This would moreover once again cause the *hetu* (premise) in the Naiyāyika inference to suffer from the fault of *sādhāraṇa savyabhicāra* (i.e. the *hetu* being too wide).

¹³⁵⁷ i.e. that things are effects.

¹³⁵⁸ i.e. the state of being an effect would be found in karma, which is not created by an intelligent creator. Thus the *hetu* (premise) is too wide, resulting in “being an effect” not proving that something has an intelligent creator. The Vaiśeṣika inference to prove God is thus invalid on account of the fault of *anaikāntika* (inconclusiveness). *Anaikāntika* is another name for the fallacy *savyabhicāra*, in this case *sādhāraṇa-savyabhicāra*, i.e. the *hetu* being found where the *sādhya* is not, thus being too wide (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119).

¹³⁵⁹ The reasons given here are unclear, and are not elaborated on. Cf. also §27 above, where it is stated that the reasons for proving that the transmigrating souls are the creators of the body etc. (through the workings of their karma) are that the body etc. are effects, their material cause is insentient and they have a special arrangement (*kāryatvācetanopadānatvasanniveśa*).

¹³⁶⁰ ed. note: “vyutkrameṇa ā samantāt lambhaḥ prāptiḥ |”. The meaning of this note is not clear. It is tempting to read it as a gloss of *vyālabha*, as *vyālabha* is not found in the MMW. *Lambha* would then be glossed as *prāptiḥ*, and *ā* as *samantāt* (ind. meaning “wholly”, “completely”, thus indicating that *ā* here has a strengthening function). But the role of *vyutkrameṇa* is then unclear. *Vyutkrama* is found in the MMW with the meanings “going astray”, “going out of the right course”, “inverted order”, “transgression”, “offence”, “dying” and “death”. It does not fit that it should be a gloss, and it is not clear why it is in the instrumental. It could perhaps be an example illustrating the meaning of *vy* in *vyālabha*, but it is then not entirely clear what the function of *vy* should here be as *utkrama* is found in the MMW meaning “going up or out”, “inverted order”, “progressive increase”, “going astray”, “acting improperly”, “deviation” and “transgression”. *Vy* thus does not seem to change the meaning of *utkrama* much. Thus if *vyutkrameṇa* is an explanation of the function of *vy* in *vyālabha*, the point may be to illustrate that *vy* does not add anything to the meaning of *ālabha*, thus making *vyālabha* mean simply “obtaining”. Alternately *vyutkrameṇa*, being in the instrumental, could, with its meanings “inverted order” or “going astray” etc., be read as

“sukhaduḥkhalābhālābhādīnām adṛṣṭam kāraṇam asti,
 dr̥ṣṭakāraṇavyabhicārānyathānupapatteḥ” ity anumitatvāt | na caivam īśvarasyāpy
 anumitatvād apalāmbhaprasaṃganivṛttiḥ syād iti śaṅkanīyam,
 tadanumānasyānekadoṣaduṣṭatvāt |

SŚP §32 English

If it is objected: certainly, how can the insentient karmas produce the various bodies, senses etc. which are suitable for the manifoldness which is to be enjoyed?¹³⁶¹

[It is answered:] how can the thorn apple, nectar, madana¹³⁶², kodrava¹³⁶³ [through fermentation] produce various effects, such as intoxication etc.?¹³⁶⁴ Or how may it be explained: “Specific magnets cause effects such as rotating iron, attracting (iron) etc.”?¹³⁶⁵

If it is answered: It is so because of unseen [causes].¹³⁶⁶ [It is answered in return:] [then] let also the subject¹³⁶⁷ not obtaining¹³⁶⁸ [its] nature be denied on account of only that [the unseen].¹³⁶⁹ Because, in the same way, it is inferred: the cause of gain and loss,

signifying that the *vy* is here to be read as giving *ālambha* the opposite meaning, thus making *vyālambha* mean “not obtaining”.

It seems unlikely that the note should be read as a sentence, as at least *prāptiḥ* seems to clearly be a gloss of *lambhaḥ*, and because there seems to be no way to interpret it as a meaningful sentence.

¹³⁶¹ i.e. how can the karmas, which are insentient, know who is to have what according to previous acts?

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika it is God who is the bestower of the fruits of our deeds (*karmaphalapradaḥ*), i.e. he governs the operation of karma as the insentient karma cannot do this by itself (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 167).

¹³⁶² name of some plant.

¹³⁶³ name of a kind of grain.

¹³⁶⁴ i.e. if it is accepted that various insentient ingredients can produce intoxication, why can it not be accepted that the insentient karmas produce the world, our bodies etc. according to our previous acts?

¹³⁶⁵ i.e. or how can a magnet, which is insentient, attract iron, make it rotate etc.?

¹³⁶⁶ Cf. footnote 1103.

¹³⁶⁷ *Prakṛta* (subject) seems here to refer to the effects of karma (the body etc.). Alternatively, *prakṛta* could be translated as “made/produced thing”, also referring to the body etc.. Cf. the Vaiśeṣika objection at the start of this paragraph (i.e. how can the insentient karmas produce the various bodies etc. suitable for enjoying the enjoyments).

¹³⁶⁸ *vyālambha* (from *vy* + *ā* + *labh*) is not found in the MMW. *Lambha* means “obtaining”, “attaining” etc.. The prefix *vy* seems here to most probably (judging from the context) have a negating function, while *ā* has a strengthening function, giving *vyālambha* the meaning “not obtaining” or “not at all obtaining”. Cf. editors note to *vyālambho* in footnote 1360.

¹³⁶⁹ The meaning of this answer is a bit unclear. I have interpreted *prakṛta* (subject) to refer to the body etc. and *vyālambha* to mean “not obtaining” (cf. the footnotes to their respective translations above and the editors note to *vyālambha* in footnote 1360). *Vyālambha* and *nivartyatām* then form a double negative meaning. The point thus seems to be that if it is answered that a magnet attracting iron etc. is on account of unseen causes, then also the fact that things obtain their proper nature is on account of the unseen causes, i.e. karma, and not God.

Vyālambha could alternately be taken to mean simply “obtaining”. The argument could then be that it is sometimes seen that things do not exhibit or obtain their proper natures. Normal causes are not sufficient to explain this, and this too must be explained by unseen causes, i.e. karma, as visible causes are not sufficient to account for the occurrence of this. From this it is then further inferred that pleasure and pain etc. are due to the unseen karma.

I have here chosen to translate *vyālambha* as “not obtaining”. The general discussion focuses around the capability of the insentient karma to produce suitable effects, i.e. according to past deeds. It thus seems more likely that this is what this argument refers to. The following sentence, i.e. *tathā “sukhaduḥkhalābhālābhādīnām adṛṣṭam kāraṇam asti, dr̥ṣṭakāraṇavyabhicārānyathānupapatteḥ” ity anumitatvāt* (Because, in the same way, it is inferred: the cause of gain and loss, pleasure and pain etc. is the unseen [karma]. Because otherwise one would not find that the seen causes are insufficient.), should thus be read as the reason for the sentence *tata eva prakṛtaḥ svabhāvavyālambho ‘pi nivartyatām* | ([then])

pleasure and pain etc. is the unseen [karma]. Because otherwise one would not find that the seen causes are ¹³⁷⁰insufficient.¹³⁷¹ And it is not to be supposed [by the Vaiśeṣika] that there must be cessation of the [erroneous] adhering to finding fault with [the postulation of God], on account of also God being inferred [on the same grounds as unseen karma is inferred],¹³⁷² because the inference of that [God] [on the same grounds as unseen causes are inferred] is false on account of many faults.

SŚP §33 41, 10-12

tathā hi - tanukraṇabhuvanādeḥ kāryatvādisādhanam kim ekabuddhimatkāraṇatvaṃ
sādhyet, anekabuddhimatkāraṇam vā, prathamapakṣe
¹³⁷³prāsādādinānekasūtradhārayajamānādihetunā tadanaikāntikam | dvitīyapakṣe
siddhasādhanam, nānāprāṇinimittatvāt tadupabhogyatanvādīnām, teṣāṃ tadadr̥ṣṭakṛtatvāt
|

SŚP §33 English

For it is as follows – does the proof, [i.e.] [the fact that] the body, the senses, the earth are effects etc., prove one intelligent creator or many intelligent creators? In the first case, that [premise/proof] [suffers from the fault of] inconclusiveness¹³⁷⁴ because a palace etc. has many carpenters, patrons etc. as its cause.¹³⁷⁵ In the second case there is proof of that which has [already been] proved [by the Jains], because many living beings are the cause of the body etc. which are fit to be enjoyed by them. Because those [body etc.] are created by the unseen [karmas] of those [living beings].¹³⁷⁶

let also the subject not obtaining [its] nature be denied on account of only that [the unseen]). Vidyānandin's argument is thus that, just like the magnet etc., things obtaining their appropriate nature, experiencing happiness and pain etc., is inferred to be on account of unseen karma, because visible causes are not sufficient to account for this (just like they are insufficient to account for the power of a magnet etc.). If the alternate reading (i.e. reading *vyālabha* as meaning obtaining) is chosen, it seems that the following sentence should be read as a further inference from this (and not the magnet etc., i.e. things do not obtain their nature on account of unseen causes, and from this it is inferred that happiness etc. is on account of unseen karma. This argument seems less convincing.

¹³⁷⁰ *vyabhicāra* usually means “erroneous” or “wrong”. In this context it is best rendered as “insufficient”.

¹³⁷¹ i.e. unseen karma is inferred because seen causes cannot account for all phenomena, just like unseen causes are inferred in the case of the magnets etc.. If there were no unseen causes the seen causes would not be experienced as insufficient to explain phenomena that are seen and experienced.

¹³⁷² i.e. that the same arguments that were used above to infer unseen karma can be used to infer the existence of God, and that the Jains must thus stop saying that God does not exist.

¹³⁷³ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “prāsādādinā anekasūtradhārayajamānādihetunā”. Corrected according to sandhi rules.

¹³⁷⁴ The fault of *anaikāntika* is another name for the fault of *vyabhicāra*, i.e. that the *hetu* (premise) is inconclusive. In this case it is the fault of *sādharmaṇa-savyabhicāra*, i.e. that the *hetu* (premise) is found where the *sādhyā* (that which is to be proved) is not. In other words, the *hetu* is too wide (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119).

¹³⁷⁵ i.e. a palace, which is an effect, is created by many creators. Thus it is not proved that the world etc. would have one single creator, as “being an effect” is also found when there are many creators.

¹³⁷⁶ i.e. if it is held that the inference proves many intelligent creators, then this has already been established by the Jains and the Vaiśeṣikas adhere to the Jain position. Those many intelligent creators are the various living being themselves, who, through the unseen workings of karma, produce the body, the world etc. according to their actions.

SŚP §34 41, 13-17

etena buddhimatkāraṇasāmānyasādhane siddhasādhanam uktam;

tadabhimataviśeṣasyādhikaraṇasiddhāntanyāyenāpy asiddheḥ | sāmānyaviśeṣasya
sādhyatvād adoṣa iti cet, na; dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭaviśeṣāśrayasāmānyavikalpadvayānativr̥tteḥ |
dr̥ṣṭaviśeṣāśrayasya sāmānyasya sādhyatve sveṣṭavighātāt | adr̥ṣṭaviśeṣāśrayasya
sāmānyasya sādhyatve sādhyasūnyatvaprasaṅgāt | nidarśanāya dr̥ṣṭetaraviśeṣāśrayasya
sāmānyasādhane ‘pi svābhimataviśeṣasiddhiḥ kutaḥ syāt |

SŚP §34 English

If a universal “intelligent creator” is proved by this [argumentation], that which is said is proof of what has [already been] proved. [But it is not the proof of the particular intelligent creator, i.e. God, of the Vaiśeṣika], because the particular [intelligent creator] that is accepted by those [Vaiśeṣika] according to [their] rule of the “implied doctrine”¹³⁷⁷ is not proved.¹³⁷⁸

If it is objected: [That] is not a fault here¹³⁷⁹, because both the universal and the particular [creator]¹³⁸⁰ are that which is to be proved.¹³⁸¹ [It is answered:] No, on account of not overcoming the [two] alternatives of that universal [creator] residing in the perceptible particulars or the imperceptible particulars. Because, if the universal [creatorhood] is proved to reside in a perceptible particular, it will be an obstacle to that which is accepted by [the Vaiśeṣikas] themselves. [And] because there [would be] adhering to the voidness of that which is to be proved if the universal [creatorhood] is proved to reside in an imperceptible particular. To illustrate: if [the Vaiśeṣika wants to] prove that the universal [creatorhood] resides in a particular that is different from the perceptible [particular]¹³⁸², how can their own accepted particular be proved?¹³⁸³

¹³⁷⁷ *adhikaraṇasiddhānta* is an established conclusion which, on being established, naturally establishes other conclusions. Cf. §35 below where the definition of *adhikaraṇasiddhānta* of the Nyāyasūtra 1|1|30 is quoted and footnote 1390. The translation of *adhikaraṇasiddhānta* as “implied doctrine” is taken from Jhā (1984: 350).

¹³⁷⁸ i.e. that there is such a thing as “an intelligent creator” is not the subject of dispute. It is the specific intelligent creator posited by the Vaiśeṣika that is in dispute, i.e. the existence of an intelligent creator that is omniscient, has created the world and the bodies of all living beings etc. is what is here being discussed. This specific intelligent creator (i.e. omniscient etc.) posited by the Vaiśeṣika is not automatically proved from the establishment of a general intelligent creator, and thus it remains unproved.

¹³⁷⁹ i.e. it is not so that the specific creator posited by the Vaiśeṣika remains unproved.

¹³⁸⁰ *Sāmānyaviśeṣasya* is here a dvandva compound in the neuter singular. Cf. Speijer §206: “But if the dvandva is to represent a real unity or if not individuals but categories are linked together, it generally is ā neuter and ā singular” (Speijer 1973: 148). Alternately, *sāmānyaviśeṣasya* could be interpreted as a tatpuruṣa compound, but that does not fit the context as this would seem to imply that the *sāmānya* (universal) would not be the *sādhyā* (that which is to be proved) in the inference.

¹³⁸¹ i.e. the *sādhyā* (that which is to be proved) is both the universal and the particular creator. Thus there is no fault.

¹³⁸² i.e. an imperceptible particular.

¹³⁸³ i.e. if the universal is said to reside in a perceptible particular, then this would go against that which the Vaiśeṣikas themselves accept, as the Vaiśeṣikas do not hold God to be perceptible. If, on the other hand, it resides in an imperceptible particular the invariable concomitance between *sādhyā* (that which is to be

SŚP §35 41, 18-30

adhikaraṇasiddhāntanyāyād iti cet; ko ‘yam adhikaraṇasiddhānto¹³⁸⁴ nāma, **yat siddhāv anyaprakaraṇasiddhiḥ so ‘dhikaraṇasiddhāntaḥ** [nyāyasū 1|1|30] tato dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭaviśeṣāśrayasāmānyamātrasya buddhimannimittasya jagatsu prasiddhau prakaraṇājagannirmāṇasamarthaḥ samastakāraṇāṅgāṃ prayoktrā sarvadā ‘viluptaśaktir vibhur aśārīratvādiviśeṣāśraya eva siddhyatīti cet; syād evam, yadi sakala jagannirmāṇa samarthenaikena samastakāraṇāṅgāṃ prayoktrā sarvajñatvādiviśeṣeṇāpi¹³⁸⁵ tenāvinābhāvidr̥ṣṭetaraviśeṣādhikaraṇabuddhimatkāraṇasāmānyam kutaścīt siddhyet; na ca siddhyati; anekabuddhimatkāraṇenaiva svopabhogyatanvādinimittakāraṇaviśeṣeṇa tasya vyāptatvasiddheḥ samarthanāt | tathā sarvajñavītarāgakarṭṛkatve sādhye ghaṭādīnā anaikāntikaṃ sādhanam | sādhyavikalaṃ ca nidarśanam | sarāgāsarvajñakarṭṛkatve¹³⁸⁶ sādhye apasiddhāntaḥ | sarvathā kāryatvaṃ ca sādhanam tanvādāvasiddham, tasya¹³⁸⁷ kathaṃcīt kāraṇatvāt | kathaṃcīt kāryatvaṃ tu viruddham, sarvathā buddhimannimittatvāt sādhyād viparītasya¹³⁸⁸ kathaṃcībuddhimannimittatvasya sādhanāt | tathā pakṣo ‘py anumānabādhitāḥ syāt “neśvaras tanvādīnāṃ kartā jñānādirahitatvāt, muktavat”, iti prāguktānumānasya tadbādhakasya bhāvād iti, jagato buddhimaddhetukatvaṃ na siddhyati, sādhakasyābhāvād bādhakasya sambhavad | tataḥ sūktam iṣṭaviruddham vaiśeṣikamatam iti |

SŚP §35 English

If it is objected: [It is proved] on the basis of the rule of the “implied doctrine”. [It is asked:] What is this which is named “implied doctrine”? [If it is answered:] “that which, when proved, proves other doctrines¹³⁸⁹, that is the implied doctrine”¹³⁹⁰. Therefore, when the intelligent efficient cause, which is merely a universal that resides in both perceptible and imperceptible universals, is well known in the [three] worlds, [its] residing in a particular [i.e. God] that is capable of creating the world, the employer of all factors

proved) and the *sādhyā* (proof) could not be established because that which is to be proved cannot be seen. Inference depends on perception. “Only when the observer has perceived fire and smoke to be related to each other is he able to infer the existence of the fire on the next occasion he perceives smoke” (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 72). In other words, it is not possible to prove that the universal creatorhood resides in the particular creator accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas if that creator is imperceptible.

¹³⁸⁴ ed. note: “yat siddhau anyaprakaraṇasiddhiḥ so ‘dhikaraṇasiddhāntaḥ |”

¹³⁸⁵ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “-viśeṣo ‘pi”. *Vīśeṣa* must be in the instrumental for the syntax to make sense.

¹³⁸⁶ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “sarāgāsarvajñakarṭṛkatve”. *Sarvajña* must be negated for this to fit the context.

¹³⁸⁷ ed. note: “tanvādeḥ |”

¹³⁸⁸ Amended. Printed ed. reads “kathaṃcībuddhiman-“.

¹³⁸⁹ *Prakaraṇa* (“treatment”, “discussion”, “explanation”, “treatise”, “book”, “chapter”, “subject”, “topic”, “question”, “matter” etc.) here seems best rendered as “doctrine”.

¹³⁹⁰ The Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya states: When it so happens that a certain fact having become established or known, other facts become implied, – and without these latter facts the former fact itself cannot be established, – the former, constituting the basis of these latter, is called ‘Doctrine resting on Implication’ or ‘Implied Doctrine.’” (translated in Jhā 1984: 350).

pertaining to actions, always has unimpaired power, is all pervading and without a body is indeed proved on account of the doctrine [of the universal creator].

[It is answered:] This may be so, if one can somehow prove that the universal “intelligent creator”, which has [both] perceptible and imperceptible particulars as its substratum, is invariably concomitant with the particular, omniscient [creator] who is capable of creating the whole world, is one and employs all the factors pertaining to actions. But it is not proved [to be so], by virtue of there being proof of that [universal] pervading many intelligent creators, which are the particular efficient causes of [their own] bodies etc. which are fit to be enjoyed by themselves. Thus, if that which is to be proved is “having a creator that is omniscient and free from passions”, the proof¹³⁹¹ is inconclusive¹³⁹² because a pot etc. [has a creator who is non-omniscient and not free from the passions]. The example is devoid of that which is to be proved.¹³⁹³ [And] if that which is to be proved is “having a creator that has passions and is not omniscient” [it results in] a conclusion opposed to the teaching.¹³⁹⁴ And the proof, [i.e.] that [the body etc.] is an effect in every way, is not proved, because that [the body etc.] is in some ways a cause. [Body etc.] being an effect in some ways¹³⁹⁵ is contradictory [to the Vaiśeṣika position], because it proves that the efficient cause is in some ways intelligent, which is contrary to that which is to be proved [in the Vaiśeṣika inference], [i.e.] that the efficient cause is absolutely intelligent.¹³⁹⁶

Thus the thesis [“God is the creator of the body etc.”] is contradicted by inference, because the previously declared inference: “God is not the creator of the body etc. because he is devoid of knowledge etc., like the liberated [soul]”, negates it. Thus it is not proved that the world has [one] intelligent cause, on account of there being no proof [of God] while there is [proof that] negates [God]. Therefore it is well said that the Vaiśeṣika-doctrine is contradicted by inference.

[iti vaiśeṣikaśāsanaparīkṣā]

Thus is the investigation into the Vaiśeṣika-teaching.

¹³⁹¹ i.e. the *hetu* (premise), *kāryatvāt* (being an effect)

¹³⁹² The fault of *anaikāntika* is another name for the fault of *vyabhicāra*, i.e. that the *hetu* (premise) is not uniformly concomitant with the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved). In this case it is the fault of *sādhāraṇa-savyabhicāra*, i.e. that the *hetu* (premise) is found where the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) is not. In other words, the *hetu* is too wide (Radhakrishnan 1966b: 119).

¹³⁹³ even the example used by the Vaiśeṣika themselves, i.e. the potter, does not illustrate that which is to be proved, i.e. an omniscient, eternal etc. creator capable of creating the whole world etc..

¹³⁹⁴ as God is held to be omniscient, free from passions etc..

¹³⁹⁵ i.e. not only an effect

¹³⁹⁶ This is a bit unclear. The point seems to be that even if it is admitted that God creates all the effects etc., these effects are also causes (in the sense of clay being the material cause of the pot). Thus, the things produced by God are also co-produced by the effects. This results in the cause not being absolutely intelligent as only part of the totality of causal conditions necessary to produce the effect (i.e. God) is intelligent, while other causes (such as clay in the case of the pot) are not intelligent. Thus the Vaiśeṣika’s acceptance of the cause being absolutely intelligent is wrong, as the cause is at best only in some ways intelligent.

Naiyāyikaśāsanaparīkṣā

Investigation into the teaching of the Naiyāyikas.

[pūrvapakṣa]

The opponent's side.

SŚP §1 42, 3-6

vaiśeṣikasamasiddhāntā naiyāyikās tv evam āmananti –

**pramāṇaprameyasamśayaprayojanadrṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkanirṇayavādajalpa-
vitaṇḍāhetvābhāsachalajātinigrahasthānām tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ |**
[nyāyasū- 1|1|1]

SŚP §1 English

The Naiyāyikas [accept] the same established conclusions as the Vaiśeṣikas. They accept it to be thus: “The highest [goal]¹³⁹⁷ is attained through thorough knowledge of [1] the valid means of knowledge, [2] the object of knowledge, [3] doubt, [4] purpose, [5] example, [6] established conclusion, [7] members [of a syllogism], [8] reasoning, [9] complete ascertainment, [10] [honest] debate, [11] wrangling, [12] frivolous argument, [13] fallacies of the premise¹³⁹⁸, [14] quibble, [15] faulty counterargument and [16] points of defeat.

SŚP §2 42, 7-8

kiṃ ca, bhaktiyogakriyayogajñānayogatrayair yathāsāṃkhyam sālokyam sārūpyam
sāmīpyam sāyujyam muktir bhavati |

SŚP §2 English

Moreover, liberation [which is of four kinds], [i.e.] residence in the same divine world [as God]; likeness [to God]; nearness [to God]; and intimate union [with God], [is attained] by means of the three [disciplines]: devotional discipline, the discipline of action and the discipline of knowledge respectively.¹³⁹⁹

¹³⁹⁷ i.e. liberation.

¹³⁹⁸ There is no uniform list of what fallacies are here referred to. Varying philosophers give varying lists and explain the different kinds of fallacies differently. See Potter (1977: 195-199) for an overview of what he calls “the 9 major varieties” of presenting the possible fallacies of the premise, which, according to him, do not even give a summary view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's views on fallacies.

¹³⁹⁹ the relations of the different disciplines with the different kinds of liberation are explained in §§3-5 below.

SŚP §3 42, 9-10

tatra maheśvaraḥ svāmī svayaṃ bhṛtya iti taccitto bhūtvā yāvajjīvaṃ tasya
paricaryākaraṇaṃ bhaktiyogaḥ, tasmāt sālokyamuktir bhavati |

SŚP §3 English

There¹⁴⁰⁰, devotional discipline is life-long worship of him [God], having been one whose mind is [devoted to] him, [thinking:] “Maheśvara¹⁴⁰¹ is [my] master, [I] myself am [his] servant”. The liberation [characterized by] residence in the same divine world [as God] is [attained] from that [devotional discipline].

SŚP §4 42, 11-14

tapasvādhyāyānuṣṭhānaṃ kriyāyogaḥ | tatronmādakādīvyapohārtham
ādhyātmikādiduḥkhasahiṣṇutvaṃ tapaḥ, praśāntamantrasyeśvaravācino ‘bhyāsaḥ
svādhyāyaḥ, tadubhayam api kleśakarmakṣayāya samādhilābhāya cānuṣṭheyam | tasmāt
kriyāyogāt sārūpyaṃ sāmīpyaṃ vā muktir bhavati | viditapadārthasyeśvarapraṇidhānaṃ
jñānayogaḥ |

SŚP §4 English

The discipline of action [consists of] the religious practice of austerities and recitation. There, austerity is enduring pain that [proceeds from bodily and mental causes] within one’s self etc. for the purpose of destroying the maddening [passions] etc.. Recitation is repeating peaceful formulas that express God’s [greatness]. Both of those are to be practiced in order to destroy afflictions and karma and in order to attain concentration. The liberation [characterized by] likeness [to God] or nearness [to God] is [attained] from that [discipline of action]. The discipline of knowledge is meditation on God after¹⁴⁰² all the categories¹⁴⁰³ are known.

SŚP §5 42, 15-24

parameśvaratattvasya prabandhenānucintanaṃ paryālocanaṃ īśvarapraṇidhānaṃ | tasya
yogasya yamaniyamāsanapraṇāyāmapratyāhāradhāraṇādhyānasamādhayaḥ aṣṭāṅgāni |
tatra deśakālāvasthābhir anityatāḥ puruṣasya viśuddhavṛttihetavo yamāḥ

¹⁴⁰⁰ The *tatra* here indicates that the following is a comment on the three disciplines enumerated in §2 above.

¹⁴⁰¹ *Maheśvara* translates as “Great Lord” and refers to Śiva. The Naiyāyikas are said to be śaivites (Potter 1977: 21).

¹⁴⁰² *viditapadārthasya* is here a peculiar genitive absolute construction, almost in the sense of an absolutive.

¹⁴⁰³ Cf. §1 above for the list of 16 categories accepted by the Naiyāyikas.

ahimsābrahmacāryāsteyādayaḥ |¹⁴⁰⁴ deśakālāvasthāpekṣiṇaḥ puṇyahetavaḥ driyāvīśeṣā
 niyāmāḥ devārcanapradakṣiṇasam̐dhyopāsana-japādayaḥ |
 yogakarmavirodhikleśajayādyarthaś¹⁴⁰⁵ ca raṇabandhaḥ āsanam padmakasvastikādiḥ |¹⁴⁰⁶
 koṣṭhasya vāyor gaticchedaḥ prāṇyāmaḥ recakapūrakakumbhakaparakāraḥ śanaiḥśanair
 abhyasanīyaḥ | samādhipratyanīkebhyaḥ samantāt svāntasya vyāvartanam̐ pratyāhāraḥ |
 cittasya deśasam̐bandho dhāraṇā | tatraikatānatā dhyānam | dhyānotkarṣān
 nirvātācalapradīpāvasthānam̐ ivaikatra cetanasāvasthānam̐ samādhiḥ | etāni yogāṅgāni¹⁴⁰⁷
 mumukṣuṇā maheśvare parām̐ bhaktim̐ āśrayityābhīyogena sevitavyāni | tato ‘cireṇa
 kāleṇa bhagavantam̐¹⁴⁰⁸ anaupamyasvabhāvam̐ pratyakṣam̐ paśyati; taṁ dr̥ṣṭvā
 niratiśayam̐ sāyujyam̐ niḥśreyasam̐ prāpnoti |

SŚP §5 English

Meditation on God is continuous reflection and recollection on the essence of God. There are eight limbs of the discipline of that [knowledge], [namely] self-restraint; restraint of the mind; posture; restraint of the breath; withdrawal [of the senses]; fixing [the mind on the desired object]; meditation [on the desired object]; and concentration on the object of meditation. There, self restraints, which are not restrained to [a specific] place, time or condition, are non-violence, chastity, not stealing etc.¹⁴⁰⁹. They cause a man to have completely pure behavior. Restraints of the mind are special activities which cause merit and depend on place, time and condition. They are worship of God, circumambulation [of God], worship at the three junctions [morning, noon and evening], muttering prayers etc..¹⁴¹⁰ Posture, such as the lotus position and the svastika¹⁴¹¹ position, is the binding of motion for the purpose of conquering the afflictions that oppose yogic practice etc.. Restraining the breath is the cutting off of air in the lungs. [This] is [of three] kinds:

¹⁴⁰⁴ Amended. The printed ed. reads: “tatra deśakālāvasthābhir anityatāḥ puruṣasya viśuddhavṛttihetavo yamāḥ ahimsābrahmacāryāsteyādayaḥ | deśakālāvasthāpekṣiṇaḥ puṇyahetavaḥ driyāvīśeṣā niyāmāḥ devārcanapradakṣiṇasam̐dhyopāsana-japādayaḥ |”. The *daṇḍa* has been moved to include *ahimsābrahmacāryāsteyādayaḥ* in the explanation of *yama*.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Amended. Printed edition reads: “kleśajapādyarthaś”. The use of *japa* (muttering prayers) here makes not sense. The mistake is perhaps due to the use of *japa* in the preceding sentence.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “raṇabandhaḥ āsanam | padmakasvastikādeḥ”. *Bandhaḥ* has been amended according to sandhi rules. *Padmakasvastikādeḥ*, being examples of *āsanas*, has been amended to *padmakasvastikādiḥ* and the *daṇḍa* has been moved to include it in the sentence.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “etāni yogāntāni”.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “bhavantam̐”.

¹⁴⁰⁹ According to Yoga philosophy, *yama* (self-restraints) also includes *satya* (truthfulness in thought and speech) and *aparigraha* (non-acceptance of unnecessary gifts from people) in addition to the three mentioned here (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 281). These additional two are possibly replaced by *ādi* (etc.).

¹⁴¹⁰ According to Yoga philosophy *niyama* consists of *śauca* (both internal and external purification), *santoṣa* (the habit of being content with what comes of itself), *tapas* (penance), *svādhyāya* (regular habit of studying religious books) and *īśvarapraṇidhāna* (meditation of and resignation to God) (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 282).

¹⁴¹¹ Acc. to the MMW it is a posture characterized by placing the toes in the inner hollow of the knee while seated.

exhalation; inhalation; and [like a] pot.¹⁴¹² It is to be practiced gradually. Withdrawal [of the senses] is turning the mind completely away from those things that are opposed to concentration. Fixing [the mind] is fixing the mind on [the desired] place.¹⁴¹³ Meditation is the state of being directed exclusively to that [place/object on which the mind is fixed when fixing the mind on a desired place/object]. Concentration is standing in one place with the mind [still and immovable] on account of supreme meditation, just like a lamp stands steady¹⁴¹⁴ on account of there being no wind. These limbs of yogic [discipline] are to be practiced with perseverance by one who desires liberation, after practicing the highest devotion to God. After a result of that [intense absorption] one sees the Lord, whose nature is unparalleled, directly for a short time. Having seen him, one obtains the highest [goal] of unmatched pre-eminence¹⁴¹⁵ [in the form of] an intimate union [with God].

[uttarapakṣa]

The refutation.

SŚP §6 42, 26-27

tad etat tārīkamatam drṣṭeṣṭaviruddham | prāganantaram pratipāditaprakāreṇaiva
pratyakṣānumānavirodhayor atrāpy upapatteḥ, ato nātra pṛthak tadvirodhasamarthanam
upakramyate |

SŚP §6 English

This very doctrine of the logicians is contradicted by perception and inference, because contradiction by perception and inference is found even here by means of that which was expounded in the immediately preceding [section dealing with the Vaiśeṣika]. Therefore a separate justification of [it being] contradicted by those [perception and inference] is not undertaken here.

SŚP §7 42, 28-30

kiṃ ca, tadabhyupagatatadārtheṣu indriyabuddhimanasām arthopalabdhisādhakatvena¹⁴¹⁶
pramānatvāt prameyeṣv antarbhāvānupapatteḥ, anyathaikānekātmakatvasiddheḥ |
saṃśayādīnām prameyatve¹⁴¹⁷ ca vyavasthānānupapatteḥ | viparyayānadyavasāyayoḥ

¹⁴¹² *Recaka* (exhalation) is the stopping of breath after exhaling. *Pūraka* (inhaling) is the stopping of breath after inhaling. *Kumbhaka* (pot) is the stopping of breath by retention of the vital breath (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 282).

¹⁴¹³ this may be part of the body, such as one's navel etc., or external to the body, such as the moon etc..

¹⁴¹⁴ i.e. does not flicker.

¹⁴¹⁵ i.e. the highest form of liberation.

¹⁴¹⁶ ed. note: "tanmatenaiva |".

¹⁴¹⁷ ed. note: "pramānāviśayatve |".

pramāṇādiṣoḍaśapadārthebhyo ‘rthāntarabhūtayoh praṭīteś ca na
ṣoḍaśapadārthavyavasthā |

SŚP §7 English

[The Naiyāyika doctrine is] moreover [erroneous] concerning the categories accepted by those [Naiyāyikas]¹⁴¹⁸, because it is not suitable that the senses, intellect and mind are included in [the category] “object of knowledge”, because [they] are valid means of knowledge on account of being conductive to knowing objects. Because otherwise [they] are proved to have a nature that is both one and many.¹⁴¹⁹ And because it is not suitable to place doubt etc. in the [category of] objects of knowledge. And it is not established that there are 16 categories, because erroneous [cognition] and indeterminate cognition are known to be different categories¹⁴²⁰ than the sixteen categories, [i.e.] valid means of knowledge etc..¹⁴²¹

SŚP §8 43, 1-6

tathaivaṃ naiyāyikavaiśeṣikasiddhāntasya dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddhatve siddhe
caturvidhavarnāśramavat¹⁴²² tadvidheyavividhācārapuṇyapāpaparalokabandhamokṣa-
tatkāraṇataphalabaddhamuktādisvarūpapratipādako ‘pi yaugāgamo na pramāṇam,
dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddhāgamābhinnasya tasyātīndriyeṣu tatkāraṇeṣu ca
prāmānyasambhāvanānupapatter iti na teṣāṃ dharmānuṣṭhānaṃ pratiṣṭhāṃ iyarti | kim vā
bahubhir ālāpaiḥ aulūkyaiḥ tārīkaiś ca laukikaṃ vaidikaṃ vā yat kiṃcid ucyate tat
sarvaṃ mṛṣaiva tadabhimatasarvatattvānāṃ saṃsargāsambhavana¹⁴²³
śūnyatvavyāpāditatvād ity alam atiprapaṅcena, dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddhatvān
naiyāyikavaiśeṣikatayor asatyatvasiddhatvāt |

dr̥ṣṭeṣṭv iṣṭeṣu dr̥ṣṭeṣṭavirodhād yaugasam̐mataḥ |

¹⁴¹⁸ cf. Nyāyasūtra quoted in §1 above.

¹⁴¹⁹ Cf. Nyāyasūtra 2|1|16: “The weighing balance, which is a pramāṇa [the means of ascertaining the weight of things] is prameya also, [as regarding its own accuracy]” (Nyāyasūtra translated by Jhā 1984: 632). Vātsyāyana, in his *bhāṣya* (commentary) to the Nyāyasūtra, writes: “ The weighing balance is called ‘Pramāṇa’ when it is the *means* of bringing about the cognition of the exact weight (of the thing weighed),— in which case the object of cognition is the weighty substance, gold and the like (which is weighed), which therefore is called the ‘Prameya’; — but when the gold thus weighed is made the means of testing (ascertaining the accuracy of) another balance, then in the cognition of the accuracy of this other balance, it becomes the ‘Pramāṇa’, and the other balance becomes the ‘Prameya’” (translated by Jhā 1984: 632). This sūtra attempts to answer the question concerning how the *pramāṇas* (valid means of knowledge) are themselves established as valid, which was raised by philosophers such as Nāgārjuna (Matilal 1986: 36). Vidyānandin’s objection to this doctrine here is that holding that the *pramāṇas* (valid means of knowledge) are both *pramāṇa* and *prameya* (objects of valid knowledge) would entail that they have a manifold nature (*ekānekātmatva*, i.e. a nature that is both one and many).

¹⁴²⁰ *artha* (object) should here be read in the sense of *padārtha* (category).

¹⁴²¹ i.e. since both erroneous cognition and indeterminate cognition do not belong to any of the 16 categories, they must be made separate categories. Thus the number of categories cannot be said to be 16.

¹⁴²² Amended. Printed ed. reads: “tadavadheya...”.

¹⁴²³ ed. note: “samavāyasambandhābhavena”.

parokṣeṣu tadekatvād āgamo na pramāṇyatām ||
 saṃsargahāneḥ sarvārthahāner yaugavaco 'khilam |
 bhavet pralāpamātratvān nāvadheyam vipāścītām ||
 drṣṭeṣṭābhyāṃ viruddhatvān na satyam yaugaśāsanam |
 na ca tena pratikṣepaḥ syādvādasyeti niścitam ||

SŚP §8 English

Thus, since the established conclusion of the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika is proved to be contradicted by perception and inference, the scriptural tradition of the Yaugas¹⁴²⁴ which, like (it teaches) the four varṇas and life-stages, even teaches various practices to be performed in those [lifestages and varṇas], the nature of merit, demerit, the other world, bondage, liberation, their causes, their fruits, the bound and liberated [soul] etc., is not a valid means of knowledge. [This is so] because the possibility of reliability with respect to that which is beyond the sphere of the senses and the causes of that [which is beyond the sphere of the senses] is not found for that [part of the scriptural tradition that deals with those things] which is not different from [the part of] that scriptural tradition that is contradicted by perception and inference. Thus their religious practice does not reach an exalted position.

What is the use of much discussion? Whatever is said by the Aulūkyas¹⁴²⁵ and logicians¹⁴²⁶ concerning worldly matters or vedic matters is certainly all false, because, as a consequence of relation being impossible¹⁴²⁷, all the tattvas accepted by them have been brought to a state of voidness. Enough with excessive argumentation¹⁴²⁸, for the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika doctrines are proved to be false on account of being contradicted by perception and inference!

The scriptural tradition accepted by the Yaugas is not reliable with respect to perceptible and inferrable on account of being contradicted by perception and inference. (Nor is it

¹⁴²⁴ i.e. the Naiyāyika.

¹⁴²⁵ i.e. the Vaiśeṣika.

¹⁴²⁶ i.e. Naiyāyika.

¹⁴²⁷ i.e. since the inherence-relation has been proved false.

¹⁴²⁸ *atiprapaṅca* is not given in the MMW. As a prefix to nouns and verbs *ati* adds the meanings “beyond”, “over”, “excessive”, “intense” etc.. *Prapaṅca* is found in the MMW with the meanings “manifestation”, “expansion”, appearance” etc. and thus also referring to the visible world. Matilal (1986) translates it as “verbal proliferation” (p 309). He writes: “I wish to translate it [i.e. *prapaṅca*] as ‘verbal proliferation’. The original meaning of this word is obscure, although it has been used by Buddhists and Vedāntins very frequently. The word is generally used in the sense of ‘amplification’ or ‘showing by verbal elaboration’. [...] In rendering *prapaṅca* as verbal proliferation I am influenced by Candrakīrti, who seems to be saying that the purpose of speech (language) is to proliferate meanings.” (Matilal 1986: 309-10; italics in original). He further states: “Candrakīrti glosses *prapaṅca* as ‘speech’, in the sense of ‘language’” (ibid: 311; italics in original). Following this interpretation of *prapaṅca* as referring to speech or language, I have in this context rendered *atiprapaṅca*, perhaps here to be read more literally as “intense speech”, as “argumentation”, and have translated the term *alam atiprapaṅcena* as “enough with argumentation”, meaning that Vidyānandin here considers the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine refuted, making further discussion unnecessary.

reliable) with respect to [that which can only be established] indirectly¹⁴²⁹ because that [part of the scriptural tradition] is one [with the part that is contradicted by perception and inference].

All the words of the Yaugas are not to be attended to by the wise, because they are mere prattling on account of all objects being destroyed since [all] union is destroyed.

The teaching of the Yaugas is not true, because it is contradicted by perception and inference. Thus it is settled: the Syādvāda is not refuted by that [Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika teaching].

[iti naiyāyikaśāsanaparīkṣā]

Thus is the investigation of the Naiyāyika teaching.

¹⁴²⁹ i.e. that which is beyond the sphere of perception and inference.

Mīmāṃsakabhāṭṭaprābhākaraśāsanaparīkṣā

Investigation into the doctrine of the Bhaṭṭa- and Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakas.

SŚP 44, 3

atha mīmāṃsakamatam api dr̥ṣṭeṣṭaviruddham |¹⁴³⁰

SŚP 44, 3 English

Now, also the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas is contradicted by perception and inference.

[pūrvapakṣa]

The opponent's side.

SŚP §1 44, 3-5

mīmāṃsakeṣu tāvād evaṃ bhāṭṭā bhaṇanti – pṛthivyaptejovāyudikkālākāśātmamanah-
śabdatamāṃsi ity ekādaśaiva padārthāḥ, tadāśritaguṇakarmasāmānyādīnāṃ tat-
svabhāvatvena tādātmyasaṃbhavān na padārthāntaram ity evaṃ padārthayāthātmya-
jñānāt karmakṣayo bhavatīti |

SŚP §1 English

Firstly, the followers of Bhaṭṭa among the Mīmāṃsakas say: “There are only eleven categories, [namely] earth, water, fire, wind, space, time, ākāśa, soul, mind, sound and darkness. There are no other categories because quality, activity, universal etc. which reside in those [eleven categories given above] are identical [to those eleven categories] by having their nature. Thus there is destruction of karma from knowing the true nature of the categories”.

SŚP §2 44, 6-14

prābhākaras tu –

dravyaṃ guṇaḥ kriyājātisamkhyāsādr̥śyaśaktayaḥ |

samavāyaḥ kraśā ceti nava syur gurudarśane || [source unknown]

tatra dravyā[ṇi pṛthivyādayaḥ¹⁴³¹] guṇā rūpādayaḥ kriyā utkṣepaṇādi | jātiḥ

sattādravyatvādi¹⁴³² | samkhyā ekatvadvatvādiḥ | sādṛśyaṃ gopratiyogikaṃ gavayagatam

¹⁴³⁰ This opening sentence, included by the editor under the heading “pūrvapakṣa”, is strictly speaking not part of the pūrvapakṣa. It has therefore been separated from the rest of §1, which starts the pūrvapakṣa.

anyat, gavayapratyogikam gogatam sādṛśyam anyat | śaktiḥ sāmartyam, sā anumeyaiva |
guṇaguṇyādīnām saṁbandhaḥ samavāyah | ekasya niṣpādanānantaram anyasya
niṣpādanam kramah, prathamāhutyādīpūrṇāhutiparyantam | ity evaṁ navaiva padārthāḥ |
eteṣāṁ yāthātmyajñānān niḥśreyasasiddhir ity ācakṣate |

SŚP §2 English

But the followers of Prabhākara say –

There are nine [categories] in the philosophy of the teacher [Prabhākara]: substance, quality, activity, universal, number, similarity, potency, inherence and order.

There¹⁴³³, the substances are earth etc., the qualities are colour etc. and activity is “throwing upwards” etc.. Universal is existence-ness, substanceness etc.. The similarity residing in a ¹⁴³⁴gavaya, which has cow as its correlative, and the similarity residing in cow, having gavaya as its correlative, is different.¹⁴³⁵ Potency means power. It is only inferable.¹⁴³⁶ Inherence is the relation between quality and that which possesses qualities. Order is that immediately after producing one, there is production of another, [like] beginning with the first offering of oblations and lasting until the offering of oblations is completed¹⁴³⁷. Thus there are only nine categories. It is said that liberation is accomplished through knowing the true nature of these.

SŚP §3 44, 15-23

kiṁ ca, vedam adhītya tadarthaṁ jñātvā
taduktanīyanaimittakakāmyaniṣiddhānuṣṭhānakramaṁ niścītya tatra vihitānuṣṭhāne yaḥ
pravartate tasya svargāpavargasiddhir bhavati |
trikālasaṁdhyopāsanaḥpradevarṣipitṛtarpaṇādīkaṁ nityānuṣṭhānam |
darśapaurṇamāsagrahaṇādīṣu kriyamāṇanaimittikānuṣṭhānam | tadvayam api niyamena
kartavyam | kutaḥ, **akurvan vihitam karmaṁ pratyavāyena**¹⁴³⁸ **lipyate** | [source

¹⁴³¹ This seems to have been added by the editor.

¹⁴³² Amended. Printed ed. reads: ”sattā dravyatvādi”.

¹⁴³³ *Tatra* here indicates that the following is a commentary to the verse quoted at the beginning of the paragraph.

¹⁴³⁴ According to the MMW *gavaya* is a species of cow. According to Radhakrishnan (1966b: 102) it refers to a wild ox (apparently a different kind of bovine than the domesticated cow or ox).

¹⁴³⁵ i.e. the *gavaya* being similar to a cows and the cows being similar to a *gavaya* are not the same similarity.

¹⁴³⁶ The doctrine of *śakti* (potential energy) is part of the Mīmāṃsā theory of causation. The cause, such as a seed etc., is held to have an imperceptible power (*śakti*), with the help of which it can produce the effect, such as a sprout etc.. When this power is somehow obstructed or destroyed (such as if the seed is fried), the cause is not able to produce the effect. The *śakti*-doctrine thus explains why it is that sometimes the cause is present, yet it does not produce its effect (Chatterjee & Datta 2007: 308).

¹⁴³⁷ i.e. from the first offering to the last offering.

¹⁴³⁸ ed. note: “pāpena”.

unknown] iti vacanāt | putrakāmyeṣṭyādīkam aihikaṃ¹⁴³⁹ kāmyānuṣṭhānam |
jyotiṣṭomādīkam āmutrikaṃ kāmyānuṣṭhānam | ”śyenābhicaran¹⁴⁴⁰ yajet” ity ādīkaṃ
niṣiddhānuṣṭhānam | tatkramaṃ niścītya teṣv anuṣṭhāneṣu vihitānuṣṭhāne yaḥ pravartate
sa svargāpavargau prāpnoti |

SŚP §3 English

Moreover, having studied the Veda, having understood its meaning and having ascertained the order of performance [of the fourfold duties] it declares to be constant¹⁴⁴¹; occasional¹⁴⁴²; for a specific end; and forbidden¹⁴⁴³, he who engages in performing that which is ordered in that [Veda], he attains liberation or heaven. Constant religious practice is [prayer] at the three times of junction¹⁴⁴⁴, worship [of the gods], refreshing the divine sages and ancestors by presenting them libations of water etc.. The occasional religious practice is performed on [the day of] new moon, full moon, eclipse etc.. Those two¹⁴⁴⁵ are invariably to be performed. Why? Because it is said: “not performing the prescribed action, one is stained by sin”. Worldly [rites] [such as] sacrifice [performed] on account of desiring a son etc. is religious practice for a specific end. Also other worldly¹⁴⁴⁶ [rites] [such as] the Jyotiṣṭoma ceremony etc. is religious practice for a specific end. “One may sacrifice while enchanting by means of a bird of prey”¹⁴⁴⁷ etc.. [This is an example of] a forbidden practice. He who, having ascertained the order of those [practices], engages in the prescribed practices among those [practices listed above], he obtains heaven or liberation.

SŚP §4 44, 24-28

api ca –

nyāyārjitadhanas tattattvajñānaniṣṭho ’tithipriyaḥ |
śraddhakṛt satyavādī ca gr̥hastho ’pi vimucyate ||¹⁴⁴⁸ [source not found] iti vacanāt |

mumukṣūṇaṃ pravrajyayā bhavitavyam iti niyamo nāsti |

¹⁴³⁹ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “-mahikaṃ”.

¹⁴⁴⁰ ed. note: “śyenayāgena |”.

¹⁴⁴¹ i.e. to be performed daily.

¹⁴⁴² to be performed on particular occasions

¹⁴⁴³ not to be performed.

¹⁴⁴⁴ morning, midday and noon.

¹⁴⁴⁵ i.e. the *nitya* (constant) and *naimittika* (occasional) practice.

¹⁴⁴⁶ *Āmutrikaṃ* is not found in the MMW. It however seems clear that it is here used as correlative of *aihika* (worldly). The point is that while sacrifices like the *putrakāmyeṣṭi* give results in this world, such as a son etc. (and are thus *aihika*, i.e. worldly), sacrifices such as the *jyotiṣṭoma* (a soma ceremony) etc. give results in the other world. *Āmurtikaṃ* has therefore been translated as “other worldly”.

¹⁴⁴⁷ i.e. performing the *śyena* (bird of prey, especially an eagle)-sacrifice in order to kill ones enemies.

¹⁴⁴⁸ ed. note: “gr̥hastho mokṣamārgastho...ityādi | tulanā – ratnakara- ślo- |”.

SŚP §4 English

Because it is also said¹⁴⁴⁹:

Even a householder, being one whose wealth is honestly acquired, devoted to thorough knowledge of those [categories], who is a friend to [his] guests, performs [the sacrifices] with faithfulness and speaks the truth, is liberated.

It is not necessary that those desirous of liberation need [to seek liberation] by going forth [from home to homelessness].

SŚP §5 45, 1-6

tatrāpi –

mokṣārtho na pravarteta tatra kāmyaniṣiddhayoḥ |
nityanaimittike kuryāt pratyavāyajihāsayā || [mī- ślo- saṃbandha- ślo- 11-] iti bhāṭṭāḥ |

pratyavāyaparihārakāmena nityanaimittakānuṣṭhānayoḥ pravartanāt | tayor api
kāmyānuṣṭhānakukṣau nikṣepāt tatkarāṇam api mokṣakāṃkṣiṇā nāvadhīyate¹⁴⁵⁰ iti
prābhākaraḥ pratyūcire |

SŚP §5 English

Also, regarding that [matter], the followers of Bhaṭṭa [say]:

One whose aim is liberation must perform the constant and occasional [practices] with the desire to abandon sin. He may not engage in those [practices] [described as] optional and forbidden. [Liberation is attained] through engaging in the constant and occasional religious practice with the desire to abandon sin.

The followers of Prabhākara refute [this], [saying that] even the performance of those [constant and occasional practices] is not performed by one who is desirous of liberation, because even those [constant and occasional practices] are included in the optional religious practices.

¹⁴⁴⁹ this paragraph establishes the validity of the last claim in the previous paragraph, i.e. that one who knows the order of practices and engages in those practices that are prescribed can attain liberation. This statement implies that one does not need to become an ascetic in order to attain liberation, but that liberation can be attained by householders as well.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads “anavadhīyate iti”. A verb cannot be negated by the prefix *an-*, which seems to have been done here.

[uttarapakṣa]

The refutation.

SŚP §6 45, 8-14

tad etan mīmāṃsakamatam tāvad dṛṣṭaviruddham, mīmāṃsakākhyair bhāṭṭair
prābhākaraiś ca pṛthivyādayo 'rthāḥ sattādisāmānyato 'nuvyajyante | tac ca
sattādisāmānyam sarvathā nityam niravayavam ekaṃ vyāpakam iti tair abhimatam; tat tu
pratyakṣaviruddham, sadṛśapariṇāmalakṣaṇasya sāmānyasyānityasyāsarvagatasya
rūpādivad anekavyaktātmatayānekarūpasyaiva pratyakṣataḥ pratīteḥ | na hi bhinnadeśāsu
vyaktiṣu sāmānyam ekaṃ pratyakṣataḥ sthūṇādau vaṃśādivat pratīyate; vyakter
utpādavināse 'pi anutpādam avināśam vā yatas tatpratyakṣam syāt | tad idaṃ
paroditasvarūpaṃ sāmānyam pratyakṣabuddhāv ātmānam na samarthayati¹⁴⁵¹
pratyakṣatām ca svīkartum icchatīty amūlyadānakrayitvāt satām upahāsās padam eva syāt
|

SŚP §6 English

That very doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas is firstly contradicted by perception. The categories, earth etc., are [held to be] caused to appear after¹⁴⁵² the universal, existence-ness etc.¹⁴⁵³, by [both] the followers of Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara, who are called Mīmāṃsakas. And this is accepted by them: “The universal, existence etc., is completely permanent, without parts, one and [all]-pervading”. But that is certainly contradicted by perception, because the universal, defined as similar modification¹⁴⁵⁴, is impermanent and

¹⁴⁵¹ According to the MMW, *samarthayati* is often wrong for *samarpayati* (to throw, hurl etc.). If the text were to be amended to *samarpayati*, the translation would be “does not throw itself at perceptual cognition”. This would perhaps be a better reading. As reading *samarthayati* also works, it has not been amended.

¹⁴⁵² The meaning of *anuvyañjyante* is unclear. *Anuvyajyante* is here 3rd plural passive causative of *anu + vi + añj*, which is not found in the MMW. The passive causative of *vi + añj* is “to be manifested or expressed” or “is caused to appear”. Adding the prefix *anu* (after, along, alongside, near to, under, subordinate to, with) here seems to give it the meaning “is caused to appear later/after” or “is manifested after”.

The meaning of this statement is not entirely clear. The most probable explanation seems to be that while the universal is accepted to be permanent, the particulars or individual things are impermanent (as they are created and destroyed). The point would thus be that the universal (which is held to be unitary and permanent) is held to exist prior to the particular/individual thing, which is contradicted by sensory perception. Cf. SŚP 45 11-13 (below): *na hi bhinnadeśāsu vyaktiṣu sāmānyam ekaṃ pratyakṣataḥ sthūṇādau vaṃśādivat pratīyate; vyakter utpādavināse 'pi anutpādam avināśam vā yatas tatpratyakṣam syāt* | (For a unitary universal [existing] in [many] individuals found in various places, like [one piece of] bamboo etc. [existing] in [several] pillars etc., is not cognized through sensory perception, nor is there non-origination and non-destruction [of the universal] while there is origination and destruction of the individual, from which there could be sensory perception of that [permanent universal].).

¹⁴⁵³ According to Shah (1968) the Mīmāṃsakas do not acknowledge the existence of a universal *sattā* (existence-ness) (p 80). In summarizing the view expressed in the Prakaraṇapañcikā he writes: “When we speak of an individual object as existing (*sat*), we do not mean that it has a class-character called being (*sat*); what we do mean is that the individual has an existence *per se* (*savarūpasattā*)” (Shah 1968: 80 italics in original. *Savarūpasattā* is a misprint for *svarūpasattā*).

¹⁴⁵⁴ Cf. SŚP 46, 24 §11 below and SŚP 25, 26 (§30 Baudhdha chapter), where it is also stated that the Jain definition of the universal is similar modification (*sadṛśapariṇāma*).

not contained in everything, is cognized, through sensory perception, as having many forms by having the nature of many individuals¹⁴⁵⁵, just like color¹⁴⁵⁶ [has the nature of many individuals]. For a unitary universal [existing] in [many] individuals found in various places, like [one piece of] bamboo etc. [existing] in [several] pillars¹⁴⁵⁷ etc., is not cognized through sensory perception, nor is there non-origination and non-destruction [of the universal] while there is origination and destruction of the individual, from which¹⁴⁵⁸ there could be sensory perception of that [permanent universal].¹⁴⁵⁹ This very universal, of the nature declared by the opponents, does not make itself fit with respect to perceptual cognition, and [yet] desires to claim perceptibility for itself. Thus [the Mīmāṃsakas] are a laughingstock for the wise, because they are customers that do not want to pay the price [of that which they desire to buy]. [The universal as described by the Mīmāṃsakas] is only a word.

SŚP §7 45, 15-23

tathāpi yadi yājñikā vaiyātyāt tathaiyeti vivadante, tarhi tatra brūmaḥ; ekaṭra vyaktau sarvātmanā vartamānasya¹⁴⁶⁰ anyatra vṛttir na syāt | tatra hi vṛttiḥ taddeśe gamanāt, piṇḍena sahotpādāt, taddeśe sadbhāvāt amśavattayā vā syāt, na tāvad gamanād anyatra piṇḍe tasya vṛttiḥ, niṣkriyatvopagamāt | kiṃ ca pūrvapiṇḍaparityāgena¹⁴⁶¹ tat tatra gacchet, aparityāgena vā, na tāvat parityāgena, prākṭanapiṇḍasya gotvoparityāktasya agorūpatāprasamgāt, nāpy aparityāgena, aparityāktapiṇḍasyāsyānamśasya¹⁴⁶² rūpāder iva gamanāsamḥbhavāt | na hy aparityāktapūrvādhārāṇām rūpādīnām ādhārāntarasamkrāntir dṛṣṭā | nāpi piṇḍe[na¹⁴⁶³] sahotpādāt, tasyānityatānuṣamgāt | nāpi taddeśe sattvāt; piṇḍotpatteḥ prāk tatra nirādhārasyāsyāvvyavasthānābhāvāt, bhede vā svāśrayamātravṛttitvavirodhaḥ | nāpy amśavattayā; niraṃśatvapratijñānāt | tato vyaktyantare sāmānyasyābhāvānuṣamgāt |

SŚP §7 English

¹⁴⁵⁵ i.e. being found in many individuals

¹⁴⁵⁶ i.e. just as a color, such as red, is found in many individual things. The Mīmāṃsakas do not accept the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of also qualities (*guṇa*) and activities (*karman*) have universals. Thus they do not accept color to be a universal (such as “whiteness” etc.).

¹⁴⁵⁷ Cf. §16 below where this example is also used.

¹⁴⁵⁸ i.e. had it been so.

¹⁴⁵⁹ i.e. it is not so that the universal residing in an individual is not destroyed when the individual is destroyed and does not come into existence when the individual comes into existence, i.e. when an individual is destroyed it is not found that the universal remains in the place of the individual. It is destroyed along with the individual. Had this been cognized one could have spoken of a permanent universal.

¹⁴⁶⁰ ed. note: “sāmānyasya iti śeṣaḥ |”.

¹⁴⁶¹ ed. note: “sāmānyam |”.

¹⁴⁶² Amended. Printed ed. reads: “aparityāktapiṇḍasyāsyānamśarūpāder iva”.

¹⁴⁶³ *na* seems here to have been added by the editor, thus giving *piṇḍa* an instrumental ending instead of a locative ending. No note is given about the reading of the manuscripts.

If the sacrificers¹⁴⁶⁴ nevertheless, on account of shamelessness, argue that it is so,¹⁴⁶⁵ then we say that if [the universal] resides¹⁴⁶⁶ wholly in one individual, it cannot reside in another [individual].¹⁴⁶⁷ [It] can reside in that [other individual in question] by going to the place of that [other individual in question]; by arising together with that¹⁴⁶⁸ individual; by [already] existing in the place of that [other individual in question even before this individual arises]; or by possessing parts¹⁴⁶⁹.

Firstly, it cannot reside in another individual by going [to the place of that individual], because it is acknowledged that [it] is inactive. Moreover, [if it was granted for the sake of argument that it could go to the place of the other individual], would it go by abandoning the former individual or not by abandoning the former individual? Firstly, it cannot be by abandoning [the former individual], because [then there would be] adhering to the former individual that was abandoned by “cowness” not having cow-nature.¹⁴⁷⁰ And it can also not be by not abandoning [the former individual], because it is not possible that that [universal], which, just like color etc., is without parts, can go [to the place of the other individual] without leaving [the former] individual¹⁴⁷¹. For it is not so that color etc. which has not left its previous substratum is seen to transfer to another substratum.

Nor [can it reside in another individual] by arising together with that individual, because [there would be] an unwarranted extension of it [universal] not being permanent.¹⁴⁷² And it is also not by [already] existing in the place of that [individual] [before the individual arises], because that [universal] existing without a substratum in that [place where the individual will arise] before the individual arises is not tenable. But if it [for the sake of argument does exist in that place as] separate [from its substratum] there is contradiction with [your own doctrine which states that a universal] resides only

¹⁴⁶⁴ i.e. Mīmāṃsakas.

¹⁴⁶⁵ i.e. that the universal as described by them does exist.

¹⁴⁶⁶ *varṭamānasya* must here be a genitive absolute construction. It is probably used here instead of the locative absolute, which is almost always used in this text for this purpose, to avoid confusion with *vyaktau*, which is a locative.

¹⁴⁶⁷ i.e. the universal, being one and without parts, cannot reside in another individual if it already resides wholly in an individual.

¹⁴⁶⁸ As the use of *piṇḍa* (ball, lump, material substance) here seems to be synonymous with *vyakti* (individual), it has been translated as “individual”.

¹⁴⁶⁹ i.e. being partite and thus residing in the individuals partly, not wholly. This point thus seems a bit strange as the matter being discussed is whether *sāmānya* (universal) can reside in another individual if it already resides **wholly** in an individual. The possibility of *sāmānya* having parts thus does not solve this problem, but rather bypasses it as it would then not reside **wholly** in any individual, thus avoiding the problems raised against it in this paragraph.

¹⁴⁷⁰ i.e. in residing in another cow the universal “cowness” would have to leave the cow it was residing in, resulting in that cow no longer having “cowness” or cow-nature. This argument is taken from Dharmakīrti, who has raised it against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *sāmānya* (universal). Cf. Matilal (1986): “The well-known verse of Dharmakīrti says that it (cowhood) cannot travel from the former cow to the latter cow, for then the former cow would not be a cow any longer;” (p 382). Cf. also the verse quoted at the end of §8 below.

¹⁴⁷¹ i.e. being without parts the universal cannot go to the place of the other individual without leaving the individual it is residing in.

¹⁴⁷² i.e. if the universal arose at the same time as the individual it could not be eternal.

in its substratum. And it is also not by having parts, because it is acknowledged [by the Mīmāṃsakas] that [the universal] is without parts. Therefore [the universal as described by the Mīmāṃsakas cannot exist] because of the extension of that universal [already existing in an individual] not existing in another individual.¹⁴⁷³

SŚP §8 45, 24-29

pareṣāṃ prayogaḥ – ye yatra notpannā nāpi prāg avasthāyino nāpi paścād anyato deśād āgatam antaḥ te tatrāsanto, yathā karottamāṅge tad viśāṇam, tathā ca sāmānyam tacchūnyadeśotpādatve¹⁴⁷⁴ ghaṭādike vastunīti | tad uktam –

na yāti na ca tatrāsīd asti paścān na cāmśavat |

jahāti pūrvam ādhāram aho vyasanasaṃtatiḥ || [source not found]¹⁴⁷⁵ iti

SŚP §8 English

This is the inference for/of the others¹⁴⁷⁶ – [Things] that have not arisen in a given [thing], nor are established [to have existed in the place of the arising of that thing] before [the arising of that thing], nor have later come into [that thing] from another place, those [things] do not exist in that [thing]. Just as a horn [does not exist] on the head of a donkey, so the universal [does not exist] in the thing, the pot etc., which arises in a place that is void of that [universal].¹⁴⁷⁷ It is said –

“It does not go [to the individual], nor did it [already] exist there, [nor can it] be afterwards¹⁴⁷⁸, nor does it have parts, [nor can it] abandon its former substrate. Alas! [what] series of calamities [befalls this notion of universal]!”

SŚP §9 45, 30-46, 4

¹⁴⁷³ i.e. the universal held by the Mīmāṃsakas cannot exist because it would only be possible for it to exist in one individual.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “utpādatve”.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Identified by Prof. Shah, who gives the reference Pramāṇavārttika III. 351, without referring to any specific edition. Matilal (1986), also seems to refer to this verse (p382), giving the reference “Pramāṇavārttika, Svārthānumāna ch. 3 verses 152cd and 153ab” (1986: 382 footnote 3) referring to the arrangement in the Pramāṇavārttika edited by Swami Dwarikadas Sastri, published by Bauddha Bharati in Varanasi in 1968 (ibid: 427). I have not had recourse to this chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika and have thus not been able to confirm the identification.

¹⁴⁷⁶ The use of *pareṣāṃ* here is curious. It would usually mean that this is the inference of the opponents, i.e. that this is what is inferred by the Mīmāṃsakas. This makes no sense here, as this inference is clearly opposed to the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of *sāmānyā* (universal). It could be taken to refer to the Buddhists, as the verse quoted at the end of this paragraph (below) seems to be taken from Dharmakīrti (cf. footnote 1475), thus meaning that this inference too is taken from the Buddhists. Alternatively, the genitive *pareṣāṃ* may here be taken to express the sense of “for”, and not the possessive “of”, thus making the meaning “this is the inference presented to the opponents, i.e. Mīmāṃsakas”.

¹⁴⁷⁷ These arguments seem to be taken from Dharmakīrti. Cf. footnote 1475.

¹⁴⁷⁸ i.e. it cannot come into being after the individual has been produced, because it is not accepted that an individual can exist without a universal.

nanv eṣa doṣo bhedavādinām¹⁴⁷⁹ eva na tu mīmāṃsakānām, taiḥ sāmānyavyaktyos
tādātmyāṅgikaraṇāt |

“tādātmyam asya kasmāc cet svabhāvād iti gamyatām |” [mī- ślo- ākr̥ti- ślo- 47]

ity abhidhānād iti cet; teṣāṃ vyaktivat tasyāsādhāraṇasādharaṇarūpatvānuṣaṅgāt |
vyaktyutpādavinaśayoś cāsyāpi tadyogitvaprasaṅgāt |

SŚP §9 English

If it is objected: certainly, this fault [applies] only to those who hold that there is [absolute] difference¹⁴⁸⁰ [between the universal and the particular], but not to the Mīmāṃsakas, because they hold that the universal and individual are identical. Because it is said:

“That [universal] is identical [to the individual]. If [it is asked:] ‘why?’, [it is answered:] understand [that they are identical] by nature”.

[It is answered:] [that is not suitable] because [it would result in] the extension for those [Mīmāṃsakas] of that [universal] having an uncommon and a common nature, like the individual [has an uncommon and a common nature].¹⁴⁸¹ And because [there would be] adhering to the suitability of that [universal] having origination and destruction, [which characterize] the individual, as well.¹⁴⁸²

SŚP §10 46, 5-16

na sāmānyarūpatā vā sādharmaṇarūpatvam; utpādavinaśayogitvam cāsyā
nābhypagamya, tarhi viruddhadharmādhyāsato vyaktibhyo ‘sya bhedaḥ syāt |
uktam ca –

tādātmyam cen matam jāter vyaktijanmany ajātātā |
nāśo ‘nāśas’¹⁴⁸³ ca keneṣṭas tadvac cānavayo na kim ||

vyaktijanmany ajātā ced āgatā nāśrayāntarāt |

¹⁴⁷⁹ Amended. Printed ed. reads: ”bhedādinām”

¹⁴⁸⁰ i.e. the Vaiśeṣikas.

¹⁴⁸¹ i.e. like the individual has an uncommon and common nature, i.e. having some traits in common with other things while some traits are unique to the individual in question, so the universal, seeing as it is identical with the individual, would have to have both uncommon and common traits.

¹⁴⁸² As the universal and individual are said to be identical, the universal must arise and be destroyed too, because individuals arise and are destroyed. Thus the universal cannot be permanent.

¹⁴⁸³ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “‘nāśo ca’”. Amended according to sandhi rules. This is also the reading found in Sanghavi and Jinavijayaji (1949).

prāg āsīn na ca taddeśe sā tayā saṃgatā katham ||

vyaktināśe na cen naṣṭā gatā vyaktyantaram na ca |
tacchūnye na sthitā deśe sā jātiḥ kveti kathyatām ||

vyakter jātyādiyoge ‘pi yadi jāteḥ sa¹⁴⁸⁴ neṣyate |
tādātmyam katham iṣṭam syād anupaplutacetasām || [hetubi- ṭī- pṛ- 32]¹⁴⁸⁵

ity evam anekadoṣaduṣṭatvāt yājñikānujñātasāmānyam kharaviṣāṇavad asad eva syāt |

SŚP §10 English

Or [rather], the universal nature is not [the same as] the common nature, because the suitability of origination and destruction is not acknowledged for that [universal nature].¹⁴⁸⁶ Therefore the universal must be different from the individuals on account of the false attribution of contradictory attributes.¹⁴⁸⁷ And it is said –¹⁴⁸⁸

“If the universal is thought to be identical [to the individual], by whom is it accepted that there is no origination [of the universal] when there is origination of the individual? And (by whom is it accepted) that there is destruction [of the individual] but no destruction [of the universal]? And why is [the universal] not not connected [to the many], like that [individual] (is not connected) [to the many]¹⁴⁸⁹?

If [the universal] does not arise when the individual arises, does not come [to the individual] from another seat¹⁴⁹⁰, nor exist before [the individual arises] in the place of that [individual], how is that [universal] united with that [individual]?¹⁴⁹¹

If [the universal] is not destroyed when the individual is destroyed and does not go to another individual [upon the destruction of the individual in which it resided], and if it

¹⁴⁸⁴ ed. note: “jātyādiyogah |”.

¹⁴⁸⁵ Compared to Sanghavi and Jinavijayaji’s ed. (1949), which does not read the last three lines.

¹⁴⁸⁶ *sādhāraṇa* seems here to be used in the sense of *sadrśaparīṇāmatva* (having similar modification), which is the Jain definition of the universal (as opposed to the definitions offered by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā etc.). Cf. §11 below.

¹⁴⁸⁷ i.e. if they were to be identical it would result in them both possessing contradictory attributes, i.e. both the universal and the individuals would have to be both permanent and characterized by origination and destruction etc.. Thus they must be different.

¹⁴⁸⁸ These verses too are quoted from a Buddhist work.

¹⁴⁸⁹ i.e. according to the Mīmāṃsakas the one universal resides in many individuals. But the individual/particular does not reside in many individuals. Thus if the universal and individual are held to be identical, the universal too should not reside in many individuals (as it is identical to the individual which does not reside in many individuals).

¹⁴⁹⁰ i.e. another individual in which it was already residing

¹⁴⁹¹ i.e. how can the relation of *samavāya* (inherence), which is held to unite the universal and the particular in which it resides, take place between them?

does not remain [in the place where the destroyed individual was which is now] devoid of that [individual which was its seat], it must be explained where the universal is [after the individual is destroyed].¹⁴⁹²

If it is not accepted that a universal is [united with another universal etc.] even though an individual is united with universals etc., how can those whose minds are unafflicted accept the identity [of the individual and universal]?¹⁴⁹³

Thus the universal, as it is accepted by the ¹⁴⁹⁴sacrificers, is indeed non-existent, like the donkey's horn, on account of being defiled with many faults.

SŚP §11 46, 17-25

yat tu tatsadbhāvasādhanam uktaṃ parair –

piṇḍabhedeṣu gobuddhir ekagotvanibandhanā |¹⁴⁹⁵

¹⁴⁹⁶**gavābhāsyekarūpābhyām ekagopiṇḍabuddhivat** || [mī- ślo- vana- ślo- 44]

na śābaleyād gobuddhis tato 'nyālambanāpi vā |

tadabhāve 'pi sadbhāvād ghaṭe pārvibuddhivat || [mī- ślo- vana- ślo- 45¹⁴⁹⁷]

ity ādiḥ; tatsarvaṃ siddhasādhanam; anuvṛttapratyayasya
sadr̥śapariṇāmalakṣaṇasāmānyālanāmbanatvasiddheḥ |

SŚP §11 English

As regards that which is said by the opponents in order to prove the existence of that [universal] –

¹⁴⁹² cf. SŚP 45, 22 §7 above where it is said that the Mīmāṃsakas hold that the universal only resides in its substratum: *bhede vā svāśrayamātravṛttivavirodhaḥ* | (But if it [for the sake of argument does exist in that place as] separate [from its substratum] there is contradiction with [your own doctrine which states that a universal] resides only in its substratum).

¹⁴⁹³ i.e. individuals are united (by the relation of inherence) with universals (such as a cow being united to the universal “cowness”), but universals are not united with other universals, i.e. the universal “cowness” is not united with any additional universals. But if individuals and universals are identical, universals too should be united with universals.

¹⁴⁹⁴ i.e. Mīmāṃsakas.

¹⁴⁹⁵ Rāmaśāstrī Tailanga's edition of the Ślokavārtika (Benares 1899) reads: “tasmāt piṇḍeṣu gobuddhir ekagotvanibandhanā |”.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Rāmaśāstrī Tailanga's edition of the Ślokavārtika (Benares 1899) reads: “gavābhāsyekarūpābhyām”.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Amended. Editor gives the reference “mī- ślo- vana- ślo- 4”. Amended according to Rāmaśāstrī Tailanga's edition of the Ślokavārtika (Benares 1899).

“The cognition “cow” in [many] different individual [cows] depends on one [universal] ‘cowness’, just like the cognition of one individual cow [depends on one universal] ‘cowness’], because the two reflections of cow are identical.

The cognition of cow¹⁴⁹⁸ is not on account of [the individual cow named] Śābaleya, because [the cognition of cow] has other [cows] as its object as well. Because even in the absence of that [cow named Śābaleya] [the cognition of cow] exists, like the cognition of earthenness in a pot.¹⁴⁹⁹”

[Statements like these] etc. are all proof of that which is [already] proved [and accepted by the Jains], because it is proved that the cognition of conformity has [the universal], defined as similar modification, as its object.¹⁵⁰⁰

SŚP §12 46, 26-28

na hi vyaṃ bauddhvat sāmānyasyāpahnavaṭārah; kevalaṃ

¹⁵⁰¹paraparakalpitasarvathānityatvādiviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭam eva sāmānyam na mṛṣyāmahe | sarvathā nityasyaikasyānaṣṭasya sarvagatasya vicāramāṇasyāsambhavāt |

SŚP §12 English

For, like the Bauddhas, it is not so that we deny the universal. We simply do not accept the universal as only being characterized by the attributes postulated by [some] others, such as completely permanent etc., because, upon examination, [the universal being] completely permanent, (completely) one, (completely) imperishable, and [all] pervasive is impossible.

SŚP §13 46, 29-31

nityam sadādi sāmānyam pratyabhijñāyamānatvāt, śabdavat iti cet, na; heto viruddhatvāt | kathaṃcin nityasya iṣṭaviruddhasya sādhanāt | sarvathā nityasya pratyabhijñānāyogāt | tad evedam iti pūrvottaraparyāyavyāpinaikatra pratyayasyopapatteḥ, paurvāparyarahitasya¹⁵⁰² pūrvāparapratyayaviṣayatvāsambhavāt |

¹⁴⁹⁸ i.e. the cognition “this is cow” in general.

¹⁴⁹⁹ i.e. the general cognition of cow, i.e. “this is a cow”, is not dependent on any specific cow. For even if this cow were to not exist, the cognition “this is cow” would not cease to exist. It can still be produced by another cow. It is the same with earthenness in a pot. The cognition of earthenness is not dependent on any one pot, but has many pots as its object, as well as other kinds of things that have the quality of earthenness.

¹⁵⁰⁰ i.e. it is not the notion of universal that is here not accepted, but the specific definition of the universal as posited by the Mīmāṃsakas. Cf. SŚP 45, 10 §6 above and SŚP 25, 26 §30 Bauddha chapter, where it is also stated that the Jain definition of the universal is similar modification (*sadrśapariṇāma*).

¹⁵⁰¹ ed. note: “nāiyāyikādirikalpita |”.

¹⁵⁰² ed. note: “kūṭasthanityasya |”.

SŚP §13 English

If it is objected: The universal, existence-ness¹⁵⁰³ etc., is permanent, because [the universal] is recognized, like words.¹⁵⁰⁴ [It is answered:] no, because the premise [in this syllogism] is contradictory as [it] proves [that the universal] is in some ways permanent, which contradicts [your] desired [position] [of the universal being completely permanent]. Because it is unsuitable that that which is completely permanent is recognized. Because it is found that the cognition “this is indeed that”¹⁵⁰⁵ [can only be generated] by that which pervades the prior and posterior modes in one thing.¹⁵⁰⁶ Because it is impossible that [the completely permanent thing], which is destitute of prior and posterior [modes], is the object of [recollection], [which is characterized by] the cognition of prior and posterior [modes].¹⁵⁰⁷

SŚP §14 47, 1-3

dharmāv eva pūrvāparabhūtau na dharmisāmānyam iti cet, katham tad evedam iti abhedapratītiḥ, pūrvāparasvabhāvayor atītavartamānayoḥ tad ity atītaparāmarśinā smaraṇena idam iti vartamānollekhinā pratyakṣeṇa ca viṣayīkriyamāṇayoḥ parasparam bhedāt |

SŚP §14 English

If it is objected: Being prior or posterior are only attributes, not the universal which is the substratum for the attributes. [It is answered:] Then how can one have cognition of [their] identity [in the form of the cognition] “this is indeed that”? Because prior and posterior nature, being the past and present [respectively], making “that” an object by means of recollection, which refers to the past, and “this” an object by means of sensory perception, which describes the present, are mutually different.¹⁵⁰⁸

¹⁵⁰³ According to Shah (1968) the Mīmāṃsakas do not acknowledge the existence of a universal *sattā* (existence-ness) (p 80). Cf. footnote 1453.

¹⁵⁰⁴ This is a syllogism: 1) *pratijñā* (proposition): the universal, existence etc., is permanent; 2) *hetu* (premise): because it is recognized; 3) *udāharaṇa* (explanatory example with a general statement): like words.

¹⁵⁰⁵ i.e. the recognition “this [cowness etc.] is indeed that [cowness]”, i.e. one recognizes the cowness seen in a cow to be the same as the cowness seen in a previously perceived cow. This, the Mīmāṃsakas argue, proves that it is the same cowness and that the universal is permanent. Vidyānandin does not agree, as this cognition presupposes that the cowness in question pervades both prior and posterior modes, which cannot be held to be completely identical.

¹⁵⁰⁶ i.e. the one substance (*dravya*) and its prior and posterior modes (*paryāya*).

¹⁵⁰⁷ i.e. as recognition/recollection (*pratyabhijñāna*) relates to both past and present it is a cognition reflecting prior and posterior modes. The completely permanent/eternal thing (*sarvathā nitya*), which by definition cannot have prior and posterior modes as it is permanent, i.e. unchanging, thus cannot be the object of recognition. Therefore, if the universal (*sāmānya*) is the object of recognition, it is proved that the universal must be impermanent in some ways (*kathaṃcidanīya*).

¹⁵⁰⁸ If the Mīmāṃsaka says that the prior and posterior modes are merely attributes of the universal, and that while these attributes may be impermanent the universal itself is permanent, then Vidyānandin asks how it is that one can then cognize the non-difference/identity between the prior mode and the posterior mode (in the cognition “this is that only”), since these are different. If it is the attributes that are cognized, there should not be any sensation of identity.

SŚP §15 47, 4-11

sadādisāmānyād ekasmāt tayoḥ kathamcid bhedābhedapratipattir iti cet, siddham tasya kathamcid anityatvam, anityasvadharmāvyatirekāt | na hy anityād abhinnaṃ nityam eva yuktam, anityasvātmavat sarvathā nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāc ca | tad anityaṃ sāmānyam viśeṣādeśāt śabdavat | tata evānekam ¹⁵⁰⁹tadvat | sad ity ādisvapratyayāviśeṣād ekaṃ sattādisāmānyam iti cet, na; sarvathāsvapratyayāviśeṣasyāsiddhatvāt pratipadādivyaktau ¹⁵¹⁰sad ity ādipratyayasya ¹⁵¹¹viśeṣāt | tadvyaktiviśayo viśeṣapratyaya iti cet; tarhi tā vyaktayaḥ sāmānyāt sarvathā yadi bhinnāḥ pratipadyante, tadā yaugamatapraveśo mīmāṃsakasya, sa cāyuktaḥ, ¹⁵¹²tanmate sambandhasya ¹⁵¹³nirastatvāt tasyeti vyapadeśānupapatteḥ |

SŚP §15 English

If it is objected: It is cognized that those [prior and posterior modes] are in some ways different and in some ways non-different from the one universal, existence etc.. [It is answered:] then it is proved that that [universal] is in some ways impermanent, because it is not different from its own attributes, which are impermanent. ¹⁵¹⁴ For it is not suitable that that which is not different from impermanence is permanent only, and [the universal is in some ways impermanent] because that which is completely permanent is opposed to both successive and simultaneous causal efficiency, just like that which has a [completely] impermanent nature [is opposed to successive and simultaneous causal efficiency], [and thus does not exist]. ¹⁵¹⁵

The universal is, like words, impermanent from the point of view of the particular. Indeed, therefore it is many, like those [particulars] [are many]. If it is objected: The universal, existence etc., is one on account of its ¹⁵¹⁶ cognitions, “[this is] existent” etc.,

¹⁵⁰⁹ ed. note: “anityasvātmavat |”.

¹⁵¹⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads “pratipadādivyakti sadyādipratyayasya”.

¹⁵¹¹ ed. note: “bhedāt |”.

¹⁵¹² ed. note: yaugamate |”.

¹⁵¹³ ed. note: “samavāyasya |”.

¹⁵¹⁴ If the Mīmāṃsaka answers that the sensation of identity is due to the fact that the universal is in some ways different from its attributes, i.e. the prior and posterior modes, (in that the universal is permanent while they are permanent) and in some ways not different from them (in that one can recognize the identity between the prior and posterior modes), then Vidyānandin asserts that it has been proved that the universal is in some ways impermanent, for the universal is not completely different from its attributes (i.e. the prior and posterior modes). And as these attributes are impermanent, so the universal must be impermanent in some ways.

¹⁵¹⁵ cf. SŚP 26, 10-27, 7 §§31-38 Bauddha chapter for the discussion of this point. The argument here is that that which is not causally efficient is not real. This idea originally belongs to Dharmakīrti. It was used by him when arguing that the completely permanent thing cannot be causally efficient, and as that which is not causally efficient cannot be real the absolutely permanent thing cannot exist. It was then later adopted by, among others, Akalaṅka, who attempted to show that also the absolutely impermanent thing cannot be causally efficient, thus showing that the absolutely impermanent thing is non-existent as well.

¹⁵¹⁶ The use of *sva-* in *svapratyaya* here is curious. It seems to refer to the universal (*sāmānya*). Thus *svapratyaya* has been translated as “its cognitions”.

being identical. [It is answered:] no. Because it is not proved that its cognitions [“this is existent” etc.] are completely identical, because [each] cognition, “[this is] existent” etc., is different for each individual, such as every word etc..

If it is objected: The cognition of difference has a [particular] individual [which is united with] that [universal] as its object. [It is answered:] In that case, if the individuals are accepted to be completely different from the universal, then the Mīmāṃsakas enter into the Yauga doctrine, and that is not suitable because the statement “[this universal is] of these [individuals]” is not acceptable on account of relation being refuted in that [Yauga] doctrine.¹⁵¹⁷

SŚP §16 47, 12-21

atha kathaṃcid abhinnāḥ, tadā siddhaṃ sāmānyasya viśeṣapratyaya viṣayātvaṃ,
viśeṣapratyaya viṣayebhyo viśeṣebhyaḥ kathaṃcid abhinnasya sāmānyasya
viśeṣapratyaya viṣayatopapatteḥ viśeṣasvātmavat | tato naikam eva sattādisāmānyam |
nāpy anamaṃsam, kathaṃcit sāmśatvaprāṭiteḥ; sāmśebhyo viśeṣebhyo ‘narthāntarabhūtasya
sāmśatvopapatteḥ tatsvātmavat | tathā na¹⁵¹⁸ sarvagataṃ tat sāmānyam vyaktyantarāle
‘nupalabhyamānatvāt | tatrānabhivvyaktatvāt¹⁵¹⁹ tasyānupalambha iti cet; tata eva
vyaktisvātmana iva¹⁵²⁰ tatrānupalambo ‘stu | tatra tasya
¹⁵²¹sadbhāvavedakapramāṇābhāvād asattvād evānupalamba iti cet; sāmānyasyāpi
viśeṣābhāvād¹⁵²² asattvād evānupalambho ‘stu, vyaktyantarāle tasyāpy
¹⁵²³sadbhāvavedakapramāṇābhāvāt, pratyakṣatas tathānanubhavāt, kharaviṣāṇādivat | na hi
bhinnadeśāsu vyaktiṣu sāmānyam ekam, yathā sthūṇādiṣu vaṃśādir iti pratīyate, yato
¹⁵²⁴yugapadbhinnadeśasvādhārāvṛttitve saty ekatvaṃ tasya siddhyet, svādhārāntarāle
astitvaṃ sādhyed iti tad evam anekabādhakasadbhāvāt bhāṭṭaprabhākair iṣṭam...

SŚP §16 English

¹⁵¹⁷ i.e. arguing in this way involves accepting the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position of absolute difference between the universal and particular (as the cognition of difference is held to have only the particular as its object while the cognition of identity has the universal as its object). This will not do the Mīmāṃsakas any good as it has already been shown (cf. SŚP 35, 25-39, 17 §§8-26 Vaiśeṣika chapter) that this is not possible because it results in the relation of inherence being impossible, which in turn results in the impossibility of the universal and particular to be related in any way. Thus the statement “this universal is related to those particulars” is impossible if one holds to the absolute difference of universal and particular, parts and whole etc..

¹⁵¹⁸ Amended. Printed ed. reads: ”tathā sarvagataṃ tat sāmānyam”.

¹⁵¹⁹ Amended. Printed ed. reads: ”tatrābhivvyaktatvāt”.

¹⁵²⁰ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “tata eva vyaktisvātmano ‘pi tatrānupalambo ‘stu”.

¹⁵²¹ Amended. printed ed. reads: “tatra tasya sadbhāvād ekapramāṇābhāvād asattvād”. The non-existence of the individual in the intermediate space is already expressed by the *asattvād*. It makes no sense to express it twice. Moreover *eka* seems a bit out of place. Changing *sadbhāvād eka* to *sadbhāvavedaka* thus seems to be a better reading as the phrase *sadbhāvavedakapramāṇābhāvāt* is found in the Jain answer below.

¹⁵²² Amended according to alternate reading supplied by the editor. Printed ed. reads: “viśeṣābhāvād”.

¹⁵²³ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “sadbhāvavedakapramāṇābhāvāt”.

¹⁵²⁴ Amended. Printed ed. reads: “yugapadbhinnadeśa”

Now [it is held that the universals] are in some ways not different [from the particulars]. Then it is [also] proved that the universal is the object of the cognition of the particular, because it is found that the universal, which is in some ways not different from the particulars which are the objects of the cognitions of particulars, is the object of the cognition of particulars just like the particular itself [is the object of the cognition of particulars]. Therefore the universal, existence etc., is certainly not one. Nor is [the universal] without parts, because it is cognized as in some ways having parts, because it is found that [the universal], which is not a separate entity from the particulars which have parts, has parts, like that [particular] itself [has parts].

In the same way the universal is not all-pervasive, because it is not perceived in the intermediate space [between] the individuals. If it is objected: [The universal] is not perceived [in the intermediate space] because it is not manifested there.¹⁵²⁵ [It is answered:] Let the non-perception [of the universal] in that [intermediate space] be like [the non-perception] of the individual itself [in the intermediate space], which is only because of that [its non-existence in the intermediate space].¹⁵²⁶ If it is objected: [the individual] is not perceived [in the intermediate space] because it does not exist in that [intermediate space] on account of there being no valid means of knowledge which makes known its existence [there]. [It is answered:] Let the non-perception of the universal [in the intermediate space] too be because it does not exist [there] on account of the particular not existing there,¹⁵²⁷ because there is no valid means of knowledge that makes known its [universals] existence in the intermediate space [between] the individuals, because it is not experienced through sensory perception, just like the donkey's horn etc. [is not experienced through perception].

For it is not so that one universal [is seen to reside] in [many] individuals [existing] in various places, just as (it is not perceived that) [one piece of] bamboo etc. [resides] in [many] pillars etc., from which, [i.e.] if it did reside in its own substratum which would be [individuals] in various places simultaneously, it would be proved that that [universal] is one and [its] existence in the intermediate space [between] [its] substratums¹⁵²⁸ would be proved. It is thus¹⁵²⁹ because there exist many negations. [The universal] accepted by the followers of Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara...

¹⁵²⁵ i.e. the universal exists in the intermediate space, but is not manifest there as there is no individual for it to manifest in. As it is not manifest it is not perceptible, therefore it is not perceived in the intermediate space.

¹⁵²⁶ i.e. just like the individual is not perceived in the intermediate space because it does not exist there, so the universal is not perceived in the intermediate space because it does not exist there.

¹⁵²⁷ i.e. since the individual does not exist in the intermediate space neither can the universal, because the individual is the substratum of the universal. Cf. SŚP 45, 22 §7 above: *bhede vā svāśrayamātravṛttivavirodhah* | (But if it [for the sake of argument does exist in that place as] separate [from its substratum] there is contradiction with [your own doctrine which states that a universal] resides only in its substratum).

¹⁵²⁸ i.e. the individuals.

¹⁵²⁹ i.e. the universal not being one etc..

[bhadraṃ bhūyāt]
Let there be good!

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